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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the interaction between literati and various social forces 
in east China in the mid-seventeenth century by focusing on their military performance. 
Based on a wide range of sources, the study focuses on about twenty literati, most of 
whom have never been previously researched from a military history perspective. It 
examines the diversity and complexity of Chinese literati as they pursued power over and 
within local society, paying special attention to the interrelation between them (literati 
and society). It argues that Chinese literati in this time period had much less aptitude in 
changing China than has been previously thought. Both individual and group case studies 
show that they mainly focused on the realization of an ideal goal, but were unwilling or 
ill-equipped to adapt themselves to changing conditions' as well as environments. This 
study also indicates that the local military forces as well as ordinary peasants generally 
played a more crucial role than the literati; the latter' s superior position could only be 
realized in times of peace. That civil and military officiaIs affected each other in fact is an 
expression of a larger relationship between the central government and its own military 
forces or with certain local forces. Finally, this study conc1udes that Chinese literati as a 
whole had no idea how to integrate and lead the other social forces to reach an ideal goal 
in that specific time period. 
ii 
Résumé 
Cette dissertation étudie les interactions entre les lettrés et les différentes forces 
sociales présentes dans l'est de la Chine au milieu du dix-septième siècle, en se 
concentrant sur leur activité militaire. Basée sur un large éventail de sources primaire, 
l'étude se concentre sur une vingtaine de lettrés dont la plupart n'ont jamais été étudiés 
auparavant. La thèse étudie particulièrement la relation que les lettrés entretenaient avec 
la société dans leur recherche de pouvoir et de contrôle sur la société locale. Elle soutient 
que les lettrés chinois avaient beaucoup moins d'aptitudes à influencer le destin de la 
Chine que ce qui a cru auparavant. Les études de cas, individuelles et collectives, 
démontrent que dans leur recherche d'un objectif idéal, ils étaient mal-préparés ou 
n'avaient pas la volonté de s'adapter à des conditions et à un environnement changeants. 
À travers une comparaison entre différentes régions, cette étude démontre aussi que les 
forces militaires locales et les paysans ordinaires jouaient un rôle plus crucial et 
important que les lettrés, l'influence des paysans n'étant ressentie que durant les périodes 
de paix. L'influence mutuelle des Wen (civils) et des Wu (militaires) est l'expression 
d'une corrélation plus large entre le gouvernement central et sa propre force militaire ou 
certaines forces locales. Finalement, les lettrés chinois en tant que groupe n'avaient 
aucune idée de la façon d'intégrer et de diriger les autres forces sociales pour atteindre un 
but idéal. 
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Introduction 
1: 1. Why Literati? 
- A Sociohistorical Perspective on the Study of 
Military History in Late Imperial China 
The survival and continuity of Chine se civilization were dependent on many factors 
inc1uding military institutions and practices. 1 However, in practice, Confucian-
Mencian thought has usually been deemed as representative oftraditional Chinese 
culture while Sunzi i%r has been ignored. This tendency is so prevalent that most 
people are unable to distinguish Mencius from Confucius in terms oftheir military 
thought: Confucius pays sorne attention to military affairs while Mencius does not? 
When scholars have engaged in political, economic, social, or cultural historical studies 
of certain periods, they have naturally tended to limit their attention to their own areas 
ofresearch and expertise. For instance, R. Bin Wong emphasizes the distinctively 
broad moral and educational ambitions of the Chinese imperial state. He argues that the 
late imperial Chinese state placed greatest importance on efforts to maintain control 
through extensive commitments to education, morality, and material well-being.3 
However, it is essential that we remember that it was only through war, and especially 
through decisive military campaigns, that various social strata could play a role in 
1 For instance, military factors were deemed as China's contributions to today's world by John K. 
Fairbank. See John K. Fairbank, "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience", in 
Chinese Ways in Waifare, ed. Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1974), 1. 
2 Joseph Needham and Robin D.S.Yates, "Military Technology", in Science and Civilisation in China, 
volume 5, part VI, 30. Chinese version, rp~f4~;f5(VJfj'.§I.:: (Beijing: Kexue and Shanghai: Shanghai 
guji, 2002),72. Alsosee, Han Yude ~.:lim, "Kongzi yujunlü zhishi" ~L-TW.1*z~, Wenshi zhe 
2 (1986), 73. The latest study shows that Kongzi was not only proud of his physical prowess, but also 
his military strategies. See Gao Peihua ~tff~, "Lun Kongzi de junshi caineng" ~~L -TiY>J.~::t~m, 
Guangming ribao, March 2, 2006. 
3 R. Bin Wong, China Transformedo Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca: 
Corne Il University Press, 1997),92-99. 
deciding their fate. Thus, it is not surprising that the new emperors and their c10sest 
colleagues always began as military leaders. 
According to Joanna Waley-Cohen, the neglect ofChinese military history is due 
partly to the relative unpopularity ofmilitary history in the Western academy today and 
partly to the relative lack of prestige that scholars have accorded military affairs in 
China, both in relation to civil affairs and in comparison with the military histories of 
Europe and the United States.4 However, over the last two decades this condition has 
seen graduaI improvement. Both historians in China and Sinologists in the West have 
begun to shed light on the various fields ofChinese military history. Numerous primary 
and secondary materials have been published in Chinese. While research remains weak 
in many areas, historians from both the Mainland and Taiwan have published man y 
books and articles, focusing on general military history as weil as sorne specialized 
topics such as the detailed aspects of a single campaign, the biographies of historical 
figures, military science and technology, c1assical military theory, logistics, 
institutional development and evolution, as weil as, more recently, so-called "strategic 
culture" (zhanlue wenhua "~~:5z:. ft). 5 
In the Western world, severalleading historians have begun to examine this field. 
Among the se, special attention should be paid to Kuhn's milestone book.6 The 
description and analysis that he provides is truly momentous for focusing not only on 
military factors, but also shedding light on aspects of social history, such as local 
organizations and local relations with state power. He identifies the control of local 
4 Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations in Imperial China: Introduction," War and Society 
18.2 (2000), 1-7. 
5 For example, Gong Yuzhen '8.3S.IlfiI!, Zhongguo zhanlue wenhuajiexi r:p~'~~:x1tfWtJT (Beijing: 
Junshi kexue, 2002); Jin Yuguo ~.:E~, Zhongguo zhanshu shi r:p~,~fijtÏ~ (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 
2003). It is impossible to Iist ail the data here because there are at least several hundred papers and 
several dozen books published in Chinese every year. Only the related materials will be cited in this 
dissertation. 
6 Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and ifs Enemies in Late Imperial China - Militarization and Social 
Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
2 
military forces as a key compone nt of local-elite power in late imperial China. 
Unfortunately, the book's significance is weakened by its narrow temporal focus 
(1796-1864) and limited regional coverage, an emphasis on Central and South China. 
Due to these limitations, there is no information on whether or how the gentry faced 
military challenges arising from ethnie conflict, both from the so-called "barbarians" of 
the frontiers and the Westerners from overseas. Furthermore, we are not told how 
militia leadership functioned within a specifie local force- how, for example, this 
leadership was related to the establishment, maintenance, or expansion of local power. 
Most importantly, we only are informed about the military behaviour of the local gentry 
while there is little information on the attitudes and actions of the ordinary people 
toward this kind of militarization. 
Despite these limitations, Kuhn's path-breaking study ofmilitarization served as a 
foundation upon which other scholars have continued to build. In 2000, Hans Van de 
Ven listed more than ten publications as examples.7 Lately, this list has grown even 
longer, and there has been an increase in the breadth of fields being explored. For 
instance, Xue Yu's dissertation has even explored the role ofChinese monks in the 
struggle against Japan.8 
Basically, these works share similar tendencies with the Chinese publications 
mentioned above: they concentrate on a single campaign, military activities of sorne 
historical figures, or the logistics service. However, one aspect that needs to be 
emphasized here is that, from a geographic perspective, the Western studies have 
focused mainly on peripheral areas such as the southwestern and northwestern frontier 
areas.
9 
7 Hans Van de Ven, ed. Warfare in Chinese History, "Introduction," (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2000), 1. 
Colin Robert Green's dissertation entitled The Spirit of the Military (Junren Hun): The Tradition and 
ifs Revival in the Republican Period (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 2003) also 
mentions sorne developments in relevant research. 
8 Yu Xue, Buddhism, War, and Nationalism: Chinese Monks in the Struggle against Japan, 1931-1945. 
Ph. D. diss., The University of Iowa, 2004. 
9 At least more than three dozen books and articles were published since the 1980s conceming these 
aspects. The latest one is Peter G. Perdue's China Marches West: the Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). For southwestem area, the typical 
3 
Most recently, David Robinson IO and Roger V. Des Forges)) have been successful 
in shifting our attention to inland China. Des Forges provides a general survey of 
Henanese history in the Late Ming while Robinson's study examines the role ofillicit 
armed violence in the social order of the late Ming in North China, around Beijing, and 
explores how the central government sought to regulate violence. His study reminds us 
that "specifie patterns of violence must be sought in the particulars oflocal society". 12 
This dissertation belongs to the field ofmilitary history, but is not absolutely 
limited to this scope. Because studies ofvaried fields related to political, economic, 
social, and cultural history have been pursued in great depth over the last several 
de cade s, my first concern is to combine sorne ofthe achievements from the se fields 
with current research developments in military history. My intention is to contribute not 
only to military history studies but also social-economic history more broadly. To reach 
this high standard, the most important prerequisite is how to set the research objective 
as weIl as its background and environment oftime and region. 
1 have chosen to focus on the Ming-Qing transition period. \3 More precisely, the 
period covered in my dissertation is from the Chongzhen reign *ff~ (1628-1644) of 
book is Robert D Jenks's Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou: the "Miao" Rebellion, 
1854-1873 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
10 David Robinson, Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven: Rebellion and the Economy of Violence 
in Mid-Ming China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001). 
Il Roger V. Des Forges, Cultural Centra/ity and Po/itical Change in Chinese History: Northeast 
Henan in the FaU of the Ming (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), xvi-xvii (Preface). 
12 Robinson, 166-67. 
13 Academics in both China and abroad have ascribed different meanings and time criteria to the term 
"Ming-Qing transition," see He Guanbiao's {i'iJmt~ conclusive introduction about this study and the 
concept of so-called "shi dafu ±j(=*" in the first chapter of his book entitled Sheng yu si: Mingji 
shidqfu de jueze ~:WJE, ~~±j(=*B"J~f$ (Taibei: Lianjing, 1997). Also see Lynn Struve, The 
Southern Ming, 1644 -1662 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) "Preface". And also see Chen-
main Wang's book entitled The Life and Career of Hung Ch 'eng- Ch 'ou (J 593-1665) (Ann Arbor: 
Association for Asian Studies, 1999), "Introduction" and the reference cited therein. 
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the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) to the Shunzhi reign 1I~1É3 (1644-1661) of the Qing 
dynasty (1636-1911). These several decades witnessed political upheaval, continuous 
internai and external military activity, peasant rebellion, economic collapse, and 
cultural crisis. In the end, the Qing established itself as the most successful of the 
conquest dynasties ofnon-Chinese origin. Although "the scattered, fragmentary, and 
otherwise highly problematical condition ofthe all-too-voluminous source materials,,14 
have brought many difficulties, studies ofvarious aspects ofthis period have increased 
in number and qua lit y in China and abroad over the past decades. During this period of 
extreme disorder, different regimes and their armies, and varied social forces and strata 
engaged with each other and negotiated their relationships. Therefore, it provides an 
excellent opportunity to undertake a military historical analysis ofvarious events and 
historical figures. Many kinds of military conflict took place- both ethnic conflicts 
and various military actions among the Chinese themselves, such as the wars between 
the Southern Ming government and rebelling peasants (and, of course, the conflicts 
between internai factions ofboth groups); the conflicts between local gentry and the 
Ming or the southern Ming as weil as the Qing governments; and the actions of 
warlords, local military forces, and ordinary people. Ali ofthese enable us to undertake 
a broad analysis of the characteristics of different social forces in times of rapid 
historical change. 
Thus, this analysis ofthe Ming- Qing transition raises important questions about 
larger historiai issues concerning the nature of late imperial Chinese society and 
China's transition to a modem society. During the preparation ofthis dissertation, 
several important issues have come to my attention: 
1. As early as the mid 1980s, Joseph P. McDermott keenly realized that "future 
studies of local society in late imperial China should question the assumption of past 
treatments ofthe gentry as a single class maintaining internai harmony in its concerted 
14 Struve (1984), xiii (preface). 
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control of the countryside.,,15 Thirty years later, scholars still have not taken up this 
challenge. Since most scholars mainly [ocus on social, cultural as weIl as economic 
history studies,16 their publications go even further in the opposite direction. For 
instance, Timothy Brook's admirable research suggests that the state-society 
relationship in late imperial China was undergoing a significant shift, and he 
emphasizes a separation of state and society.17 
Shifting attention to military history enables me to draw a completely different 
conclusion. 
This dissertation will argue that a "public sphere" or "civil society" cannot be 
proven to exist in the most important region of China, and that it is impossible to 
separate society from state during wartime. The local elite had to choose between 
compromise and resistance. Their survival often depended on their choice, not their own 
capacities and forces. No member of the local elite could cope adequately with the 
crises caused by govemment (including both Qing and Ming or the Southem Ming) and 
rebellious peasants or tenants simultaneously. Through the examination and comparison 
of a large number of case studies in Shandong (see Chapter 1), Huaibei (see Chapter 2), 
Jiangnan (see Chapter 3) and Zhejiang (see Chapter 4),1 argue that, by themselves, the 
local gentry were not able to play a crucial role in military affairs in many of these areas. 
ln contrast, it was the other local military units, mainly composed of the lowest social 
strata, who controlled or decided the destiny of local society. Whether or how to 
integrate these local forces thus became the essential problem for those aiming to gain 
political control. 
15 Joseph P.McDermott, "Bondservants in the Taihu Basin du ring the Late Ming: A Case of Mistaken 
Identities," Journal of Asian Studies 40.4 (1981), 692-93. 
16 The relevant studies since the 1990s, in fact, have not yet touched important information related to 
the real relationship between the central government and local society, and the various social forces in 
late imperial China. See Frederic Wakeman, "The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western 
Reflections on Chinese Political Culture," Modern China 19.2 (1993), 108-38. Comparatively, modern 
Chinese military history has achieved certain developments in this aspect, such as Diana Lary's study 
about the soldiers and warlords. See Diana Lary, Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 
1911-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
17 Timothy Brook, Prayingfor Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late- Ming 
China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 311-30. 
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2. From a political perspective, Confucian legitimacy and the so-called hua yi zhi 
bian .~zfflf (distinction between Chinese and barbarian) may have been the two 
most important concepts for Chinese literati. But, wh en they had to choose between 
these two concepts, which one was the primary concem? Their military behaviour will 
show that the literati who had become officiaIs preferred the former, while the 
"non-officialliterati" often preferred the latter. From the northem plain area to the east 
coast region, from the mountainous border to the riverine communities, the varying 
cases studies will show that many literati shifted their most important identities 
according to the changing state of affairs. Apart from the above difference, these two 
sorts of literati also share the same tendency. Yet, for those officialliterati who felt the 
heavy burdens of social and political obligation and joined in resistance movements, 
their decision to value personal integrity or political expediency also meant a choice 
between death or survival. Most ofthem naturally tended to choose the latter (survival). 
For concrete reasons of sorne high ranking Chinese scholar-officials who changed their 
political allegiance, usually they tended to find a way to get rid of the shame of being a 
traitor. In this case, they naturally attributed their surrender to present the best chance 
of serving China and its people in a time of national crisis; their hope was to let the 
others believe that they were motivated "by an overriding concem for the welfare of 
China and its people." Obviously, the other motives such as the desire to survive were 
covered up under the se explanations and emphasis. 18 
3. Civil affairs (Wenshi 3($) and military affairs (Wushi :IT:t$) theoretically 
played an equal role in the imperial central govemment, but what was the real 
relationship between Wen and Wu? Vivid descriptions from primary data remind us 
that in order to examine this relationship we must distinguish between times of peace 
and times ofwar rather than applying an abstract concept of the relationship between 
18 Wang's relevant study only emphasized this aspect while it ignored the latter. See Wang Chen-main, 
244-52. 
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them. Lynn A. Struve has claimed that role changes between Ming scholar-officials 
and military commanders "were unthinkable.,,19 ln fact, this phenomenon did exist. 1 
shall argue that, in practice, Wen and Wu were the means by which the central 
government, local authorities and private military forces negotiated their relationship, 
and, it was military commanders, not civil officiais, who played the crucial role in 
deciding the destiny of local societies. Although it is not often very clear to us today, 
it would appear that warlordism was a frequent phenomenon. 
4. Without paying equal attention to both foreign invasion and internaI rebellions, 
as we mentioned above, the previous local history studies have usually focused on the 
triangular power relationship involving the government, the local elite, and dispersed 
communities of commoners. From the the local elite's perspective, this kind of research 
has meant that it is unclear how they handled the simultaneous pressure of both the 
government from the top and the people from the bottom, and, from foreigners. Kuhn's 
book focuses on peasant rebellion and Wakeman's first book looks primarily at the 
foreigner invasion,20 but neither deals adequately with the question ofhow local eHtes 
responded to these challenges. This study will show that most literati and local elite as 
weIl as ordinary people always kept as their primary concern their survival during the 
crisis. Whether or not the resistance movement would occur and its scale if it did were 
entirely dependent on the management and control of the various levels of government, 
as weIl as the attitude and actions of the common people. 
Each ofthese four issues will be developed more fully over the course ofmy 
dissertation. 
19 Lynn A.Struve, The Southern Ming 1644-1662 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1984),6. 
20 Frederic Jr. Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966). 
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The broad sc ope ofthis study of the Ming-Qing transition means that a reliance 
on previous research has been essential.21 In addition to the abundance of data in 
Chinese (see below), Wakeman's two volumes not only vividly recapture the sweep of 
this period but also offer a penetrating analysis.22 Struve's book focuses on native 
Chinese resistance to the Manchu invasion and helps us to understand why and how 
the resistance failed as a whole.23 
To engage in this sort of broad exploration, it is important to find a way that will 
bring together the various factors that were involved in military and social history, as 
weIl as sorne knowledge of political history concerning this complicated period. In this 
dissertation, the literati, and specifically their military actions and role in the process of 
war, will be the primary concern. There is no need to reiterate the importance of Iiterati 
(wenren -;cAi4 in pre-modern Chinese society. The official examination system 
provides a clear criterion to define the concept of literati- they were the holders of 
official degrees conferred by the imperial government, ideally by virtue oftheir having 
passed examinations in the Confucian classics. The sale of examination degrees did not 
21 Neither the Ming nor Qing should be treated as a whole in terms of military history. During the 
entire Ming dynasty, there were a total of 579 different wars. In addition to the threats from the 
northern border, there was the plundering of and conflicts with Japanese pirates, and peasant rebellions. 
ln addition to the traditional "cold weapons," modern European firearms such as cannons also began to 
demonstrate their decisive"power on the battlefield. Both attack and defence technology reached a high 
level of accomplishment. Furthermore, as mentioned below, many relevant military research papers and 
books have been published, especially on late Ming times. See Fan Zhongyi îliHr:p~, "Ming dai junshi 
sixiangjianlun" 13)j{~.$J~;mM~1fâ, Lishiyanjiu 5 (1996), 91-104. 
22 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in 
Seventeenth - Century China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985). 
23 For example, she keenly indicates that "in the Southern Ming effective statesmanship and 
generalship seldom appeared in the same men, and statesmen and generals sel dom were in accord." See 
Struve (1984),194. 
24 1 am in basic agreement with Benjamin A. Elman's concept of the literati, Le., those members of the 
Chinese gentry who, through a demonstration oftheir literary qualifications in the civil service 
examinations, maintained their status as Confucians (ru f~) in the elite class of imperial China. See 
"Explanatory Notes" in his book entitled C/assicism, Polities, and Kinship: the Changzhou Schoo/ of 
New Text Confueianism in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). In this 
dissertation, "literati" refers to Han Chinese who received the higher degrees (juren ~A. andjinshi 
~±) on the civil service examinations. In Chinese these are referred to as wen ren ?XA., and must be 
distinguished from the so-called shiren ±A. which refers to ail degree holders. In Qing times, the latter 
term most often referred to the shengyuan ~~ degree holder. Also see Chen Baoliang 1iJI! • .f!., "Ming 
dai shengyuan xinlun" 13)j{~~~lfJT~1fâ, Shixuejikan 3 (2001), 38- 43. 
9 
become common until the end of Qing. On the basis of their degrees they were given 
the power to become high level officiais managing and controlling aIl of imperial China. 
Literati should not be confused with the "gentry" and "elite." However, we should keep 
in mind that the non-officialliterati usually belonged within the scope of the gentry 
Unlike their English counterparts, the Chinese gentry had no military power; they 
also had no direct control over the peasants. This status has been described as "having 
empty fists" ($-=f.~~). NaturaIly, academics over the past decades have focused on 
their cultural, ideological, political, or even economic and daily lives.26 Facing the 
limitations in the field of military and political affairs, as mentioned above, in times of 
extreme turmoil the gentry were forced to find their own ways to engage in defense 
actions, ifthey did not want to be turncoats or remain silent, and ifthey wanted to stay 
alive. At the same time, because of the degrees they held and their connections with the 
various levels of authority as weIl as with the common people, whatever the y did, their 
behavior was undoubtedly related in complex ways to social structure, military 
personnel such as military officiais and soldiers, and to the ongoing processes of the 
25 In the past decades, studies of "gentry" and "local elite" have comprised one of the greatest 
developments in the research of Chinese social history. Early work on their definition was done by Ho 
Ping- ti in his book entitled The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 
1368-1911 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). For the entire process ofresearch, see 
Timothy Brook, "The Historiography of Gentry Studies" in Prayingfor Power: Buddhism and the 
Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
5-15. Also see Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin, eds., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of 
Dominance (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1990), "Introduction" and "Concluding 
Remarks". And, Ch'u Tungtsu's -M/qjWùl book entitled Local Government in China under the Qing 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 169-72. His book not only provides the definition 
of gentry, but also argues that a distinction existed between gentry and literati. 
Japanese scholars have also made a great contribution to this field. See Linda Grove and Christian 
Daniels, eds. State and Society in China: Japanese Perspectives on Ming-Qing Social and Economie 
History (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984). See also Liu Junwen ~H3f:3t ed., Riben xuezhe 
yanjiu Zhongguoshi lunzhu xuanyi B::<$:~1lfliffJi:$rma~~Üâ=j=~~~ (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1993), vol.2. 
Especially, Shigeta Atsushi's meH~ paper entitled "Zhongguo shehui gouzao de tezhi yu shidafu 
wenti" $rmaWd:.~1*~!3~!f,fjlf!M±*:1çi3-9F",~~ and "Xiangshen zhipei de chengli yu jiegou" ~M$5t 
lfc!i3-9fflG:îI!M*51*, 199-247, as weil as Danjo Hiroshi ;fiL 'J[, "Ming Qing xiangshen lun" I3Jjm~B*,$ 
~Üâ, 453-83. 
26 On this aspect, see Timothy Brook, The Corifusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
10 
war. Therefore, an examination oftheir military actions can serve as a shortcut to an 
exploration ofhow the various military forces and society affected each other. It is for 
these reasons that 1 consider why and how the literati organized and joined military 
action in the Ming-Qing transition period in this dissertation. 
1: 2. The Nature of the Literati during the Ming-Qing Transition Period 
While theoreticaIly open to aIl, the civil service competition in fact excluded most of 
the population. Based on Elman, during the last empire only 1.6 to 1.9 percent of the 
total population achieved literati status by obtaining examination degrees?7 The 
shengyuan ~~ degree was roughly proportional to the population of each county. 
Those who received this degree were technically only "govemment students," and 
therefore not qualified for official appointment. It was the provincialjuren ~À degree 
which qualified one for official position. The quotas for this degree were province-wide, 
but certainly not evenly distributed across the province. There was a wide gulf between 
the juren/jinshi degrees and the shengyuan, both in terms of access to office and in 
prestige. This is why Ho Ping-ti eliminated holders of the shengyuan degree from the 
ranks of the elite.28 For the same reason, this dissertation does not coyer the shengyuan 
holders. 
27 Benjamin A. Elman, "The Social Roles of Literati in Early to Mid-Ch'ing", in The Ch'ing Empire to 
1800, part one. Denis Twitchett and John K.Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History o/China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), vol. 9, 362. 
Military examinations (wuju ftt*) need to be mentioned here. Elman's book touches brietly on 
the subject, but only in relation to the Qing. "At various times, military examinations were offered on 
the analogy of the civil ones, the subjects ofwhich were the military cIassics combined with tests of 
strength, horsemanship, archery, and so on." See Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History o/Civil 
Examinations in Late Imperial China (University of California Press, 2000), 222. According to Xu 
Yougen ~lf:6z:f.lt over the course of the Ming dynasty, there were several thousand military jinshi and 
juren. Most ofthese could only filllower military positions. The Chongzhen Emperor once personally 
appointed a military zhuangyuan AA5ë, but only nominated him as vice-regional commander Il1U~9;.. 
From about 1640 to the end of the Ming dynasty, almost nobody registered for this examination. See 
Xu Yougen, Wuju zhidu shilue ftt*fljUli~1II& (Suzhou: Shuzhou daxue, 1997), 60. 
28 Ho, chapter 1. 
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According to Gu Yanwu Il~~ (1613-1682), in late Ming times the total 
number of shengyuan had reached 500,00029, about a 17-fold increase over the early 
Ming. Only about 3.3% ofthe shengyuan moved on to obtain ajuren degree.30 The 
termjuren means an "established man" or "elevated man." It indicates that its 
recipient was established both academically and officially; whether or not he was 
rewarded with an immediate office is immaterial. 
The fOllowing data provide a picture of the condition ofjuren in Shandong 
province entering the seventeenth century:31 
Year 
1600 
1624 
1642 
(Figure 1) 
No.ofjuren 
76 
87 
90 
Becoming officiais 
No. % 
25 
15 
17 
33 
17 
19 
Becomingjinshi 
No. % 
33 43 
33 38 
41 46 
Since the bureaucracy was, in fact, quite small in size in relation to the overall 
population as weil as ail those literati, there were fewer posts available than there were 
degree-holders qualified to fill them. Those who could not get the chance or did not 
want to become officiaIs could live as local gentry. During the mid-Ming, a powerful 
movement for intellectual emancipation was inaugurated by the statesman and general 
Wang Yangming .::EIWîS)j (1472-1529). Wang's emphasis on intuitive knowledge and 
the unit y ofknowledge and conduct encouraged people ta engage in whatever they 
29 Gu Yanwu, Tinglin wenji ;!5q*3t~, juan 1, in XXSKQS 1402,77. 
30 Liu Xiaodong ~J~*, "Keju weiji yu wan Ming shiren de fenhua" f4~fê;~WB$fl~±Âfd:W!6"J:5t 
1t, Shandong daxue xuebao 2 (2002), 103-08. 
31 From Elman (2000), 666. 
12 
liked, instead of single-mindedly pursuing an official position. Because the core of his 
philosophy was the beliefthat intuitive knowledge was latent in every man, the 
implication was that everybody had the potential to achieve enlightenment and reach 
sagehood. With this kind of knowledge, this theory attracted many literati from the 
early period of the sixteenth century. With the addition of opportunities brought by 
economic and commercial development, the literati gradually enhanced their capacities 
for pursuing various activities other than focusing on the civil examinations. This shi ft 
enabled many literati to play an increasingly active role in local society, undertaking 
duties related to charity, road and bridge building, etc. However, sorne also played a 
negative role through their interference in local affairs, or illegal activities. In the early 
period of the Wanli ;i;M reign (1573-1619), the emperor criticized the behavior of 
these corrupt literati (±) and ordered that they be punished harshly for their frequent 
breaking of the law.32 
Despite these exceptions, the primary con cern for most degree holders was 
attaining an official position. Due to the Iimited number of positions available, many 
were forced to find other ways to fulfill their dreams. When Li Zicheng' s * El mG 
(1606-1645) peasant armies entered Shandong Province, at least twelvejinshi and jure n, 
mostly from Shanxi UJiZ§,joined and helped these troops establish their own local 
governments.33 Importantly, those who had already become officiais found that 
realizing their own ideals or following Wang Yangming's theories was far from simple: 
since the economic and political resources derived from the authority of the Ming 
dynasty, and ultimately the emperor, they had no choice but to offer their obedience.34 
32 Li Guoxiang *mt~ ed., Ming shilu leizuan aJl.jf/<~iï -Anhui shiliao juan ~M~;j8j.~ (Wuhan: 
Wuhan, 1994), 1062. 
33 See Li Jixian *~'!i, "Li Zicheng qiyijun zai Shandong" * EinlGiI1\ftJ:ll:frW*, in Zhongguo 
nongmin zhanzhengshi luncong bianji weiyuanhui ed. Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhenshi luncong rpmM 
~'J~~~fl (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1982),4: 514-19. 
34 A vivid and complete description of the behavior of officiaIs can be found in R. Huang's book. See 
Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981), especially chapter four, "A World without Zhang Juzheng," 75-103. Although 
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Wu Han ~Bf5 (1919-1969) used four characters to summarize the lives of many 
officials:jiao ,., she ~,yin y~, and yi ~ (lordly, luxury-loving, loose-living, and 
idle).35 The most famous political phenomenon in the late Ming period was the 
development of and contlicts caused by cliques among officiaIs. For instance, the 
friction between the Donglin *if* and Zhedang #JT. factions was one of the major 
causes of the loss of the Sarhu llI'mmf campaign (in April 1619). This decisive battle 
with the Manchus was lost largely because the Zhedang faction controlled the court, 
and, they did not pay enough attention to the powerful Manchu military machine.36 We 
will see this kind of political struggle sometimes directly cause the failure of anti-Qing 
resistance movement. 
Establishing the legitimacy of government, in effect, the government that would 
ensure the maintenance oftheir status, was al ways a primary concern. For example, 
his study concentrates on the highest officiais of the empire, the middle and lower level officiais 
basically followed the same mode!. 
3S Wu Han~~, "Wan Ming shihuanjieji de shenghuo" ilSÉaJJ{±'@:IY'~*&B"J~m, in Li Hua*~~ihnd Su 
Shuangbi ifi!!~ ed., Wu Han shilunji ~~~~ifQ~ (Beijing: Guanming ribaoshe, 1987),214-22. John 
Thomas Meskill also provides sorne detaited sources concerning of Jiangnan gentry's daity lives. See 
Meskill, Gentlemanly /nterests and Wealth -in the Yangzi Delta (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian 
Studies, 1994), 175-78. Aiso see Timothy Brook, 1998. 
Accompanying the emergence and expansion ofwealthy classes, there was a stratification of the 
gentry in late Ming times. It was no longer accurate to imagine a unified gentry with hegemony over a 
locale's affairs. The Confucian order of gentry, peasants, artisans, and merchants was divorced from 
social reality. In order to improve or maintain their local position, the gentry had to rely on land 
acquisition, marriage, commerce, and other strategies. Relevant studies are too numerous to list here, 
but for a concise description and analysis, see Yu Yingshi #,;~~, "Ming Qing zhuanbian shiqi shehui 
yu wenhua de zhuanbian" fjijm~~~Wljji±frW3t1tB"J"~, in Zhongguo Iishi zhuanxing shiqi de 
zhishifenzi r:p[ilM~"ml~WlB"J~D~{5lT (Taiwan: Lianjing, 1992),35-42. 
36 Ma Chujian f.&~~, Ming Qing bianzheng yu zhiluan aJJm~iBl:Wyél~L (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 
1994), 167. Aiso also Ray Huang, "The Liao -tung Campaign of 1619," Oriens Extremus 28 (1981): 
30-54. For studies of the Donglin clique, see Charles O. Hucker, "The Tung-Iin Movement of the Late 
Ming Period," in J.K. Fairbank, ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1957), 132-62. See also Wang Tianyu .:E7(~, Wan Ming Donglin dang yi ilSÉaJJ*;f,H.~ 
(Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1991). 
Among these studies, Hucker's study provides interesting data about military officiais who became 
engaged in the Donglin's political struggle: among 32 military officiais, only one identified and 
belonged to Donglin, the other 31 belonged to the opposite side. We will discuss this ph en orne non in 
Chapter Four. 
The most recent western study of the Donglin party is John Dardess, Blood and History in China: 
The Donglin Faction and its Repression, /620-/627 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002). 
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Ray Huang indicated that those silk-robed officiaIs in the capital only cared about the 
matter of succession in comparison with crises at the frontiers as weIl as peasant 
rebellions?7 
The common gentry discussed above, as weIl as the ordinary people, were 
accustomed to their peaceful daily lives in the late Ming. In the Jiangnan area, neither 
peasant rebellions nor the Manchu invasion could disturb the camival atmosphere. 
According to one description, literati and other local elite, as weIl as the ordinary 
people in Fengqiao .m, Suzhou fii*1'l'Ilooked "crazy." In Wujiang ~Œ city, people 
held their camival despite knowing of the faIl of Beijing in the early summer of 1644, 
and they provided beautiful decorations that had never been seen before.38 
Charles O. Hucker indicates that the literati as a whole in the late Ming did not pay 
enough attention to social, economic, and military affairs.39 However, the latest studies 
showed that the Ming literati graduaIly began to pay attention to military affairs and 
martial arts.40 These studies are basicaIly derived from the fact that many 
comprehensive military manuals were produced after the mid-Ming.41 According to 
them, these publications "gave descriptions and illustrations ofweapons, wall s, ships, 
37 R. Huang (1981), 86. 
38 Wu Han, 336-37. 
39 Hucker (1957). 
40 For example, Xiang Yannan lÔJ~m, "Ming dai bianfang shidi de boxing" aA{-tjfllJj~tiQli9~., 
Beijing shifan daxue xuebao 1 (2000), 127-43. See also Chen Baoliang IltW~, "Wan Ming de 
shangwu jingsheng" II$M~a':Jf;1ITlitmt$, Mingshi yanjiu 1 (1991), 248-59. Another detailed analysis is 
by Lin Kunhui t*t$~, "Ming dai bingxue changxing de Iishi kaocha" aA{-t~~~fY'Ia"J!ïl92.~~, 
Ming shi yanjiu zhuankan 13 (2002), 73-107. 
41 Xu Baolin ~lf1:~t* provided further detailed information about these publications. Xu's conclusion 
raised two important questions: most of the Ming military publications emphasized defense, not 
attack; they concentrated on the practical factors su ch as training, technical equipment including both 
"cold" weapons and tire arms while ignoring the exploration 0 ftheory. See Xu Baolin, Zhongguo 
bingshu tong/an t:p~~~~~ (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 2002), 59. 
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tactical formations, and the like, along with instructions on how to organize and lead an 
army, ail explained with the help of more recent historical examples.,,42 
Although we cannot, on the basis ofthis evidence, conclude that the literati as a 
who le had already engaged in or was interested in writing something about military 
affairs, and there is no reason to believe that the general tendency for literati to ignore 
military affairs had changed dramatically since that time, these phenomena did exist. In 
addition to the fact of the rapid increase in literati and limited number of available 
official posts which forced many to shift their interests to other careers, there is another 
factor that should be emphasized: the above shift coincided with economic and 
commercial development. These developments stimulated fundamental changes in the 
Chinese society and also brought cultural prosperity, i.e., literature, arts, the building 
and decoration of gardens, food and drinking culture, and, of course, more and more 
publications concerning military affairs.43 
With these conditions, it should not surprise us that there were many new types of 
publications. And, in fact, the novelty spread beyond writing to a new ideal: the pursuit 
of Wen Wu quan cai 3t:IT:t~=t (good at both civil and military affairs) became the 
goal for most literati, although wu remained subordinate and only a very few people 
would have met this goal. During the Ming, especially the late Ming, sorne concepts 
such as xia 1~ (knight errant) were accepted among both highly educated literati and 
illiterate farm boys, among influential statesmen and rebel leaders. As Robinson has 
indicated, " .. .it is abundantly clear that many young elite males were fascinated by 
42 Dreyer, Il. 
43 Wakeman quotes from some writings by Fang Yizhi and Gu Yanwu and describes their activities as 
follows: "The ideal man of culture in the late Ming was skiIIful in lyric poetry, metrics, prose writing, 
songs, music, calligraphy, painting, stone engraving, dice playing, staging theatricals, telling stories, 
playing the flute and drums, as so forth." See Wakeman, 1985, vol. 1, 644-45. Xia Xiancun's !i)l31Zif 
book entitled Wan Ming shifeng yu wenxue B$tlaJl±m.w:x~ (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1994) 
also provided more detailed information about these aspects. 
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martial arts, assiduously practicing swordplay and enthusiastically discussing military 
strategy and famous battles.,,44 
Xu Guangqi 1~*.@: (1562- 1633) may be deemed an ideal representative oflate 
Ming Iiterati. He served as Grand Secretary of the empire, led an astronomical reform, 
translated Western scientific books, renovated the army, compiled an important 
treatise on agriculture, and was a Christian convert. Moreover, he aiso introduced a 
series of innovations to traditional Chinese society: new mathematics (Euclid' s 
Elements), new astronomical knowledge, a new religion, new military technology and 
- though less conspicuously so - agricultural experiments. He even planned to go to 
Macau to hire "foreign soldiers" (yangbing ~~) in order to expel the Manchu 
invaders.45 However, beyond these plans we have no idea what concrete military 
actions he would have taken because he died before the fall of Beijing and Jiangnan, 
his hometown, present-day Shanghai. However, his colleagues and fellow townsmen 
will help us to understand how many Iiterati performed on the battlefield. 
White Xu Guangqi had a wide range of interests and expertise, there was Iittle 
guarantee that other Ming Iiterati who passed the examinations would have similarly 
broad competence. The path through the examination system was mainly determined by 
a candidate's ability to compose the eight-Iegged style essays with quotations from the 
Four Books and Five Classics [gW1L*~ that were expected in the first session of the 
examinations. In reality, these essays became a "useless form of empty words.,,46 After 
they were appointed as officiais, they had to learn many things from the beginning. 
Except for the very beginning and end of the Ming dynasty, the status of civil 
officiais was always above that of military commanders. As Huang puts it, "the 
44 Robinson, 171. 
4S Catherine Jami et al., Statecraft and Intellectual Renewal in Late Ming China: The Cross-Cultural 
Synthesis ofXu Guangqi (1562-1633) (Brill, 2001),1. Also see Wang Chongmin .:Em~ ed., Xu 
Guangqiji 1*7\:;~~ (Taibei: Mingwen, 1986), 15-16. 
46 Elman (2000), 218-19. 
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dynasty's Civil Service had gained maturity roughly within the hundred years from the 
mid-fifteenth century to the mid-sixteenth century. During the same period, the prestige 
of army officers had sunk to the lowest level.,,47 
In most cases, civil officiais had no expertise or even basic knowledge of military 
affairs. Unfortunately, the Ming armies they controlled and managed had already 
reached their nadir by late Ming times. Scholars have extensively described and 
analyzed the military weakness that lay behind the failure of the Ming dynasty. For 
example, Ray Huang's series of books and articles, Frederic Wakeman Jr.'s work on 
the Manchu's "great enterprise," and so on. It would be too long to acknowledge ail 
these relevant studies, and, at least both Huang and Wakeman's studies mentioned 
above have already provided us detailed analysis, there is no need to reiterate those 
factors concerning how and why the Ming army and its Wei Suo ~ÎpJT system declined 
and deteriorated.48 Moreover, this is why we do not need to mention the se sorts of 
information when we discuss the certain areas later on in this dissertation. Suffice it to 
say that the Ming dynasty and its higher level civil officiais were unable to deal 
effectively with a military crisis. 
Charles O. Hucker used a case study to provide vivid description of the means used 
by a provincial commander to suppress marauders on the seacoast south ofthe Yangzi 
delta in 1556. The Supreme Commander Hu Zongxian i!ïJ3*Jfi (?- 1565), a "political 
general," was in charge in Zhejiang that year. Having few resources to count upon, he 
used " ... imperial prestige, off ers of pardon, patronizing friendship, subornation of 
colleagues, poisoned wine, moral princip les, false intelligence, procrastination, 
beautiful women, solemn and fair promises, bribery, banquets, threats, intimidation, lies, 
cajolery, assassination, and deployment oftroops to undo his opponents. It is a 
masterpiece of dirty work far beyond the unsophisticated capacity of a mere military 
47 R. Huang (1981), 158. 
48 R. Huang (1970), 39- 62; (1981),160- 61. 
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man, and shows why warfare in this particular Chinese style deserves more serious 
study." He observes that both Hu and his subordinate commanders demonstrated a high 
degree of tlexibility in meeting the shifts of circumstance; they showed responsibility, 
initiative, and caution ail at once.49 
Hu is known to history as a capable and ruthless official. Obviously, not everybody 
was as smart or lucky as him. What Chinese literati faced in the 1640s was not merely 
small bands of pirates on the coast. The coming of the Manchus was accompanied by a 
powerful military machine including cavalry, effective bureaucracies (because they 
adopted and copied sorne Chinese ways) and also a certain pretence of legitimacy such 
as fighting aga in st Li Zicheng. In addition to the Manchus, the peasants in the north and 
central plain area were also creating big problems. There was no clear course of action 
for literati in the face of these concurrent threats. 
One prerequisite for analyzing the choices made by literati is to div ide the literati 
into two groups: officialliterati and non-officialliterati. Being official, those literati 
tended to be tumcoats. In the contlict between their dut y as officiaIs of the state and 
their private interests, it was almost inevitable that the latter would win out. The higher 
their rank, the greater their tendency to protect their dignity; the richer their property, 
the less they desired to change the status quo. As we will see, only a tiny minority of 
officiaIs refused offers from the Qing govemment. According to the Chinese 
bureaucratic tradition, officiaIs could not be on duty in their hometowns. The primary 
concem ofthis policy was to maintain administrative effectiveness, but its unintended 
consequence was that officiaIs lacked the main motive for organizing the defenses of 
the places they served. This is one reason why so many Ming officiaIs left positions 
without hesitation when the Manchu army or rebels arrived. 
The resistance movements of many cities, such as Jiangyin Œ~ in Jiangnan area 
we will mention later on, were led by officiaIs who had retumed from other areas. Shi 
Kefa's ~"j:jn* (1601-1645) original dut y also was not at Yangzhou m'l'I'I. What we 
49 In John K. Fairbank, 23; also see Merrilyn Fitzpatrick, "Local Interests and the Anti-Pirate 
Administration in China's South-east 1555-1565," in Ch 'ing- shi wen-t 'i, 4. 2 (1979), 1-50. 
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should bear in mind is that if an official retumed to his hometown after retirement, he 
was usually deemed as a member ofnon- officialliterati. 
Measures implemented by the Qing took advantage ofthe tendency of the official 
literati to behave in the way noted above. After taking Beijing, the Qing understood that 
China could not be ruled from horseback. It tried to get the cooperation and 
understanding of aIl social strata. For example, they arranged the funeral of the 
Chongzhen emperor in order to gamer sympathy; they used and promoted former Ming 
officiaIs; and they remitted taxes to attract the ordinary people. AIl the measures they 
adopted enabled different levels ofChinese officiaIs to simply find a way to survive 
themselves while keeping a certain dignity. During the govemment's transition period 
in China, aside from staying alive, the primary concem was always maintaining 
legitimacy, the so-called Dao (way).50 
EssentiaIly, what the Chinese officialliterati identified with was authority itself. 
Being officiaIs always enjoyed huge advantages in comparison with those common 
people as weIl as the others. Yet, to ho Id and keep this authority naturally became their 
primary concem, regardless ofwhere it came from. The case of Tongcheng */IlJ~ 
County (in present-day Anhui) provides us with a vivid picture ofhow they put local or 
family interests and the maintenance oftheir positions and prestige above the abstract 
notion of loyalty to a fallen dynasty or to a few outward symbols of Chinese cultural 
identity. Since the new regime tried to refrain from sweeping attempts to alter the local 
status quo and to maintain through the examination system the same channels of social 
advancement as had the Ming, these so called elite decided to accept the Qing without 
too much heart-searching.51 
Wakeman uses the performance of Han officiais during the pacification of Wu 
Sangui's ~=fi (1612-1678) rebellion to demonstrate that Chinese literati readily 
50 Needham and Yates, 46-49. 
51 Hilary J. Beattie, "The Alternative to Resistance: The Case ofT'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei," in Jonathan 
D. Spence and John E. Wills. Jr., eds., From Ming to Ch 'ing, Conquest, Region, and Continunity in 
Seventeenth-Century China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979),269-70. 
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shifted their loyalties- after only a little more than a decade, they were already loyal to 
the Qing.52 This thesis will show that many Chinese officiaIs required only several 
ho urs to make such a big decision between loyalty and treachery. 
However, a form of ethnie identity did exist. In the process of dynastie transition, 
the distinction between Chinese and barbarian (hua yi zhi bian) also played a crucial 
role. When official literati became involved in an alien government, they chose either 
to ignore this aspect or to find another pretence for their shifting loyalties- the existence 
of so-called "virtue" (de f!), another even more abstract concept. According to this 
concept, any people of good virtue could govern the world, regardless oftheir ethnie 
background. 
The performance of non-official literati is another story. Except for those few 
literati who really cared little about changes in the political environment, most of the se 
literati were deeply concerned about hua yi zhi bian. Huang Zongxi ~*. (1610-95) 
can serve as an example. He said: 
Even the bandits and thieves may manage China, because they still belong to 
Chinese.53 
According to Huang, if barbarians controlled the empire, Chinese people would not 
only lose legitimacy, but also the moral basis for social order represented by Sangang 
wuchang _=JIl4J.lim'.54 The whole process of the literati's resistance movement will 
show us that the se non-officialliterati, numbering far more than the officiaIs, played a 
52 Wakeman, "Romantics, Stories, and Martyrs in the Seventeenth - Century China," Journal of Asian 
Studies, 18.4 (1984),647-56. 
53 Quoted from Li Mingyou ~aJl:tz, Yiben wanshu- Huang Zongxi de zhexue yu zhexue shiguan -7.f;: 
~7?K-Ji*.a"J!i"*W!i"*~1l (Beijing: Renmin, 1994),266. 
54 The Three Mainstays are: the relationship ofruler/minister, parentlchild, and husband/wife; the Five 
Moral Relations are as follows: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity. 
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much more important role in the resistance movement. One thing we should mention at 
the outset is that these people did not have the leeway enjoyed by officials- resisting the 
invasion also meant protecting their homes and property. Based on Chen Zilong's ~T 
ff~ (1608-1647) observation, it is impossible to expect officiaIs to join the defense of 
the communities in which they served because they were lacking a sense of 
responsibility.55 That is, there were dual motives for resistance. One arose from 
abstract concerns such as legitimacy, ideals, and the conflict between Chinese and 
non-Chinese. The other was linked to the practical benefits to be gained by resistance. 
Only after realizing that the Qing would bring them peacefullives were most of the se 
literati willing to withdraw from the resistance, or, to go further and cooperate with 
Qing. 
There was little hope that the literati' s resistance would be successful. Realizing 
the inevitability of their fate, sorne ofthem committed suicide in order to sacrifice their 
lives for the empire (xunguo ~~). This often occurred after the loss of a battle or even 
before a war took place. During wartime, loyalty (zhong J~') and filial piety (xiao ~) 
were two difficult choices that cou Id not be avoided, and nobody could make an easy 
decision.56 This is also one ofthe reasons for later divisions among the resistance 
camp. 
What was the situation faced by those who intended to launch or join the resistance 
movement? First, it was impossible for them to be an ordinary soldier on the battlefield. 
They could join an army as an advisor, staff officer, coordinator, or liaison between the 
various forces. Alternatively, they could take on responsibility for sorne specifie matter 
such as financial accounts. However, this dissertation will focus primarily on those who 
served as military commanders. 
55 Chen Zilong, "Laiyang Libu Songgong xunjie jishi" ~1lJj;!--g~*0)ilyft'i*c.$, Anyatang gao 3i.'ft 
1i!:1f.Ij,juan 8, in XXSKQS 1388,21. 
56 For detailed information conceming their loyalty and filial piety, see He Kuanbiao, 40-44. 
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Skillful military commanders are often graced with innate abilities or genius. 
Classical military theorists in both China and the West such as Sunzi, Machiavelli, 
Clausewitz, and Jomini articulated similar principles important for understanding the 
role of the military leader: temperament, battle environment, the intuition of the leader, 
and so on.57 Of course, it is unrealistic to expect that these literati would be effective in 
aIl these capacities. It was necessary that they be able to mobilize the masses and 
organize their own troops to bec orne real commanders. The question is how was this to 
be done? Why would the masses follow them? What was the relationship between local 
military forces and the Ming and Southem Ming's regular armies? If the literati's 
military forces are seen as one side of a quadrangle, how do they connect with and 
affect the other three sides - the Ming or the Southem Ming, Manchu-Qing, and the 
local rebel forces composed primarily of peasants? The answers to and issues 
surrounding these questions will be at the core ofthis dissertation. 
Based on European history, Clausewitz indicated that, before the nineteenth 
century, war was only an affair for the govemment. In Chinese military history, apart 
from sorne mercenary armies, it is also very hard to find cases to certify that war could 
gain popular support, although Sunzi's theory is particularly sensitive to the problem of 
losing popular support in prolonged wars.58 
Theoretically, mobilizing the masses, and especially the peasants in China, was not 
very difficult because they were not bound to the soil- they were neither serfs nor slaves. 
They cou Id change to other occupations and manage their own affairs ifthey wanted to. 
But in reality they belonged to a static class with little opportunity for upward social 
mobility. For example, they had neither the necessary capital nor expertise to become 
merchants. In a chapter entitled "The Masses," Des Forges shows us the various 
attitudes of the outlaws towards the officiaIs, the elite, and the masses in Henan during 
the 1640s. Because ofhunger and the ravages of the plague, most of the masses in 
57 Michael 1. Handel, Masters ofWar: Classieal Strategie Thought (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2001),255-72. 
58 Handel, 119. 
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northeast Henan were mobilized to join the rebellion, " ... sorne of the masses may have 
taken refuge in pockets ofrelative peace in the countryside, towns, and cities ofthe 
region. Others may have simply disappeared through death or flight. Whereas the 
majority spoke with their bodies and voted with their feet by rising in revolts, a 
minority- of farmers, workers, women, and servants- may have remained silent because 
their conditions were better, or worse."S9 
The rebels' mobilization measures should be differentiated from those of the 
literati. For example, the literati could not simply copy the way which was used by 
those rebels such as "killing the wealthy and aiding the poor." However, it was also 
possible for literati to find their own ways to mobilize the masses. The early 
seventeenth century suffered from a "general crisis": climatic cooling that reduced 
agricultural yields, revenue shortfalls, political strife, social disruptions, economic 
dislocations, monetary instability, and epidemic disease were aIl rampant.60 Cao Shuji 
1fW~ indicates that in addition to the extreme drought, North China also suffered 
from the plague during this period. Within one year (1643-1644), Beijing's population 
was reduced by 40%. When the Manchu invasion occurred, the Ming dynasty in fact 
already had little available manpower.61 
Based on the se conditions, feeding the people actually became the most important 
factor for mobilization. However, this aspect was not fully understood until the 1940s 
by Mao Zedong ::§~* (1893-1976).62 For the literati of the Ming-Qing transition it 
was already too late. 
59 Des Forges, 198-203. 
60 Lynn A. Struve, ed.: trans., Voices Jrom the Ming-Qing Cataclysm - China in Tiger 's Jaws (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993),2. Also see S.A.M.Adshead, "The Seventeenth Century General 
Crisis in China," Asian Profile 1.2 (1973), 271-80. 
61 http://www .xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/history/ancientlming_ miewang.txt, 9/1/01. 
62 Zhang Yimin ~:tit~, "Ershi niandaihou de Zhongguo zhengzhi Iiliang zhi zhenghe" = +1f.{~1&B"J 
q:t~jBatl1.Jj!z~~, Nanjing daxue xuebao 2 (1992), 148-55, 180. 
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There were also problems when literati managed to engage in military actions 
against the Qing. This participation, asWakeman puts it, "exposed members ofthe 
gentry to certain kinds ofpolitical and moral compromise, inasmuch as loyalists 
resisted central authority, they were easily confused with rebels. At the same time, they 
attracted the very kinds of disorderly elements into their ranks that members of the 
gentry most feared. Time and again, loyalist literati found themselves in the midst of a 
band of men whose social values they hardly shared, and whose choice of means they 
could not condone.,,63 
Since most of the literati chose surrender or silence, and few ofthem went so far as 
to commit suicide, we should keep in mind that there are only a few people who can be 
included in the research scope ofthis dissertation. However, it is their lives which help 
us understand why and how the Chinese literati were always unable to affect China's 
destiny- they only deserved to survive as literati. One can not rely on them to do more -
to play a decisive role in Chinese history, especially, during those crucial transition 
periods. 
1: 3. Region Selection and Military History Studies 
Probably, only from an ideological perspective can late imperial China be deemed as a 
united culture, and, as a whole because Confucian legitimacy was accepted in various 
areas and through different social strata. Apart from this, a study must first select a 
representative geographical area. One should also make it clear to what extent the 
chosen area can be considered representative ofthe broader empire. Peter K. Bol has 
examined the local identity of the Jinhua~. area of Zhejiang Province #JfŒ~ in the 
late Ming. He suggests that local identity as a collective product easily serves the 
pursuit of collective interests. According to his observation, this Jinhua case reminds us 
63 Wakeman (1985), voU, 600-0l. 
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"that local identity discourse was understood to exist in relation to the national, and that 
the (re)construction oflocal identity was intended to be a means both oftransforming 
local society and of increasing the locale's participation in nationallife.,,64 
Indeed, this conclusion is suitable for Jinhua, but to what extent was this true of the 
entire empire? Only when we are sure the area we choose is representative can we 
know that an individual case study is useful for understanding similar situations in 
other parts of China, or at least that this case has value in a study of the entire empire. 
Among ail the approaches to the use of data in generalizing about variations over 
time and space, the most influential in Chinese studies is that of G. William Skinner. 
He divides China into eight macroregions and de fines them by drainage basins, 
choosing boundaries that generally follow watersheds and the crests of mountain ranges, 
and that cut the great river systems into regions on the basis oftransport efficiency and 
trade flow. Gradually, Skinner and others have used criteria such as population density 
to subdivide macroregions further into inner core, outer core, inner periphery, and outer 
periphery and so on. Based on the above, this system has been introduced into other 
fields ofChinese studies, such as political studies.65 Because ofhis emphasis on the 
different characteristics and independence of various regions, his systematic studies and 
publications have enabled many Western scholars to engage in studies of certain 
specific region (s) without needing to treat China as a whole.66 For instance, Schoppa's 
64 Peter K. Bol, "The 'Localist Turn' and 'Local Identity' in Later Imperial China," Late Imperial 
China 24.2 (2003), 41-42. 
65 Gilbert Rozman, Population and Marketing Settlements in Qing China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982),9-10. 
66 G. William Skinner, "Marketing Systems and Regional Economies: Their Structure and 
Development", paper presented for the Symposium on Social and Economic History in China from the 
Song Dynasty to 1900. Beijing, Oct.26- Nov.1, 1980,43-44. 
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study about gentry activities in modem Zhejiang,67 and Susan Naquin's study of the 
Shandong uprising cite the influence ofSkinner's model.68 
It is important that we consider the suitability of his the ory in the study of military 
history. Hans Van de Ven has already reminded us that" ... China needs to be mapped 
in a different way from what would be suitable in the case of economic or political 
history. Ifmacro-regions are important for economic history, and provincial and 
country boundaries for political history, then garrisons, frontier regions, lines of 
communications, centers of political and ritual significance, areas with key economic 
resources, as weil as local populations with supposed martial qualities are more 
important for military geography. ,,69 
When we accept Skinner' s important reminder of the difference between region 
and "regioned system," we have to bear in mind that his analysis focused exclusively 
on economic and geographical aspects.70 As for other aspects, more recent research has 
questioned the suitability of Skinner's model. For instance, Esherick argues that "there 
are several respects in which North China fails to fit neatly into Skinner's model," and 
he suggests that we "shaH have to look for other sources of local variation beyond 
regional cores and peripheries and shift our unit of analysis.,,7\ 
67 Keith Schoppa, Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
68 Susan Naquin, Shantung Rebellion: The Wang/un Uprising of 1774 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981). 
69 Van de Ven, 29. 
70 Paul A. Cohen has indicated this shortcoming in chapter four ofhis distinguished book entitled 
Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1981). 
7\ Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987), 3-7. The Journal of Asian Studies has published series of papers to discuss Skinner' s work and 
theory. See "The Spatial Approach to Chinese History: A Test," 45.4 (1986), 721-43; and the replies 
from Skinner, 48.1 (1989),90-99,100-13; also see 49.2 (1990), 344-46. 
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On the other hand, Skinner's theories have not received any attention from scholars 
in China until quite recently. 72 We should realize that the language barrier is not the 
primary reason. From the perspective of economic or social history, if a few Chinese 
scholars pay attention to the scope of the entire empire, they generally intend to focus 
on the so-called "united national market system.,,73 As for local history, the related 
studies usually come from those local scholars who belong to the corresponding 
academy of social science ffr±1fffr±f4~JG or local universities and colleges. In this 
condition, focusing on his or her hometown while ignoring the rest of other regions 
becomes the general tendency. 
In terms of military and political history, 1 want to point out that that the factors 
Skinner emphasizes are exactly those which the Chinese central government wanted to 
prohibit over the past centuries. From the Qin * (221-206 B.C.) to the Song * 
( 960-1279), the divisions ofChinese administrative areas basically accorded with 
watersheds and the crests ofmountain ranges. However, the Yuan's (1271-1368) policy 
was a milestone in the development of political divisions. Since the Mongolian 
population numbered only about two million, they took special measures to prevent 
each Chinese province's antagonism toward the central government. To achieve this, 
they depended on certain geographical features: merging Henan and Hebei in order that 
the Yellow River not be used as a barrier; using the same reason to merge Jiangnan and 
Jiangbei, eastern Zhejiang and western Zhejiang, Hunan and Hubei considering, 
respectively, the factors ofthe Yangzi River, Qiantang River i~!J8Œ and Dongting 
Lake 1~~m3.74 These strategie considerations even included the plains area. For 
72 In the "preface" of Chinese version of his 1977 book, Skinner admitted this aspect. See Ye 
Guangting ~:YéJ9ï et al, trans., Zhonghua diguo wanqi de chengshi r:p.1ff~8$iMB'9~m (Beijing: 
Zhonghua, 2000). 
73 Wu Chengming ~ffi:fY'J, Zhongguo zibenzhuyi yu guonei shichang r:pm~*::t~jMM;!pgmt!à 
(Beijing: Zhongguo kexue jishu, 1983). The concise and systematic study is from: Li Bozhong $fSm, 
"Zhongguo quanguo shi chang de xingcheng r:pm~;!m~ÉI'9~nIG, 1500-1840 1j::," Qinghua dwcue 
xuebao 4 (1999): 48-54. 
74 Wei Yuan ft~ (1794-1857) paid special attention to this aspect. See his Sheng Wu}; ~~~è 
(Chronicle of Imperial Military Campaigns) Guweitang r5fl'&1lt edition. Also see Zhao Xiding JI:lHfflffi, 
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instance, Xuzhou :f;8d'['[, a key city connecting northern and southern China, is deemed 
as the southern gate of Shandong province, but it has been historically excluded from 
this province. Until the twentieth century, aIl central governments basically copied the 
Yuan model. 
ln this dissertation, 1 have selected Shandong, Nanzhili mŒr~!75 and Zhejiang as 
the focus ofmy research (see Map 1). Not only are these provinces connected to each 
other geographicaIly, they are also the most economically and culturally advanced 
region of China. Only ifthis area was controIled, could the central government 
effectively administer the entire empire. Shandong province, particularly its western 
part, may be deemed as representative of the north China plain.76 Due to reasons such 
as social structure, geography, and cultural background, this plain and the Jiangnan area 
have been decisive regions for the conquest of China since the thirteenth century. 77 
Among aIl recorded historical figures (lishi renwu ~9:À!jo/J) of the Ming dynasty, 
44.61% came from these three provinces.78 Elman's statistics provide the total 
number ofjinshi from this area froml572 to 1644. 
Nanzhili 
Zhejiang Province 
1366 
1046 
"Qing dai gesheng de zhengzhi zhidu" m{~~~É8i5!:1'élfMll, Lishi yanjiu 3 (1980), 153-64. For a 
general overview of the provinces of the whole country, see Gu Yanwu, Tianxiajunguo libingshu 7iÇT 
Wl1!\iIflj(pjJ1J. Another very important book also should be mentioned here is Dushifangyujiyao ~~1J 
W*c.~, written by Gu Zuyu ,'ÎMŒl.J!. ( 1631-1692) . 
75 This name was changed to Jiangnan Province ŒWi~ by Qing in 1645. Seven years later, in 1662, 
this Jiangnan Province was separated into two provinces- present Jiangsu Œl* and Anhui 3ï.'M. 
76 Des Forges has analyzed the role that Zhongyuan (the central plain) played in the long history of 
China. See Des Forges 2003, 312-13. 
77 For the reasons why this area played such crucial role in the military and political history of China, 
my own forthcoming paper entitled "From Khubilai to Mao Zedong: The Grand Military Strategy of 
Conquering China since the Thirteenth Century" (unpublished paper) will try to provide a detailed 
analysis. 
78 Anonymous, "Lishi renwu yu dili de guanxi" ~~A.~W:f:t!!3ôJ.É8IUJ{*, Dongfang zazhi 20.5 
(1923), 125-33. 
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Shandong 732 79 
Figure 2 
Geographically, the plain is bounded by the border of Shandong and Beizhili ~tŒr 
~Jt in the north, the Taihang Mountains j,(ff0..1 in the west, and the Huai River 
drainage basin *)"i'lJ1m~ to the south. Flat land, cereal agriculture, dense population, 
and impoverished villages are common characteristics ofthis region. Although the 
vagaries ofweather left this region prone to recurrent natural disasters, the plains have 
long been one ofChina's key agricultural regions. 
Between the North China Plain and the Yangzi delta is the drainage basin ofthe 
Huai River. This area is often defined as limited to the northem parts of Anhui and 
Jiangsu provinces, or northem Anhui alone. We have cogent reasons for treating the 
entire area as a coherent socioeconomic unit because the terrain is basically similar, a 
common language was spoken, and the same crops as northem China were grown 
throughout the region. 
Nanzhili and northem Zhejiang together comprised the nation's economically and 
culturally most advanced region. It was a core rice-producing area and a national center 
for the production of silk, cotton, and tea as weIl. It was a main source of state revenue, 
both from the land tax and the grain tribute system. 
In the following chapters, we will see that various conflicts arose not only among 
govemments, ethnic groups, local social forces, soldiers, peasants, citizens, and regular 
army units that had been brought in from different are as, but also between regular 
troops and volunteer auxiliaries. We will also examine whether, and to what extent, the 
topographical features and other social and economic characteristics affected the 
military actions of all these different groups. 
79 Elman (2000), 696. Ali the literati 1 have selected and analyzed in the present study are incIuded in 
these figures. 
30 
Sichuan 
,. 
N 
A 
O~====;;:_600 km. 
'. 0 300 mi . 
.. . 
. '-\': *. 
··14···'···· '. ,.
. '. 
" .+, jmh 
Map 1. China in the Mid-Seventeenth Century (based on Struve [1993], 5) 
In general, nearly aIl areas of China dtiring the Ming-Qing transition period 
witnessed large-scale military clashes between the various forces mentioned above. 
Indeed, we have to pay attention to the regional variations ofthese clashes. Robinson's 
study "has attempted to show those specifie patterns of violence must be sought in the 
particulars of local society," because they could "provide another revealing historical 
perspective from which to view Chinese society."gO Nevertheless, we have to keep in 
mind that China must also be analyzed from a macro perspective, in other words, we 
have to treat it as a who le. 
80 Robinson, 166-67. 
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By using Qi Jiguang's mlGM7'é (1528-1588) career in Yiwu ~,~ County as an 
example, Thomas G. Nimick indicates that the way in which that army was recruited 
and the impact of that recruitment on the local area exemplify the extent to which 
developments in local society could shape regional and national events, and the extent 
to which the actions of centrally appointed officiaIs could affect local society in the 
Ming period.81 Ifwe focus only on this very special case while ignoring the general 
condition of rest of the empire, his conclusion makes sense. However, a careful 
examination ofYiwu County's social background (in Chapter Four) will allow us to see 
that his conclusion is not universally valid. 
Faced with the extremely tumultuous conditions of the Ming-Qing transition period, 
it is obvious that there was no fixed pattern or set of rules governing behavior across 
the empire. The essential prerequisite for choosing Shandong, Nanzhili and Zhejiang is 
that this area not only had its own traits, but most importantly, it had an effect on the 
entire empire. Only by examining an influential region like this can we expect a study 
to help us understand the complexity of Chinese history while also paying attention to 
its existence as an entirety. 
Let us now turn to the abundant data. 
1: 4. Source Material, Methodology and Theory 
• 
The basic impression one gets when examining aIl the available data from the 
Ming-Qing transition period is ambivalence. On the one hand, there is an abundance 
ofprimary ofhistorical records as weIl as secondary research, and this combination of 
different and complementary source materials make it possible to engage in a specifie 
and detailed topical study. On the other hand, the data is often far from ideal for the 
purposes of analysis or comparison. This is especially true for the objects ofthis 
81 Thomas G. Nimick (1995). 
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dissertation. For example, there were rare govemment records regarding the Ming 
army's deployment, garrison numbers, equipment as weil as logistic supplies during 
the 1640s in the areas chosen by this dissertation. And, because of these reasons, those 
related secondary materials have basically focused on the mid, especially, early Ming 
times.82 
To compensate for sorne ofthese problems, 1 make use ofa wide range ofmaterials 
from many different kinds of sources. These can be divided into four principal types of 
materials. 
First is the data from the different levels of administration of the Ming and Qing 
govemments. Usually this data has been preserved as archives. Despite sorne biases and 
other shortcomings, these sources enable us to see relevant issues and people from the 
perspective of the govemment. For certain periods, they are crucial to the analysis. For 
example, a prisoner's confession from the Qing govemment archives is the only way to 
discover the real connection between the Ming loyalists at sea and the rural society of 
the coastal area of Zhejiang during the 1650s. The memorials from local officiais to the 
emperor usually included reliable information, but we have to pay attention to the 
problem of exaggerating achievements during peace time and overstating casualties on 
the battlefield in time ofwar. In order to emphasize their merit, local officiais naturally 
tended to exaggerate their achievements. The Qing emperors not only realized these 
common traits among the allieveis ofbureaucracy, but also took measures to punish 
this sort ofbehaviour.83 
82 The typical study about these aspects was Wang Yuquan's .:EfiiiUî book entitled Ming dai dejuntun 
fYj{-tJY;JlJïti. (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1965). Another kind of very important and valuable material was 
military encyclopedia published in Ming times, most ofthem were collected in ZGBSJC - Zhongguo 
bingshujicheng ~m~tH~~. Unfortunately, they were basically not relevant for this study because 
ofvarious reasons, see page 40 and notes therein. 
83 For instance, in June of 1659, after the Ming loyalists' northern expedition was defeated, the reports 
ofvictory roused the Shunzhi Emperor's great indignation for they were totally inaccurate-
commanders at the front often used words such as countless (wu suan M,.) to enumerate the casualties 
of the war. He asked the Board of War to convict those who did this for "the crime of cheating the 
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As for the documents issued by the government, one with origins at the top level 
is the The Veritable Records (shilu .~) which supplemented the imperially authorized 
account. These records contain the most important imperial edicts and provincial 
officiais' memorials. But we still need to deal carefully with this data. Gu Cheng 
indicates that sorne Qing documents were first written in Manchu, and then translated 
into Chinese for the purpose ofwriting the shilu and so on, a lot ofmistakes appeared 
during this process.84 Another point that should be mentioned at the outset is that 
regulations, laws, policies, and orders related to military affairs changed often and 
differed substantially between theearly and late Ming. The early Qing policy basically 
followed the former Ming, except its Banner army system. Academics in both China 
and abroad have focused their studies on the early - mid Ming times. Apart from the 
reasons mentioned above, another reason was that precise and detailed information is in 
the Ming huiyao a)j1!t~.85 Timothy Brook has realized this situation. In addition, he 
also indicates the other characteristics of official sources such as the difference in 
terminologies used in different provinces and regions. This is why he ignored most of 
the huidian-style (1!tW!) prescriptive regulations and relied instead on records of actual 
administration in local gazetteers.86 
The second group of sources are those which Struve calls "the most credible 
sources." These are those sources "written by men who actually observed the events 
they de scribe, or who conducted conscientious inquiries soon after such events 
emperor and falsely cIaiming credit" ~L. ~:ç}]zml. Qing shilu m-.~ 3- Shizu shilu tltWŒl.~ 
(Beijing: Zhonghua, repr. 1985), juan 126, 126. 
84 Gu Cheng ,liglZ, Nan Ming shi i~ï3)3.9:: (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian, 1997),204. 
85 The most recent and complete study is by Zhang Dexin iJl1~fEl, Ming chao dianzhang zhidu 1:T)jW3:l!'l! 
Jli[~UJjt (Changchun: Jilin wenshi), 2002. 
86 Timothy Brook, "The Spatial Structure of Ming Local Administration," Late Imperial China 6.1 
(1985), 1-55. 
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occurred.,,87 1 accept her assessment ofthese materials and try my best to make use of 
this data. However, we also should not accept without question that these materials are 
the "most credible." One of the most famous non-officialliterati, Huang Zongxi, 
witnessed andjoined the military resistance in eastem Zhejiang. According to Struve's 
criteria, Huang's descriptions such as Xing chao/u 1:y!j!)j~, Hongguang shilu chao iJL*, 
.~jrJ>, and Haiwai tongkuji iij7!-'[i!J§}@§c.), can be deemed as basic primary materials. 
However, recent studies have certified that these sources "usually come from prejudice, 
and add his own tastes," furthermore, as Gu Cheng indicates, lots of descriptions are 
full of oxymora, lies thus make serious difficulties when we use them .... 88 This sort of 
data needs to be examined very carefully. Since the writers ofthese materials "observed 
the events they describe," ifwe simply take them without checking, we can be led 
astray. 
ln contrast, family letters, diaries, manuscripts, and poetry should be treated as 
primary materials. In most cases, this data enables us to understand the deepest 
sentiments of the authors at that time. For example, as we will see in Chapter Two, 
nobody doubts the authenticity of Shi Kefa's letter sent to his family members, and the 
same can be said of the letters of Jin Sheng ~7t (1589-1645). In addition, examining 
and using these sources will enable us to harmonize the nature of individualliterati's 
personalities with their actions. This aspect is exactly what previous studies have left 
relatively untouched. As for the value of their collected writings, it de pends on the 
editor or publisher, and we will discuss these later. 
The third kind of data is from gazetteers or local histories such as genealogies. 
Generally speaking, this sort of material, especially county gazette ers (xianzhi) is the 
only way to gain access to detailed accounts of local affairs. 
87 Struve 1984, "preface," xiv. 
88 Gu Cheng, 164,280 as weil as 300. 
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For example, from Wuxian zhi ~~*,~J we know that, in the year 1640 in this 
Jiangnan county, there were a total of 190 soldiers drawn from local residents who 
came from various units of the Ming govemment on hand. They owned eighteen 
sorts ofweapons including both cold (such as spears and broadswords) and tire arms 
(such as muskets) as weIl as the raw materials for producing gunpowder.89 
James W. Tong's book is based on a statistical analysis of gazetteers. Since the 
quality and quantity of gazetteers varied widely during the Ming according to time and 
place, his book also needs to be examined very carefuIly. For example, he suggests that 
"the later gazetteers have often faithfully recorded data from earlier editions. Since 
much ofthe information was recorded without comment or copied without change from 
earlier editions, these gazette ers can, for sorne purposes, be treated as primary sources 
for data originally published centuries before. For other purposes, however, the se 
histories must be treated as secondary sources.,,90 
Gazetteers do contain detailed information on local events, as he concludes. 
Records relevant to my present study usually belong to the categories entitled bingshi 
or bingge (~$, ~1j[). In terms ofthese materials, Tong's discovery sharply contrasts 
with my own observations. According to him, "it wou Id be ideal ifboth a late Ming 
(1600-1644) and an early Qing (1644-1700) edition were available; the late Ming 
edition wou Id contain socioeconomic data (e.g., taxation, population, troop deployment) 
drawn from county archives before they were destroyed by inter-dynastie violence, and 
the early Qing edition would contain accounts oflate Ming violence.,,91 
89 Chongzhen Wuxian zhi ~iii.fl:~!jI'*;t;, juan 18, Bingfang ~~Jj 2 (This gazetteer was edited during the 
Chongzhen reign [1628-1644]), quoted from Tianyige Ming daifangzhi xuankan xubian 7Z-00iiifj.Ej{~ 
1J;t;~fUtiU~ (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1990),465-66. 
90 James W.Tong, Disorder under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming Dynasty (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991),36-42. 
91 Ibid. 
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Within aIl the gazetteers 1 have examined, detailed descriptions of the wars or 
conflicts between the Han Chinese and Manchu armies or Qing govemment later in the 
seventeenth century are very infrequent. His conclusion only appears valid in relation 
to the late Ming rebellions. In terms of literati resistance movements, 1 cannot be as 
optimistic as Tong. The reason is simple: the gazetteers' compilers in East China ofthis 
period were aIl Chinese (a few higher ranking Manchu officiaIs were sometimes 
responsible for compiling, but only in name). If the relevant contents were written in 
detail, this would mean a "confession" of guilt (for resisting) and would undoubtedly 
bring on repression and punishment. On the other hand, ifthey treated the resistance 
figures as negative figures, then how could those compilers face their peers or the local 
people? ln fact, the relevant materials in the gazetteers were usually composed after the 
reign of the Qianlong emperor (1735-1796), and most are directly copied from other 
secondary materials such as Nanjiang yishi WH11~9::.92 
Similar problems often apply to genealogies. Since these sources are now very easy 
to access in the world's major Chinese-Ianguage library collections, more and more 
scholars have begun to use them. These genealogies play a crucial role in the study of 
social and economic history. For instance, Harrell points out that the "earlier 
preliminary studies have told us that a genealogy that provides birth dates for about 
80% ofthe people recorded and death dates for about 50% can be quite useful in 
estimating the fertility and mortality rates ofits subject population.,,93 But the use of 
genealogies in military history is more problematic. It is important that we do not 
exaggerate their function. As Ho indicated, "the clan system was never uniformly weil 
developed or evenly distributed geographically. It is weil known that the clan system 
92 The doubtful authenticity of source material in local gazetteers is also important to keep in mind for 
studies of social and economic history. For instance, millet and wheat were the most important food 
crops, along with sorghum (gaoIiang ii11iim), beans, and barley. But it is very hard to know precisely the 
amounts produced, or to gain a complete survey of the land, because the compilers tended to 
underreport the amount of land to avoid increases in the tax quota of a given district. 
93 Stevan Harrell, ed., Chinese Historical Microdemography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995),94. 
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was most highly developed in the two southernmost coastal provinces of Fujian and 
Guangdong, well organized and widely distributed in the lower and central Yangzi 
provinces, somewhat underdeveloped and thinly distributed in a number of northern 
provinces. ,,94 
Furthermore, my impression of genealogies concurs with a general survey made 
by Ted A. Telford. He states that genealogies "include information only for those 
individuals who were ritually significant ... they would appear to be quite useless for 
historical demographic studies.,,95 
Generally speaking, the longer the genealogies are, and thus the broader sc ope of 
time they coyer is, the less useful their data becomes in the study ofmilitary history. 
Mainly because ofthe catastrophes caused by long term warfare, the genealogies could 
not have survived in the North China Plain. In the Yangzi delta area, there are lots of 
arguments among academics about the performance of clans over a long time frame. 
Hilary Beattie's study ofTongcheng is based on both gazetteers and genealogies. She 
successfully draws conclusions about the persistence of genealogies in one part of 
Anhui. However, this kind of case study has a strong tendency to focus on the social 
elite while ignoring the ordinary people. In terms ofmilitary history, another important 
shortcoming is the fact that ail of these genealogies were edited in the seventeenth 
century. Exactly like the shortcomings of gazette ers mentioned above, the se kinds of 
genealogies cannot be expected to provide substantial material on anti-Qing military 
action. 
The more one examines the sources, the more one becomes convinced of the 
complexity oftheir utilization. For periods of extreme turmoil, such as the Ming-Qing 
transition, it is impossible to rely on only one or a limited number of sources to produce 
a study. This dissertation will argue that genealogies do not provide very useful source 
material for the study of the literati resistance movement. Due to factors mentioned 
94 Ho, 210-11. 
95 Ted A. Telford, "Survey of Social Demographie Data in Chinese Genealogies," Late Imperial China 
7.2 (1986), 118-47. 
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above, we are short ofthese records and, most importantly, as we will show in Chapter 
Four, the fact that military actions related to consanguinity almost always took place 
among family members (father and son, or among brothers), and seldom extended to 
the scope of the entire clan. 
The last type of data 1 use in the dissertation are secondary materials. Struve' s book 
provides a useful introduction to these materials.96 Generally speaking, there are two 
trends to which special attention must be paid. The first is what we might calI the 
"official factor." What is evident in the sources for Ming history, "as in aIl Chinese 
history is that the historians often seek to edify their readers, to draw a moral by 
exalting the virtuous and condemning the wicked. Often in their zeal they paint their 
heroes as perfect, leaving out aIl their shortcomings. Their narrations thus become 
one-sided and to form a fair judgment, one has to read the opposite side of the story if it 
can be found. Again, it is quite common for historians to write only about what they 
consider 'great events', leaving aside many things that we should be interested in 
nowadays. ,,97 
The second trend can be referred to as the "private factor." According to a famous 
early Qing historian, Quan Zuwang ~ff!Éi~ (1705-1755), the biographies of Ming 
martyrs written after 1644 are unbelievable in most cases.98 As mentioned before, late 
Ming scholars demonstrated their various abilities and tastes, including the writing of 
the history oftheir own times. These publications are filled with personal points of 
view which must be examined very carefuIly. This is especially true for those sources 
which come from the so-calledyeshi ml§/:: ("Wild" histories). Needless to say, most of 
96 Lynn A. Struve, The Ming-Qing Conflict. 1619- 1683 -A Historiography and Source Guide (Ann 
Arbor: Association for Asian Studies), 1998. 
97 Albert Chan, The Glory and FaU of the Ming Dynasty (Norman: University ofOklahorna Press, 
1982), "Introduction," xix. See also, On- Cho Ng, "Private Historiography of the Late Ming: Sorne 
Notes on Five Works," Ming Studies 18 (Spring 1984),46-68. 
98 Quan Zuwang, Jiejitingjiwaibian ~fiij-.~)i.*,!jji, juan 48, in XXSKQS 1430, 267. As for the 
rnaterials about Quan Zuwang and his works, see Struve, 1998,54-59. 
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these abound with historical fiction-"thematic truth encrusted with imaginative, often 
fabulous details.,,99 However, sorne ofthese histories still provide certain true 
descriptions that we may check with those present in the primary materials. lOo 
Besides aB the above, another category, military encyclopedias published in the 
Ming and Qing times are also available conceming sorne background knowledge. lOI 
By judiciously exploring aB these materials, 1 will be able to undertake a 
multi-faceted exploration ofthe role Iiterati played in military action. However, it is 
important that we examine the methodology and theory that will be applied to analyses 
ofthese sources. In comparison with Chinese-Ianguage studies, "English language 
writers are sensitive to contemporary methodological discourse, and discuss issues 
dealing with paradigms of geographical organization, economic interpretations, and 
incipient imperialism. They tend to be more analytical but ... offer Iess descriptive 
detail.,,102 
My own generaI impression basicaBy tallies with Johnson's observation. Paying 
more attention to analyticaI or theoreticaI models sometimes helps us to formulate 
explanations and answers to general questions. EspeciaBy since the mid-1980s, in 
addition to the remarkable depth of scholarship in Chine se primary sources and 
99 See Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conque st of Kiangnan: The 
Tragedy of Chiang-yin," in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant ed., Conflict and Control in Late 
Imperial China (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1975),57; Since the 1990s, most of the 
availableyeshi have been compiled and published in a collection entitIed Zhongguo yeshijicheng r:pm 
m:.sè.~nx (Chengdu: Bashu, 1993) 50 vols; Zhongguo yeshijicheng xubian r:pmif.sè.~nxk;tUi 
(Chengdu: Bashu, 2000), 30 vols. The contents ofthis series, in fact, exceed the scope ofyeshi; sorne of 
them really are primary materials. 
100 This is especially true in Chapter Four below. Practically, it is impossible to rely on just one source 
to analyze the Zhejiang literati's resistance movement. 
101 So far as 1 know, the most important collected data is Zhongguo bingshujicheng r:pm~!imnx, 
(Collected Chinese military writings). Unfortunately it is not very useful for this dissertation, albeit it 
provides broad knowledge and background information about late Ming military history. For instance, 
it contains no records about military actions concerning the Ming loyalists' resistance in the Ming-Qing 
transition period. See Zhongguo bingshujicheng bianji weiyuanhui, ed. Zhongguo bingshujicheng 
(Liaoshen shushe and Jiefangjun, 1987-95),50 vols. 
102 Linda Cooke Johnson, ed., Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China (Ithaca: State University of 
New York Press, 1993), "Preface". 
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meticulously detailed case studies, models, paradigms, and theories have been created 
for or adapted to Chinese studies. Unfortunately, few ofthese have received general 
approval among the scholars of late imperial China or modem China. Instead, we are 
deeply impressed by sorne criticisms about them. For example, Chun does an admirable 
job pointing out the limitations of structural-functionalism in approaching Chinese 
lineage organization. 103 Roger V. Des Forges has become increasingly skeptical about 
the utility ofthe three paradigms of Modemization theory, Marxism, Imperial China 
that have long dominated the study of Chinese history and continue to inform many 
accounts of the Ming-Qing period. He also argues that although the various "post-" 
theories (postmodemism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism) as weIl as feminism are 
"valuable in dissolving the unsubstantiated certainties of more orthodox Marxists and 
modemizationists," sorne ofthese theories go too far. 104 
Johnston has aroused interest with his ''parabellum'' theory.105 On the basis of 
both classic Chinese military texts and the whole history of the Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644), he concludes that there are two Chinese strategic cultures, one is idealized 
or symbolic, which invokes princip les ofharmony and the avoidance of open conflict. 
Another one is operational. In dealing with security threats, imperial China has 
presented two faces based on these two cultures. The conclusions reached in his book 
have attracted much attention from people engaged in general contemporary military 
and political studies. However, historians of specific periods have challenged his theory. 
103 Allen Chun, "The Lineage -Village Complex in Southeastern China - A Long Footnote in the 
Anthropology of Kinship," in Current Anthropology 37.3 (1996),429-40, along with the comments 
from critics and his replies, 440-50. 
104 Roger V. Des Forges (2003), 314-15. A remarkable work should be mentioned here in relation to 
American historical writing on Chinese history prior to the 1980s, Paul A. Cohen's Discovering History 
in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981). 
105 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategie Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
41 
Perdue, for example, not only successfully challenged Johnston's the ory, but also 
showed us "that Qing strategy was radically different from Ming."I06 
While Johnston's theory and explanation are beyond my current research, as 
mentioned above, his book mainly focuses on early and mid- Ming time, rarely 
touching those military affairs entering the seventeenth century. It is clearly not suitable 
for the period and region 1 selected. Moreover, the Ming dynasty lasted more than two 
and half centuries (as long as the United States' national history), and its military 
history witnessed great changes in almost every aspect. 107 If somebody chooses to 
undertake a study with a topic such as "the grand global military strategy" of the United 
States, it is hard to imagine that George Washington and George W. Bush could be 
treated together, and that the se two presidents could be imagined as adopting the same 
policies toward the rest ofthe world. 
Theories such as Marxist discussions of class struggle, those that offer 
perspectives on state-society relations, the relevance of Skinner' s theory of 
macroregions, and the "civil society" debate deriving from the work of Habermas, 
peasant rebellions and popular protests, and about millenarian movements and 
revolutionary organizations and so on do provide a certain amount of help in 
understanding Chinese social, political, and military history. However, their use is 
limited.108 The fact is, the complicated differences that exist within the huge 
territory of China provide numerous opportunities for various theories to find 
evidence for their applicability and suitability. Moreover, the abundance ofprimary 
and second-hand materials, as mentioned above, are characterized by ambiguity: it is 
not very difficult to collect data, but there is a shortage of systematic and reliable 
106 Peter G. Perdue, "Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing Conquests," 
in Van de Ven, 261. 
107 Roger V. Des Forges, 150-54. 
108 There is no need to list ail their contents here. However, at least the following materials may help us 
to make a general survey about those important studies: Daniel Little, Understanding Peasant China: 
Case Studies in the Philosophy o/Social Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); See also 
Cohen, 1981, as weil as Wakeman, 1998. 
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resources. These conditions often aHow researchers to be successful in case studies 
because they can easily find what they need, while ignoring other material 
intentionally or unintentionally. In other words, any theory with universal ambitions 
should be questioned at the outset. Quite frankly, the tendency and desire to generate 
theories in the West may be effective and beneficial. However, in the field of China 
studies it has gradually become agame played by a few people: it starts with 
somebody who creates (or even copies) sorne theories on the basis of limited sources, 
and then, someone else naturally voices his or her opinion based on their own 
specific materials. During this process, every player gets what he or she wants: the 
publication lists become longer and longer, but the questions and problems still 
remain. 
No statement about Chinese history can be made with absolute certainty. In 
contrast, a "problem oriented" approach may lead us to sorne concrete answers. 
Through the various case studies from the different regions, we may systematically 
compare and find certain generality as weIl as particularity, and avoid the tendency of 
only focusing on isolated cases while ignoring the whole and vice versa. 
This dissertation begins with the faH of Shandong, and continues through a series 
ofwars and ethnic conflicts between Chinese and Manchus in Lianghuai w.i* and 
Jiangnan ŒïrIT. It concludes around 1659 with the final defeat of the Ming loyalists in 
eastem Zhej iang. The question of why and how the literati of these areas organized and 
joined military actions is the point from which my research has proceeded. Through a 
briefrelated comparison of the economic, political, as weIl as social structural changes 
within the region, and by a comparison of many kinds of military actions - fighting 
against the Manchu invasion; defending against rebellions of peasants in the north and 
tenants or serfs in the Yangzi delta; conflicts among the different groups - 1 shall try 
to find the various characteristics and patterns of the literati's changing military 
behavior. Moreover, 1 will try to ground their military actions firmly in time, space, and 
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the environment by dividing them into several groups and categories in order to shed 
light on the complexity of Chine se military history. 
There are three aspects that need to be specifically emphasized at the outset. First, 
as mentioned above, in order to find characteristics and patterns of the literati's 
changing military behavior, 1 shaH attempt to ground the military actions ofthe literati 
firmly in time, space, and environment. To reach this ideal goal, a brief and general 
examination of economic, political, social structure, and even topographical features of 
certain regions is absolutely necessary because this background knowledge is crucial 
for a more meaningful comparative study between the experiences of different areas. 
However, to mention ail this information within a single paper is impossible, and, 
unnecessary. Since the previous studies about these aspects have been pursued in 
great depth - as mentioned at the beginning, only those directly related to 
military action will be mentioned and quoted. 
Second, this study only focuses on the literati's military actions; it cannot coyer or 
even touch any other areas such as philosophy or literature. From the military 
perspective, my research mainly explores the Iiterati's actions, not what they said or the 
suggestions they raised. In fact, there are "countless" reasonable policy suggestions, 
plans, and advice, many ofwhich are even still available.109 But, few ofthem were 
109 Xie Guozhen ~~~, Nan Ming shilue maJj~1IIi! (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1957), 51. 
Generally speaking, paper work was the strong suit of Chinese officiais and literati. They were good at 
making suggestions and plans, but less capable when it came to action. Sometimes they could offer 
apparently valuable advice, but practically speaking, their proposais sel dom met any real needs. For 
instance, after Beijing fell, a man named Peng Shiheng rv~~ (dates unknown) made a special report 
entitled Zhilu yi ~U~~, he strongly suggested the use of "battle wagons ,J$:, basically a huge 
two-wheeled mule cart. Since he was from Jiangnan area, it seems that he did not know that this sort of 
weapon had already been used by Qi Jiguang ~1t7\:; (1528-1587) several decades earlier. See 
Zhongxing shilu t:pJQ.Jr~ in NMSL BZ, 681-82. 
The late imperial Chinese governments shared this tendency. They were good at policy making, and 
the promulgation of laws and orders, but it is difficult to know how these were carried out and what 
their effects were, especially during tumultuous periods like the Ming-Qing transition. The typical 
example is the baojia {*if! system (mutual-responsibility units). We find great amounts of information 
on baojia in the various sorts of records (including the official archives), but we have no way to explore 
how or to what extent this system affected the government and local community. The records focus on 
why the baojia system should be implemented, suggestions, policies, as weil as sorne statistic on baojia 
numbers. In contrast to the abstract descriptions of its achievement such as chengxiao zhu oran m<:5&1'j[ 
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discussed or adopted at the time, let alone carried out. Based on this criterion, only 
those who really appeared on the battlefield are included in the scope of my 
research. For sorne very important figures such as Gu Yanwu, though he is very 
famous for his ideas as weIl as his remarkable relevant military publications such as 
Jun zhilun .FffU~1fû and Xingshi /un ~~~1fû, 110 since there are no detailed and credible 
records showing when and how he joined the resistance movement, there is no way to 
explore his military action. Another very important figure is Qian Qianyi ~~~ 
(1582-1664). His career demonstrated the complexity of Iiterati behaviour: he went to 
Yangzhou in the spring of 1643 to plan anti-Qing military strategies, but he surrendered 
to the Qing one year later. After suffering a mixture of shame and pride un der the Qing 
authorities, he finally participated in the resistance movement starting from the winter 
of 1646. But ail of his actions were Iimited to aspects such as "rewarding the army" 
(gaoshi ~gjjj), counterespionage (cefan ~BZ), and sorne liaison work between various 
resistance forces. 111 
~ (remarkable success), the criticisms usually provide concrete and detailed analysis. For example, 
The Jiangpu xianzhi rIrm!ll*it- deemed the baojia as xuwen um:x: (empty paper); The Huoshan xianzhi 
mU-.!!II*it- criticized local official runners and common people for cheating each other. See Wanli 
Jiangpu xianzhi (~M) Œrm'Jf,it-, juan 10, Bingfangzhi ~1ît5it-, TYGCMDFZXK XB 7; Guangxu 
Huoshan xianzhi (7\:;~) mU-.!WJf,it-, juan 14, Bingfangzhi minfang ~~fjit-~Iît5, in ZGDFZJC- (A) 
13,269. Essentially, baojia was an enforced administrative system. Whether or not it could be 
successfully carried out totally depended on its relationship with that the local community's existing 
social forces such as cIans and gentry. As we will see, no single thing can change rural Chinese society 
unless it brings with it certain benefits. There are many studies of baojia during the Ming. For the early 
Qing baojia system, see the following sources: Xiao Yishan JI-u-'!, Qingdai tongshi mf~jffi~, vol. 1, 
631-38; also see Wakeman (1985), vol.2, 708-12. 
110 These two papers were published in 1645. In "Junzhi lun", he examined the evolution of the Ming 
military system but did not provide any suggestions for improving it. See Tinglin wenji, juan 6, ~#:x: 
m, in XXSKQS 1402. In "Xinshi lun", he explored the various destinies of eight dynasties (Wu!!ii!:, 
DongJin *ll, Song *, Qi 'ft!{, Liang W;, Chen 1lJR, Nan Tang m~, Nan Song m*) which had their 
capital in Nal1jing. He considered taking advantage of the geographic factors in order to gain a balance 
between defence and attack. See Tinglin wenji, juan 6, XXSKQS 1402, 127-28. 
III QDRWZG, A, vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1991),210-24. 
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Third, sorne literati did bec orne involved in military action, but their activities took 
place outside the geographic scope ofthis dissertation. For this reason, two very 
important literati, Hong Chengchou mjf<WI (1593-1665)112 and Yang Sichang m~~ 
Ë§ (1588-1641)113 are excluded. Furthermore, the Manchu's perspective is given less 
attention because Wang's penetrating work has already provided a revealing exposition 
of Manchu strategie thinking, military tactics, and statecraft concerns in their conquest 
of China. 114 
What 1 want to explore is the Iiterati's performance as a whole in military 
action. To be concrete, this dissertation will concentrate on the following figures 
selected from among several dozen literati withjuren andjinshi degrees: 115 
112 Hong was ajinshi of 1616. He was the governor-general ofnortheastern Zhili and Liaodong liJ~mt 
~ of the Ming dynasty before he surrendered to the Manchus. In 1645, he was sent to Nanjing by the 
Qing dynasty with the title of Pacifier of Jiangnan :JiHflItrIr-f'iJ. In 1656, he was promoted to Grand 
Secretary and Commander-in-chief *~IH&*~±. Frankly, Wang Chen-main concludes with an 
idealistic description of Huang's career, that is, Huang's primary motive for being a turncoat probably 
came from his concern for the survival of the people, see also page 7 and notes therein. 
113 Yang Sichang mPiPJ~, jinshi of 1610. As Grand Secretary and Minister ofWar, he enjoyed the 
emperor's confidence for a long time, but finally committed suicide in Huguang because ofhis failure 
in fighting against the peasant rebellions. 
114 Frederick W. Mote, "Preface" for Wang's book on Hong Chengchou. 
Ils Sources from: Arthur W. Hummel, edited, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912), vol. 1 
(Washington DC: The Library of Congres s, 1943); Xu Bingyi 1~*~, Ming mo zhonglie jishi I3Jl*f.1!, 
r.U*è.Jl, in Ming mo Qing chu shiliao xuankan I3Jl*mfJJ9:$HiHU (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, repr., 
1987); Wen Ruilin rli!i!flllîli, "yi shi xusi kao" ~9:'[lfn~~ in Nanjiang yishi r-f'iJHI~9:, ZGYSJC, 36; 
Xie Zhengguang ~IE7'é, Fan Jinmin m1iZ:~ ed., Ming Yimin lu huiji I3Jl~~n!lilt (Nanjing: Nanjing 
daxue, 1995); Qu Dajun Ftti*~, Huang Ming sichao chengren lu ~I3Jl[9iji~mG1=n, in SKJHSCK, 
Shibu 50. 
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Table: Individual Literati Involved in Military Action 
Name Place of Degree The highest official title from Ming 
birth and year or South Ming 
Chen Qianfu Zhejiang juren 1636 Judge of Kaifeng, Vice Minister of the 
~*m:;lç Qiantang Court of Judicial Review and lnspector of 
(1610-1646) #JT1I~* the Circuit of Jiangxi 
OO!ttt'§'*f!~yg~P~Œ~~~ ~ 
Chen Zilong Nanzhili jinshi 1637 The Right Vice-Minister ofthe Board of 
~r~ Songjiang the War and Academician 
(1608-1647) mŒ[ff~f'iâI Reader-in-waiting of the Hanlin Academy 
~g~k:î{~Jl!~~~if*~{~~.~± 
He Gang Nanzhili jinshi 1630 Vice-Director of the Department of 
fPJjlijJU (?-1645) Songjiang Operation of the Board of the War 
m@J~f~1I ~g~IIi1JP]~:$'U~ 
Hou Tongceng Nanzhili jinshi 1625 Left Vice-Commissioner of the Office of 
{*iIJil'J~ Jiading Transmission ~jl)(:f~ P] tcimil& 
(1591-1645) m[!![~~.)Ë 
Huang Chunyao Nanzhili jinshi 1643 
Ji1$)\;i Jiading 
(1605-1645) m[!![~.)Ë 
Huang Daozhou Fujiang jinshi 1622 Army-supervisor, Junior Mentor, Grane 
Ji~mJ Zhangpu Secretary, Minister of the Board of War 
(1585-1646) t;9!~im Minister of Ministry of Personnel 
~gffiy1W*~±]ë~=g~f,!ij~ 
Huang Zongxi Zhejiang Left Vice-Censor-in-Chief of the 
Ji*_ Yuyao Censorate ~~~tc!i1iUm~ ~ 
(1610-1695) #JTŒ5R93E 
Jin Sheng NanzhiIi jinshi 1628 The Right Vice- Minister of the Board of 
~~ (1598-1645) Xiuning the War, Right Censor-in-Chief of the 
m[!![~f*$ Censorate ~g~k:î{~Jl!~k:î~m~ ~ 
Ling Jiong Nanzhili jinshi 1643 Regional Inspector 
~,'5IiiJ (?-1645) Shexian ~~~~ 
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moo:~~~~~ 
Lu Zhengfei Shanxi jinshi 1625 Grand Coordinator of Huaiyang 
~tJiUf~ (7-1649) Quzhou rttm~Mff 
llJï§li!3ffl] 
Liu Zongzhou Zhejiang jinshi 1601 Left Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate 
;U*fffJ Shanyin 1!ff)~Im1I:1!ff)~j: 
(1578-1645) #JTŒllJll! 
Qi Biaojia Zhejiang jinshi 1622 Right Censor-in-Chief of the Censorate 
mGmâ{~ (1602-45) Shanyin 1!ff)~ImJb:tJ!1!ff)~j: 
#JTŒllJll! 
Qian Suyue Zhejiang jinshi 1625 Grand Secretary, Minister of the Ministry 
~J#rf~ Yinxian of Rites 
(1606-1648) #mIf~~~ *~±~ffilgBfSlif 
Shi Kefa Henan jinshi 1628 Army-supervisor, Grand Mentor, Grand 
j:BJ1.t Xiangfu Secretary, Minister of the Board ofWar 
(1602-1645) rIiJmWt1 1fgffi*1W*~±#gBfSlif 
Sun Jiaji Zhejiang jinshi 1637 The Vice- Minister of the Board of the 
i%JUlt Yuyao War, Right Censor-in-Chief of the 
(1604-1646) #JTŒ7RPjt Censorate #gB{~Jj!~Jb:tJ!1!ff)~j: 
Wu Yi Nanzhili jinshi 1637 Minister of the Board ofWar ~gBfSlif 
~~ (7-1646) Wujiang 
mOO:~~~Œ 
Xiong Rulin Zhejiang jinshi 1625 Chief Grand Secretary, Minister of the 
~~&~ (7-1648) Yuyao Board of War *OO*~±~~gBfSlif 
#JTŒ7RPjt 
Yan Ermei Nanzhili juren 1630 
MmffiJ Peixian 
(1603-1679) mOO:~rrp~* 
Zhang Huangyan Zhejiang juren 1624 Chief Grand Secretary, Minister of the 
5:IH~§ Yinxian Board of War *OO*~±*#gBfSlif 
(1620-1664) #mIf~~~ 
Zhang Guowei Zhejiang jinshi 1622 Army-supervisor, Junior Mentor, Grand 
5ft~*l Dongyang Secretary, Minister of the Board ofWar 
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(1595-1646) Wf1I*~ tlfgjfj:J;~ *~±~ff~ filàtl 
Zheng Yuanxun Nanzhili jinshi 1643 
t~5t1iJ Shexian 
(1604-1645) m@J$~~,*, 
Zhu Dadian Zhejiang jinshi 1616 Chief Grand Secretary, Minister of the 
**~ (?-1646) Jinhua Board ofWar 
Wf1I1iZ:~ *M*~±~~ff~filàtl 
In the light ofmy discussion of the reasons for choosing the regional focus ofmy 
dissertation, 1 shaH start with the Shandong area. 
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Chapter 1 
Literati in Shandong 
Shandong Province has played an extremely important role in the past millennium of 
Chine se military history since the Grand Canal was opened as the main route for traffic 
and tribute grain transfer between the south and north, as it passed through the western 
part of the province. With the other waterways and the connecting roads, this province 
became a coherènt region, geographically, economically, and culturally. 
Entering the province from the north at Dezhou it1\[\[, there was an imperial 
highway west of Jinan ~~1$j which ran north to south. After the Qing armies captured 
Beijing in the early summer of 1644, they followed this road due south several months 
later. Since the main force was pounding the rebel bandits in the Central Plains, prince-
general Dodo ~~ (1614-1649) did not lead his powerful cavalry to merge with those 
Qing armies from the north at Xuzhou until the early spring of 1645. The Qing army 
took this city in early May. Ten days later, they reached the outskirts of Yangzhou m 
1'1'1. 
Three centuries later, in 1948, Lin Biao **mz (1907-1971) followed the footsteps 
of Dorgon ~~lt (1612-1651) to enter into north China from Manchuria. Meanwhile, 
Deng Xiaoping ~~I J \~ (1904-1997) and Liu Bocheng ~HËljf\ (1892-1986) as well as 
Chen Yi ~*~ (1901-1972) deployed their powerful armies in the south part of 
Shandong. The Chinese Communist Party exactly copied the above model and 
successfully defeated the main forces of the Nationalist armies. 
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Generally speaking, previous military history studies about this province usually 
focused on geographic, topographical or transportation aspects. 1 During this specifie 
1 For exarnple, Anon., "Lishi renwu yu dili de guanxi" mt§!::AfmW:f;llii.!é'-J!j~WA, Dongfang zazhi 20.5 
(March, 1923), 125-33. Rao Shengwen ~1m3t, "Qipan xing Zhongguo junshi dili geju"m!l!i~tp~'&l)J 
tlli3]!f~.r.u, in http://www.ornriitalk.com/rniliarch/rnessages/2703.html. 2005. Gu Yanwu, Tianxiajunguo 
libingshu 7ÇTW~flJ~~, in XXSKQS 595-97. Gu Zuyu UffŒl.~, Dushifangyujiyao Ht§l:::1JW*è~, in 
XXSKQS 600-09. Zhao XidingiM1fdWl, "Qing dai gesheng de zhengzhi zhidu" mf~~1tf!B"Ji&W:îf!5tlJjt, 
Lishi yanjiu 3 (1980), 153-64. Leif Littrup, Subbureaucratic Government in Ming Times: A Study of 
Shandong Province in the Sixteenth Century (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget ,1981). Philip C. C. Huang, 
Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985). 1 
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time of the Ming- Qing transition period, what 1 want to emphasize is the manpower 
resources - the most important prerequisite for the war itself. Only by doing so can we 
expect to understand why and how wars could be supported. To reach this goal, we 
must explore the specifie social structures of the province. 
1: 1. The special status of Shandong in military history 
Ming Shandong had almost the same area as it does today, about 150,000 sq. 
kilometers. There were 6 prefectures, 15 sub-prefectures, 89 counties, and they only 
changed very little in the early Qing. By 1578, the population was 5,664,099, and the 
number ofhouseholds was 1,372,260. Throughout the Shunzhi reign (1644-1661) of 
the Qing, the population increased to about 6,480,000.2 
ln the vast rural areas, especially in the west part of Shandong, most village 
families to sorne extent produced for the market as individual units. From this 
perspective, the village was more a neighborhood of separate peasant families pursuing 
their individual interests than a solidary collectivity. This preponderance of owner-
cultivators made for a greater presence of the state, and thus tended to contribute to a 
fuIler articulation of a village political organization to cope with state demands. 
Moreover, the low level of social stratification and rarity of elite members in rural 
lineages also meant the absence of elaborate and powerful kinship groupings such as 
those in the lower Yangzi or the Pearl River delta.3 
Accompanied with economic and commercial development, the sixteenth century 
is generally regarded as the time when elite influence over local communities began to 
accelerate. This coincided with the growing tendency to establish institutionalized 
Songgyu, "Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign: The Establishment of Local Control and the Gentry 
Response ", trans. Joshua A. Fogel, Ch 'ing-shih wen- n, 4.4 (Dec.1980), 1-34, (part one) and 4.5 (June 
1981), 1-31 (part two). Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (Berkeley: University of 
Califomia Press, 1987). 
2 An Zuozhang ~{'F3'~ ed., Shandong tong shi - Ming Qing Juan rll}jl,Œ!t§t:-EJlm~ (Jinan: Shandong 
renmin, 1994), 173-77. 
3 Philip Huang (1985), 29; Also see Joseph W. Esherick (1987), 1-37. 
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lineages which could perpetuate the power of certain families. The sources consulted 
by Leif Littrup have not revealed much information on the creation of such lineages in 
Shandong and their possible influence. His detailed study of sub-county administration 
in sixteenth century Shandong observes that he went looking for the growth of local 
gentry power that other scholars have noted for the late Ming, including the increasing 
interest among wealthy gentry in building lineages as a means of perpetuating the 
power oftheir families. Eventually, he concludes that there was not much evidence of 
gentry lineage-building in Shandong.4 
For the government, its encouragement of a smaIlholder economy at the expense 
of big estates is not surprising. SmaIlholders, after aIl, were a more accessible source 
of tax revenue than powerful big estate owners, and they were also far less politically 
threatening. 5 
However, Shandong people also had another tendency: they usually fled to other 
places where they could feed their stomachs during time of famine or suffering from 
high taxes. An early Qing edict also provided another clue to understand this tendency: 
Because families often had many sons and little land, "the people of Shandong 
easily left their homes without a second thought." In the worst cases, whole villages 
would take to the road to beg -carrying entire families, men, women and children with 
them. This long-established pattern of migration and mobility was an important aspect 
in the social structure of northwest Shandong villages. With people constantly moving 
in and out, villages were much more heterogeneous.6 
The above characteristics, especially the tendency of ordinary people to easily and 
frequently migrate, provide ample opportunities for the varying political and military 
forces to mobilize them for military purposes. They also enabled the central 
governments to know that only by controlling this area could they manage the entire 
empire effectively. For instance, at the end of 1948, the Communist effort at 
4 Littrup, 32. 
5 P. Huang (1985),86. 
6 Esherick, 1987,27. Even in the 1970s, 1 myselfstill witnessed this kind ofmobility during the winter and 
spring seasons. 
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mobilizing upward of 2 million peasants in the Xuzhou area to provide logistical 
support was directed by Deng Xiaoping. 7 
The situation was no different for the Manchus. Dorgon, the prince regent clearly 
realized that this province is the "gate" and "throat" of Beijing. 8 Within six months 
after taking Beijing, he sent Pacification Commissioner (Zhaofu 1t3~) Wang Aoyong 
::E.1i7k, Grand Coordinator (Xunfu ~~) Fang Dayou ht:.ttJ\ and Chen Jin ~*~ as 
weIl as Director- General of the Grand Canal (Hedu 1PJ1f) Yang Fangxing t~hJ! and 
others to be on dut y in this province. He also sent the powerful Manchu armies to the 
province in order to face the challenges from both the remnants of the Ming armies and 
the rebellious peasants operating there. Based on the specifie study of Chen Feng ~*~, 
in the early period of Shunzhi reign, the total number of soldiers of the Manchu army 
was about 23,000. At the end of Shunzhi reign, there were about 20,000. 9 
For those Manchu armies, due to simple and special dietary customs, they usually 
had no worries about logistics: every soldier could feed himself for about three 
months. lo In fact, the Manchus invaded Shandong three times before the Ming decline; 
each of these attacks saw Shandong suffering great damage. The scattered Ming 
garrisons could not face the forces of the powerful Manchu cavalry. II 
The Qing also realized that the financial health of the regime mainly depended 
upon clearing the roads (as well as the Grand Canal) through Shandong so that grain 
could be transported along them, and securing communications through this area so 
that merchants and goods could travel safely. If the dynasty adopted a policy of 
"soothing" (zhaofu) the populace by awarding amnesties, then its financial needs 
would be met. 
7 Jonathan D. Spence, The Searchfor Modern China (W.W. Norton & Company, 1990),508. 
8 Ming Qing shiliao bingbian, vol.5, 468. 
9 Chen Feng Il*~, Qing daijunfei yanjiu m{~ •• Uff~ (Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue, 1992),92-94. 
\0 Yang Shicong ~±l'!!, Jiashen hezhen lue 'i3 $~~1IIi!! (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, repr. 1985), 52. 
11 Ming Qing shiliao yibian, vo1.6, 525. See also "Introduction" part ofthis dissertation, pages 17-18 and 
the notes therein. 
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Considering aIl these aspects, the Qing urgently needed help and cooperation from 
the Shandong elite. Dorgon asked that those civil officiaIs who already worked for the 
Qing should "quickly make known the names of those of unusual talent and 
magnanimous virtue who have sunk into retirement, so that provision may be made for 
their recruitment." As Wakeman states, "one of the first to respond to Dorgon's 
invitation for the names of local collaborators was the new governor of Shandong, 
Wang Aoyong, who also held the honorary post of Vice- President of Revenue." 
Wang was from Shandong himself; he even encouraged localliterati to accept the 
new dynasty; and on Aug.13, 1644, he submitted an initial li st ofthirty-nine names of 
Shandong notables. Other nominations were also sent forward at this time by other 
officiaIs. Dorgon accepted most of these recommendations. And he also rewarded the 
Shandong landlords as an entire group by accepting Wang Aoyong's recommendation 
that the province's taxes be momentarily "forgiven"; and during the following year, 
1645, the tax burden be lightened for a longer period oftime. 12 
Wakeman also indicated that the majority of collaborators at that time were neither 
unemployed poets nor the literati from the south. Most of the fifty prominent officiaIs 
who joined the Qing government in 1644 and whose biographies are recorded in the 
1Sth - century compilation Erchenzhuan jt\;§ ft (Biographies of twice-serving 
ministers) were administrators in the capital. And, during the Chongzhen reign, 
roughly three-quarters of the ministerial officiaIs came from the north. This reversaI in 
the ratio between northerners and southerners mainly resulted from the large number of 
Shandong adherents: of all the Erchen surrendering in 1644, one-quarter was from this 
province. "It was Shandong that led by far in offering civilian support to staff the new 
Qing government in Beijing."J3 The sudden prominence of Shandong men in the early 
Qing was partI y due to the early pacification of their province, and partly to the ready 
identification of local elites with dynastie law and order in rebellious areas. 
12 Wakeman, 1985, vol. 1,437-38,424. 
13 Ibid. 
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Now, the real condition of the various social strata in the province before the 
arrivaI of the Manchus becomes the key to understand the reaction of the Shandong 
literati and the other gentry to the new Qing government. 
From 1 Songgyu's research, we know the process by which the Manchus 
conquered and controlled the Shandong area, and what the response from the local 
gentry was. It shows that the peasant bands posed an immense threat to the ruling 
structure of the landlords and gentry, thus forcing them to organize local militia and 
bravoes and to devise measures for self-protection in order to survive the crisis. The 
gentry hoped to preserve and secure their existing advantages under the Qing, and by 
fulfilling the se expectations the Qing won the acquiescence and support of the gentry. 
By investigating the showdown in Shandong province between gentry authority and 
local bandits, the surrender or resistance of the gentry to Li Zicheng regime, the 
process by which the gentry surrendered to the Qing, and the measures taken by the 
Qing toward them, his paper fills a scholarly void answering such questions as under 
what circumstances was help from Qing power requested by local militia groups 
seeking to protect themselves in the face of local bandit forces? Or, how did the gentry 
oppose bandits and establish their local power under the Qing? His conclusion is that 
the Qing's "success was attained by balancing three elements: state authority, peasant 
resistance, and the gentry's 'special interests. ",14 
However, since the author' s study only focused on the Jining ~. area, it could 
not cover the very complicated conditions of the entire province, especially the big 
difference between this area and the rest of Shandong. Furthermore, there are sorne 
limitations within the primary materials. For example, works such as Dingsi xiaoji JE 
JGVJ\~èI5 and other relevant data have has not been used. 
Both Wakeman and Littrup's studies share the same tendency of overstating the 
cooperation of the Ming officiaIs, literati and other local gentry with the Qing. We 
14 1 Songgyu, "Shantung in the Shun-chih Reign: The Establishment of Local Control and the Gentry 
Response", trans. Joshua A. Fogel, Ch 'ing-shih wen- t'i, 4. 4 (Dec.1980), 1-34 (part one) and 4.5 (June 
1981),1-31 (part two). 
15 Written by Liu Shangyou IUfirrbZ: who witnessed the events he describes. See Dingsi xiaoji, in Jiashen 
hezhen lue (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, repr.1985). 
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have to admit that, compared to southemers (Nanren mÀ), the northemers (Beiren ~t 
À) and especially Shandong people did have a tendency to cooperate with the 
Manchus rather easily. Other than the reasons mentioned by Wakeman above, it is also 
related to customs and even the language factors. However, his emphasis on the "high 
degree of violent class conflict in the province" before the Manchus arrived did shed 
light on conditions in the province. Comparing the resistance movements that took 
place in the Jiangnan and east Zhejiang later on, this observation would inspire us to 
examine the characteristic of local ethnic consciousness. 
The reasons that made previous scholars ignore the complicated responses of the 
Shandong people in the face of the Manchu invasion are because they mostly focused 
on the southwest and the border areas of the province. For example, Leif Littrup's 
study,1 Songgyù's excellent research on the Qing's local control and the response 
from the gentry and Sato Fumitoshi's *ltx1~ study on Li Qingshan's $J'!iw 
rebellion are examples among many others. 16 
ln fact, the eastem part of Shandong also provides us a chance to study different 
facets of the Shandong literati. The Jiaodong peninsula ~**~ was "a world of 
military personnel." By the latter stages of the Hongwu reign (1368-1398), there were 
9 Wei and 3 So, or a total of 53,760 military officiaIs and soldiers, plus their family 
members. The overall number reached about 160,000. The land was not fertile, and 
local residents had a tendency to move out, and the more they moved, the higher the 
population of the military residents was. 17 
By the end of 1642, the Manchu cavalry had encircled and attacked Weixian 1*'l~* 
(now named Weifang 1*'l:ljj) City for a whole week. The Regional Inspector of 
Shandong (W*~f1i:), Chen Changyan ~*§§ 1=1, and his colleagues received full 
cooperation from the local gentry and the civilians. The Manchus had to withdraw their 
16 See 1 Songgyu and Sato Fumitoshi f:5:ii?X:{3i:, "Dozoku Ri Seizan no ran ni tsuite - Minmatsu 
Kahoku nomin hanran no ichi keitai" ±jttr~JF~: ~ O)fIIL ,.:. J ~ ) l -l3jj*~::[ t~.R&fIIL O)-~~, 
Toyo gakuhO 53.3-4 (1971),117-63. 
17 Cao Shuji VW~, Zhongguo yiminshi - Ming dai CP~~.Rse.-l3jj{-ç (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1997), 
198-201. 
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anny even though they caused the city wall to collapse. 18 Several months later, the 
Manchu army reached Laizhou ~1\1\1 City. There, the defending Ming anny, got help 
from various forces: retired officiaIs such as a former minister (Shangshu ffiJ:;:) 
donated 4,000 taels of silver, a Grand Secretary (Daxueshi *~±) donated 3,000 
taels of silver; sorne juren and shengyuan also joined the defense - firing cannon, 
attacking the enemy, and so on. 19 
Basically, by about 1647, the Qing had reached its first goal in the establishment 
and consolidation of its authority in Shandong. To mobilize for war, in the early period 
of the Qing's rule Regent Dorgon ordered that the former Ming local civil and military 
administrative units should "prepare food and forage for the coming of the Manchu 
anny. As for the officiaIs and ordinary people, whether they used to serve Li Zicheng 
or not, ifthey surrender to the Qing they may get the relevant benefits." 20 However, 
these instances did not mean that the Qing were able to enjoy a peacefullife from then 
on. 
1: 2. Facing the Challenges: the Varions Facets of Literati 
The general historical background ofthat period is that the majority of the population 
of Shandong was always caught in a precarious balance between a full stomach and 
famine. The area was constantly subjected to natural calamities such as floods, 
droughts, locusts, or pests, which endangered the balance between food production and 
the size of the population. Each district and sub-prefecture reported such calamities at 
intervals of only a few years, and few if any of the districts avoided famine at least 
18 Ming Qing shiliao yibian, vol.5, 485-86. 
19 Ming Qing shiliao xinbian, vol. 1 0, 952- 53. 
20 Zheng Tianting ~::Rl!;, Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao aJl*§ll~JB~st:;f6!. (Beijing, Zhonghua, 1957), 
514. 
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once during the years span from 1550 to 1660?! ln 1641, a famous literatus Zuo Maodi 
~~5FJ (1601-1645) witnessed the catastrophe of drought: "the dead are everywhere 
along the roads" between Jinan and Yanzhou ;tv'I'I. It was said that about 40% of the 
population 10st their lives.22 This crisis of survival made the various social forces try to 
find their own ways to meet the challenges. In the following sections of this chapter we 
shall concentrate on the literati's military as well as their political activities. For the 
convenience of analysis, 1 would like to classify these social forces into specifie 
elements such as the Ming government, the rebellious peasants as well as the southern 
Ming regime, and finally, most importantly, the Manchu authorities. Using the 
changing political environment as clue, 1 shall first explore the military performance of 
the literati and their representatives - civil officiaIs in the face of the Manchu invasion. 
By the end of sixteenth century, the Ming army had a total of about 56,000 
officiaIs and soldiers in Shandong, plus 3,000 soldiers responsible for the protection of 
the transportation oftribute grain. 23 Basically, they only had very po or training and 
equipment. For instance, one soldier might get 6 dou ofrice every month in Dezhou. 
This amount could have fed him for about half a month, but if paid in its cash 
equivalent of 0.18 tael of silver a month, it could only purchase 3 days worth of 
grain.24 
With this army, there was no hope to rely on them to engage in the various 
military actions. Entering the seventeenth century, the first severe damage to the 
province came from the mutiny of Kong Y oude ::rLtH~. This rebellion was finally 
pacified in the early part of 1633. It lasted two years and affected 2 prefectures and 
more than 10 counties. A witness to the mutiny de scribes that, from Laizhou to the east, 
21 Littrup, 20-22. 
22 Ming Qing shiliao yibian, vol. 10,943. 
23 MSLLZ- JSSLJ, 1197. 
24 Ming Qing shiliao yibian, volA, 308. 
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an area of almost 300 li was destroyed and more than 100,000 people were killed.25 
From both Pingpan ji ZP:*.&~G and Chongzhen changbian %M~fiHI26 we have detailed 
records about the whole process, and there is no need to repeat them here. By this time, 
most of the Ming army had enjoyed more than two centuries ofpeacefullife. Its 
highest commander even took a sedan chair into the battlefield during the process of 
the pacification of the mutiny.27 
Another threat was from peasant rebellion, especially religious rebellion. During 
Ming times, there were more than twenty religious rebellions that took place in 
Shandong. In the Chongzhen reign, a total of five violent religious incidents took place 
throughout the whole empire, of which three were in this province. Among them, the 
biggest one was Xu Hongru's ~frJ,!1&f$ rebellion in 1622.28 
Xu's rebellion lasted 161 days from May 3 until October 16, 1622, when he was 
captured, and resulted in the occupation oftwo county cities, Teng ~ and Zou;~ 
counties for more than 100 days. Based on one source from Ming shilu, we know how 
a typical high ranking civil official treated the rebellion. 
When the rebellious army of the White Lotus sect Bji~j( reached its apex, Yu 
Dacheng 7.R::knlG, the Grand Coordinator of Shandong, did nothing but try to have the 
leader of the rebellion become his "swom brother", and help him to apply for a rank of 
nobility. Yu even exaggerated his achievement before the rebels had entered the border. 
25 MSLLZ- SDSLJ, 423. 
26 Both ofthem are in ZGYSJC 28. 
27 Pingpanji, in ZGYSJC 28,502. After the expulsion of the remnants of the Mongol forces from the north 
and the northeast, there foUowed two-and-a half centuries of relatively stable rule. The Ming only was 
briefly challenged in the borders, and suffered from Japanese pirates, who occasionally ravaged the coasts 
in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but they were no threat to Ming rule. 
28 For these aspects, at least the following studies should be mentioned: Daniel L. Overmyer, Folk Buddhist 
Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 
73-108; Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1976),63-66; 267-69, and sources cited therein. Also see Wang Jing :EjW, "Ming 
dai minjian zongjiao fan zhengfu huodong de zhuzhong biaoxian yu tezheng" aJ!fi;WFI"l'*f5(,&:J&Jffmlb 
~~fj~fflJ~!f,fîlE, Nankai xuebao 2 (1987), 28-36; Hu Yiya tiJ3-~, "Ming dai houqi Bailianjiao qiyi" 
aJ!fi;13tM8~f5(~~, in Zhongguo nongmin zhanzheng shi yanjiuhui, ed., Zhonguo nongmin zhanzheng 
shiyanjiujikan t:p~.W'~~.§I:liff~~ fU (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1982), vol.2, 81-90. 
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When the rebels finally came to Cao Zhou li)'['[ and the adjacent areas, they met no 
resistance, and the official armies could not expel them. For several months, what this 
Grand Coordinator did was just to let his subordinates report the "merit" (r}]) in order to 
avoid the consequences of damages caused by the war. When the rebellious sect retreated, 
the official armies chased in name, but in fact they "just liked to see them off'. Yu 
Dacheng kept this secret. As a Buddhist disciple, he emphasized "the prohibition of 
killing" (t!X:*~), what he knew was "to close his gate and read sutra" (MF~~m*~)?9 
At the end of 1622, Xu's main force was surrounded by government troops in 
Tengxian, and Xu finally was taken to Beijing and executed in the market place. 
Both Xu's army and other traditional types ofpeasant rebellious armies in this 
area were called local bandits and local pirates (tuzei ±M and tukou ±~) in the 
official documents. Although the Ming's military forces sometimes could meet their 
challenges, such as capturing Xu, they could not respond adequately to Li Zicheng's 
powerful rebellious army. 
Li's military potential increased relatively steadily and attained its apex in 1644. 
But his armies subsequently suffered a precipitous decline when opposed by the 
Manchu Banner army. Li Zicheng occupied Beijing in the spring. Because his regime 
had no regular source of income, he had to pay more attention to zhuixiang ~N/ÎiJ -
getting illicit money to help pay for the army. For the Shandong are a, he designated a 
few armies to gain control over the population in certain specifie strategie locations, 
and also sent his civil officiaIs to Shandong to try to manage the area. 
Faced with these new conditions, many Ming local officiaIs chose to surrender, 
including sorne ofConfucius's descendents. The Qufu fft:J~ hereditary Magistrate 
Kong Zhenkan fL~m even contributed 10 horses and 1,000 taels of silver, and sent 
staffto welcome Li's officiaIs in Linqing ~m, and knelt before them when they got to 
Qufu. Li' s officiaIs also reached the eastern part of the province such as Qingzhou W 
29 MSLLZ- SDSLJ, 583-84. 
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1'['[, Laizhou *1'['[ and Dengzhou ~1'['[. Since Li's regime did not have enough officiaIs 
to send, sorne appointed officiaIs (many of whom were Iiterati possessing the 
shengyuan degree and who came from the Shanxi area) went on dut y only with very 
few staff or even alone.3o In fact, Li's local officiaIs had to focus primarily on the 
getting "illicit money" and in the meantime had to ignore the management of local 
affairs. 
Based on Parsons's study, the Achilles heel of the late Ming rebel movement was 
its failure to translate military power into political power in the form of solid 
administrative structures. Sorne literati and other elite later joined the rebels but had no 
real opportunity to influence rebel policy at the earlier stage. The rebels showed very 
little interest in deliberately seeking their support, and there are only a few instances 
known when they attempted to persuade captured members of the localliterati and 
other gentry to join them. They were insignificant numerically, and many gave only 
half-hearted support at best; with a few exceptions, none of them ever attained a 
position ofreal power and influence. The rebels remained unreconciled with them.31 
Li's few armies in Shandong also had no suitable training and they were short on 
discipline. This stimulated a "united resistance" from the Ming government, most of 
the local gentry, and even from the so-called "Southem Ming" later on. When the Qing 
joined these struggles against Li, his regime became even weaker. 
After the Qing established its rule in Shandong, their deepest worry came from 
what 1 call "the integrating forces" which included the gentry, many ofwhom did not 
cooperate with the Qing, peasant rebels (both local predators and roving bandits), and 
elements of the Southem Ming regime mentioned below. The Qing could easily defeat 
any one of them on its own, but it had to prevent the combination of the above 
30 AlI the above materials are from Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi luncong bianji weiyuanhui ed., 
Zhongguo nongmin zhanzheng shi luncong tp ~ • .ERJI!~~ .§I::§lfB~ (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1982), vol.4, 
514-19. 
31 James Bunyan Parsons, The Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty (Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1969),206-16. 
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different forces into one. Xie Guozhen lists more than twenty peasant rebellions 
against the Manchu conquerors, sorne ofthem such as those of Yuqi fj~t, Xieqian 1lM 
~, and Renqi {-ft lasted for several years.32 In Ming Qing shiliao, Qing shilu and 
other primary sources, we can find a lot of data about how the Qing army united with 
the local officiaIs and gentry to fight against the peasant rebellions. 
Turning now to the Southern Ming government, let us see whether or not this 
government provided any help to the resistance against the Manchus in the Shandong 
area. 
In mid-June of 1644, the Ming Prince Fu 1iliEE was picked by sorne Ming officiaIs 
and generals to ascend the throne in Nanjing, and the following year was declared to be 
the first year of the Hongguang 51,.7'6 Reign. This is the so-called Southern Ming 
regime. Scholarship in the West has not paid enough attention to the relationship 
between this reign and Shandong. Usually the Southern Ming regime is deemed to 
have been "powerless" to do anything in the province and the rest ofnorth China.33 
Similarly, Chine se scholars have criticized the Southern Ming regime because it was 
short of "strategie vision" and lacked confidence to affect Shandong and to organize an 
effective defense against the Qing.34 
Facing the threat from peasant rebellions and the Manchu invasion, the Shandong 
literati and the other gentry tried to get in touch with the Southern Ming. After the 
Ming lost control in Shandong, it is said that the local village bravoes and militias were 
more than 100,000 in this area, but both the Grand Coordinator of Shandong and 
Denglai were in the Huai'an area rl3ï: ofNanzhili. The Southern Ming several times 
pressed them to return to their duties in Shandong, but received no answer.35 
32 Xie Guozhen ~~;f!1, Nan Ming shi lue ~"'J.l3t:1Bâ (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1957), 103. 
331 Songgyu, Part one, 15. 
34 Gu Cheng.li~, Nan Ming shi m SJ.l3t: (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian, 1997),94-101. 
35 Li Qing $1f, Nandulu millt~,juan 4, in NMSL BZ, 314. 
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According to archivaI sources, sorne high officiaIs such as the Grand Coordinator and 
the Regional Commander (zongbing *~~) of the Southem Ming regime only sent a 
few people to enter into those regions of Shandong where there was no Qing army to 
engage in sorne propaganda activities.36 
On April 17, 1644, Ming officiaIs, including a Censor (yushi ~Ji:), a Judge 
(tuiguan fffêD and the local gentry, organized to repel Li's regime in Dezhou. They 
killed his local officiaIs such as Defense Commissioner (jangyushi ~jj~ Ji:) and 
Prefectural Govemor of Dengzhou (Dengzhou Mu ~1Ntn and elected a member of 
the Ming imperial clan as Prince of Ji (Jiwang ~~.:E). This Dezhou Incident was the 
tuming point for Li' s rule in Shandong because it triggered a series of rebellions in 
more than fort Y prefectures and counties in the province. 
In Laiyang *~, "the thieves and the bandits were everywhere." After the Ming 
magistrate fled, Li's magistrate also had to leave his office. The local gentry Song 
Huang *$ sent his cavalry to Wendeng:3t~ and killed Li's official. A shengyuan 
named Yang Wei mmIG from Zhaoyuan m:ii who secretly accepted a title from the 
Southem Ming as Vice -Regional Commander, led more than one thousand people and 
occupied the county city.3? 
According to Liu Zeqing ;rJ~m (1603-1648), the Ming General Commander of 
Shandong, this shengyuan's name was Yang Sigun mjIJJjt, who changed his name to 
"Wei" (mIG, literally "authority" in Chinese) to express his resentment at both the 
peasant rebellion and the Manchu invasion. He also gave up his career as a shengyuan 
in order to pursue a military career ~:3tJJi~:ltt. The Board ofWar let him attach 
himselfto Liu Zeqing. One year later, Liu sent him to the east coast of Shandong to 
organize xiangyong ~~~. He hired and trained more than one thousand local militia, 
"becoming a powerful army.,,38 
36 Gu Cheng, 98. 
37 Laiyang xianzhi ~~~*it (Minguo .œ~), last chapter, fuji· Bing ge ~t~ë';~1j!i:, np., nd. 
38 Ming Qing shiliao yibian, vo1.6, 540. For xiangyong and rest of other local forces, see page 68 ofthis 
chapter and notes therein. 
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Many of these local militia units, especially those in northwestem Shandong, had 
already been mobilized to fight against the peasant regime. However, in fact, they 
could not get any assistance from the Southem Ming regime. The eminent scholar-
official Xie Sheng ~7t (jinshi 1607) was not favorably disposed toward the Nanjing 
regime. Appalled by Li Zicheng's depredations and impressed by the Manchus' 
transformation into a host ofvirtuous avengers, Xie Shengjoined with more than fort Y 
other leading members of the Shandong gentry and sent a representative to Beijing to 
get in touch with the Qing govemment. Their coming coincided with the Qing's urgent 
demands to secure the province, and so it was natural that they formed an alliance. 
We also have many cases that show sorne of the Shandong literati keeping their 
dignity and refusing to serve the aliens. Yang Shichong f~±m~, the author of Jiashen 
hezhen lue publicly refused to serve the Qing: 
l would like to live in the hills and woods till my death (*~t5 L.U;f,f), and to be 
hermit of the Qing. Fish in the water and birds in the sky, each one may find its 
suitable way to live.39 
Another example is Zheng Xingqiao t~~{fjj (juren 1636). He joined the resistance 
movement to fight against the peasant rebellion, trying to protect the transportation line 
of the Grand Canal. After the Manchu army occupied Shandong province, he fled to 
the South with his family members. Later on, he joined Shi Kefa' s Yangzhou 
resistance, and fled to Hangzhou after the faU of Yangzhou. He steadfastly refused to 
serve the Qing.40 
GeneraUy, the attitude ofthese Ming literati and other gentry toward Li's regime 
was not uniform. Sorne of them chose to cooperate with it in order ta survive. When 
Li's army pursued zhuixiang, they began to try to fight against this peasant regime: 
they killed and expelled Li's officiaIs and tried to resume Ming authority. Faced with 
the Qing, the attitude they had was even more contradictory. In fact, the Qing knew 
39 Yang Shichong m±~J~, 54-55. 
40 He Lingxiu fBJ~l~, "Shi Kefa Yangzhou dushi qijian de mufu renwu" §!:ï:iJ1tJ~1H'l-Biljjt~Fs~B"J;;;Rt.A 
fo/j, Yan jing xuebao, New series, 4 (1998), 73. 
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and understood what they thought and what they had done. Although deserters "living 
in the woods and hills" were offered amnesty in return for reporting to their former 
unit, it was evidently not altogether easy to bring unruly Ming military units under 
central control. An edict from the Qing prince-regent dated September 17, 1644, reads: 
Many of the local military personnel who surrendered are like rab bits suspiciously 
looking two ways at once. Seeing the shape ofthings, they pretend to tender their 
allegiance, but still harbor misgivings. These kinds of people are merely seeking 
[an opportunity] to commit crimes. Even though they have obvious merits, it is 
still hard for them to redeem themselves. From now on, only those who are truly 
able to painfully correct their former faults and who can keep their word will have 
the same rank as before. As for ignorant and mean people, whether they took 
advantage of disorder to commit rape, or in fear of punishment turned into outlaws, 
they too will be forgiven their former crimes. They are permitted to renew 
themselves, return to their native places, and enjoy their occupations. But ifthey 
are obdurate and irreclaimable, then we must decisively kill and exterminate them, 
and not be lenient.41 
Finally, others surrendered; while yet others had no choice but to accept alien rule. 
A few of them even engaged in military activities against the Qing and were executed. 
For the rest of the chapter, 1 will focus on these types of people. 
The four months from the Dezhou Incident to the Qing's pacification of Shandong 
in August 1644 provide us with enough evidence to analyze the performance of the 
local military forces. 
The rural society of late-Ming witnessed a boom in agricultural production as well 
as significant changes in the social order and social structure. In order to keep public 
order, the Ming dynasty took a variety of measures. Especially, it inherited the Lijia lE 
41 Quoted from Wakeman, 1985, voU, 417-18. 
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Ej3 and Baojia f*Ej3 systems. These two systems were created for a static society, and 
in this respect they must be regarded as a considerable achievement of the early Ming 
bureaucracy. However, there are no primary materials which show that these kinds of 
local administrative units played any role in the Ming- Qing transition period in this 
province. Littrup's book did provide sorne information about both baojia and xiangyue 
~~i%'3, but it seems that there are no actual methods which allow us to measure the 
baojia system and its implementation. "They did not enforce a uniform system.,,42 
From the perspective of military affairs, the local military forces are very 
complicated in their names and organizational structures. "We read, for instance, in an 
account of the defense of Zhangqiu against rebels in 1647 that the government forces 
consisted of: (1) regular garrison troops under army captains; (2) yamen police 
commanded by a constable (bu), who also led a contingent of "housemen" (jiading); (3) 
the personal housemen of the prefect (at that moment Prefect Chen led his personal 
housemen to block off the street entrance); (4) the personal housemen of a former 
Ming soldier and local magnate (the Ming Captain Yu Dahai and others commanded 
their housemen); village militia (xiangbing) specially assembled to defend the city, and 
led by local gentry (xiangshen).,,43 
In general terms, the Great Ming Code (Da Ming lü *E!)j1=ft) lists the items of the 
military arms which were prohibited to be privately possessed. Other relevant laws 
included prohibitions against the private sale of military equipment and war horses. 
But in the late Ming times, most officiaIs took it for granted that most households 
possessed such weapons as cudgels, bows and arrows, knives, spears, and swords. 
They wanted to take advantage of the widespread presence of arms in society to 
strengthen local security. Thanks to previous studies, we know sorne facts about them, 
42 Almost ail the studies about the baojia system have focused on the mid- and early Ming, and no concrete 
research available in the Ming-Qing transition time. See, Littrup, 160-70; John R. Watt, The District 
Magistrale in Late Imperial China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), chapters, 8-10; for a 
Chine se book, see Wen Juntian 1iFJ~$J7(, Zhongguo baojia zhidu t:pID&J{*Efl~U~ (Shanghai: Shangwu, 
1935), 171-272; Also see Zhu Shaohou **gfl~ et al., Zhongguo gudai zhi 'an zhidu shi r:pID&J~1-\:;Yéî3(~U 
~j: (Zhengzhou: Henan daxue, 1994),605-32, 715-43. For more information, see also page 44 ofthis 
dissertation. 
43 Wakeman, 1985, voU, 433. 
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such as the similarities and differences between the military forces in the various areas, 
and their organizations, and even sorne oftheir economic backgrounds.44 For example, 
it is clear that "minzhuang" .§;';M± was one kind of local militarized force controlled by 
the government in the late Ming times, while "xiangbing" ~~~~ was only controlled by 
the local gentry or other elite such as merchants. Those Xiangbing were involved in 
militia training during the winter, after autumn crops had been harvested and before 
spring agricultural activities had begun. They had only one function, which was to 
provide protection for local society. There was no relation with the local government. 
And, we also know that the soldier's pay and provisions in the minzhuang had no 
guarantee. As for the "xiangbing", it was usually composed by "baojia" and "tuanlian" 
111**. Sometimes, xiangyong ~~~:OO or yiyong~:OO are also called "Tuanlian." There 
were big differences between regions, and the leaders of the forces also have different 
names depending on the region. For instance, we may find sorne titles like "lianzong" 
***~, "tuanzhang" III~, or "baozhang" 1*~.45 
Littrup' s study shows that "the key to the eventual consolidation of Qing control 
over Shandong was the interlocking ofthis system ofpersonally-Ied militia with 
officially supplied and appointed regular troops under the command of the central 
government." These militiamen were organized into individual brigades (ying fit), and 
further assembled into "families" (jia *) of eighty to one hundred soldiers under their 
own militia commander (lianzong). As "house-men" (jiading *T) they were 
personally loyal to the local lords and magnates who fed and clothed them. This semi-
feudal relationship was actually nurtured by the civil authorities: the governor himself 
provided funds to pay the personal troops "under the banner" (biaoxia ~J~) of each 
44 Chen Baoliang ~15it~, "Ming dai de rninbing yu xiangbing" I3jH~é"J~Ji;.:W~~Ji;., Zhongguo shi yanjiu 1 
(1994), 82-92; Wu Han ~~, "Ming dai de junbing "I3JJ1-1Çé'JlJJi;.", in Dengxia ji :kIf~ ~ (Beij ing: Sanlian, 
1961); Liang Fangzhong m:1J1$, "Ming dai de rninbing" I3JJ{~é"J~Ji;., Liang Fangzhong jingji shi wenji 
bubian, m:1J{q:t*~~§!::X~fm*j (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji, 1984); Li Guangtao $*13, Ming Qing 
shi lunji I3JJffl §!:~jjjJ~ (Taiwan: Shangwu, 1971). 
45 For these kinds oflocal forces, see notes rnentioned above. Esherick's description about the local rnilitary 
forces of Shandong in the late- nineteenth century is also relevant here: Landlords would organize local 
rnilitia, but they wou Id also expect their tenants to join in the protection of the locality. Unlike the late 
Ming period, villages becarne very tight-knit cornrnunities now, well-fortified against outside threats, and 
typically subject to the absolute rule of sorne leading farnily. See Esherick (1987), 23. 
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commander. The same principle of personalloyalty as well as the official recognition 
of individual units of "housemen under the banner" of a commander was extended to 
higher-Ievel military units. At the prefecturallevel, there were assemblages of troops 
known generally as guards units (zhen ~). And, in addition to the large contingent of 
personally-commanded housemen under the local gentry, there were also housemen 
under regular Qing officiaIs. Moreover, the personal forces of local gentry could be 
transferred from one district to another as the need arose. What came to be called 
"skilled braves" (yiyong) by the govemor in his reports to Beijing thus became a major 
force behind Qing rule.46 
The local gentry's armies could easily cooperate with those of the govemment if they 
faced a common threat from rebels. In the spring of 1641, The Regional Inspector of 
Shandong (J1r:~lU~f1(), Li .Tingu *lli:~, complained that he had a very few soldiers to 
pacify the rebellion in the southwest of the province along the Yellow River. Since there 
was no help from Beijing, he had to ask for assistance from the local gentry. To cooperate 
with him, twenty local gentry led their own forces, numbering more than two thousand 
family forces (qinding~JtT) to help and they killed "countless" rebels.47 
This kind of local force also could be used to meet the Manchu invasion. In 1642, 
a member of the gentry "mustered four hundred able-bodied tenants to make up a 
family militia and got together fi ft y draft horses and donkeys with carts and enough 
weapons and firearms to arm everyone." To counter roaming rebels, he and other 
gentry raised a cavalry force and another four thousand men from the private militias 
of the great families of the region to drive them back.48 But when the Manchu armY 
controlled the province, none of these men could get support from the Southem Ming. 
In fact, their resistance to the Manchu invasion lasted only until August. Under the 
46 Littrup, 30-32. 
47 Zheng Tianting, 328. 
48 Timothy Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China (Berkeley: 
University of Califomia Press, 1998), 241-43. 
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pro gram of amnesty and enlistment developed by Fang Dayou most ofthem had to 
surrender to the Qing.49 
Under this new authority, these local forces found they could easily get help from 
the government in the pacification of the bandits in the southwest region of Shandong. 
Early in the Shunzhi reign, a large number of bandits tried to attack Zouxian City. The 
Grand Coordinator ordered the nearby regions of Qufu 8±i~, Tengxian ~9f,* and 
Dongping *ZJS to provide aid. These three counties provided two hundred cavalrymen 
in total; the general director of militia (lianzong ***~) of Zouxian provided more than 
eight hundred infantrymen. AH of them were weIl trained and could be deployed right 
away. The Qing gave them three hundred taels of silver for logistical support and sent 
one official to each unit (ying) to supervise them. 50 
1: 3. Literati and Local Military Forces 
For both local elite and the local military forces, the primary concem was to gain or 
ensure security in order to protect their interests and privileges. Sorne of them did not 
even care about the issue of ethnicity when they were facing attack from the Manchus. 
When the Manchu army planned its attack against Gaotang, aIl the gentry were 
afraid of it. By that time, the tribute silver of Jiangxi province happened to be passing 
by, so they forced the Subprefectural Magistrate (Zhizhou ~D1\[\[) to give this silver to 
the Manchus, a total of 100,000 taels, and therefore the Manchus did not attack the 
city. 51 
Based on their personal experience, sorne Ming officiaIs paid attention to the local 
forces, andthey assumedthat the Southem Ming might use them against both Qing 
49 Fogel's English translation was confused about this name, and Wakeman's quotation also did not 
indicate this mistake (Wakeman, 1985, vol.l, 433); instead of "xian" ft "you" @:i\ is correct. 
50 Xie Guozhen jf~~, Qing chu nongmin qiyi ziliao zilu mfJJJ.m~jfj;\~JiM (Shanghai: Shanghai 
renmin, 1957), 79. 
51 Li Qing *lff, Sanyuan biji ..:::J1I*§ê (Beijing: Zhonghua, repr, 1982), 15. 
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and Li Zicheng's peasant regime.52 After the Qing occupied Beijing, a Ming official 
named Zhang Yi 1.&'I'Ét left the city and fled to the south, and described what he saw 
and heard along the road: 
Entering the border of Dezhou, the village bravoes united. They use "exterminate 
the bandit and support the Ming" as their slogan; everywhere it is same. When 1 
got to Jinan, there were several thousands belonging to a "Hui army" who united. 
The army was in good order and their equipment was reasonably good. They 
blocked the river and checked every passing boat along the bank; the road also 
was blocked by earth; cavalry could not pass by. Even the ordinary people also 
took suitable measures to fortify the defense. AlI of them were looking forward to 
the army's coming from the Southem Ming. When meeting with the people who 
came from the South, they always wanted to hear news about Shi Kefa (as 
Minister of the Board of War of the Southem Ming, Shi was the highest military 
official in the Jiangbei area) and his army. Were we to use them now, great 
achievements would be realized. 53 
A man named Ding Yaokang T%l1C (1599-1669) witnessed the military conflicts 
in the coastal area of Shandong. He also issued this kind of suggestion: 
Now the big clans usualIy have their own military forces to protect themselves, 
what they need is the status. Supposing we provide sorne blank certificates of 
appointment and let themjoin the army, we may gather several thousands 
immediately.54 
52 Even now sorne Chinese scholars still insist that it could have happened, see Gu Cheng, chapter 3. 
53 Gu Cheng, 95. 
54 Ding Yaokang TŒ1C, "Chujie jilue i±\M*è~," in Ming shi ziliao congkan 13f13t:JJ;jêj.iïfU 2 (Nanjing: 
Jiangsu renrnin, repr., 1982), 154-56. Eventually, those local forces did get three thousand rnilitia later on. 
They were disbanded after the Manchus consolidated their rule. 
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Another personal experience shows us that Shandong was facing a very 
complicated political and military situation. In his book Jiashen hezhen lue, Yang 
Shicong, another Ming official who left Beijing on June 5, 1644, provides a lot ofvivid 
and detailed information about what happened along the road to the south. 
By mid-July of 1644, he had arrived at Jining City. The local militia leader Li 
Yunhe *ft~D and others came to see him and asked him to be their leader. He replied 
that the Qing official in Tianjin had asked him to be on dut y there, but he refused to do 
so. "If 1 am on dut y here, 1 will come into conflict with the Qing in every respect. This 
will make them angry and they will send an army to suppress the region." Furthermore, 
"1 did not obey the Qing's rule and decided to go South; the main purpose is to caU on 
our new Ming emperor." Had he just stayed there, and became a Qing official, how 
would he be any different than those others (who were "turncoats")? 
Jining City used to have a basic defense system. After the arrivaI of Li Zicheng's 
army, the local Ming officiaIs surrendered. On May 12th, the Jining gentry Pan 
Shiliang 1I±.â and others could no longer tolerate Li's policies that required them, 
for example, to "donate silver," and so they asked a Hui army to enter into the city. 
This army captured and killed Li's officiaIs and generals. The leader of the Hui army 
was named Yang Pu fJ!~, and he appointed the local administrative officiaIs and 
appointed himself as a Vice-Regional Commander. Furthermore, according to the 
agreement with the army, the local gentry promised to give them a suitable monetary 
reward. Because they could not pay it on time, General Yang led his troops to force 
Pan to deliver the money. Thereafter, Pan lost his powers and influence and could not 
bestir himself again. General Yang also could not cooperate with his own colleagues. 
On June 24, another leader named Mi Jizhong **ir:p killed Yang and his entire 
family. Mi also appointed himself as Vice-Regional Commander, and nobody could 
now question his authority. Since this time, he did not care about the local gentry or 
their interests. 55 
55 Yang, 46-47. 
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AIl of the above shows us a much more complicated situation than any revealed in 
other sources. For one thing, the local leaders, including both the officiaIs and the 
gentry, only considered how to administer the local society. If anything were to happen 
that might disturb the peace of local society, they chose to avoid it. When the Li 
Zicheng peasant regime came, most Ming local officiaIs not only obeyed its rule, but 
also actively co-operated with it. The most important point to note is that the data 
illustrates the real relationship between the local elite and the other local social forces. 
Unlike in South China or the Jiangnan area (as we mentioned in the first part ofthis 
chapter), in Shandong province and most parts of the north China plain, the local 
gentry in fact could not control rural society, and most especially, local military forces. 
What they wanted from the local military forces was for them to pacify the peasant 
rebellions, but the local military forces, of course, had their own agenda: getting power 
and money from the local society and gentry, and they did not care where or from 
whom these benefits came. Since this kind of "independent force" also played a crucial 
role in Shandong society, scholars both in China and abroad in ignoring them have in 
fact left a gap in their description of the conditions of the time. 
As mentioned above, Littrup's study only focused on the Jining area, and he 
claimed that "the local militia was under the command of the district magistrates and 
intimately connected to the civil subbureaucratic government system," and because of 
that, "we can hardly regard it as part of an independent military hierarchy."s6 
Findings from my own research about the se local forces compel me to strongly 
disagree with his conclusions. The above data already showed that the local 
government, in fact, could not completely control the military forces. We have enough 
materials to show that these local forces not only played their own crucial role in rural 
society, but sometimes might have even gone further ifthey coIlaborated with the local 
literati or other elite groups. 
To assure their survival and their own interests, the localliterati and other gentry 
also might unite and co-operate with any forces, or they might oppose and resist any 
other forces from the outside. These local gentry and the local militia could act 
56 Littrup, 30-32. 
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independently, but they might also unite. For example, in mid-October of 1647, ajuren 
degree holder named Lu Shen fi!4t1$ ordered his own militia to co-operate with the 
bandit Wang Hongxiang .:f.5.b~, creating an organization of about three thousand men 
which proceeded to occupy the county town of Tangyi '§tÉ5.57 
The Ming central govemment used to have nothing to do with the local gentry, 
while Li's peasant regime had no time to demonstrate its power. At the beginning of 
the Qing, there were almost no changes in these conditions. In the spring of 1647, the 
Shunzhi emperor had to admit that at the present time sorne local officiaIs and their 
relatives, clan members, old and evil gentry had brought great harm to the ordinary 
people. Usually they seized property and land (from the people). They not only bullied 
and humiliated the people, but also refused to pay tax to the govemment. The local 
govemment was afraid ofthem, thus the ordinary people had to pay (for them), so that 
the rich became even ri cher and the poor people even poorer. The bad habits of the 
former Ming were still in existence. 58 
Sorne independent local military forces belonged to the peasants. Most ordinary 
peasants engaged in their rebellions simply as a result of the harsh conditions of their 
lives, such as famine and so-called "exploitation" by landlords or officiaIs. Since the 
basic living conditions were always their primary concem, they cared little about 
where the real authority of rural society came from, or who controlled it most of the 
time. These ordinary people might support or oppose any forces; their actions 
depended on whether or not someone or sorne forces could provide the me ans that they 
needed to survive. This is why they might simply select either rebellion or surrender. 
In 1640, there was a local predator Ma Yingshi 1~~~Jt in the southwest of 
Shandong who began as a thief and organized more than 10,000 people. Within five 
years he had surrendered to the Ming regime six times, and had also become Li 
57 Ming Qing shiliao bingbian, vol. 7, 645-46. 
58 Qing shilu m.~ 3, ce 3, Shizu shi/u titffi'§'.~, juan 31 (Beijing: Zhonghua, repr., 1985),255. 
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Zicheng's official. He plundered Yuncheng îIm:f:nlG, Juye E!T and the rest of the region 
of southwest Shandong: " ... the ignorant people all enrolled in his force. ,,59 
Ma was not the only one. Another peasant rebelleader called Li Qingshan *~rl! 
was even more famous. It is said that he and his brother "did not consider money to be 
important, and they liked to get in touch with rascals." So they had many followers.6o 
He also switched between surrender and rebellion quite often. 
The most important group ofpeasant rebels came from the Manjia Dong 1jtffi~#lJ 
area, along the north-south highway in Yanzhou prefecture and alongside the Grand 
Canal in Jiaxiang mf1$. The confederations of peasants were loosely allied, and acted 
under leaders who ruled the countryside as they wished. Neither the local gentry nor 
the Ming or Qing government could control them. They did not stop their resistance 
against the Qing unti11655.61 
If the localliterati who possessed a "good reputation" suffer~d from poverty, they 
might provide sorne help. If somebody was grievously wronged, they would retaliate 
for him. From the point of view of the peasants, the literati deserved to be respected 
because they were "you xue wen l:f*FI=1~ (they are men oflearning)." In sorne cases, 
the peasant forces even integrated with the literati. One of Yu Qi' s staff secretaries was 
a famous poet from Laiyang. A clan head from Haiyang mJl3!h also joined his action to 
fight against the Qing. The Elm Forest Army (Yuyuanjun fIfr1l11l'1[) of the southwestern 
region mobilized thousands of people to fight against the Ming, and later to resist the 
Qing. Many ofthem were famine victims who joined the armY out of desperation. 
Their actions devastated much of the surrounding countryside, and came to an end only 
when a Yellow River flood left them with no place to flee to. In the latter period of 
their existence, Ye Tingxiu ~g*, a disciple of the very famous Confucian literatus, 
Liu Zongzhou, came to join this army. He also connected with another famous poet of 
59 Zheng Tianting ~7ÇtM, Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao I3J.1*.~~~§I::;f8I- (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1957), 
475, and Ming Qing shiliao xinbian, vol. 7, 613. 
60 Ming shi ziliao congkan 2, 40 (from "pishuo" ,vol. 2, "Li Qingshan"). 
61 Wakeman (1985), voU, 431-32. 
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this area Yan Ermei Immfm (1603-1679) to get his help in organizing a more effective 
resistance against the Qing.62 
Since the PRC was founded in 1949, the role ofpeasant rebellions has received 
more attention in China for more than three decades, and this role was deemed as the 
"motive" for history development. Whether we agree or not with this statement, the 
attitudes and the actions of the ordinary peasants and their own local forces really were 
the most important factors. It is they who decided the real fate of rural society. In 
addition, it was they who were always there, and they always fought against war, 
turmoil, and famine itself and their rebellions were also the result of their sufferings. 
Meanwhile, they did not care who the leader in name of rural society was. For this 
specifie period, previous studies either emphasized the "united control" of the 
Manchu - Han elites and landlords, such as the studies from Mainland China, or the 
role of local gentry, such as Leif Littrup's analysis mentioned above, and also Timothy 
Brook's book on the gentry of Late Ming times.63 As Brook indicated, Kuhn's 1970 
study oflocal militarization during the Taiping Rebellion revealed the process by 
which the local gentry came to be involved in overseeing local administration in 
formaI, rather than the previously informaI, ways. The gentry's enhanced power 
stemmed originally from military service but spread to many other are as of local 
management, with the result that they came to share public authority with the local 
magistrates in ways that were to last through the Republican period. "Other China 
scholars, notably Keith Schoppa and Mary Rankin, followed Kuhn's lead," shift the 
focus from militarization to the full range of political and economic functions, even 
dubbing them "the local managerial public sphere.,,64 Esherick's study goes even 
further: the sparse gentry presence in the west of Shandong Province resulted in "a 
particular proclivity for heterodox activity", thus arose "the origins of the Boxer 
62 Xie, (1 957b ), 11. 
63 Brook (1998), 252-53. 
64 Timothy Brook, Prayingfor Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late- Ming China 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), 25. 
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Uprising." 65 But real conditions were more complicated than were previously 
imagined. In September of 1644, the Qing govemor Fang Dayu said "fan shoufu 
difangjiyi xing wen bu rua mianshang" fL~)(tM,tt!r1J~1l1=r:x/G;;S:ŒOJtij, 66 which 
means, "consulting personally is better than official communication for all matters 
re1ated to the local pacification and its incorporation into our own force." We have to 
consider these complex factors. 
The crux ofChinese rural society, or even the entire country's final fate depended 
on whether or not there was a certain political force which could integrate and lead the 
other forces, especially the far more numerous peasants. 
Traditionally, the rebellious peasants always "wiped out the evil households." This 
is why they could get the support of the ordinary people. From the perspective of the 
local gentry, since these kinds of disturbances took place often and in fact in most 
cases no help.could be expected from the govemment, either in the Ming or in the 
Qing later on, they had to organize their own military forces to defend themselves. For 
the area where there were no topographical advantages, they usually built "tuzhai"±Wf: 
with earth to defend themse1ves in the plains area. 67 This tendency became more and 
more prevalent up until the twentieth century. Elizabeth Perry shows that the Red 
Spears of the North China plain in the 1920s was a movement of dispersed village 
communities that took up arms to protect themselves from different forces, inc1uding 
the Japanese invasion. Usually these kinds of "purely self-defense organizations" only 
fought when their homes were threatened. 68 
For their survival, the primary concem of the local forces, regardless which social 
strata they belonged to, was always to keep or enlarge their own influence in every 
aspect. This is why we find numerous examples of local military leaders becoming 
turncoats. The most famous one in the Ming-Qing transition is General Liu Zeqing, 
65 Esherick (1987),36-37. 
66 Ming Qing shiliao bing bian, vol.5, 436. 
67 Li Wenzhi *3tm, Wan Ming /iukou B$ËSJ.jrAE7fl (Taibei: Shihuo, repr., 1983),209. 
68 Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China 1845-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1980), 152-207. Also see P. Huang (1985), 30. 
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the General Commander of Shandong. Liu was born in Caozhou fl 1+1, Shandong 
province. He always tried to find a suitable official position and benefits from the 
Ming dynasty, the Southern Ming Reign, and the Qing govemment. Entering the 
twentieth century, General Wu Huawen ~1t3t (1904-1963) is another even more 
famous example. He first betrayed his boss Feng Yuxiang m~.3S:t.f. (1882-1948) in the 
warlord period in order to get help from Jiang Jieshi ~frE (1887-1975), and then he 
surrendered to the Japanese as a traitor, and then turned back to Jiang again. Finally he 
became a general of the People's Liberation Army under the control of the Communist 
Party of China, and led his 35th Army to occupy Nanjing -- Jiang's capital in April of 
1949. He mightjoin with or oppose any of the above forces based on his need at the 
time. 
1: 4. Rebel or Qing: Who Was the Primary Enemy? 
It is not very easy from the perspective of military action to make a brief conclusion 
about the behavior of the Shandong literati or the behavior of the local elite in other 
areas. Faced with various threats and crises, they responded in different ways. 
Fortunately, ajinshi from Huizhou 1M&1H ofNanzhili - Ling Jiong ~,IïJ, provides us 
with a vivid example to examine how a typical Confucian literatus faced the challenges 
from both peasant rebellions and the "barbarian" invasion. At first, he deemed the 
peasants as the most important threat, while treating the Manchu army as an outside 
force which could be cooperated with to fight against the rebels. When he began to 
realize the Manchu's real threat, it was too late and he had no choice but to sacrifice 
his life.69 
69 Gu Cheng aiso used Ling Jiong as example to emphasize the oscillation of the Ming officiaIs wh en faced 
with the Manchu army, but he condemned them for being "busy without purpose" (§~'I'L)- since they did 
not collaborate with peasant army to fight against the Manchu army "(Gu Cheng, 96). 
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Based on the materials available now, we may explore his activities starting from 
the time he received hisjinshi degree in 1643, until his death in March 1645. 
Ling Jiong's initial official position was director of Zhifangsi of the Board ofWar 
(~$~:1JRJ±$).70 He was sent to Shanxi ilig§ to supervise an army led by Li 
Jiantai *~*. When Li Zicheng's peasant army occupied that province and most 
parts of Beizhili, Li Jiantai surrendered to the peasant army, but Ling Jiong insisted on 
fighting against the rebellion. In the battle of Zhending.JE city, it is said he was hit 
by six arrows and was- eut by swords six times. Finally he fell down close to a well; the 
rebels thought he was dead.71 He spent three months totally recovering from serious 
wounds. 
After this battle he went to Linqing in Shandong. With the other local elite, he 
organized military action to try to expel Li Zicheng's army. There were approximately 
several hundred people under his control. They successfully arrested Li's general 
Wang Huangji 3::~;@, and announced that what the rebels relied on was only "faise 
righteousness and empty reputation" (jiayi xusheng ~~Jft§). Usually, the se rebels 
simply claimed to exempt taxes and tended to exaggerate their forces. A lot of people 
welcomed these rebels, but finally they suffered from what they did: these rebels levied 
money from both officiaIs and merchants, everybody suffered from severe punishment; 
the rebellious generals and soldiers raped women, regardless whatever they were 
widows or underaged; "their local officiaIs had only one dut y, that was to get money 
from worthy households."n 
Since Ling raised up his flag fighting with the rebels, a lot of local forces came to 
join him from both the areas of Shandong and Hebei. In his Ming ma zhanglie jishi f!Ij 
*J~r.a*ê,., Xu Bingyi provided not very clear and basically wrong information about 
Ling's initiallogistical support. He claimed that Ling "using the money from 
70 He was thus responsible for maintenance of military maps, the manning of frontier fortifications and 
signal systems, functions performed by the Board ofWar. 
71 Zhang Dai il-IH:ù, Shikui shu EII~ Juan 33, Ling Jiong liezhuan ~~1:IDl)1U~, in XXSKQS 320, 600-01. 
7~ Ji Liuqi itï\tij-, Mingji nanlue 13)j:*Wj~, juan 8, In ZGYSJC 36,567. 
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merchants," conscripted three thousand men, deployed local xiangyong, and managed 
the 1'1'1 (Zhou) administrative affairs. 73 On this matter, the description from Jiashen 
hezhenlue offered us a clear clue that not only lets us know where his money came 
from, but also provides a clear picture that shows us how the variety of local forces, 
including Ming officiaIs, local gentry, and military forces, as well as the Li Zicheng's 
rebellious army, affected each other. 
Ling's money was not from merchants. InitiaUy, the rebel army did not reach 
Jining. Director-General of Grand Canal Huang Xixian J.!:'ffffi wanted to send the 
army pay to the South, but he worried the local gentry and bravoes might cause trouble, 
so he decided to divide this money into three parts (in order to reduce the potential 
loss): one for officiaIs and their staffs; one for local gentry; and the third for local 
military forces (yingbing). But in fact the local gentry only owned this money in name. 
The officiaIs and their staffs kept all of the funds in their own hands. When the rebels 
came, they knew about this money and tried to get it. Because of the possibility of 
severe punishment, both civil and military officiaIs, such as Prefect of sub-prefecture 
~D1'1'1 Zhu Guang *:Yé, had to give the money back and the others being afraid of the 
"bandits", also had to provide compensation. In aU, the rebels managed to acquire 
130,000 taels ofsilver, and carried this money by boat to Dongchang 5F!ê't. However, 
they had no time to use it. After they fled, this money stayed at Dongchang. Ling Jiong 
and the other gentry used this money to recruit General Zhang Guoxun 5:R~1iJ and his 
rebellious army. 
"The Dongchang gentry in fact paid nothing.,,74 Ling Jiong and his army took 
Linqing and Jining cities on the same day. By this time he asked the Southem Ming to 
reoccupy Shandong in order to reunite the south and north. What we have to notice is 
that he simultaneously tried to get in touch with the new govemment - the Qing. 
73 Xu Bingyi ~*~, Ming mo Qing chu shiliao xuankan aA*i~f)].3I:.;fB!-~fU (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, 
1987), juan 12,217-18. 
74 Yang, 52. 
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ln July of 1644, the Qing army took Dongchang and Ling Jiong fled to Daming -)( 
::go On August 2, Wang Aoyong recommended Ling Jiong to the Qing. According to 
Wang, Ling Jiong had great capacities, could handle anything, and he knew how to 
adapt to varying conditions. Two weeks Iater, Dorgon appointed Ling Jiong as "Palace 
Steward of the Board ofWar (bingkejishizhong)" ~f4*i?i.r:p.75 By the end of 
August, Ling Jiong sent a memoriai to the Qing government to request support, and 
aiso mentioned his plan for pacifying north China. (Ironically, he used the Qing's reign 
title- Shunzhi meanwhile he kept using his Ming seaI): 
1 exhausted my heart conceming the Shandong matter. This province is just like 
the head while Hebei is the feet, and Henan is the abdomen. Without a head, one 
would be numb; without feet, lame; but without an abdomen, one would be 
nothing at all. To put these areas in order, we must pacify Shandong first, then 
Hebei, and Iater Henan ... But my soldiers have no pay since the outset. Through 
borrowing from merchants and other measures 1 was able to take, we reluctantly 
supported the army for both May and June, but we do not know how to manage in 
the future. The soldiers will Ieave if there is no pay; no soldier means the arrivaI of 
the rebels; our greater concem is that we do not know what will happen. 
Finally, he asked the Qing not to change the Ming's old policy so that the soldiers 
and army pay might have suitable resources. 76 
At the same time, Ling Jiong still kept in touch with the southem Ming. On Sept. 
Il, the Southem Ming regime ordered him to connect with "the gentry and righteous 
people ~± of Henan and Beizhili." 
Ling Jiong Ieft us a very important memorial in which we may examine his 
original thinking about his concrete balance between the Qing and the Southem Ming. 
75 Gu Cheng, 96. 
76 Zhongguo Renmin daxue lishixi and Zhong guo di yi lishi dang'anguan ed. Qing dai nongmin 
zhanzhengshi ziliao xuanbian 1W{~.~!\!!~~~iifl3iU!ij (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1984), book 
1 (B), 46. 
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ln this memorial sent to the Southem Ming. In the middle of September, he admitted 
that he was only a schoolboy (lEt) and he was not familiar with military affairs. 
Since he could not sacrifice his life on the death of the former Chongzhen emperor and 
the Ming dynasty, he just wanted to organize a righteous army (yishi ~gffi) to fight 
against the rebels. However, what he relied on during this process was neither soldiers 
nor grain. He claimed that what he could rely on was only loyalism and righteousness. 
Now the rebels are still at the apex oftheir power, while the Qing army gradually 
closes in us. 1 have sent a letter to a minister of Qing government ... Our current 
plan may let me have sorne authority to communicate with the Qing, and to 
collaborate with them to pacify the rebels. However, the West expedition (to fight 
against peasants) is only in name, the reality is to prevent the Qing's invasion. 
After the pacification of the rebels, our dynasty would bec orne stronger; then, 
graduaUy, we may find suitable ways to handle everything. Ifwe fought against the 
Qing right now, we would not have enough military forces to do so, or, even worse, 
we would give up this friendly Manchu force and let these Manchu force become 
foes. In case they (the rebels and the Qing) connect with each other and attack the 
South, then disaster would come to the Jianghuai 1I$ area. My own plan would 
do it this way. 1 am a southemer. If 1 only consider my own reputation and official 
rank, 1 could survive in the South. But 1 am afraid that if 1 move to the south, we 
would lose aIl the land north of the Yellow River. The reason 1 stay here is just to 
provide a base in order to reoccupy Hebei and Jinan ~r-(IT (now the southem part of 
Hebei province). Depending on Shandong, we may have Jinan, and may then have 
Hebei. Linqing is the hinge of Jinan and Hebei. Now (the Southem Ming) spends 
aU its money to guard the Huai River. We would rather use this money to defend 
Shandong. 1 supplicate Your Majesty to choose a minister who can carry out your 
orders, and link up with the North in order to prevent future troubles. He also needs 
to comfort everywhere in Shandong to consolidate the people's heart J;)@1A'L\.77 
77 ZGYSJC 36, 567-68. 
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Ling Jiong did not know that the Southem Ming had already sent Chen Hongfan 
~*~iB to be an ambassador to the Qing government by this time. "Not one soldier 
was sent to save Shandong." 78 
On the 12th of September, he began to use the Qing's title Zhao lu Henan dengchu 
bing kejishizhong (Palace Steward of the Board ofWar who is responsible for 
Soothing Henan and Other Places m~lPJm~~~f4~.tp). Meanwhile, he never 
forgot to send military reports to the Southem Ming. By this time, The Southem Ming 
promoted him as Censor (yushi) and Inspector of Shandong (Xunan Shandong ~~r1I 
Jf[), and gave him three hundred blank certificates of appointment for mobilizing the 
local forces. 79 Two months later, he went to Nanjing and his title became Investigating 
Cens or (}iancha yushi f~~~.§I::). 
Apart from Shandong, he also was ordered to inspect Henan as weIl as to control 
the local military forces of this province. After the Qing army occupied the entire 
Shandong area and most of the north China plain, Ling Jiong began to realize that there 
was no hope to recover the lost land by depending on the regular Ming army. He had to 
shift his attention to the local forces. In a memorial sent to the Southem Ming, he said 
that he had already made agreements with the leaders of each zhai.80 According to this 
plan, those zhai were supposed to defend their own areas. Moreover, if one zhai were 
defeated, the rest of them would come together to assist it. Since all the soldiers were 
ordinary peasants who had no regular training and they were short of equipment, Ling 
Jiong and the others thought that they would use the Yellow River as a frontier, and 
they planned to rely on any natural or topographical condition they could. 
78 ZGYSJC 36, 567-68. This peace mission was headed by Zuo Maodi, Govemor of Nanjing under the 
Hongguang Emperor. For detailed information, see Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 405-13; also see Gu Cheng, 
111-20. 
79 NMSL BZ, 464. 
80 For more information about this kind oflocal force, see page 68 ofthis chapter. 
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However, the Hongguang Emperor could not provide any practical help for Ling's 
plan. What he could do was to let the Board ofWar and the Board of Personnel give 
Ling Jiong more than one hundred blank certificates for future use. 81 
By early in the following year, 1645, Ling Jiong went to Henan. When his old 
mother saw him off, Ling Jiong wept. He told his mother that he could not devote 
himselfto both Emperor and mother simultaneously. In March, Ling Jiong led his 
army and staffto Guide &ffH~ city (also in Henan). Several weeks later, the Manchu 
army encircled the city with the cooperation of Chinese armies led by the former 
generals of Li Zicheng. Since Ling Jiong refused to surrender, the prince of Yu -Dodo 
~3:~~, the highest commander of the Qing army ordered that Ling Jiong be 
captured alive, otherwise the whole city would be destroyed. 
We have two different views about the following developments. One is from Xu 
Bingyi who described that Ling realized his devotion would cause the death of the 
ordinary people; in that case he would like to sacrifice himself for pursuing "great 
righteousness". Based on this description, it is Ling Jiong who decided to see Dodo 
first. The prince of Yu treated him with wine and other presents but he refused to 
accept. At that specifie time, Ling left us a poem. One sentence admitted that he had 
suffered all the hardships but finally in vain (~JI~m*J~1Jt~). Before his execution, 
he also left a letter to Dodo. In that letter, he said that his family has benefited from the 
kindness of Ming for generations. To sacrifice for it was his form ofrighteousness and 
he had already done it. However, he pretended believe that the Qing's coming was to 
free the Ming from the rebellion of Li Zicheng. He wished that the Qing "not go 
against your original friendly relationship with us." Finally, he suggested that the 
Yangzi River should be the frontier of Ming and Qing. 
It seemed that the prince Yu was moved by the letter. He ordered him to be buried. 
AIl the officiaIs, staff, as weIl as the ordinary people of the city wept for his death. The 
81 Xu Bingyi, juan 12,217-18. 
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southem Ming posthumously appointed him as Vice-minister of the Board ofWar. 
After his death, "no one planned to reoccupy Shandong. ,,82 
The descriptions above from Xu Bingyi show sorne doubts or mistakes. For one 
thing, among the higher officiaIs of the Southem Ming, whether they had the real 
power and authority or not in reality, sorne ofthem did suggest reoccupying Shandong. 
For instance, in the spring of 1645, the Govemor-general of Shandong Wang Yongji 
.:E7ks, who was appointed by the Southem Ming, sent spies to reconnoiter north 
China and knew that "aH the Manchu's powerful cavalry went to the West to expel Li 
Zicheng, Beizhili as weH as Shandong are aH void." He strongly suggested recovering 
this province.83 
Most importantly, why and how did Ling Jiong decide to see the highest commander 
of the Qing- prince Yu? What was his motive? The answer provided by Xu shows that he 
went to see Dodo on his own initiative, it was done on his own free will and according to 
his own conscience. But the foHowing two primary data84 do provide us another story: 
According to Huang Zongxi, the Manchu army stated that if Ling Jiong would not 
surrender, they would destroy the city. Thus, aH the officiaIs, generals, staff and the 
ordinary people of the city forced Ling Jiong to surrender.85 
Based on Zhang Dai's description, the Manchu army laid siege to the city; Ling 
Jiong wanted to fight to the death. But an the civil and military officiaIs made no 
response. Ling Jiong had to admit that the people's hearts were broken, and that there 
was nothing to do now. 86 
It is pretty clear now that Xu's book exaggerated Ling Jiong's honorable action 
and words. In fact, the only one ideal possibility for the Southem Ming was as Zhang 
82 Ibid. 
83 Gu Cheng, 137-38. 
84 These materials were written soon after the events occurred. In contrast, Xu Bingyi finished his book in 
1694. 
85 Huang Zongxi JIi*_, Hongguangshilu chao 5l7\:;.~~j>,juan 4, in NMSL BZ, 71. 
86 Zhang Dai, juan 33, Ling Jiong liezhuan, in XXSKQS 320, 600-02. 
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Dai predicted: since the Manchu anny had not yet turned to the East, the Southern 
Ming could have sent an anny to the North to collaborate with Ling Jiong, "to control 
Cangzhou ~ 1+' and Dezhou in the far northern part and occupy Xuzhou as well as 
Yanzhou, then nobody could imagine what would have happened. Alas! Ling Jiong is 
dead, there is no man (who may rescue the country) now.,,87 
Following the Manchu army's attack, we turn to the Jiangbei area, to examine what 
happened there. 
1: 5. Summary 
Shandong's prominent position in Chinese military history derives not only from its 
geographicallocation and the factor of the Grand Canal, but also, more importantly, 
from its abundant human resources. Faced with the turmoil resulting from both the 
governmental transition and peasant rebellions, Shandong literati and the other local 
elite had no hope to continue their previous dominance of the local communities. Apart 
from compromise and obedience, their military actions not only had no way to 
challenge the various government authorities, but also they lost the campaigns for 
control of rural society in the competition with the local military units which were 
mainly composed of lower social strata. After the Qing took Beijing, Chine se literati 
represented by Ling Jiong apparently had no means of handling the crisis of both 
invasion of aliens and rebellions from peasants, meanwhile keeping their loyalty to the 
Ming throne. Their tragedies were directly caused by triple pressures: no concrete 
financial as weIl as other supplies from the southern Ming government, no cooperation 
from their peers, and finally, no support or even understanding from the numerous 
common people. 
87 Ibid. 
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Chapter Two 
From Plains to Mountainous Area- Literati in Nanzhili 
2: 1. The Local Forces in Huaibei 
After it took Shandong and the other are as of the northem plains, the powerful Manchu 
army began to launch attacks against Huaibei. 
Broadly defined, this is a sizable geographical area to the north of the Huai River, 
from its source in central Henan to the Yellow Sea. More narrowly conceived, it refers to 
the northemmost parts ofNanzhili. There is little variation in terrain, and a common 
language is spoken throughout. Few regions in China can claim a legacy of collective 
violence more ancient or continuous than here. Occupying the lowland between the Huai 
and Yellow Rivers,l it is in the heart of China' s so-called flood and famine region, an area 
noted for the harshness of both its geography and people. Huaibei was also the site of the 
first great popular revoit in Chinese history, the uprising of Chen Sheng ~tOO in 209 BC 
against the oppressive Qin (221- 207 BC) dynasty. 
Generally speaking, the people of this area have been characterized as proud, unruly 
and fond ofmaking trouble. In the late Yuan dynasty (1277-1367) it provided hundreds of 
thousands of soldiers for the Red Turban Army *1 rH. which eventually overthrew the 
dynasty. Elizabeth Perry suggests that the "explanation for the persisting violence lies in 
the strategic geopolitical situation of the region. Forming.a demarcation between South 
and North China, Huaibei constituted a natural battlefield for contenders for national 
power. Thus it is hardly surprising that over the centuries the area should have been the 
site of many a military confrontation. The destruction wrought by repeated battles in tum 
undermined the possibility of sustained economic development, leaving the inhabitants of 
Huaibei to the mercy of the unbridled natural elements."z 
1 During this period, the Yellow River flowed to the south of Shandong and joined with the Huai River at a 
point west of Huai 'an $.'9: (see Map 3). 
2 Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1980), 10-18. 
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During the Ming, in terms of administration, this area was under the control of the 
Grand Coordinator of Fengyang (Jit~~~). The successive high ranking officers clearly 
realized the characteristics of the area, both the social conditions and the nature of local 
people mentioned above, and they had to pay special attention to the controlling ofthe 
people and their communities. 
For those local people, sorne elite even controlled militias. Since these private 
military retainers were not directly controlled by the government, their presence 
threatened to undermine the dynasty's monopoly of force. However, the Ming 
government looked at these militia as a potential military force available for future crises. 
In early 1517, the assistant Regional Commander of northwest Anhui was charged 
with "maintaining military retainers without authority to vaunt his power and prestige." 
This officer and his band of several hundred retainers, who had performed service on 
behalf of the throne during the pacification of a peasant rebellion, had become a source of 
worry to local civil officiaIs. Instead of disbanding his army after the pacification, he had 
used military power to advance his local interests. His men seized lands, forcibly 
converted people's grave lots into agricultural fields and orchards, and established illegal 
toll stations along well-traveled highways. Although the officer and his men were a potent 
challenge to local civil authorities, the emperor chose not to press the issue, noting that 
the officer had already retired.3 
A datum from the Ming shilu indicates that in the e~ly period of the Wanli reign 
(1572-1620), the Censor-in-Chiefof Fengyang used to look for "great households" (jushi 
IHin and try to get their help to solve the problem. Finally, he hired a total of 300 men 
to form a local militia. This local militia was given the name "yiyong" ~:OO, and took as 
its main responsibility the pacification of thieves. The Grand Coordinator promised that 
if this militia achieved merit, its members would be promoted. Later on, this army 
successfully arrested sorne thieves, and its leaders were promoted to the rank of Squad 
Leader (bazongtl:l*,~). The Board ofWar approved ofhis plan, noting that those who had 
once been thieves themselves now were used to pacify other thieves.4 
3 Robinson, 89. 
4 MSLLZ- AHSLJ, 864. 
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In 1626, the Grand Coordinator Su Maoxiang ~Dt*§ submitted a memorial 
requesting the use of men from the Huaibei area. According to his description, the people 
of Huaibei were honest and powerful, and had already shown their worth as his own 
bodyguards and military officiaIs. However, because of the recent dismissal of many 
Ming armies, these men were unable to receive promotion. According to his judgment, "if 
they were not the pillars of the country anymore, they would become bravoes." His 
request ultimately received no answer from Beijing.5 
Generally speaking, the Ming government allowed for a certain degree of local elite 
military control, especially during the pacification of peasant rebellions. 
In 1635, there were "three big bandits" (san da kou _*~) around Xuzhou City. 
These three bandits, Cheng Jikong fï*ifL. Wang Daoshan 3:.~f!f, and Zhang Fangzao 
5:Rnm, occupied Xiao county If~,* and burned down the northern part of Xuzhou city. 
Traffic was totally blocked for several hundred kilometers around this city. Since they 
already threatened the government, the Ming army came to besiege them during the 
summer of 1643. On July 23, the Ming army destroyed Wu Jiaji ~*~Jt the headquarters 
of Zhang Fangzao, and killed several thousand bandits. Cheng Jikong pretended to 
surrender. However, when the Ming government wanted to transfer his forces to other 
areas, he refused to go. By the end of the year, 5,000 Ming sol di ers from southeast 
Suzhou m1H and 3,000 soldiers from northwest Xiao county had gathered outside of 
Xuzhou city. With the cooperation of the local militia - yiyong - the bandits were 
~efeated and Cheng was arrested.6 
The Ming government' s long term toleration oflocal militia forces in this region, as 
we mentioned above, meant that there were not enough soldiers available to handle a 
series of crises. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1635, the Ming government was forced to 
redeploy sorne armies from Shandong to Huaibei. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
5 Ibid., 895. As we mentioned in the Introduction, the in land Wei-Suo system practically collapsed in the 
period ofthe last several decades of the Ming. Mainly because offinancial problems, members of the inland 
Ming army were either dismissed or transferred. 
6 Xie Guozhen ~m~, Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao xuanbian I3A*~~~~§I::*'I-~*1 (Fuzhou: Fujian 
renmin, 1981), 197-98. 
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Shandong Province also suffered from the threats of peasants, in this case, the Grand 
Coordinator of Shandong Li Zi (*~) complained to the Board ofWar: 
Originally Shandong soldiers were not used by the other provinces. Every district is 
supposed to defend itself; sorne districts have as many as 2,000 soldiers, while others 
have only several hundred. Within the province, when armies are redeployed to 
certain places other places will be emptied ... The western part of Cao County and 
the eastern part of Shan county along the YeUow River cover a total of more than one 
thousand li, and there are more than one hundred ferries. The defense of the eastem 
part will mean the loss of the west and vice versa. How many armies are enough? 
Furthermore, Fengyang has its own two Yamen m-jF~: Regency ~~ and Grand 
Defender ~~, and each has its own army and supply. Huai'an and other areas 
nearby are important places, and also have powerful armies. Other are as such as 
Xuzhou, Suzhou ll~H\I\I, Luzhou JlI1H [present day Hefei itm:u, Yangzhou, Langshan 
3NrlI, Guazhou JIl1H, Yizhen fiffiï, Tai ~1H, Yancheng gf~, Miaowan iij_, 
Y ongsheng lk1:, everywhere has its own forces. These places face the Yangzi River 
or the sea, and have no other alarms [from the north] - it's very easy to caU them 
together. Why not use armies that are close while seeking what is far away [she ji tu 
yuan *lli:Iiù;ij]? Since Shandong province has often been asked to offer [the army 
and supplies], l am wondering whether this province belongs to the Ming court. Now 
Li Zicheng's rebels are going to the east. Huaibei and Xuzhou are close to Shandong 
province, the threat to Shandong is not less than that to Huaibei and Xuzhou. To 
increase the armies in Huaibei and Xuzhou by two thousand is not enough; can we 
imagine that Shandong province has surplus armies? What surprised me is that those 
armies were deployed to Huaibei and Xuzhou, but they still get the supplies from 
Shandong province. The result is that Huaibei may use the armies with no worries 
about logistics, while Shandong will have to pay everything but will have no armies 
to use.7 
7 Ming Qing shiliao xinbian, vol. 2, 178. 
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The arrivaI of the armies from Shandong brought a lot of trouble because of their 
failure to cooperate with local people and armies. By the end of 1643, the Grand 
Coordinator of Shandong Qiu Zude liftE!. f! sent a memorial report: 
Administratively, the Yellow River's defense of Shandong is from the location of 
Qing Huaguan 1f_fN to the east where it connects with Feng ~, Pei yrP and Dang 
~ counties [belonging to Nanzhili]. Usually we send Yanzhou's xiangbing and 
others soldiers from Qingzhou and Laizhou to defend this area. Recently, because of 
poverty and disruptions in rural society, there have been no xiangbing to send. 
Furthermore, the soldiers and the ordinary people could not cooperate . .. The 
Xuzhou people consider them as enemies, and they are eager to expel them. For this 
purpose [to expel the Shandong army] they will do whatever they cano The Shandong 
army cannot stay there anymore.8 
Among local military forces, it is not easy to clearly distinguish which belonged to the 
local elite and which were controlled by peasants; their political attitudes were also 
blurred. 
After the Southem Ming regime was established, local officiaIs and gentry had 
troubles with the armies from the Southem Ming in the border area between Shandong 
and Nanzhili. Those armies and the local forces were supposed to unite together to fight 
against the Manchu invasion. However, when the Southem Ming army reached a small 
city called Suqian m~ and camped in the outskirts, the magistrate sent a shengyuan 
accusing them ofthree things: not repaying their obligations to the Ming court in Beijing 
C1~~&J~"), failing to seek vengeance for the death of the Ming emperor, and failing to 
protect the locals. Later on, several groups of cavalry tried to enter the city, but were shot 
by residents. Suddenly, aIl the Southem Ming army entered the city. The residents and the 
men who wore military uniforms fought and killed each other. Soldiers plundered goods 
worth more than 10,000 taels of silver.9 
8 Ming Qing shiliao xinbian, vol. 1 0, 996. 
9 Jiashen hezhen lue, 79. 
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In the southeastem part of Suqian, the region of Huaiyin $~ played a crucial role in 
grain transfer from the south to north since the opening of the Grand Canal. In the eady 
Ming there were two Wei and several So covering this area. Exactly like the other areas 
we mentioned above, this kind of military registration system had also broken down here, 
and the Ming had few means through which to exert local control. As one official 
document indicated: "Suppose that battles would have taken place, there would have been 
no soldiers to use."IO 
In the city of Huai' an tft3i:, there were more than 10,000 military officiaIs and 
soldiers, including 2,000 soldiers trained for defense duties. Up to the mid-Ming, in fact, 
only very few soldiers were on duty. The Ming authorities depended on a force of only 
about 580 minbing from the adjacent countryside who were "al ways defeated when they 
met an enemy."ll After Xu Hongru's rebellion broke out in Shandong, the Ming 
government tried to set up 570 military officiaIs and soldiers to defend Qing Hekou m~fiJ 
D, a town at the gates of Huai' an. However, the Ming govemment could not afford to 
pay for logistical expenses, and so had to discuss relevant issues with the local gentry.12 
Like the Ming government, the Qing authorities also realized the importance of the 
Huaibei area. In his secret memorial report, Wang Aoyong not only mentioned the 
importance of the area, but also discussed how it might be conquered: 
liangbei is the area which must be conquered. AU the cities subordinate to Xuzhou 
and Huaibei are across the Yellow River, we should control them first ... For our 
CUITent tactic, let sorne important officiaIs move to settle in Cao county and Shan 
10 Wanli Huai'anfuzhi~M 1fË3(Jff;&:,juan 7, Bingwei zhi ::!=(.1l\!J;&:, in TYGCMDFZXK XB 8. 
11 Qianlong Huai'anfuzhi ~1li1fË3(Jff;&: ,juan 16, Bingrong ::!=('1X;, XXSKQS 700, Shibu Dili lei 3/:.$j:lli 
:E!I!Ji,797. 
12 Ibid., 105. 
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county along the Yellow River to control Xuzhou and Huaiyin in order to plan for 
future attacksY 
Within the entire Huaibei area, the Qing army did not meet any effective resistance. 
According to a report sent by a Qing general, the Qing army arrived in Pi Zhou !~1H on 
May 21, 1645. The next day, they reached Suqian. The southem Ming army fled away, 
allowing the local inhabitants to be easily subjugated. On May 23, the local gentry and 
common people of Suining Dt$ surrendered to the Qing forces. When the Qing army 
arrived at Taoyuan ~j~{Jm county on May 24, the southem Ming official had already fled, 
and the remaining officiaIs led the local people to we1come the Qing army. 
Only in Qinghe 1~~PJ county did the army meet with resistance. But the se scattered 
skirmishes could not haIt the Qing army's advances. When they reached Huai'an, "all the 
gentry we1comed them.,,14 Liu Zeqing fled along with his army. "The gentry, military 
personnel and residents treated the Qing army with wine and oxen, welcoming their 
coming.,,15 
In the face of the above dramatic changes, it is important that we consider the 
questions ofhow Huaibei's literati survived and why they acted in the ways they did. The 
story of Yan Ermei provides us the tirst clue to lead us toward the answers. 
13 Ming Qing shiliao bingbian, vol. 5,405. 
14 Ming Qing shiliao jiabian, vol. 2, 114. 
IS Qianlong Huai'anfuzhi ~1Ii$3(Jff;&;,juan 16, Bingrong ~1X;, XXSKQS 700, 96-97. 
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Shandong 
Henan 
NanzhiH 
(Map 3. The Qing attack on Huaibei and Jiangbei, reprinted from Struve 1984,52.) 
2: 2. A Lonely Loyalist from Pei County 
100 
llilomelfi/S 
Yan Ermei was born in Pei County ofNanzhili in 1603. He was awarded thejuren degree 
at the age of twenty-seven, by which time he had already published a book of poems. In 
the 1620s to 30s, he traveled and lived in many places such as Nanjing, Huaiyang, 
Jiangyin as weIl as Hangzhou in Zhejiang province. However, in 1641, growing social 
turmoil drove him back to the relatively secure haven of Huai' an. Later on, he returned to 
the north, settling briefly in Shandong before traveling to an even more remote frontier 
area. He finally died at home in poverty in 1679. His travels had carried him back and 
forth across the Yellow River many times, and he was thus able to develop close friends 
both in the north and south. His travels also had brought him to Beijing several times. 
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Yan Ennei has been ignored by Chine se historians mainly because of the role he 
played in pacifying peasant rebellions. In Western scholarship, Wakeman has provided 
an idealized description ofhis personal righteousness and activities: "For patriotic 
loyalists like him, the obligation to repay the country was even more compelling than the 
responsibilities of looking after one's immediate relatives or friends, even though 
observing this higher dut y might mean 'turning against the lineage' (ni zu ~~) ... " 
Wakeman also argues that Yan placed loyalist commitment above compromise, and the 
individual's conscience above social consensus. The epitome of such absolute sincerity 
was the traditional knight errant, whose integrity represented the ultimate fonn of li 
(propriety ifrI). The knight errant' s scrupulous adherence to "sincerity" (cheng ~) - his 
personal sense of right and wrong - ideally took precedence over all other sentiments. As 
Wakeman puts it, "the central notions of li are respect and confidence. If pushed to the 
extreme, it even means killing (for the sake of one's belief.).,,16 
Because of the limited amount ofmaterials he used, especially data about Yan's later 
years, Wakeman's description is insufficient. In fact, Yan lost his dignity in his later years 
when he was arrested, thrown into jail, and forced to beg to be spared from execution. In 
the last years ofhis life, his unyielding integrity was no longer evident. His begging to be 
spared execution by the Qing provoked sharp criticism by the other scholars ofhis time. 17 
Below, 1 will begin by describing and analyzing Yan's early military career, before 
moving on to explore his military actions against the Manchus. Finally, from the 
perspective of military mobilization, 1 will use this case study to shed light on how social 
structure, military actions, and historical figures affected each other. 
Based on scattered materials, we only can trace his main activities. In 1640, Yan 
helped to organize and train an army of 3,000 local peasants. This army was intended to 
deal with peasant rebellions on the border of Shandong and Nanzhili. As he became 
increasingly aware of the Ming's loss of control over the empire, he sold his belongings 
and family property to raise money for the purchase of weapons and the organization of 
16 Wakeman (1985), 516-17. 
17 He Lingxiu, 26. 
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local peasants into a small army. This army numbered about 1,000 soldiers. Yan trained 
them personally. Unfortunately, we have no more detailed data available to analyze what 
happened to that army of 3,000, what was the relationship between this group and his 
own 1,000 soldiers. 
In 1644, fishermen from Weishan Lake engaged in uprisings under the leadership of 
Liu Xuan iIJ1r, and began to besiege Pei City. Yan led his militia to assist the official 
army. Liu's peasant army was forced to retreat, purposefully leaving behind large 
amounts of cash and goods to distract the official armies and other village militias. In this 
way, Liu's army managed to escape largely intact. However, Yan insisted on leading his 
own militia to cut off the retreat ofLiu's army. The subsequent battle with Liu led to the 
absolute defeat ofYan's army and the destruction ofhis home. 18 
When Yan heard the news of the Chongzhen Emperor's death, he refused to eat for 
seven days. At that time, the Yu Yuan Army in Sharidong sent its representative Ye 
Tingxiu to invite him to join them in an administrative role. Yan offered no definite 
answer to the request. After Li Zicheng's peasant army occupied most ofnorth China, Wu 
Su jÇ'I', ajinshi from Shaanxi ~ïffi province, received the title Defense Commissioner 
ifangyushi ~jJl!!f~) from Li Zicheng's peasant regime. When he passed through Suqian 
m~, the city was already under the control of Dong Xueli .~~, another peasant 
general. Dong treated Wu for a couple of days, and let him use his army to go to Pei Xian. 
Since Wu borrowed this army from Dong, he claimed that his army reached about 
200,000 in number and would occupy the whole of the Huaiyin area. 
Without any resistance, Wu Su got an the registration data such as the lists of civil 
and military personnel from local Ming officiaIs and he asked them to welcome his 
commg. 
AIl the Ming military commanders tled to Huai'an. However, Yan Ermei refused to 
listen to Wu Su's order. Later on, when Wu Su came to Xuzhou, the leader of a local 
18 AlI the data about Yan's early career are frOll Qing shi Bianweihui ed., Qing dai renwu zhuangao it1~ 
Àfo/]1$lf.Ij (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1984), part 1, vol.l, 211-22. 
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peasant rebellion, Cheng Jikong, offered to accompany and prote ct him. With Cheng's 
assistance, Wu Su led his army into Pei City where he arrested Yan Ermei. 19 
Yan himselfprovides us a vivid description ofthis tumultuous period: 
Previously, 1 lived in the countryside. 1 did not believe that Beijing was occupied 
when 1 heard this news the first time. 1 thought that Beijing had a solid defense 
system, how could it be occupied so easily? Furthermore, there are a lot of councilors 
and different levels of local government officiaIs in the south and north, how could it 
be that there was no one who mourned for the emperor and sent armies to save him? 
These words must be the faIse, instigating, and misleading words of the rebeIs.2o 
On April 15, 1644, sorne Ming officiaIs from Beijing fled to the south along the 
Grand Canal. However, those people, as weIl as most of the local Pei officiaIs, literati and 
local gentry went to the outskirts of the city to express their we1come to Wu Su. 
Yan refused to do so. He believed that although the peasant rebels had already set up 
an administrative system, they had insufficient military forces under their control. 
Furthermore, Yan felt that the best approach was to remind them of loyalty and 
righteousness: 
Ifthey [those people who welcomed Wu, as weIl as Wu himself] show repentance, 
we may use them. Otherwise, since there are not so many rebels here, we may kill 
them. Dedicated to the service of Ming, we have no regret. 21 
On May 6, Yan wrote a letter to Wu Su, but the letter evidently prompted little in the 
way of repentance. Wu carried out his plans such as seizing the official seai in Pei County. 
Moreover, he paid his respects to the Temple of Confucius in order to find another way to 
19 Peng Yisun provided wrong information about this process- in fact, Yan was not killed. See Ping Kouzhi 
ZJS~;E, 255-56. 
20 Yan Ermei M'mm, Baitashanren wenji aifU-iÀ3ttl, XXSKQS 1394, Jibu bieji lei tl~~ 73Utllt 551. 
21 Ibid., 553. 
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gain the respect of the localliterati. Wu also set up administrative and judicial systems, 
and trained his army for the defense of the Yellow River. On May 12, Wu began a one-
week tour of inspection in Feng County .~*. When they heard the news of the defeat of 
Li Zicheng (by the Qing army), Wu and the other rebelleaders had to flee. 22 
The actions of literati and local elites such as Yan were much the same as their 
counterparts in Shandong: they killed and expelled Li's officiaIs and tried to resume Ming 
authority. Yet, their attitudes toward the Qing were often very contradictory: sorne of 
them surrendered; sorne of them saw no option but to accept alien rule; sorne 
demonstrated a heroic loyalty to the fallen Ming and readiness for self-sacrifice; many 
officiaIs committed suicide rather than surrender to their barbarian conquerors; and a very 
few of them even engaged in military activities against the Qing. Yan Ermei belongs to 
this final category. For those like Yan, loyalist commitment was beyond compromise, the 
individual's conscience was above social consensus and the obligation to repay the 
country was the primary concem. Both family members and friends could be neglected 
for this larger cause. 
Yan Ermei's writings show a well-developed knowledge ofmilitary affairs. Although, 
we still do not know how Yan acquired his military knowledge. For instance, one ofhis 
articles entitled "Liu Kouyi" 1fr'E~~ mentioned why literati could not command the 
Ming army. Based on his observation, those literati who supervised armies, and those 
who were bom in areas close to the frontier were probably used to seeing fighting, but 
still never joined the battle physically. As for those who were bom and grew up in the 
south, they could not even recognize the different types of weapons. How could you 
expect them to join or command in warfare? 
The changing battle arrays, glittering knife-edges, arrows like rain ... witnessing 
death or life; could you expect them to have imperturbability? AlI they could do was 
close the city gate, simply giving up the suburbs and the rest of the area.23 
22 Ibid., 555. 
23 Ibid., 517. 
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He realized that the main forces of Li Zicheng's peasantarmies were from the 
northwest, and they were proud oftheir use of cavalry. To deal with these powerful 
military forces, he suggested using infantry and providing them special training with 
falchion and spear. However, his plan was never carried out. Ultimately, his ideas were 
founded on the assumed presence of good training, courage, strict command, and a 
willingness to sacrifice one's life. None ofthese conditions was present at that time.24 
In addition to his writings on military affairs mentioned above, his concrete military 
actions are also worth examining. He hoped to arouse the Southem Ming troops to 
engage in a northem expedition. On February 12, 1645, he was invited to become a 
private secretary of Shi Kefa, the highest military official of the Southem Ming in the 
liangbei area. During Yan's interview with Shi Kefa on February 15, 1645, Yan agreed to 
join the secretariat, but insisted that Shi should move a portion ofhis army into Henan 
and encourage the growth of resistance movements there. According to him, most of the 
former Ming armies in the north remained loyal to the Ming. On the other hand, the Qing 
could not gather its armies right away. If the Southem Ming army embarked on a long 
march to fight against the Qing in the north, they would be joined by former Ming 
armies?5 
In December 1644, the Manchu cavalry began to probe the Southem Ming defenses. 
Hearing that many officiaIs and gentry members in Henan province had joined the 
Manchus, and knowing that former Ming officers were treated with respect by the Qing 
govemment when they did surrender, Xu Dingguo ~'f5E~, a former peasant general, 
offered to surrender his fort Y to fi ft y thousand troops in exchange for amnesty. One 
month later, Shi Kefa ordered Gao lie ~f~, one of Li Zicheng's former generals, to 
recover the area around Guide &wt~ and Kaifeng fjfJt-.f. 
Gao had thirteen Regional Commanders under his command, and his army included a 
large cavalry which was considered the most powerful force within Li Zicheng's army. 
Since Xu had already surrendered to the Qing, Gao's coming forced him to make a choice. 
Several days later, he suddenly trapped and killed Gao and his bodyguards. After hearing 
24 Ibid., 522. 
2S Xiao Yishan If-Lil, Qing dai tongshi m{-t~'§!: (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1927), vol. 1 ,303. 
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this news, Shi realized that the Central Plains could not be taken. But he still hoped to 
keep Gao' s force of fort Y thousand men, which was the best of aIl the armies north of the 
Yangzi River, together as a unified commando Yan encouraged Shi Kefa to use this 
opportunity to control of Gao's army strictly, but he received no answer from Shi.26 
What Yan had in mind, on the one hand, was persuading local magnates who were 
undecided to remain loyal to the Southern Ming; and, on the other, linking up with a 
confederation including even the bandit-Ioyalists in Shandong such as Yu Yuan Army. 
Now, Yan and Ye Tingxiu and others were hoping to link up with them, foment a popular 
uprising across the YeIlow River, and then together with these "righteous soldiers" 
recover the Central Plain. Yan did not de scribe all of these plans in detail during his 
meeting with Shi, but he did spell out both his own strategy for a northern expedition and 
his strong ideas about how to carry out these plans. 
In a letter to Shi Kefa, he wrote: 
When the bandit armies seized the capital, there was no ruler left in the Central Plain 
and spurious officiaIs occupied local posts. AIl that 1 could do then was bide my 
time ... , and aware that 1 myselfwas too weak to strike back alone. Therefore, 1 
petitioned my superiors of each and every office, asking that a punitive expedition be 
sent north and that at the same time we mobilize the tens of thousands of loyal and 
daring gentlemen of the area north of the river to form an imperial vanguard ahead of 
the main force pledged to wreak vengeance on the enemies of our former emperor 
and to recover our ancestral territories.27 
However, Shi totaIly rejected Yan's de~ands, not only because he lacked the real 
power to implement these demands, but also because he had his own considerations, 
which will be discussed below. Shortly after this, Yan was ordered to move west into 
Henan and there to join the Southern Ming army, forming a light defensive line against 
the Manchu army in case the Manchus decided to turn south. Yan did set off to the west, 
foIlowing the Southem Ming's order, but on March 6, 1645, before reaching the front, he 
26 QDRWZG, part 1, voU, 214. Shi's condition will be discussed in the following part. 
27 Quoted from Wakeman (1985), vol. 1,514. 
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decided that the mission was hopeless and turned back. He was thus in the Huaibei area 
when the Manchus finally launched their attack upon Shi's headquarters in Yangzhou. 
Shi finally roughly settled his plan of defense. 28 On April 25, Yangzhou fell into the 
hands of the Manchu armies, and the famous massacre occurred. 
By this time, Yan Ermei was at Luzhou in central liangbei. Later on, he wrote a poem 
entitledXi Yangzhou C'111fm1H). In the preface we learn why Shi Kefa insisted on 
returning to Yangzhou. Yan points out that "because the people who surround Shi Kefa 
are from the South" aIl their homes and property are in the South, so they have no 
intention to pursue a northern expedition. In this same poem, he also wrote: 
The revered Shi supervised Ming armies entered into Peng Cheng W!,glG (Xuzhou), 
Righteous persons from both the Yellow and Huai Rivers welcomed hirn with wine 
~1üJ~±]i~jill 
Such people's hearts are providential 
To order the armies to launch the Western or Northern expedition 
ûTJOO:gg1lE~~ C1lE ..... . 
What a sorrow the barbarian cavalry crossed the Yellow River 
They rnurdered the people everywhere but in Yangzhou the rnost 29 
*~ÀjlJ;jm1\1\1 ~ 
After leaving Shi, Yan personally led sorne local rnilitary forces to fight against the 
Manchu invasion. When the Qing arrny entered Huai'an city, Yan led his rnilitia in an 
attack, but was defeated. The Qing army surnrnoned Yan to surrender, but Yan refused to 
do so, saying: 
28 Yan Ermei, XXSKQS 1394,524. 
29 Yan Ermei, XXSKQS 1394,498. 
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How can you imagine a real man who would act as a slave 
1 feel ashamed to change Chinese dress into barbarian robes 
Indeed, Yan had a certain degree of military experience in the pacification of peasant 
rebellions, but this time he had no hope that any cooperation could be procured from the 
local residents. The local people feared his actions would cause retaliation from the 
Manchu army, and they refused to cooperate with his loyalist army. Finally, Yan had to 
admit that he was uncertain about how to proceed.30 
ln the process of organizing opposition to the Qing, Yan also played a role as liaison 
among anti-Manchu armies from different regions, such as the righteous armies from 
Jiangnan that will be discussed in Chapter Three. He frequently adopted the guise of a 
monk, naming himself"Taodong monk" lm*fD#Û. He and others were hoping to unite 
all the anti-Manchu forces, including the Shandong bandit-Ioyalists mentioned above. 
After uniting these forces, they planned to foment a popular uprising across the Yellow 
River, and then together with these "righteous soldiers" recover the Central Plain. In the 
process, he was arrested several times by the Manchus, but was finally successful in 
escaping. After 1652, he embarked again on travels in north China. Eventually, he 
returned home to Pei Xian in 1673, dying six years later. 
Why were Yan Ermei's military actions ultimately unsuccessful? 
In 1662, Yan had a chance to visit Shi Kefa's former camp in Xuzhou. Standing 
before that place, he said: 
Alas, Shi Kefa does not deserve to be discussed. If he had taken my suggestion, 
how would he have lost his life?31 
30 Ibid. 
31 Qing dai renwu zhuangao, part 1, vol. 1,211-21. 
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Is this true? Could his plans for expeditions to the west or north have succeeded? 
To explore Yan Errnei's failure in military affairs, there is no need to reiterate military 
factors from the Manchu's perspective. As we briefly mentioned in Chapter One, 
previous studies have already extensively covered factors such as the use of cavalry, 
military training, logistics, and so on. What 1 want to argue here is that the structure of 
rural society in this area proved unsuitable for literati like Yan Errnei who hoped to 
engage in military actions. 
As 1 mentioned in regards to Shandong, to assure their survival and the protection of 
their own interests, the local elite might unite and co-operate with any forces, including 
local bandits, or they might oppose and resist any other forces from the outside. Since 
basic living conditions were always their primary concem, they cared little about where 
the real authority and control over rural society came from. They might support or oppose 
any forces. Their actions depended on whether or not someone or sorne forces could 
provide the means that they needed to survive. Yan's area ofactivity was located on the 
border of Shandong and Nanzhili. Here the social structure and other characteristics were 
similar to that of Shandong. Yan realized that the most important action he could take was 
to mobilize the masses. He also realized that most ordinary peasants took part in 
rebellions simply because of the harsh conditions of their lives, such as famine or the 
exploitation of landlords and officiaIs. With this in mind, he felt that if ordinary people 
realized the benefits of a Ming govemment, they were certain to join in defending the city 
and following orders.32 
Yan also remained convinced that the sense of loyalty and righteousness of the entire 
dynasty's progeny had not been extirpated in the area north of the river. According to him, 
a bold stroke, a decisive act, could still mobilize this sentiment: 
The people's emotions can be aroused ... The martial heroes of the empire may be 
few indeed, but the common mass is numerous. First there must be people to lead 
32 Yan Ermei, XXSKQS 1394,521. 
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them. Only then will those who are easily swayed by outside influences rise in 
response to what they see and feel. 33 
The problem was how to mobilize these common people. 
In the fall of 1644, he asked a representative from the Southem Ming to implement a 
policy oftax reduction in order to benefit the peasants; however, he received no answer. 
Regardless of the suggestions or plans he made, neither he nor the forces he led and 
relied on were able to mobilize an anti-Manchu "united line." This is why Yan Ermei 
could not carry out his military actions in the Huaibei area. 
Yan Ermei is a representative of those few Chinese literati who engaged in military 
actions in order to save the Ming in Huaibei area. Their many different tactics aIl proved 
ultimately unsuccessful; their tragic destiny was decided by the time and environment. To 
be more concrete, they were not successful in finding ways to integrate the numerous 
peasants into their military plans. However, Yan Ermei's career alone is not sufficient to 
prove these judgments and conclusions. The following Yangzhou Campaign and its 
related military activities provide us with several different perspectives from which to 
analyze the place of literati during the war. The war included ethnic conflicts and 
contradictions between gentry and ordinary citizens, as well as various military actions, 
such as the wars between the govemment and rebellious peasants. 
2: 3. Literati Group Military Action in Jiangbei 
Literally, Jiangbei means north of the Yangzi River. Specifically, the area lies between 
Xuzhou and the north bank of the Yangzi River. Yangzhou city is the largest commercial 
and cultural center in the area. However, in late imperial China this city was generally 
considered culturally a part of Jiangnan. Though it was not actually "south of the river," 
it shared the social and cultural characteristics of Jiangnan and had enjoyed a similar 
degree of economic prosperity since the Sui dynasty (581-618). During the Ming and 
33 Quoted from Wakeman, (1985), voU, 514. 
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much ofthe Qing, this city owed much ofits economic prosperity to the salt monopoly.34 
Since the city had enjoyed a long peace since the early Ming, its residents tended to focus 
on the pursuit of prosperity while ignoring coastal military defense. From a military 
perspective, although Gu Yanwu's book provides detailed information about Ming 
garrisons in Yangzhou, such as the weapons they used, and places troops were 
stationed,35 there is nothing related to this current study because the Wei and Sua system 
had already practically collapsed by the seventeenth century. Even in the mid-sixteenth 
century, the unwalled market towns around the Grand Canal suffered from prolonged and 
repeated pirate attacks. Most of the attacks took place from 1554 until the defeat ofXu 
Hai ~~ in August, 1556. In 1555, several hundred Japanese pirates reached Yangzhou 
city, killing people, looting, and buming houses. In aIl, several thousand people were 
killed by the sword or drowned. 
Since this city, like much of Jiangbei, was characterized more by ease and luxury than 
military involvement, the Ming govemment had to redeploy its army from other locations 
such as Xuzhou, or even transfer sorne soldiers from the northem frontiers in order to 
defend it. Among them, soldiers from areas such as Yiwu and Dongyang *~ of 
Zhejiang province were acc1aimed for their courage and skill in fighting.36 
Sorne soldiers who were skilled at naval fighting were also transferred to Yangzhou in 
order to prote ct transportation along the Yangzi River. 
However, military supplies could not be guaranteed. The Ming govemment had to 
levy a special tax for military purposes in addition to the common agriculture and labor 
taxes. In order to meet the huge expense spent on the northem frontiers as weIl as the 
34 Thomas A. Metzger, "The Organizational Capabilities of the Ch'ing State in the Field of Commerce: the 
Liang-huai Salt Monopoly, 1740-1840," in W.E. Willmott, ed., Economie Organization in Chinese Society, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972),9-45. It is impossible to list the countless studies related to 
Yangzhou, for example, Antonia Finnane, Speaking o/Yangzhou: a Chinese City, 1550-1850 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2Q04); Wang Zhenzhong .:EfiJ:f:l, Ming Qing Huishang yu Huaiyang shehui 
bianqian Bjjm~ooW*mjfr±"~~ (Beijing: San1ian, 1996); see a1so Tobie Meyer- Fong, Building 
Culture in Early Qing Yangzhou (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
35 Gu Yanwu JIj~ftt, TXJGLBS, vo1.l2, Yang:m, Bingfang kao JUJj~, see XXSKQS 596, 221-23. 
36 The majority ofordinary soldiers of Qi Jiguang's famous army were also from this area. See R. Huang 
(1981), 156-88; also see Thomas G. Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-Kuang and I-wu County," Ming Studies 34 (1995), 
17-26. 
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pacification of peasant rebellions across northem China, a policy of increased taxation 
was carried out in the east and southeast coastal areas until the end of the Ming.37 As for 
the few local armies, they gradually posed big problems for the Ming government 
because sorne soldiers connected with the powerfullocal gentry coerced their generals to 
address their special needs, and none could question them. Faced with review (by the 
govemment), these soldiers tended to hire sorne people to replace them. Furthermore, the 
arrogant soldiers from Zhejiang frequently refused to cooperate with the local armies, and 
bothered local residents.38 
As in Shandong, for sorne people and local military forces, their primary concems had 
little to do with the perception of ethnie conflict, but were focused on the possibility of 
gaining sorne material benefit. When Japanese pirates came, 
Sorne of the wicked Chinese people benefited from their bribes, and often had 
connections with them. A man named Gu Biao 1fI~ who was from Tongzhou imv'['[, 
was very cunning and even guided the pirates. For these reasons, the pirates were 
able to occupy the important traffic points and understand the actual conditions of the 
Ming garrison.39 
These aspects of the social and military background of Jiangbei before the Manchu 
invasion indicate that the Ming and Southem Ming could expect little military support in 
this area. Whatever the Ming govemment had done, and regardless of the motives and 
behavior of Ming officiaIs, there were simply insufficient military social resources to 
engage in an effective resistance against the Manchu invaders. We can first focus on the 
literati who played the role of military staff. 
Like Yan Ermei, many literati entered into Shi Kefa's camp to demonstrate their 
abilities and Ioyalties. Since Shi was the highest southem Ming official who took care 
37 TXJGLBS, ce 9, Feng Ning Hui )I\,$mf[ XXSKQS 596, 105. 
38 XXSKQS 596, 223. 
39 Zhang Tingyu ~M3î, Ming shi SA3/:. (Beijing: Zhonghua, repr., 1999) (vol. 199, Biography of Zheng 
Xiao ~~f$.), 3514. 
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Jiangbei's defenses after Beijing's faH, this group of literati surrounding Shi provides us a 
good opportunity to explore their actions and characteristics as a whole. Fortunately, a 
paper published recently by He Xiuling not only sheds light on the behavior of this group, 
but also provides a vivid example ofhow to explore other characteristics ofthese 
literati.4o 
Beginning in 1425, the Ming government began to aHow higher ranking military 
officiaIs, especiaHy those who had done service on the northem frontier, to employ staff 
officers to help with paperwork. In addition to the copying of manuscripts, these literati 
also participated in military planning and strategizing.41 Entering the sixteenth century, 
it was common for high officiaIs in the capitals (both Beijing and Nanjing) and in the 
other provinces to have private scholars acting as their private secretaries and advisors. 
For instance, Hu Zongxian is known to history as the capable, ruthless official who ended 
the pirate invasions into the interior of the country and who engineered the capture of the 
notorious pirate leader. He is also remembered for the brilliance of the literary gentlemen 
he coHected in his headquarters, or mufu J;W,42 to serve as military advisors and 
secretaries. He was described in the gazetteer of the district as a man who paid attention 
to large questions and did not concem himself with details. From detailed reports coming 
in from aH over the province, Hu was able to see how pressures from localities seeking 
protection had fragmented the available military forces and weakened the ability of the 
regional administration to marshal its resources against the pirates. FinaIly, he used a 
variety of strategies to defeat the pirates.43 
Staff officers fiHed two different roles during the late Ming: sorne worked within 
formaI administrative agencies under the direct control of the Ming govemment. Most, 
however, were in the employ ofhigh-ranking officiaIs. For most staff officers, their main 
40 He Xiuling, part 1 and part 2. 
41 Zheng Xiao ~~, Jinyan 4- j§, juan 2, YMSLBJCK 136, 81. 
42 The concept of "mufu" has various meanings in different periods ofChinese history. By the time of the 
Ming-Qing transition, it may be deemed as the tent from which the higher officiaIs on dut y at the frontier or 
administrative office govemed. 
43 Merrilyn Fitzpatrick, "Local Interests and the Anti-Pirate Administration in China's South-east 1555-
1565", in Ch'ing- shih wen-f'i, 4.2 (1979), 1-50; John K. Fairbank, 23; see also pages 18-19 ofthis 
dissertation. 
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jobs included document management, assisting their employers in devising strategies, and 
reviewing or composing literary works for the purpose of entertainment. The number of 
staff officers hired by an official was dependent on his budget or personal financial 
capacity. The Ming govemment allowed high ranking civil and military officiaIs who 
worked outside the capital area to posses blank certificates in case they needed to hire 
someone. In the Southem Ming, due to financiallimitation, more blank certificates were 
issued. 
Shi Kefa was in possession of this kind of blank certificate. His headquarters at 
Yangzhou had attracted ardent loyalists from among the gentry of Jiangnan. Most of his 
personal staff, however, was recruited later when he fought in the area of present-day 
Anhui in the early 1640s. 
After reaching Yangzhou in May of 1644, Shi announced the formation of a special 
secretariat, the Lixian guan ff~Jf~ (Bureau Which is Courteous to the Worthy) and sent 
out summons to the scholars of the region. Ying Tingji ff!g-a-, ajinshi degree holder 
(1627) from Yin County J~~* in Zhejiang was responsible for the care ofthese literati. 
Ying had served as magistrate ofTangshan~Ù-J, and when Shi come to Yangzhou, was 
serving as the Tuiguan of Huai' an Prefecture *~ Jff. He was said to be skilled in 
astrology as weIl as divination, and relied on these abilities to predict the outcome of 
military actions.44 
Under the management ofYing Tingji, the Lixian guan enrolled a total oftwo 
hundred literati in the first several months. Shi Kefa provided them with monthly 
subsidies and treated them very well. When he got a little bit of wine, he would even 
invite them to drink together. Most importantly, he used his blank certificates to appoint 
these literati as local civil officiais. After the Qing army entered Yangzhou city, he 
advised these people to fiee with him for their lives. In the end, nineteen followed Shi to 
join the Southem Ming. 
Among them, about two-thirds were from Nanzhili. Twenty four had received their 
jinshi orjuren degrees, and only four ofthem later surrendered to the Qing. He Lingxiu 
44 Wen Ruilin, in ZGYSJC 35, 220-21. 
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provides two reasons to explain why so many ofthese literati were from Nanzhili. The 
first is simply because Shi Kefa was familiar with them. Although Shi himself was from 
the north, he had had little contact with people from the north since being appointed to the 
Military Defense Circuit of Chitai 1tB*~{jfiH~ (located in Chizhou 1tB1'1'I, on the south 
shore ofYangzi, now in Anhui Province) in 1635. Following this appointment, he had 
spent several years as Military Defense Circuit of Anlu (Anqing and Luzhou ~m.1'1'I), 
Grand Coordinator of An, Lu, Chi, and Tai ~.1tB*~jM" Grand Coordinator of 
Fengyang, Director-general of Grain Transport MHm*~tf~l1l.~~, and finally the 
Director of the Board ofWar in Nanjing. 
The second reason offered by He is that many of the literati from the South had a 
"strong desire to restore the Ming.,,45 However, from the above discussion of Yan 
Ermei's critics, we know this judgment needs to be considered: it is they who tried to 
persuade Shi Kefa to retreat to Yangzhou; it was also they who refused to consider 
engaging in battles in northem China, because of their local interests in the south. 
The motives of the literati who became Shi's staff officers are not easily classified, 
but we can be sure that most had already made the decision to dedicate themselves to the 
Ming. We cannot, therefore, compare these men with those who never considered 
sacrificing their lives for the Ming, or those who did not care about ethnie conflicts. 
Nonetheless, the following ean be taken as broadly representative of the fates of these 
literati: 
He Gang {ïlJ~U: sacrificed his life for the Ming like Shi Kefa; 
Wu Yi ~~: fled from Yangzhou city, but later dedicated his life to the Ming; 
Ying Tingji and Yan Ermei: bec orne vagrants (yimin j!~); 
Hou Fangyu {~jJ~: surrendered to the Qing. 
Most of these staff officers were really military specialists who were proud of their 
skills in training, strategy, tactics, and logistics. Unlike those who specialized in other 
fields such as literature or poetry, these military experts joined Shi Kefa because they 
45 He, part 2, 31. 
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really wished to lead the attempt to recover the Central Plains. They placed their hopes in 
the possibility that Shi Kefa would be able to integrate or lead the resistance, and that the 
ordinary people and local militias of north China would ri se up in response to their 
military action in the Jiangbei area. Two figures, He Gang faJJlijJij and Lu Zhenfei Jil~fJlH~, 
are representative of these officers. 
He Gang received his juren degree in 1630 in Songjiang f.t1I (present-day Shanghai). 
Following this, he spent much ofhis time in Jiaxing ~~ where he became acquainted 
with a number of other talented literati. Around 1640, he began to realize the great 
turbulence was imminent as a result of peasant rebellions and ethnie conflicts. Speaking 
to his disciple, Xu Du strm from Dongyang in Zhejiang, he said: "The place you reside in 
is proud of its strong soldiers, please pay attention to the conscription and training of 
soldiers for future use. ,,46 
In the spring of 1644, He Gang sent a memorial to recommend Xu Du. He praised Xu 
for his loyalty, filial nature, and abilities in military strategy and tactics. In this memorial, 
he asked the Hongguang emperor to use Xu to mobilize the people from the Prefectures 
of Hui ~ and Wu ~ (present-day south part of Anhui). He himself offered to serve as 
liaison to communicate between them. Given Qi Jiguang's training and managing 
methods, this army could be expected to fight on the battlefield within about one year.47 
He's endeavors received full cooperation from Palace Steward (Jishi zhong *-€l$J:fl ) 
Chen Zilong (we will mention him in Chapter Three) and a few other Jiangnan literati. 
In the very early period of the Southem Ming, Chen made several suggestions about 
how to defend the Yangzi River. He emphasized the importance of waterbome forces 
(shuishi 7J<gffl) and strongly recommended the building of ocean-going boats for use in the 
near future. He recommended that He Gang be employed to train this special force. 
These suggestions were finally accepted by the Southem Ming court. Several months 
46 For Xu Du incident, see Jerry Dennerline, "Hsu Tu and the Lesson ofNanking: Political Integration and 
the Local Defense in Chiang-nan, 1634-1645." In Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills. Jr. ed. From Ming 
to Ching - Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth -century China (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1979),91-132; Pan Xinhui rJJE.)$, "Mingji Dongyang minbian kaolun" aA~*IlMi.fï;~~~Jfû, in 
Zhu Chengru *~~D and Wang Tianyou X7(~ ed., Ming Qing fun cong aAm~Jfûîll (Beijing: 
Zijincheng, 1999), vol. 1 ,349-65. 
47 He did not know Xu had been killed by this time. See Xu Bingyi,juan 12, 197. 
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later, He established his own army, to which he gave the name Zhong Guanying of 
Songjiang tlrIJ~,jf*. Unfortunately there are no further materials available about this 
army: its size, as well as its military effectiveness, are unknown. 
He did demonstrate his capacities for military training. For example, he was said to 
have combined the use of grace and awe in controlling his sol di ers Ogl,&lZ:Mzffl); he also 
treated soldiers as his own sons and disciples. After only two months, his army was weIl 
trained and ready for deployment. As a result of this success, He was promoted to the 
position of Vice Director of the Department of Operation (zhifangsi yuanwailang IM:1J1§j 
~:9}~~). However, He remained dissatisfied with his achievements. Facing the disorder 
of the Southem Ming, he sent a memorial urging that Prince Fu not be indulgent in lei sure 
or improper in routine courtesy. He wrote: 
What we demand is a search for genius within the entire world; let people with 
wisdom make decisions, honest and clean people handle financial matters, and brave 
men fight on the battlefield. 
Furthermore, He also suggested that "the court should give honor to those who have 
practical capacities, rather than those who only know how to compose poems or papers." 
Obviously, He realized that heroes could come from the grassroots of society. This 
sort of memorial represents a clear tendency among late Ming literati who had already 
realized and tried to avoid the side effects of the eight-Iegged style essays with quotations 
from the classics. Instead of abstract discussions on the nature of the heart-mind {/Ii, 
they began to pursue practical policies. 
Unfortunately, his appeal received no response. Disappointed with the Court at 
Nanjing, he decided to go to Shi Kefa's camp and allow his army to be placed under Shi's 
control. Shi gave He Gang, along with Qin Shiqi ~±~ and Shi Fengyi limJOO.1~, the 
control and command ofhis entire Yangzhou army. He's military plan and activities 
included the occupation of Baiyanghe a#iBJ (present Yanghe town #iBJjjj, located in 
Siyang rlmm county of Jiangsu Province), and the oversight of logistical problems such as 
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grain transportation. In addition to these responsibilities, he traveled frequently between 
Songjiang and Yangzhou to take care ofhis own army. 
At the time of the Manchu siege of Yangzhou, He Gang led his army back to this city, 
and decided to devote himself to the resistance.48 Shi Kefa, realizing that there was no 
hope in winning the battle, said to He Gang: "You should attempt to summon additional 
troops to help us, rather than staying here and losing your life." 
He replied: "Now the people's hearts are scattered, who will echo us? For this country, 
for the people who know me very weIl, l de serve to die." 
After the faIl of Yangzhou, He hanged himself.49 
Lu Zhengfei provides us another example to explore their military actions. 
Lu was born in Quzhou Htlml, Shanxi Province and passed hisjinshi degree in 1625. 
As a prominent civil official, he was noted for his integrity and courage, and for gaining 
expertise in military affairs. He had been engaged in a variety of administrative and 
military capacities before the faIl of the Ming dynasty. In 1631, he became a Censor; in 
1635, he was appointed as Regional Inspector of Fujian ~~mï9! where he pacified the 
pirates in the coastal area; in autumn of 1643 he was promoted to Right Censor-in-chief 
(Youqian duyushi ïËî~tîI3~j:) and was named Viceroy in charge of the Huaiyang area, 
as weIl as the Grand Inspector of Grain Transportation ïËî~tîI3~j:*,~1?m~~~rlm. 
Entering 1644, he had adopted a number of methods to fight against the peasant 
rebellions. In January, he sent seventeen generals to deploy armies along the YeIlow 
River. By providing sorne subsistence materials, he mobilized a local militia numbering 
more than 200,000 men. In the spring, Lu tried to raIly the populace, and assigned 
officiaIs under his charge. They were given responsibility for the defense of different 
parts of Huai' an city. By this time, there were seventy-two wards (fang f:jj) in the city, 
and each of them "assembled righteous troops" to be drilled by two shengyuan, one of 
whom was given the title of ward chief (fangzhang W*). These local troops were to be 
used for night patrols in the city. However, this sort ofmilitarization was incomplete: 
48 Ali the above quoted from He, part 1, 182. 
49 Xu Bingyi, juan 12, 198. 
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there was no registration, no formaI training, and no certain pay. The members came from 
local families, each of which was to provide anywhere from one to five men. AU of them 
were volunteers, and were expected to provide their own weapons and sustenance. These 
militias were intended to secure the local community. However, one of the major results 
was that local residents were prevented from fleeing the city.50 
Lu himself encouraged the recruitment of local militia. During the weeks after the faU 
of Beijing, he rallied the local gentry and summoned them and the ordinary people to join 
the resistance against the coming peasant rebels. A parade was held in which a Juren 
named Tang Tiaoding ~WijJJffi and several others dressed up in military uniform. FinaUy, 
Lu gave out about 4000 dan of grain to the residents of city. With the support ofhis 
soldiers, he ordered the beheading of "spurious officiaIs" (wei guan ~'§', sent by Li 
Zicheng's peasant regime).51 He even made a special announcement that any one able to 
capture a "spurious official" would receive an award of2,000 taels of silver. Later, he led 
his army to recover Xuzhou. In cooperation with Lu, sorne Ming loyalists from Yancheng 
.~ captured and killed the rebel general Dong Xueli jf~ifrI and thirteen other rebel 
officers.52 
Huai'an was thus tumed into a haven for Ming loyalists, and especially for officiaIs 
and nobles fleeing from the north. Lu's work in this city impressed Shi Kefa. Following 
Li Zicheng's entrance into the Central Plains, most civil and military officers had 
surrendered. Only this city was successful in uniting both officiaIs and ordinary people to 
defend itself. Their military action not only expelled the rebels, but also prevented other 
rebels from invading. Furthermore, they recovered Suqian and other places. Jiangnan thus 
had a brief period of peace. 
"Why did the people of Huai'an dare to do so?" 
50 Huaichengjishi1fJJ&Jè.$, in ZGYSJC 29, 473-74. Wakeman's description emphasizes that it is Lu 
himselfwho organized or mobilized the militia, see Wakeman (1985), voU, 330. In fact, Lu only used the 
existing local militia, he did not "devise". Wakeman's data are based on the Mingji beilue and Jiayi shi'an., 
Compared to those two sources, Huaichengjishi provides more first hand and detailed description. 
51 Ji Liuqi, Mingji nanlue aJ.J~j$j~,juan 3, in ZGYSJC 36, 478-79. 
52 Peng Yisun, 255-56. 
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According to Shi Kefa, "it is just because the local official inspired them.,,53 
Nevertheless, sorne ofLu's actions in the Huai'an area were criticized by Liu 
Zongzhou ;U*JWJ (1578-1641), a prestigious scholar and philosopher referred to by 
many literati as an heir of the "righteous scholars" ofthe Chongzhen period. Liu sent a 
special memorial to the court to condemn Lu Zhenfei: 
The most important matter for regret is that although Lu himself remains to defend 
the city, his family members and house-hold are on a boat, preparing to flee anytime. 
Undoubtedly this action is inspiring others to flee. Thus we heard that Liu Zeqing 
and others also let their family members reside in Jiangnan, not Jiangbei. AIl of them 
deserve to put to death.54 
After this memorial was sent, Liu Zongzhou delivered a further series of scathing 
memorials to the court. In these memorials he lambasted not only certain hereditary 
military nobles for interfering in civil affairs, but also eunuchs and political opportunists. 
As a representative of the literati, Liu even urged that Ma Shiying I~±~ (1591-1646), 
the most powerful man of the Southem Ming, be sent immediately back to Fengyang, and 
that "if any generals do not follow orders, they immediately should be dealt with 
according to the great laws of the court."S5 
Liu Zongzhou did not realize that the world was changing. Hereditary military nobles 
and defense commanders had bec orne thoroughly politicized during the time of the 
Southem Ming. According to Struve, military leaders, the defense commanders in 
particular, began to indict court officiaIs and memorialize the throne on political matters 
without inhibition. For instance, several military men violently attacked the Minister of 
Personnel Zhang Shenyan ~/11!î 1=1, criticizing him for appointing only civil officiais to 
53 Shi Kefa ~PJy!, Shi zhongzhenggongji ~/~,IE0.,juan l, in XXSKQS 1387, 178. 
54 Li Qing, Nan dulu, juan l, in NMSL BZ, 169. 
55 Struve (1984), 27. 
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posts, thereby neglecting military men. Among these military men, attitudes toward the 
relationship between Wen and Wu were changing. Whereas traditionally they had been 
subordinated to civil officiaIs, they now "wanted the civil officiaIs to live up to their side" 
because it was they who allowed Prince Fu to bec orne emperor. 56 Since Liu's remarks 
touched on this very sensitive topic of the relationship between Wen and Wu, he tried to 
make it very clear. From his perspective, those military officiaIs who served outside of 
the capital would not been allowed to review court politics, and they would not be 
permitted to appointed civil officiaIs. 57 
Among the military officiaIs, Liu Zeqing was attacked severely by Liu Zongzhou. 
As we mentioned in Chapter One, Liu Zeqing had once served as regional commander of 
the major Ming garrison in Shandong. When the Chongzhen Emperor asked him to join 
his other generals in a march upon Beijing to rescue the court from Li Zicheng, Liu had 
ignored the order and instead had turned south, plundering his way through Linqing and 
reaching Fengyang, where his men reportedly killed many of the local population.58 
Liu was appointed to take charge of the eleven prefectures and counties of the 
Huai'an and Haizhou region, with responsibility for recovering Shandong. He would be 
garrisoned at Huai' an. This raises a question: how would Lu Zhenfei and local residents 
treat Liu and his notorious armies? Although Lu greeted refugees and any other sort of 
people from the north warmly, neither he nor the residents of Huai 'an had any intention 
ofaccepting the armies of Liu Zeqing. Lu's tragedy is that he had no guarantee ofhelp 
from the court ofthe Southem Ming; finally, he became a victim ofpolitical struggles in 
56 Struve (1984), 22. 
57 Li Qing, Nandu lu mrll~ ,juan 2, in NMSL BZ, 205. 
58 See Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 327. Liu's actions, together with the others, indicate that these generals in 
fact had already become warlords by this time. Whatever the measures taken, the Ming govemment had lost 
control of its own armies, let alone the lower local military forces such as xiangbing. We will mention this 
tendency in Chapter Four. To the best ofmy knowledge, the best study about the ri se ofprivate armies is a 
paper entitled "Ming dai mubing zhijianlun" ~{-\:;J.JAiMMll~ by Li Du *l1.l, Wen Shizhe 2 (1986), 62-68. 
This paper listed a lot of instances to certify that the Ming court, even the Chongzhen emperor himself, 
could not command his Regional Commanders. In this Jiangbei area, the typical example is Zhang Tianlu 
~7(ff~ (1599-1659). As a Regional Commander, he refused to follow the emperor Chongzhen's order in 
February of 1644. In the spring of 1645, Shi Kefa ordered him to provide assistance for defending 
Yangzhou, but he made an opposite decision: to surrender to the Qing, and led his army to pacify the anti-
Qing rebellions. See QDRWZG, part 1, vo1.2, 186-87. 
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the court. He was removed from power by Ma Shiying so that Ma could use his favored 
general Tian Yang E81m. Lu lost his position and died several years later in south China. 59 
After Lu's departure, Liu Zeqing and Tian Yang occupied the city but did nothing in 
preparation for the coming Qing invasion. AlI the righteous people :j§± were scattered, 
and their armies had absolutely no rule or discipline. When they were asked how to 
prepare the resistance, Liu answered: 
1 am here in support of Prince Fu. This city is the place for letting me take a break. If 
something were to happen, 1 would go to Jiangnan to choose a good place.60 
However, faced with Liu Zongzhou's sharp criticism, Liu Zeqing launched a 
counterattack. He declared that "the world of the [Ming] ancestors had been completely 
ruined by white-faced students 8~ii~." For this reason, he suggested to the Southem 
Ming court that it was necessary to terminate the civil service examinations.61 
Neither Liu Zongzhou nor Liu Zeqing could finally reach their goals because this 
relationship of Wen and Wu was too sensitive to resolve (as we will explore in Chapter 
Four). The Hongguang emperor admonished all parties saying: 
This contention between Wen and Wu grows more severe day by day ... ifthis fire-
and water [relation] is not resolved, and spears and shields are tumed and raised 
[intemalIy] then affairs of the world will deteriorate insufferably. Moreover, what 
kind ofruler do you think 1 am [to countenance this]?62 
59 Previous studies paid special attention to the political struggles among the Southem Ming, especially of 
the roles Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng played. See Gu Cheng, Chapters Two, Three as weil as Five; 
Struve (1984), 22-28; and Wakeman (1985), voU, Chapters Five and Seven. 
60 Wen Bing 3t31t Jiayi shi 'an If! Z.$~, in NMSL BZ, 464. 
61 Struve (1984),22. 
62 Ibid., 28. 
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As a prominent civil official who had considerable experience in military affairs, Shi 
Kefa had a crucial understanding of the situation. Literati cou1d say whatever they like, 
but they had little understanding of actions and effects. Fighting against the bandits and 
protecting the people would bring about countless hardships which those "white-faced 
students" could not be expected to bear.63 In contrast, for military figures, it was Shi who 
initiated plans to give the leading generals unprecedented freedom in managing their 
armies. As Minister ofWar and Grand Adjutant, "Shi has been prompt to submit plans to 
reorganize and strengthen the lower Yangzi defense system and the Nanjing imperial 
guard, which was changed to conform to the Beijing pattern. Shi proposed that certain 
powerful and recently ennobled generals, with their semiprivate armies, constitute four 
defense commands (IZY.), which would radiate northward and westward from 
Nanjing.,,64 
In the spring of 1644, several Ming generals led their armies into the Huai River 
valley from the north. Others had already been in this area for a couple of years. Apart 
from Gao lie and Liu Zeqing mentioned above, Huang Degong J.!1~:r)] was made 
Regional Commander of Fengyang in 1641, and was later garrisoned in Luzhou. Liu 
Liangzuo ~J.EHtr:, a former bandit from Beizhili who later joined the imperial army, was 
also in the Fengyang area with his own army, said to number 100,000 troopS.65 
Each of the four genera1s was ordered to garrison particular key cities and to 
command forces fixed at thirty thousand troops, called Sizhen IZY •. Unfortunately, aIl of 
these powerful generals became deeply involved in political actions. Ma Shiying, the 
Fengyang Viceroy, had carefully cultivated their support, and it was they who united to 
decide to let the Prince of Fu become the new ruler of the Southern Ming, giving him 
control over aU the affairs of the court. Shi was only Minister ofWar; the real power was 
held by Ma Shiying and his close friend Ruan Dacheng ~3t*jfi.X (1587-1646). Residing in 
liangnan, the primary concern of Ma and Ruan was to consolidate the court as a who le. 
Preparation for resistance against the Manchus and recovery of 10st land from rebellious 
63 Shi Kefa, Shi zhongzhenggongji 3I:!i~HE0~, juan 1, in XXSKQS 1387, 176. 
64 Struve (1984), 23-24. 
6S Wakeman (1985), vol. 1,327. 
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peasants were not their only concems. Under these circumstances, the staff members from 
Shi Kefa' s Lixian guan, as weIl as Shi himself, had no hope to carry out their military 
plans effectively in order to defend the liangbei area. 
AH the above has shown the variety of literati and their military actions in the Huaibei 
area. Although sorne, such as Yan Ermei, personally appeared on the battlefield, and 
others, such as Lu Zhenfei and Shi Kefa, devoted themselves to the Ming court in a 
variety of ways, none of them able to reach their final goals of fighting against the 
peasant rebels and resisting the Manchu invasion. However, we still have another 
example which will show us how sorne literati tried to play a role between the warlords 
and the ordinary people. l will examine this example below. 
During the summer of 1644, Gao lie led his army to the Huaibei area. His army 
received a notorious reputation for looting and other undisciplined action. It is said that 
sorne soldiers from this army had more than ten attendants, including wives, concubines, 
and servants.66 Gao lie was in many ways the most capable of the warlords north of the 
Yangzi. His armies filled the inhabitants of Xuzhou and Huai'an with terror. He first took 
Xuzhou city without any resistance. But when his army moved south to Huai'an and 
Yangzhou cities, the local leaders and residents had aiready become vigorously engaged 
in local defense measures, because they knew that Gao's army was prone to loot cities 
rather than defend them. Gao's army finally had no choice but to live offthe countryside. 
A censor sent the following report about this condition: 
At places like Yangzhou, Linhuai ~$ and Luhe 1\;fO,67 the people and the soldiers 
are at total odds with each other. Military discipline is almost non-existent, and now 
the soldiers have bec orne even more perverse. The soldiers and local peoples are 
separated by a wall: the people regarding the troops as bandits, the troops regarding 
the people as rebels; and there is fighting on aIl sides for no reason at al1.68 
66 Feng Menglong {,~~lm, Jiashen jishi EfI $ *è$ , Yangzhou bianlue mm~~ 5, in ZGYSJC 30, 217. 
67 This place should not be read as "Liuhe". 
68 Quoted from Wakeman, 1985, voU, 351. 
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In the whole area of Jiangbei, "everywhere soldier and civilians are in conflict . .. If 
suddenly the real bandits should arrive, the people surely will be taken by surprise and 
run away rather than defending their locales. This truly is the greatest worry of the present 
day.,,69 
In early June, 1645, Gao had garrisoned his soldiers outside Yangzhou's wall. Despite 
the large sums of money bestowed upon Gao by the concerned residents of that wealthy 
city, he still placed the city under siege and permitted his men to plunder the suburbs at 
will. 
At this time, a new jinshi (1643), Zheng Yuanxun ~~lCitJ, arrived to mediate the 
quarrels among this army and the local community. Zheng was born in She County ~~* 
ofNanzhili, in present-day Anhui Province, but had been a resident of Yangzhou for 
some time. He was familiar with both Liu Zeqing and Gao lie. After Gao's army arrived, 
he welcomed them with sheep and wine. He and Gao even became sworn brothers. Gao 
told Zheng that his only purpose now was to settle his family members here in 
preparation for his future career. Zheng promised to let his family members enter and 
reside in the city, and conveyed this news to Taishou ::tv Ma Minglu Ji~~~,~/o the 
highest official of Yangzhou city at that time. What happened next was entirely 
unexpected to Zheng: Ma simply refused this request, and aIl the gentry and ordinary 
people made known their intent to defend the city to prevent Gao's 100ting.71 
Yangzhou had long been proud of its wealth. The city was filled with wealthy 
merchants engaged in the salt and timber trades. Depending on their support, aIl the 
streets and lanes were blocked with paling, the city wall was consolidated, and channels 
69 Quoted from Struve (1984), 24-25. 
70 By this time the tenu Taishou was a common quasi-official or unofficial reference to a Prefect such as 
Zhizhou, Zhifu. 
71 Wakeman describes the process as follows: "When Governor sent a member of the local gentry to Gao's camp to 
mediate the crisis, and when that person reported back with the suggestion that Gao be allowed to enter, the envoy was 
beaten to death by a mob and the Yangzhou garrison mutinied, forcing the governor to flee for his life." See 
Wakeman (1985), voU, 351. In fact, voluntarily Zheng wanted to mediate; he not was sent by the governor or any 
one else. 
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were deepened. Since Gao's army lacked the ability to attack the city, they garrisoned in 
the suburbs where they killed and wounded countless people. Within the city, sorne 
people seized the opportunity to break the law. After hearing ofwhat had happened in 
Yangzhou, Grand Coordinator Huang Jiarui ji*JIffi came to try to resolve the disputes. 
Huang surnrnoned the relevant officiaIs, as well as local gentry to discuss the situation. 
Meanwhile, the ordinary people and soldiers stood around and listened. 
Zheng Yuanxun asked: "what kinds of troubles have been caused by General Gao? 
Why did you not let hirn in?" 
The audience began to clamor and answered: "Corpses are everywhere in the suburb, 
can you say there has been no harm?" 
Zheng replied: "Sorne of thern killed each other; General Gao does not deserve to be 
scolded for everything." 
The noises grew even louder after his words. One who was injured showed his 
wounds and said: "Can you say 1 did this to rnyself?" 
Everybody was furious. They believed that Zheng belonged to Gao and said: "There 
is no hope to defend this city without killing this man." 
Zheng was killed irnrnediately by sorne soldiers.72 
As a typical wenren who hadjust been awarded his Jinshi degree, Zheng Yuanxun did 
not understand his own tirnes or the feelings of the people. It is obvious that he 
overestirnated his own capacities for rnediating the conflicts between armies and local 
people. In the end, his words triggered public anger and caused hirn to lose his life. 
However, local officiaIs also had no idea about how to handle these incidents between 
enraged residents and the warlord soldiers encamped outside the city. This event shows us 
that literati or local gentry were often unable to ensure their own survival, let alone affect 
others. 
After the people's refusaI to weI come his armies into Yangzhou and their killing of 
his friend Zheng Yuanxun, Gao Jie became enraged. He launched repeated attacks, but 
72 Jiashenjishi ftl$~è$, Yangzhou bianlue m1H~1Bê S.In ZGYSJC 30, 217-18. 
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remained unable to occupy the city. In the midst ofthe attacks, Shi Kefa arrived and 
attempted to persuade him to give up on his attempts to avenge Zheng's death by 
attacking Yangzhou and killing Ma Minglu. Shi pointed out to Gao that Ma could not 
easily control his underlings or the ordinary people and soldiers; and secondly, that he 
was an official of the Ming court. 
Shi Kefa failed to transform Gao's army into a useful instrument for future battles 
with the Qing. Instead, he spent more than a month trying his best to persuade Gao. Shi 
Kefa's attempts to influence Gao by personal example met with little success. Instead, his 
concessions to Gao, such as allowing Gao to be the first to read official documents from 
Nanjing, caused him to lose the respect of the people of Yangzhou, as well as the 
commanders. 
Eventually, Gao convinced Shi to send an impeachment order to punish Ma Minglu. 
Shi's order accused Ma of obduracy and shirking ofresponsibility. Following Shi's 
impeachment, Ma Minglu was arrested and those who killed Zheng Yuanxun were 
beheaded or beaten to death in the market. 73 Yangzhou city became an isolated city, the 
residents were unable to maintain the defenses, and the rich families and merchants all 
fled. 74 
2: 4. Before the Massacre of Yangzhou 
Shi Kefa came originally from Henan and passed hisjinshi in 1628. He was one ofthose 
rare civil officiaIs who also demonstrated talent for military organization and strategy. 
In 1635, Shi Kefa became an assistant delegate ifushi j!jijij{j!) of Lu Xiangsheng 111~7t, 
a famous civil official who was appointed as Grand Coordinator of the provinces of 
Henan, Shandong, Huguang, and Sichuan. Shi was responsible for overseeing the towns 
ofChizhou wg1H and Anqing 3(~, and for preventing Li Zicheng's rebel armies from 
crossing the Yangzi River. Shi Kefa commanded only eight hundred troops. In the 
73 Ji Liuqi, B,juan 3, ZGYSJC 36, 472. 
74 Feng Menglong, in ZGYSJC 30, 217-18. 
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following several years, major rebel armies from north China such as the Muslim Lao 
Huihui ~@J@J often pressured the area for which he was responsible. In the summer of 
1637, he was appointed governor of Anqing and charged with protecting present central 
Anhui. Faced with ten thousand rebel troops, Shi managed to drive back their attack. By 
the end ofthis year, his headquarters at Qianshan MrlI was besieged by two peasant 
rebels, Xiao Yuanying IJ\:R~ and Guo Tianxing ~7(lî. Shi failed to hold his defense; 
many ofhis armies were lost while he himselfnearly drowned before being rescued by 
one of his men.75 
Early in 1638, several major rebels attacked Tongcheng, a city lying immediately to 
the north of the Yangzi in south-central Anhui. The rebels met Shi's army in battle about 
10 li outside that city in the western suburb. This time Shi Kefa and his army received full 
cooperation from the local govemments and residents. Since his army was besieged by 
rebel cavalry from the north, and was running out of food, the Magistrate of Tongcheng 
asked for help from residents of the city. Each family was asked to provide cooked food 
for the Ming armies. The local county govemment' s support was not limited to this; they 
also provided torches to allow the soldiers to see during the night. With this local 
assistance, the Ming armies successfully expelled the rebels.76 
During these battles, Shi won the loyalty ofhis men and the respect ofhis officers. 
His military achievement soon attracted the attention of the emperor. In 1639, Shi was 
assigned to defend the province of Shandong against Manchu raiders from the north. In 
securing the western frontier of Shandong, his first concern was to pacify the peasant 
rebels. What we should mention here is that Shi Kefa demonstrated a willingness and 
ability to pay attention to the complexities of local society and local administrative 
systems. In addition to the above examples, several of his writings provide cIues in this 
regard. In a letter entitled Reply to Huizhou Gentry (fiHJ(1'['!*'$±), he expressed the view 
that "unit y is strength;" with the cooperation of the Ming govemment, local gentry, and 
75 Dai Tianyou ~EB:f:ï, Jieyilu ::f~~, ZGYSJC 30, 85. 
76 Wang Wenyao .:E~)\I, Quantongjilue ~:fIilJ*èPm, in SKWSSJK, part 2-21, 333. 
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ordinary people "it would be easy to pacify the bandits.,,77 In an article entitled "To those 
Officers, Gentry and Civilians who are Martyred", written in the winter of 1642, he states, 
1 recall the previous years when 1 resisted rebels in Anqing and Luzhou, wherever 1 
went, aIl the gentry and common people welcomed me in the suburbs as weB as 
along the roads, the scholar-bureaucrats waited for me at their homes ... alas, the 
time is different now.78 
After three years of mourning for his mother' s death, he was made Vice-Minister of 
Finance and supreme commander in charge of grain transport from Nanjing to Beijing, as 
weIl as Grand Coordinator of the Huai'an area. In 1643, he was named Minister ofWar, 
in Nanjing. 
In the winter ofthat year, military conditions worsened everywhere. He had tried to 
make preparations for the relief of Beijing. He tried to raIl y his troops, swore an oath with 
them to 'succor the King' (J1JI.), and proceeded to head north. Before receiving word 
that the capital had fallen, his army actually had crossed the Yangzi River at Pukou. Shi 
along with many others appealed to aIl the leaders to defend the South. They not only 
sought the allegiance of the Ming generals whose armies lay between Yangzi River and 
the Shun regime in the north, but also tried to go to Huai River valley in search of 
"righteous braves." 
As Minister ofWar, Shi Kefa in fact could not play his actual role in the court of the 
Southem Ming. Since Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng strictly controlled the court, he had 
no choice but to establish his headquarters at Yangzhou. From here he was able to 
coordinate aIl the defense armies in the Jiangbei area, particularly the Sizhen armies. 
According to the policy, each ofthese armies was supposed to be kept under control by 
his personal surveillance. At this time, the Southem Ming govemment had to support a 
large military force. During the winter of 1644 to 1645, when its armies were most 
numerous, it is said that there were over one million soldiers under Southem Ming 
77 Shi Kefa, Shi Zhongzhenggongji .§I:,'iS',lE0~,juan 2, in XXSKQS, 1387, 195. 
78 Lujiang xianzhi Li'ŒW'*it, juan 15, GGZBCK (A), book 7, 71. 
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command.79 Most of the armies were largely dependent upon the Nanjing government for 
logistical support and soldiers' salaries. The combined military and civil expenses 
amounted to about 10,000,000 taels per year. For those garrisoned in the Jiangbei area, 
the Nanjing government was pledged to provide 2.4 million taels of silver each year, but 
supplies and weapons were to come from local taxes. The individual generals were to be 
given authorization to impose taxes at their own will, as weIl as to exploit abandoned land, 
engage in mining, and assess commercial tariffs. A special policy was implemented to 
encourage the recovery of territory: if a general rescued a city from rebel hands, he would 
be given control of that city under those same rules. 
In the process of planning the defense of Yangzhou, Shi Kefa was faced with 
countless challenges. The first difficulty, mentioned above, was financial. After the 
Manchu army took over Suqian, Shi tried to plan a counterattack. He estimated that the 
attack would require approximately 300,000 taels of silver. To meet the demands, he and 
others sent a request for funds to Nanjing. The answer from both the Board of Revenue 
Fff~ and the Board ofWorks Iff~ read: 
The time is different now, with only half of the empire; people have already 
exhausted their capacities. 
In total the court was short of about 2.25 million taels for military affairs, and the 
Board of Revenue only had a little more than 1,000 taels in hand. 8o 
When combined with the fact that Yangzhou was under the administration of Gao Jie 
after the Zheng Yuanxun Incident, this refusaI from the Board of Revenue meant that Shi 
had no way to carry out his planned action. Eventually, Shi appointed a man to sell rice 
and beans, hoping in this way to make enough money to coyer the expenses. But this 
attempt also met with failure as the money went to the individuals involved in the 
business, rather than to Shi's official agency. Shi next shifted his attention to Tuntian ïtL 
79 Wakeman (1985), vol,l, 393; see also Struve (1984), 8. 
80 AIl the above from Nandu lu mt1l~, juan 4. In NMSL BZ, 285. 
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ES - letting his armies open up wasteland and grow food grain. But, this venture too met 
with no success. 81 
The second challenge was related to politics and personnel. After the fall of the 
northem capital, sorne high officiaIs who had not committed suicide out of devotion for 
the Ming dynasty or surrendered to Li Zicheng's regime, made their way to Nanjing. Shi 
Kefa made a suggestion for using these officiaIs: "AlI officiaIs originalIy registered in the 
north should be ordered to present themselves to the Ministries of Personnel and War to 
register their names to be selected for appointment. Otherwise, we will destroy their 
hopes ofretuming to the south." 82 The problem is that what they brought from Beijing 
was not only their wisdom and administrative experience, but also red tape and the related 
corrupt political atmosphere. Since Shi Kefa was responsible to the Board ofWar, he 
understood this very weIl: 
Recently 1 read memorials written by sorne chancellors; what they know is only 
asking for more military forces, rather than thorough consideration of how to pay the 
relevant fees. Can you find in this world soldiers who do not need to eat, and horses 
that do not need to feed? 
He also complained about the literati who cared for nothing but official degrees and 
reputations. They were proud only of argumentation or disputation rather than engaging 
in industry or business. He wrote, 
When faced with matters related to money and grain, they would say that only the 
lower level officiaIs should handle concrete administrative matters. For military 
affairs, they would say that it is a troubling matter, and that you should not bother us. 
AlI their energies and spirit were used up in acting as officiaIs; nobody wanted to do 
81 Ying Tinji ff!~fE, Qing linxietfm.J'fil, part 1, in ZGYSJC 33, 83. 
82 Wakeman (1985), voU, 381. 
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anything to deal with the logistical demands of the country. 83 
In a memorial sent to Nanjing, he wrote: 
Now, in the Jiangbei area there are fourlan (Zhen), army supervisors, Xunfu and 
Xun'an, special officers for Tuntian as weH as viceroys; altogether too many officiaIs. 
However, they did not bring any benefits when the rebels and Manchus invaded ... 
Since a variety of officiaIs from different agencies were in this city, he found that 
"Social intercourse produces many conflicts; both prefecture and county are bothered. 
Now two official positions for managing salt have been created. Both may exploit the 
merchants, thus making them lose their capital; in this case how can we levy taxes?84 
The relations between civil officiaIs and the various Zhen military warlords brought 
even worse effects. Shi Kefa's helplessness and embarrassment in this regard was 
expressed in one ofhis memorials. According to Shi, both civil and military officiaIs 
shared responsibilities for the death of the Chongzhen emperor and the faH of Beijing: 
Of course civil officiaIs hurt the Ming a lot, but could you say aU the military officiais 
are loyal? Countless officiaIs surrendered to the bandits; are they aU civil officiaIs? In 
the past several years there has been no clear way for an official career. The problem 
lies in narrowly partisan factional struggles.85 
The conflicts between political factions and civil and military officiaIs reached a 
zenith in the spring of 1645. At that time, the force ofZuo Liangyu tL.â.:li (1599-1645), 
another Zongbing garrisoned in the Huguang area and dissatisfied with Ma and Ruan, 
began to attack to the east along the Yangzi River. In order to hoid back Zuo's army. 
83 Ali the above materials are from Li Qing *F1f, Nandu lu ï~Hll~, juan 2. In NMSL BZ, 210. 
84 Wen Bing 3Z::~t Jiayi shi 'an Efl Z,$~, part 2, in NMSL BZ, 542. 
85 Shi Kefa, Shi Zhongzhenggongji 5I:J&tiE0~,juan 1. In XXSKQS 1387, 171. 
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there was no choice but to withdraw armies from the Jiangbei area, and thus weaken the 
Southem Ming's defenses against the Manchus. Faced with this situation, the ministers of 
the Southem Ming court were divided. Sorne ministers insisted that the Manchu threat 
was of primary concem, that it was better to let the Jiangbei armies stay in their original 
location. The Hongguang Emperor himself agreed with this argument. However, Ma 
Shiying, the holder ofreal power in the court feared the Qing far less than Zuo. "We 
together, ruler and minister," declared Ma, "would rather die at the hands of the Qing than 
not die and fall into the hands of Zuo Liangyu." He believed that it would be possible to 
negotiate with the Qing army, but were Zuo's army to occupy Nanjing, there would be no 
way to proceed. Finally, he ordered forces to interpose themselves between Zuo's army 
and Nanjing along the Yangzi River.86 
Shi Kefa immediately voiced his opposition, saying: 
.... Along the Yangzi River we have a large number of armies that will be sufficient 
to fight against Zuo; ... we have enough evidence to show that the Qing will invade. 
If we give up the defense, there would be no fortifications in the Jiangbei area ... I 
really do not know why (Ma) Shiying is beclouded to such a degree. 87 
Shi thought that the main Ming armies should be deployed in the Jiangbei area, to 
control the Huai River and defend against the Manchu army. He was also pleading for 
reinforcements to bolster the defenses of Yangzhou. But finally, Ma Shiying not only 
refused this request, but also tried to order Liu Zeqing' s troops back from the Yellow 
River front where they were holding the line of defense against the Qing, in order to 
strengthen the barrier between Zuo Liangyu and the Southem Ming court. 
On May 2, Shi was formally ordered to come back across the river, and the Ming 
general reluctantly complied. He had to divide his army and led the main force toward 
Nanjing in preparation for repelling Zuo Liangyu. 88 
86 Li Qing, San yuan biji -=tl[~~c, 140. 
87 Shi Zhongzhenggongji 3I::,~jE0~, vol.l, in XXSKQS 1387, 185. 
88 Finally, Zuo's force was halted and the entire army later surrendered to the Qing, thus posing a serious 
long-term threat to the Southem Ming. 
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Looking briefly at Qing movements since the end of 1644, one commander named 
Haoge ~f~ had moved south from Jining, taking both Haizhou &1'['1 on the coast and 
Suqian near the junction of the Grand Canal. On the western front, Dodo ~~ had led his 
army to attack the southern bank of the Yellow River from Mengjin ~:tf. Although the 
Manchu offensive was delayed for a while by remnants of Li Zicheng's armies in Henan, 
they quickly readjusted their troop deployments. From early April 1645, Haoge pressed 
his attack from the east, while Dodo began to lead his army in three columns toward 
Guide. From Guide, Dodo sent one group down the Fei River ~HE7J< towards Linhuai, 
another along the right bank of the Fei River to Xuyi HfH'Éî, and a third along the northern 
side of the Yellow River through Xuzhou toward Huai'an.89 
Shi Kefa's original plan was to prepare a coordinated defense and offense. The first 
step was to reinforce the loyalists' armies at Xuzhou in order to keep alive the hope of an 
ultimate recovery farther to the north. He therefore marched out of Yangzhou, moving his 
army up to the foot of Lake Hongze ~~YliJj. Unfortunately, he was short of sol di ers and 
financial resources that might have made his plan successful. For instance, from Suqian to 
Shuanggou ~1., a distance of about 180 to 190 li, no force was deployed. Along the Huai 
River, the total number oftroops was said to be about 60,000, but there was no pay for 
new recruits, nor was there any attempt to undertake further training.90 
Finally Shi decided to retreat with his army to XuYU.91 Since Xuyu had already fallen 
to the Qing before Shi' s coming, he had no choice but drop back, withdrawing all of his 
30,000 men to defend Yangzhou. Although Shi had personally addressed his troops, 
89 The Manchu army which came from Shandong area is not shown in a map in Struve' s book (1984), 
52 (see Map 3). In fact, the Chinese sources clearly mention it, for example, Nanjiang yishi, ZGYSJC 35, 
215. 
90 Li Qing, B, juan 4, in NMSL BZ, 319. 
91 Xuyu ~nér- these two Chinese characters should not be read as "Yutai" as Wakeman does. Wakeman 
(1985), vol. 1,545. 
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telling them that "each should shoulder the responsibility for himself and not trouble the 
citizens," very few followed his order.92 
Yangzhou now became the Southern Ming court's last line of defense north of the 
Yangzi River. Under Shi Kefa's leadership, this city was the first to resist the Qing arrnies 
and the first city where the Qing army met sustained military resistance. And, perhaps 
because the Manchus wished to set a c1ear example for the rest of the Yangzi delta cities, 
a general massacre of the city was ordered and continued for more than ten days. Within 
this city, Shi Kefa assembled a force ofthirty thousand men inside the wall, crowding 
them among urban residents and refugees. Tactically, he rushed to reinforce the city's 
walls, installing gunnery platforms and foreign-style cannon on the ramparts, but he was 
unable to do much else. This was due in part to the fact that this city was dominated by 
the so-called elite, merchants and entrepreneurs, most of whom were "parasitic" forces 
who could not be expected to protect the city. In fact, many chose to flee rather than 
remain to defend the city. 
Shi Kefa finally realized that his defense of Yangzhou had no chance of success. In a 
letter to his family members, he wrote: 
The Northem (Qing) troops surrounded the Yangzhou city wall on the 18th but have 
not yet attacked. In any case, the people have already lost heart, and the situation 
cannot be saved. Sooner or later 1 must die ... life is ofno use anyway. 1 write no 
further; my heart is rent to pieces.93 
ln fact, Shi Kefa's dilemma began at the outset ofhis Yangzhou mission. There were 
two enemies in front of him: both peasant rebels and the Manchu forces. During the 
whole course ofhis Jiangbei military career, the rebels, rather than the Manchu invaders, 
92 Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 548. 
93 Edited and translated by Struve, Vaices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm - China in Tiger 's Jaws (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 31-32. 
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were clearly uppermost in his mind, because he had spent the previous sixteen years 
fighting internaI rebellion.94 
However, he had little experience fighting against an external invasion. Faced with a 
rebel attack, he knew how to go about mobilizing the local community, including the 
various social strata such as officiaIs, gentry, and ordinary residents. But fighting against 
the Manchu invasion was another matter. His authority over the armies of Jiangbei was 
really only nominal, only a few staff officers, such as He Gang, followed him in fighting 
to the death. Most of his time was actually spent on the road between the Yangzi and 
Huai Rivers (f.Ë:1Ix-f.Ë:1t) trying to harmonize and intercede in conflicts between the 
various warlords. For his efforts, he was given the mocking title offemale matchmaker 
(meipo YJil;~). His style of leadership belonged to that oftypical scholar-officials; with the 
increasing militarization of the area, this approach became even less effective. As 
mentioned before, after Gao Jie was killed by Xu Dingguo, and Gao's armies surrendered 
to the Qing, Yan Ermei suggested that he incorporate rebel armies into his own force. 
However, from Shi Kefa's point ofview, Yan's suggestions were simply unimaginable. 
Regardless of the suitability of such ideas, they did not accord with the princip les of an 
imperial minister. Yan Ermei had to leave him behind, and Shi paid for his conservatism 
with his life. 
Other incidents show that Shi Kefa did not have a great capacity to deal with 
complicated military situation. Before the Yangzhou massacre, the Manchu's invasion 
from the north and Zuo Liangyu's attack along the Yangzi River took place 
simultaneously. Apart from an expression of consternation, Shi Kefa had no definite ideas 
about how to handle such an emergency. For example, within one day Shi issued three 
successive and contradictory orders for the deployment of the Southern Ming army 
quartered at Gaoyou r%ijj/). In the morning he ordered them to go to Pukou rmO to 
defend against Zuo's coming; at noon, he ordered aH his armies to return to Yangzhou 
and wait for another order; in the afternoon, he sent a third order stating that Xuyu was in 
danger, and that each army should come to Tianchang 7(~ for future deployment. His 
head of staff, Ying Tingji, witnessed this behavior and commented that Shi had lost his 
94 Shi Zhongzhenggongji §!:/'&,IE0~, juan 1, in XXSKQS l387, 173. 
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mind (:1J-t~L~). The distance was altogether about one thousand li, with limited 
supplies, how could the army be redeployed three times in one day?95 
On May 20, Qing armies poured into Yangzhou city. Shi was captured after 
attempting suicide, and then he was executed for refusing to submit. After the Yangzhou 
massacre, the Qing army continued preparations to cross the Yangzi River. According to 
one report sent by Dodo, there were a total of twenty-three zongbing as weIl as infantry 
and cavalry numbering about 238,300 who surrendered in the Jiangbei area.96 What we 
should bear in mind is that the reason for the Ming armies' surrender was not only their 
poor quality, bad training, or lack ofbattle effectiveness. For instance, the armies of 
zongbing Li Chengdong $fflGf* and Jin Shenhuan ~§:f.EI played an even more important 
role than that of the Manchu armies during later campaigns of pacification in South China. 
For most of the former Ming generals, their primary concern was the pursuit of actual 
benefits. Since Beijing had already faIlen, and the Southern Ming could not provide what 
they needed, joining the Qing thus became their ideal choice. 
Before shifting to the Jiangnan area, following the Qing army's route, we must 
consider the western part ofNanzhili. For one thing, it geographically covers aIl present-
day Anhui, for another, this area (inc1uding both sides of the Yangzi River) deserves to be 
examined because of its specifie local military forces, social structure, as weIl as the 
military behavior of its literati. 
95 Ying Tingji, in ZGYSJC 33, 85. 
96 QSL -Shizu shilu ütWŒl..~, juan 17. 
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2: 5. "Pedantic" and "Absurd": Anti- Qing Resistance in a Mountainous Area 
The local rnilitary forces in the west part ofNanzhili had a long history, with sorne of 
thern such as the Shanshui zhai LlJ7.K* traceable back to the Song Dynasty.97 These 
forces still existed at the end of the Ming Dynasty. In Taihe county *fO, the forces were 
cornprised of ordinary peasants, sorne shengyuan, and others who had sorne knowledge of 
rnilitary affairs. Since all the members were common local residents, one could not expect 
these forces to fight on the battlefield, but they were sufficient to defend their local 
areas.
98 
In the southern part of this area, local forces either built walled towns (zhaO for 
defending the cornrnunity, or sirnply used geographical advantages such as cliffs and a 
mountain range to create a fortress. In the plains, the walled towns had long been the 
center of ruling c1ass power in the countryside, designed both for the safety of life and the 
storage of accurnulated property. "The first principle in defending it is to c1ear the 
surrounding countryside by bringing everything movable within the walls. Outside should 
be only bare fields, poisoned wells, and a clear glacis for defensive fire. Inside should be 
stocks of food and other supplies far superior to what the enemy can laboriously bring up 
to sustain his siege. The besieged definitely have the advantage.,,99 
In mountainous areas, these fortified villages were referred to as bao ~ . An example 
from Huoshan _LlJ shows that due to the narrow pass and cliffs as well as a mountain 
range, they were able to protect thernselves frorn rebels. 100 
97 Luzhou fuzhi .1'1'1}ff~, juan 22, in XXSKQS 652, 606. For general information about this sort of local 
force, see He Ruo {BJ;g: "Ming mo de shanzhai yibing" aJl*Iy,:HlJ~jU~~,Da Zhong 5 (1944), 116-28. See 
also Li Wenzhi $3'Ot, "Ming mo de zhaibao yu yijun" aJl*ÉI"HiH~W~UI[, Wenshi zazhi 3: 7-8 (1943), 
29-37; Wang Xiande ::Ewtf- "Minmatsu doran ki ni okeru goson boei" i3A*IDJJ~L1JT (:: h' tt 7.> ~HIW1~Î, 
Mindai shi kenkyü 2 (1975), 26-49. 
98 Wu Shiji ~ t!:!:i1ff, Taihe xian yukou shimo *;fD~~~JŒMî*, part 2, 79. 
99 See John K. Fairbank, 20. 
100 (Guangxu *~) Huoshan xianzhi .r-U~~~, juan 14, in ZGDFZJC (A), Anhui 13,282-83. This book 
provided wrong information about the origin of shanzhai. In fact, it did not originate with Shi Kefa. 
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By April 1644, the Ming court simply had no more available forces. With great 
reluctance, an edict was issued authorizing the formation of militia on a nationwide scale. 
The Chongzhen emperor admitted the need for local military forces. According to his 
edict, the residents of fuzhai ±* and others had no choice but to mobilize the masses 
and protect themselves from bandits. 
This special edict wants to pardon whatever you have done before. However, ifyou 
can capture and kill rebellious officiaIs, you may be granted an official position; if 
you are able to arrest bandits, you will receive a reward ... Those who can recover a 
fallen city will receive a promotion. As for the rest of sol di ers from the shanzhai, 
they should be organized as xiangyong, and they should be given oxen and seeds in 
order to cultivate the barren lands .... 101 
This policy could not be carried out because Beijing fell two months later. However, 
the different levels of the Ming government did have sorne specific policies in these are as 
in the preceding years. For example, sorne records related to the baojia system are 
available for Taihe County. This system had not been carried out before 1634, but had 
been carried out ever since. AlI the residents of the city were organized into a baojia 
system: 10 families into onejia, with eachjia taking tums patrolling the city at night. The 
suburbs and countryside copied this method in organizing their own baojia system. In the 
past, the local gentry generally did not participate in the baojia system, because 
theoretically they were to be protected by the common people oftheir community. But 
now the county govemment encouraged them to let their family members join the 
baojia. 102 
Ming local governments often struggled to resolve financial problems. For example, 
the most powerful weapons for protecting a city were "firearms and gun powder" !X~j( 
101 Peng Yishun, juan 6, 132-33. 
102 Unfortunately, there is no further record to show the results ofthis special endeavor. Wu Shiji ~ t!t~, 
part 2,90. 
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~. They relied on these to achieve victory, but often lacked both materials and people 
with the skills required to produce them. 103 
In 1635, Taihe County announced a policy to apportion soldiers according to li cm): 
Our county now has thirty five li, each li has ten pai ~F, each pai should dispatch a 
man who must be strong and acquainted with military affairs. Their food, clothing, 
and equipment should be provided by the govemment; in total we may get three 
hundred and fi ft y men. .. Let professional military staff act as the heads of each 
unit. 104 
The other counties ofthis area adopted roughly the same policy. Large counties 
organized about 500 to 600 men, medium-sized counties about 300 to 400, and small 
counties about 200 to 300. The rates ofpay also differed according to the size of the 
county.105 However, this conscription policy was only carried out for about one or two 
years. In June of 1636, the highest official of the Ming govemment in the Jiangbei area, 
Zhang Guowei, produced two documents. The first document indicated that one 
infantryman should be limited to a salary of only 0.3 taels of silver every month. The 
order for recruiting soldiers had been issued more than two months earlier, but only a 
very few people were recruited. Since the rebels were so violent, Zhang Guowei said: 
"Who would want to get such little pay in compensation for his life? This is why 
conscription is so difficult.,,106 Another document talked about the defense of Luhe city. 
This city was located on a plain, and there were no geographic advantages to rely on for 
defense. "It requires an official army for protection, but nobody wants to be recruited."I07 
On the other hand, the peasant rebels were also equipped with poor weapons. At the 
end of 1634, the Magistrate of Taihe witnessed the real conditions of the rebel armies. 
103 Ibid., 61 and 73. 
104 Wu Shiji, 99. 
105 Zhang Guowei ~Iîl!a*l, Fuwu sucao ~~iffiî1j![, in SSJHSCK shi.§l;: 39, 315-16. 
106 Zhang Guowei, 333. 
107 Ibid., 355. 
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Based on his description, we learn that the bandits had no firearms or gunpowder, their 
arrivaIs and departures Iooked like the playing of games. According to faise information, 
there were eighty thousand bandits coming, but when they arrived there were only about 
two thousand, inc1uding about five hundred women and children. Real fighters did not 
even reach two thousand. 
This county had no resident soldiers, so the magistrate had to conscript fifty-three 
men to defend five gates ofthe city, in addition to sorne shengyuan and baojia who were 
already in the city. Surprisingly, this force finally repelled the bandits. lOS 
Even the powerful, well-equipped rebel armies were often prevented from using their 
military advantages because of geographical differences: they were well-practiced in 
tactics such as cavalry attacks in the north China plains,109 but here the land was mostly 
mountainous. For instance, on the border between Yingshan ~LU and Taihe, the 
mountain range was so high that even birds were unable to cross, let alone the rebel 
cavalry. In the spring of 1635, the peasants tried to attack here, but finally had no choice 
but to withdrawYo 
Due to administrative, financial, and military shortcomings, the Ming government had 
lost control in this western part ofNanzhili by the 1640s. The local rebels were 
accompanied by a large number of bandits belonging mostly to peasant leader Zhang 
Xianzhong ~~JiS'\. Faced with these challenges, the Ming government had to adopt a 
policy of "appeasement". For ordinary people, there was no certain "moral model" ([i§J* 
~~I1!!IiiS;) to follow. The choice ofwhether to surrender andjoin the rebels or to 
continue under the government' s control was totally dependent on changing 
circumstances; most important of aIl was survival. lll 
\08 Wu Shiji, 74-75. 
109 Zhang Guowei, 315-16. 
1 \0 Zhang Guowei, 106-08. 
III Ming Qing shiliao xinbian, vol. 1 0, 971-72. 
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The actual social situation of this area is too complicated to describe in sufficient 
detail. AH the social forces affected each other in various ways. The foHowing data 
provide sorne examples ofthis complexity. 
In the two years of 1640 and 1641, Shucheng county gr~~*, lost countless people to 
starvation caused by locusts and drought. At the same time, General Kong Tingxun JLff 
wH and his soldiers were garrisoned in the city. Since both his soldiers and the local 
farmers suffered from severe famine, conflicts took place over the harvesting of wheat. 
Both soldiers and farmers tried to engage in lawsuits. However, the final judgment 
favored the local farmers. The soldiers accused the local officiaIs and gentry of showing 
partiality to the farmers. A soldier named Zhang Hushan ~JJê~ was angered by the 
court's judgment and led several other soldiers to join with the bandits who were in Huo 
Mountain .~. The bandits were very happy about their coming; but they could not trust 
them completely. The bandits ordered these soldiers to attack the city in order to test 
whether they reaUy wanted to cooperate with them. When the soldiers showed that their 
loyalties reaUy lay with the bandits, the bandits decided to join with these soldiers and 
besiege the city. 
General Kong lost control of the situation. First, he came to the city wall and cried out 
to the defenders to open the door "because 1 still have a lot of soldiers who did not 
surrender [to the bandits]." But nobody in the city believed him; they responded by firing 
at him with a gun. His soldiers witnessed the situation and said in one voice: "Let's 
attack to occupy this city so that we may share the benefits (:k%~m)." General Kong 
could do nothing. 
Two days later, on April 3, 1642, the city feU. 
This was also the date ofthefukao J&~ (Prefectural Examinations). Luzhou was only 
about fort Y miles away from Shuchen. A shengyuan took this news to the Prefect of the 
Prefecture (Zhifu) Zheng Luxiang ~RiM. Based on the record, 
... although Zheng has ajinshi degree, he knows nothing about current social and 
political affairs; his only concem is minor benefits C'litjVJ\fU). When he heard the 
news, he looked like a puppet, apart from trembling, he had nothing to say. 
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The other residents of Luzhou also tumed a deaf ear to this news because everybody 
was more concemed with passing this exam than with the fact that Shucheng city was 
occupied by bandits. 1 12 
This material reminds us of several things: the triangular relationships between local 
govemment, ordinary farmers and residents, and the local army; the problems faced by 
the head of the local army in controlling his own army; 113 the shifting identities of bandits 
and soldiers; the literati's primary concem with civil examinations, a concem that led to 
an ignorance of the real changes of their own time; and, as mentioned in the 
"Introduction" ofthis thesis, the literati's inability to handle the complicated situations of 
the late Ming. 
However, the above data do not provide information about the roles played by local 
gentry. Fortunately, the case study of Tongcheng f/PlfAlG can serve as a useful supplement. 
The most important primary source for Tongcheng local history is Jieyi lu .::rm~, 
written by Dai Tianyou ftlGB3:R. In this document, Dai daims to have written down 
everything that he had seen and heard of happenings in his hometown. According to his 
description, in the past many literati had become officiaIs through civil examinations in 
the Ming dynasty. These scholar-bureaucrats were generally virtuous. Thus, usually the 
ordinary people were not afraid of official agencies and respected the literati. In the 
seventeenth century, the situation had changed: old and well-known families all pursued 
wanton and luxurious lives. Their children and even their slaves frequently broke the law. 
Their behavior finally triggered a peasant rebellion led by Huang Wending ~3tfm and 
112 Yu Ruizi ~fIffl1*, Liuzei Zhang Xianzhong xian Luzhouji 1m:M5:&~,'&,~@Jil1'1'1*e., in ZZYSJC 29, 687-
88. 
113 Generally speaking, the Ming govemment had no idea how to command its army in this area. In terms 
of local xiangbing and other military forces, sorne higher officiaIs wanted to let the generals who came from 
the frontiers command them, because the bandits were afraid ofthis sort of general, while others, such as 
Zhang Guowei, insisted on letting the general who came from the South lead local military forces, because 
frontier generals would not be familiar with the customs and social conditions of the Yangzi area. See 
Zhang Guowei, 234-35. 
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Wang Guohua 1..f.~. in the summer of 1634. They bumt down the rich families' houses 
and looted their money.114 Although this rebellion was pacified within a short period, the 
social fabric was impacted. 
What happened following this rebellion has been discussed in detail by Hilary J. 
Beattie. 115 Beattie's study provides evidence to indicate that the social fabric of the 
county was so strongly woven by the end of the Ming dynasty that not even violent 
disturbances were able to tear it apart or change the course of social development in any 
really fundamental way. Further, she demonstrates that the social order in the Ming and 
early Qing was becoming stabilized and developing resilience against outside shocks and 
disturbances. The Tongcheng elite undertook a number ofmeasures to ensure this sort of 
stability. They used political influence to obtain the provincial govemment's support for 
their localities, sent sorne of their families off to safety in other areas, defused local unrest 
with concessions or gifts, mobilized local militia defense corps, and took tough action 
against their own deviant members. When discussing responses to the Manchu invasion, 
the author differentiates between officiaIs and the so-called gentry-elite. OfficiaIs, who 
might have been expected to demonstrate strong loyalties to the Ming govemment, by no 
means exhibited a marked desire to resist alien rule. On the contrary, this key social 
group seems to have made successful efforts to minimize the effects of this traumatic 
period by cooperating with rather than defying the new regime. 116 
1 would argue with her conclusions for a number ofreasons. For one thing, it is not 
easy to distinguish between the three social strata of official, gentry elite, and literati. 
These groups were usually mixed together, and played different roles in different 
environments. Secondly, according to Ming law, officiaIs were not allowed to serve in 
their hometowns; this is why they usually left their offices before the arrivaI of the Qing. 
However, if officiaIs retumed to their hometown after retirement, they were deemed to be 
114 Dai Tianyou, in ZZYSJC 30, 79-81. 
115 Hilary J. Beattie, "The Alternative to Resistance: The Case ofT'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei," in Jonathan D. 
Spence and John E. Wills. Jr. eds., From Ming to Ch 'ing, Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-
Century China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 239-76. 
116 Beattie, 241-43. 
138 
"gentry" and did not belong to officialdom any more. In contrast, the motives of local 
gentry are understandabIe: not only from a politicai or idealistic perspective, but aiso 
from the fact that their interests coincided with defending their property. Only after they 
realized the Qing would bring them peacefullives would they end their resistance or go 
further and cooperate with the Qing. Generally speaking, "pure" literati are in the middle 
between local officiaIs and gentry, thus, they tended to identify with either officiaIs or 
local gentry. 
Beattie's studies are based on both gazetteers and a large number of genealogies 
compiled by lineages, both of which were finished in the seventeenth century. 117 
However, her uses of the se sources raise further questions: since most information is 
gathered from these sources, there is a strong tendency to focus on the higher social strata, 
while ignoring the lower levels of society. Another important shortcoming is contained in 
sources themselves, as l indicated in the Introduction: aIl of them were edited in the 
seventeenth century and thus could,not be expected to provide sufficient materials for a 
description of anti-Manchu military action. 1 18 
Fortunately, the career of ajinshi named Jin Sheng ~§ from Huizhou Prefecture ~ 
1'f'/Jff provides us further cIues with which to analyze this sort of characteristic. This 
prefecture, located in the southwest part ofNanzhili, was proud of its developed culture. 
In Ming times it produced a total of 298juren, and in Qing times, 698. In terms ofjinshi 
degree holders, 392 were produced during the Ming (1.55 percent of the imperial total), 
and 226 in the Qing (0.86 percent of the total). 119 
117 Beattie, 242-43. 
118 In the late 1770s, the Qianlong emperor started to caU for the absolute standard ofloyalty to one's state, 
see Struve, The Ming- Qing Conflict, 1619-1683, A Historiography and Source Guide (Ann Arbor: 
Association for Asian Studies, 1998), 63-64. 
119 Wu Ren'an ~e3i:', Ming Qing Jiangnan wangzhu yu shehui jingji wenhua aAlWŒlW~~Wffr±it*~~ 
3t1t (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 2001), 81-110. Ye Xian'en .;~L~" Ming Qing Huizhou nongcun shehui 
yu dianpu zhi aAiW~1\lt":f1ffd:itWf83~~U (Hefei: Anhui renmin, 1983). 
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Jin Sheng received hisjinshi degree in 1628 and later became a Member of the Hanlin 
Academy. It is said that he was not only good at economic and financial activities, but 
also skilled in military strategy, an area in which he had practical experience. 
BasicalIy, he was opposed to war itself, because he had his own opinion about 
warfare which he felt consisted of assembling men who were not righteous, and holding 
weapons while engaging in killing people. GradualIy, he realized that the Ming had 
already entered its nadir in the early seventeenth century for a variety of reasons. For 
instance, the court talked only about clever tricks and strategy but cared little about their 
practical use. As for generals, if they could not lead their soldiers into battle, how could 
they expect them to achieve victory? In ancient times, famous generals could bury more 
than ten thousand prisoners alive in a night, and act as though nothing happened. But now, 
according to Jin, they could not dare to eliminate even a few people because of their fear 
of causing rebellion. 120 
In 1635, he was called to organize and train tuanlian andyiyong in Shandong 
province as qianshi ~$. However, we have no relevant records conceming the result of 
his endeavors. Due to his skill in military affairs, he was appointed as yushi ~ 9: to 
supervise the Ming armies around Beijing city. While there, he walked a distance ofmore 
than twenty li and inspected several camps, and also heard the news about the battlefront 
from sorne refugees. AlI the news made him deeply saddened. According to his opinion, 
since the Ming armies still had more than several tens of thousands of soldiers, the right 
way to go about defending was to try to find which road the Manchu army would use. 
Each general should occupy his own camp and deploy his armies, paying attention to 
communication and to the use ofvarious strategies. However, he clearly realized that 
what the Ming armies had actually done was in contrast to the above measures, and he 
understood these generals' difficulties: 
120 Quoted from Wu Jingxian ~jJJf, "Jin Zhengxi zhi kang Qing yundong" 3lî:lE1ffz:l1CiffimltJ, Xunfeng, 
5.1 (1935), 1- 27. 
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1 saw several battalions of soldiers who had no shelters or quilts despite the bitter 
co Id weather; also, they could not fill their stomachs. 121 
Since the general conditions of both the military and Ming finances were worsening, 
Jin Sheng's endeavors finally achieved nothing. In the end, he returned to his hometown 
of Xiuning 1*$, offering the excuse of illness. 
Xiuning and its neighboring county, Shexian ~~,*, shared the same social background: 
a dense population and a shortage of farmland because the mountainous landscape was 
not suitable for farming. According to Jin Sheng' s observations, 
.... within these two counties only about twenty to thirty percent of the people own 
property or businesses, while seventy to eighty percent of the people are unemployed. 
This percentage is certainly one of the highest among the entire Ming Empire. 
Furthermore, these two counties suffered from inflation. Given these economic 
factors, these two counties are among the most dangerous places in the empire. 
According to Jin, the primary concem of this area should be to find sorne way to let 
everybody have something to do. 122 Based on this consideration, he tried to devise 
certain social reform programs. However, none ofthem moved far beyond the stage of 
suggestion making. Other programs he suggested included a change in the tax collection 
system intended to punish official corruption, and the training of local young people to 
maintain social order and protect Huizhou from disturbances caused by thieves. His 
endeavors received a certain amount of help from Jiang Tianyi iI'X- , another juren 
degree holder from the Huizhou area. 123 
In June of 1645, the Qing govemment sent officiaIs to the Huizhou area. AIl the Ming 
local officiaIs either fled or surrendered while most of the local gentry expressed their 
welcome. Meanwhile, the original social fabric was becoming even less intact. For 
121 Jin Sheng, Jin Zhengxi xiansheng wenji jilue :ft:IE:ffl-)t;~X~@~, in SKJHSCK, Jibu 50,476-77. 
122 Ibid, 523. 
123 Xu Bingyi, 328-29. 
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instance, Huizhou's slaves organized twelve zhai, asked their housemasters to return their 
covenants and bumed them if they felt dissatisfied. These slaves said: "The Emperor has 
changed; housemasters should become slaves and serve us." Hosts and servants called 
each other brothers in order to show equal status. Ordinary households were afraid of this 
condition and so organized their own groups, a total of seventy-two she ffd:. Rich families 
provided money and grain for these organizations. What they wanted to do was to protect 
local society from attack or disturbance caused by peasants or serfs, not the coming threat 
from the Qing. 
Jin Sheng joined these actions. 124 
There were two motives at the outset for Jin Sheng's military action. One was his 
desire to maintain social order in the Huizhou area. However, as we will see, his primary 
concem was to resist the Manchu invasion. This is the most important reason why he 
finally lost support from the ordinary people of his hometown. 
In order to express his determination to fight against the Qing, he began by killing the 
new govemment's envoy and then summoned the local gentry and literati. They swore 
under the portrait of Gao Huangdi r'êJ..mifiJ (Zhu Yuanzhang): 
Those who kiIl barbarians deserve a reward, those who surrender deserve to be killed. 
Jin Sheng's reputation and his former status enabled him to attract a lot offollowers. 
Sorne Ming loyalists from other areas also responded to his calI, including: Wu Yingqi ~ 
J!!~ from Jiande 9!f;~; Two shengyuan, Wu Hanchao ~~~m and Yi Minxing ~ ~~, 
from Jingxian 1~~,*; Wu Yuan ~~Jj from Guangde JJ:~; 
Gradually, Jin Sheng was able to summon about eight hundred soldiers. In order to 
collect money for military pay, he sold his own clothes, personal wares as weIl as utensils 
124 Ji Liuqi, B, juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 594. 
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for a total of about two thousand taels of silver. Sorne resources were also given by the 
merchants of Huizhou. 
At this time, the former Shandong Xurifu Qiu Zude .Ii~WŒ3.~, accompanied by two 
jure n, Qian Wenlong ~:~t~~ and Zhu Shengma *~a, also mobilized their own local 
army (named Qi Jiajun 1::::;~jJ) and expressed their intention to follow the orders of Jin 
Sheng. 
Jin Sheng continued to undertake preparations for the coming tight. What he needed 
were propitious circumstances to begin action. A few months later, the Qing issued its 
hair-cutting edict, angering many people. Jin Sheng decided to take this chance to call 
together a variety of anti-Qing forces. 
In the following several months he demonstrated his military capacity in both 
command and management. Under his leadership, Juren Wang Guan 1J:D was 
responsible for logistics, and his brothers Jin Jing ~*~ and Jing Wei ~*l were 
responsible for conscription. He led sorne soldiers to defend the pass in order to resist the 
invasion of the Qing cavalry. 
The campaign for recovering Xiuning city involved a number of different armies 
simultaneously. First of all, Jin Sheng ordered his brother Jin Lu ~~ to lead soldiers to 
recover the city and force the Qing official to flee. Meanwhile, he ordered general Huang 
Geng ~tM: and magistrate Hu Mingfu i!îJj~I®~ to lead about two thousand soldiers to join 
the attack. However, Jin Sheng did not forget the need for backup support: he appointed 
Fu Xing m~ and his one thousand-man army to reside in the city to handle any 
unexpected emergencies. Another Ming loyalist, Wen Huang ~gfli, the Tuiguan of 
Huizhou, had also joined with Jin Sheng's resistance, and he voluntarily played a role in 
the defense of Huizhou city. Among aIl the above armies, Jin Sheng himselfplayed the 
role as generalliaison, and took on responsibility for alliogistics. 
In the process of resistance, Jin Sheng placed his main forces in Jixi *'~ and seven 
other important passes around the county. He knew that the Qing army's attack on 
Huizhou depended tirst on its control of Jixi. There were a total of thirteen battles, with 
both sides suffering from roughly the same number of casualties. Jin Sheng and his 
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comrades gradually recovered several cities such as Jingde mt~, Ningguo mm, Jingxian 
1~~* and Xuancheng s:!;glG. Finally, Jin Sheng and his army exhausted aIl oftheir 
resources. Wu Yinqi and many others died on the battlefield, Jin Sheng and his few 
remaining forces persisted for three more months. At the end of September, former Ming 
Yushi Huang Shu JirM from Huizhou led sorne Qing armies with the pretense of 
providing help for the defense of Jixi city. Because they wore the Ming style of clothing, 
nobody questioned their coming; Jixi was easily occupied by the Qing. 125 
Jin Sheng tried different ways to get sorne help from the outside, especially from the 
remnants of the Ming court. The Hongguang reign had appointed him as Left Censor-in-
chief (Zuo qian du yushi tr:~m~ 92.), but he had refused dut y because of his distaste for 
the factional conflicts at court. During the summer of 1645, he could not get any help 
from the remnants of the Ming court such as the Lu regime ~'.:E in Zhejiang. FinaIly, he 
decided to support the Longwu ~i:~ regime in Fujian. Under the Longwu, Jin Sheng 
received his highest rank as Vice-Minister of the Board ofWar and Right Censor-in-chief, 
as well as general manager of military affairs for Nanzhili (Bingbu you silangjian 
duchayuan you qiandu yushi, zongli Nanzhi zhudao junwu ~:g~:ti1~~~~m~~:ti~m 
However, these ranks could not provide actual help on the battlefield. Jin Sheng 
organized a resistance movement, but the majority of ordinary Huizhou people and local 
gentry did not sympathize with his attempts. Sorne gentry said: "One man is loyal (to the 
Ming), and ten thousand people suffer disaster because ofhis behavior." Meanwhile other 
gentry said: "Surrender will allow survival, but resistance may bring damage to aIl your 
relatives." As for the common people, nobody wanted to fight when they heard these 
words. When Jin Sheng realized the real conditions of Huizhou, he told his friends: 
.... the people of Huizhou did not want to fight against the Qing, 1 forced them to do 
so. Since we lost the battles, 1 cannot leave them alone. 1 would like to be prisoner in 
order to allow the people to survive. 
125 AlI the above materials are from Xie Guozhen (1 957a), 124-25; Wu Jingxian; Jin Sheng, SKJHSCK, 
jibu 50. 
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He also told his officiaIs and generals that "the people of Huizhou are not familiar 
with warfare, what 1 want to do is protect our land and wait for the Ming army to recover 
the lost land. Since we have no capacities to do so, 1 deserve to die; there is no use for you 
to foUow me. You should simply find your own way for the future.,,126 
It was Zhang Tianlu iJ.R:::R,~U<, the Qing army's commander, who finally captured Jin 
Sheng. Jin told him: "Killing me and my brothers is enough because we forced the 
Huizhou people to fight against the Qing. You are also Chine se, be sure not to kill the 
ordinary people." Zhang answered: "1 am afraid that Huizhou people do not believe what 
you said." Jin wrote a note to announce his will, and the Huizhou territory was left in 
peace. 127 
FinaUy Jin and his close friends were executed in Nanjing. When Jin Sheng was sent 
under escort to this city, it had already been half a year since the faU of the Ming, but Jin 
and Jiang Tianyi insisted on wearing Ming style clothing. AU who saw them along the 
road felt surprised. 
Before we finish this account of Huizhou's anti-Qing military actions, another 
historical figure, Grand Secretary Huang Daozhou, should be mentioned. He provides us 
a wonderful example of how typicalliterati demonstrated their military knowledge and 
capacity on the actual battlefield. As a leader of the Donglin political faction, he had 
achieved national prominence. Huang Daozhou had not only read many military books, 
he had also written notes and criticism on sorne of them. But aU his endeavors were little 
more than idle theorizing. He had never had a chance to command an army on the 
battlefield. When presented with the opportunity for actual military command, he 
overrated both his abilities and the degree of general anti-Qing sentiment in the empire. 
126 AlI the above data are quoted from Wu Jingxian. 
127 Ibid. 
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In order to provide assistance for Huizhou's resistance, Huang Daozhou, sixt Y years 
old at the time, mobilized about 3,000 soldiersin Fujian and led them north on July 22, 
1645. But aIl his armies were lacking in training and equipment, and supplies were only 
sufficient for about one month, with only about 4,500 taels for provisions and expenses. 
No sources show that he received the service of any regular troops or officers or any 
logistical support from the Ministry ofWar. However, Huang thought that, because ofhis 
good name among the people, sufficient men and supplies would come to him along the 
way, and that he probably would be able to strike directly at Nanjing within a month's 
time. He believed that he could easily mobilize and conscript enough soldiers after his 
army entered Zhejiang and Jiangxi Provinces. According to Huang's estimation, the 
foIlowing local armies would be sure to join him because ofhis reputation: Zhang 
Guowei and his 4,000 xiangbing in Jinhua ~., Yongkang 7k~, Dongyang *~ and 
Yiwu; the former Ming armies of about 1,800 sol di ers trained by the Zhifu ~D.Rt of Jinhua, 
Wang Li .:f.ffiI; the former Ming army of about 1,200 soldiers trained by Magistrate Zhu 
Mingshi *ilttt ofYongkang 7k~; and the 2,000 yibing conscripted by ajuren named 
Gong Guangsheng aJ.J:~ and several others. Huang believed that aIl the above military 
forces had equipped themselves and waited his order. He felt that he could command 
them, just like a man's head directs his hands and feet. 128 
Huang did enjoy a certain reputation for his leaming. But this reputation was 
evidently oflittle use when it came to preparations for war. In the end, none of the above 
forces joined him. In order to conscript more soldiers, Huang finally had no choice but to 
sell his calligraphy, and fill sorne blank certificates to appoint local officiaIs. 
At its largest, Huang's army totaled about 9,000 soldiers, but most ofthese had no 
previous military experience. However, within Huang's army there was a famous military 
figure who was to play a crucial role in pacifying the south-east coast and recovering 
Taiwan, Shi Lang :âffit!~(1621-1696, his name later changed to :âffif~). Shi was weIl aware 
of the fact that Huang's army would be unable to reach its goal, and suggested that Huang 
demobilize this army. Instead ofusing this army to fight, he advised Huang to deploy 
128 Zhang Dao shao nan ~:l]î::lrf-lij, Lin 'an xunzhiji Gmi3('a]fljU~e,juan l,in ZZYSJC 33, 199-200. 
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sorne Ming armies in the southem part of Jiangxi, Huguang #i§Jji, Guangdong, and 
Guangxi. Huang totally ignored his suggestions. 129 
Arriving in the area of Quzhou 1f1'N, on the border of Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces, 
Huang was unable to get assistance from local govemments and communities. He finally 
had to take the risk to enter the Huizhou area. At this time Huang received a letter from 
one ofhis students, the magistrate ofWuyuan ~1J]{, who had already become a turncoat. 
The letter urged Huang to lead his army into a deep valley; Huang simply trusted him and 
did it. By the end of December, all his armies were surrounded by Qing armies. More 
than one thousand of Huang's soldiers were killed, and he was arrested. 
Only when he was captured, did Huang realize that his army had in fact almost met 
Jin Sheng's army, for there was only one mountain between these two anti-Qing armies. 
Huang was captured at Wuyuan in early February of 1646. Like Jin Sheng, Huang 
was also executed in Nanjing city with several ofhis loyal aides two months later. 
Let me finish this chapter with Zhang Dai's frank comments conceming what both Jin 
Sheng and Huang Daozhou had done: 
Huang was a righteous man but pedantic, while Jin Sheng was a person of unusual 
ability but absurdo They were intellectuals ~~, and neither of them was familiar 
with military affairs. Therefore, they could not be expected to be successful on the 
battlefield. 130 
The resistance of these two famous figures coincided with the military action of 
Jiangnan literati. More and more literati were involved in a series of campaigns in this the 
most economically and culturally advanced region of the empire. Their performance goes 
129 Gu Cheng, 292-94. 
130 Zhang Dai, Shi kuishu houji :EilI.1tt~, juan 37, in XXSKQS 320, 632. 
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even further than that of the Shandong literati: they not only pursued individual and group 
military action, but also tried to enlarge the anti-Qing camp by mobilizing and integrating 
the regular Ming armies, inc1uding those who belonged to the Qing army. 
2: 6. Summary 
This chapter has shown that literati devoted themselves to the Ming court in a variety of 
ways in Huaibei and the southwest part Nanzhili. Sorne ofthem personally appeared on 
the battlefield; sorne of them played the role of staff officers; others achieved certain 
results in defending the area but finally became victims of political struggles. Local 
gentry, such as Zheng Yuanxun, were often unable to ensure their own survival, let alone 
affect others. Righteous men, like Huang Daozhou, had pedantic behavior that caused 
more people to lose their lives. Shi Kefa and Jin Sheng's behavior and destiny 
represented the helplessness and embarrassment of typical scholar-officials during 
wartime. Although they knew how to go about mobilizing various strata of the local 
community to face rebel attack, they had little experience or ability in fighting against an 
external invasion from the Qing. Unfortunately, these two threats took place at the same 
time - they had no way to cope with them simultaneously. Apart from the concrete 
reasons, such as a lack of financial support as well as an absence of cooperation among 
the various forces, their final tragedies resulted mainly from their inability to integrate 
and lead the ordinary people. 
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Chapter 3 
Literati and the Resistance Movement in Jiangnan 
3: 1. The Ming Dynasty and Jiangnan: The Military Perspective 
By June 1, 1645, mixed Manchu and Chinese Qing armies had crossed the Yangzi 
under the cover of a dawn fog and begun their march on Nanjing. The Hongguang 
emperor immediately decided to flee with a small number of officiaIs as well as the 
empress and a few servants. Half a month later, Dodo led his army into the city. 
Historically, the Yangzi has been referred to as a "natural moat" (tianqian :7(11), 
but, in reality, it presented little real barrier. If the defenders of Jiangnan lost control of 
the Jiangbei area, the river would be easily crossed. Xu Fuyuan ~$jj (1599-1665), a 
juren of 1642, explains the reasons in an essay entitled Jiangfang 1I~jj. According to 
him, the loss of Jiangbei meant sharing geographic advantages with the enemy from the 
north. Furthermore, the north shore of Yangzi, dotted with numerous harbors, branching 
streams, and reed marshes, provide enough space for concealing an army. There was no 
way to defend the Yangzi and no hope for the protection of Nanjing city. 1 
Yangzhou's fallieft the Yangzi completely exposed to the Qing army. In fact, the 
Ming's Yangzi defenses had not received adequate attention since the fifteenth century, 
and, by the early sixteenth century, the defenses were in no condition to repel the 
attacks of a powerful and well-organized army. For example, on April 1, 1534, a report 
from the Board of War listed the problems related to the defense of the Yangzi. 
According to this report: 
1 Quoted from Gu Yanwu, Tianxiajunguo libingshu 7(Tfi~~flj(Pf~, ce 8, Jiangning lu'an ŒmJil~, in 
XXSKQS 596, Shibu dili lei seff~tlli:E.l~, 58-61. 
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More and more officers and soldiers have fled ... along the Yangzi, those soldiers 
are not accustomed to fighting on the water; there are no forces that can be used for 
defending [the Yangzi] and arresting [bandits]? 
Furthermore, the defenses of Nanjing city were woefully inadequate. Statistics 
compiled in mid-September, 1621, reveal that a camp named Xin Jiangying *JT1I~ 
which had originally held 15,280 officers and soldiers had been reduced to only 5,200, 
while warships had decreased from 300 to 160.3 Until the Hongguang reign, along 
more than a thousand li ofYangzi, there were only about 7,000 officers and soldiers. 
Moreover, they could not get any supplies or pay.4 It is not surprising, then, that during 
their crossing of the Yangzi, the Qing army did not meet any challenges from the Ming 
forces. After taking Nanjing, the most prosperous area of China became an easy target. 
Geographically, Jiangnan is usually identified as a major component of the lower 
Yangzi macro region. It inc1udes an elaborate network of rivers, canals, and lakes that 
link the Yangzi River and the Grand Canal. Through these two very important water 
ways, the area links north and south China to the middle and upper Yangzi regions. 
Basically, Jiangnan covers a large area encompassing most of the modem provinces of 
Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang. During the Ming, most ofthis area was called Nanzhi1i; 
in the early Qing, Jiangnan became the name of a specifie province that was 
subsequently divided into the modem-day provinces of Jiangsu and Anhui. 5 
2 (Ming) Shizong shilu tJ:!:*"~, juan 160, in MSLLZ -AHSLJ, 844. 
3 (Ming) Xizong shilu .* .. ~, juan 13, in MSLLZ- AHSLJ, 884. 
4 Jiashenjishi EflEf:1mè., juan 9, ZGYSJC 30, 271. 
5 The definition of Jiangnan is more complicated. See "The Lower Yangzi Connection", in Benjamin A. 
Elman, From Philosophy to Phil%gy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984),8-13. Also see 
"Preface" of Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China, edited by Linda Cooke Johnson (Albany: NY, State 
University of New York Press, 1993). For Chinese and Japanese scholars' definitions ofthis term, see Feng 
Xianliang {;ilfrJf~, Ming Qing Jiangnan diqu de huanjing biandong yu shehui kongzhi I3Am1IfW:f:t!!~B"J:Eli 
~~ljJWffd:~~ij5U (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 2002), 1-10. Another term "Wuzhong" "~r:p" also 
needs to be mentioned here. See Li Jinshu **~W, "Ming chu Wuzhong diqu shehuijingji zhuangkuang 
chutan" I3A*)]~r:p:f:t!!~ffr±~*~1~M*y5H)]~, in Zhongguo shekeyuan lishi yanjiusuo Ming shi yanjiushi ed., 
Ming shi yanjiu luncong I3A3I:.liff~~j1jft (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin, 1981), vol. 2, 197-219. 
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The settlement of this area benefited from a combination of natural advantages and 
human action. Since the eighth century, these included a large-scale southward 
migration of educated northem Chinese, an unrivaled network for water-bome 
transportation, a convenient irrigation system, and the dissemination of early-ripening 
rice. Added to these were the area's naturally warm climate, fertile soil, and abundant 
rainfall, all of which were ideal for agricultural deve1opment. 
These factors he1ped to make this area the most economically and culturally 
advanced within the entire empire. 
From geographical perspective, the largest province in the empire was Huguang. It 
had a total offifteen prefectures 1&, nineteen sub-prefectures 1'1'1, and one hundred and 
seventeen counties. However, the total amount of taxes and grain it paid to the central 
govemment did not surpass that of Suzhou ~1H prefecture in Jiangnan. By the end of 
the fourteenth century, the farmland of Huguang accounted for 25% of the total for the 
entire empire, but its taxes and grain comprised only 8% of the total amount gathered; 
meanwhile, the farmland of Suzhou prefecture accounted for only 1 % of the total, but 
its tax and grain accounted for 9.5%, a level of production that was twenty six times 
that of Huguang. 6 
Since the beginning of its economic development, Jiangnan was given special 
attention by the central govemment. During the Yuan Dynasty (1260-1368), the 
Mongols generally treated the Jiangnan elite very weIl. Mongol military officers often 
had close re1ationships with local elites and big families (hao jia ~~). Regardless of 
the upheavals in north China, the economy of Jiangnan maintained its rapid 
development, attracting more and more educated and wealthy people as immigrants. 
The war between Zhu Yuanzhang and Zhang Shicheng 5i±~ (1321-1367) at the end 
of the Yuan did not have a great effect on the pace of deve10pment because most 
6 Lin Jinshu **~W, "Lun Ming dai SuSong erfu de zhongfu wenti" ~~ifâa}j{-t~f'l=Jffé'9mlti1:r",,~, in 
Zhongguo shekeyuan Iishi yanjiusuo Ming shi yanjiu shi ed., Ming shi yanjiu luncong (Nanjing: Jiangsu 
renmin, 1982), vol. 1, 101. 
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Jiangnan cities simply changed their flags, and the local elites joined the Ming. 
Furthermore, Zhu's army was generally well-trained and disciplined.7 
Despite its development, the area was not highly militarized. This characteristic 
may have been related to the topographical features noted earlier. The fact that the area 
was crisscrossed with rivers, rivulets, lakes, and ponds meant that, in most 
circumstances, traffic was completely dependent on boats or ships. This is indicated by 
the fact that every family, even the most impoverished, had to own a boat. The simplest 
boats, named Jiansou UH!t Qiangchuan f~J1JB, or Qiang Huazi f~'U-T, could usually 
hold three or four people and be handled by children as young as eight. Rich families 
sometimes owned several hundred boats or ships; sorne of the bigger ones required 
thirty people for operation, and could be loaded with about 100 dan 15 of grain. 8 The 
presence of so much water made it impossible to deploy large armies or to provide the 
logistical support necessary for decisive military campaigns, and yet naval warfare was 
possible. 
In the summer of 1645, a Jiangnanjuren, Sun Zhaokui ~~Is~, decided to 
cooperate with several others in the fight against the Qing army. He was said to be 
talented in military strategy, the training of soldiers, and the management of financial 
affairs. Over the course of about ten days, he organized an army of approximately three 
thousand men. This action served to trigger the Jiangnan resistance movement. The 
army he organized was one of the most powerful in the anti-Qing struggle, and had 
frequent success in battles against the Qing thanks to its use of firearms such as muskets 
(huoqiang j(f~).9 
After Sun Zhaokui was captured, he refused to surrender to the Qing. The following 
is a conversation he had with an anonymous person: 
7 Suzhoufuzhi fi1\1\IJff~ (1823), juan 108, Renwu A~. Also see Zheng Kecheng, 62-64. 
8 Xie Zhengguang i~t IEJ't and Fan Jinmin m:~ ~ ed., Ming yiminlu huiji aJ3jf~~I1im- (Nanjing: 
Nanjing daxue, 1995), 185-90. 
9 Xu Mingjishi benmo kifSJ3*è.ii=**, juan 15, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 107. 
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'What Jiangnan relies on is fighting on water, and yet the Qing army has already 
penetrated into this area. It has taken and used the advantages of both lakes and 
mountains, and it has occupied aH the important forts. [In this case] boats and ships 
cannot demonstrate their advantages; and even marvelous wisdom cannot reach 
their goals. With general conditions like this, how do you intend to do something?' 
Sun Zhaokui answered: 'How can l not know that Jiangnan does not decide this 
country's destiny? The war is already here, forcing yourselfto resist it is the sort of 
1 
behavior that corresponds to a stroll in front of cavalry or playing with weapons in 
the bottom of a weIl. What l despise is that the Ming has cultivated its literati for 
more than three hundred years. However, now you see only a very few ministers in 
both Nanjing and Beijing who have chosen to die for moral integrity, and we have 
heard no righteous voices. 1 intend to sacrifice myself for this country in order to 
inspire the righteous people and shame the craven. With this choice l will certainly 
live up to the great benefit the Ming has given to me for several generations, 
meanwhile l will realize my own great will. As for success or failure, there is 
nothing to do but put it in the hands of destiny.,10 
Sun's speech indicates that literati of the late Ming time knew that the Jiangnan area 
could not play a crucial role in military actions due to the absence of any natural 
defenses apart from the waterways that made the movement of cavalry and artillery 
inconvenient. Sun was killed in Nanjing at the age ofthirty-nine. His army remained 
together for about three months (from June until August 22, 1645).11 
Regardless of social status, few people in Jiangnan chose to be involved in military 
affairs. According to Chen Zilong's observation, neither rural militia nor baojia 
conscription was workable in the Jiangnan area. He felt that the baojia system would 
work only if the inequalities in society were leveled out. Chen also believed that the 
rural militia, an institution born in the northern plains, was completely inapplicable to 
10 Wen Ruilin i1îft!iltIi{ïi, Nan Jiang yishi rwijl*,~, liezhuan JUft, juan 22; (kanben WJ/-f;:) juan 28, in 
ZGYSJC 35, 406. 
Il Ibid., 408. 
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this region. He suggested that, because of the commercialization of the Yangzi delta, 
people mingled mainly in market towns and failed to develop ties of solidarity with 
their immediate neighbors. Moreover, because agriculture was so labor-intensive in the 
south, people did not have the time or inclination to practice martial arts. Finally, 
Jiangnan people did not possess hors es or weapons, or the strength to use them. He 
conceded that the times might force the gentry to raise militia in Jiangnan, but he feared 
that these would easily degenerate into vigilante groups, as, indeed, was often to be the 
case. "Thus, anyone who says that they wish to arouse xiangbing (village troops) in 
Jiangnan," Chen concluded, "is indeed misguided." Unlike Jiangnan, north China was 
characterized by both a much more contiguous landscape, and a stronger tradition of 
village community. People clustered in villages that were not congruent with kinship 
units, and so had developed a much stronger tradition of self-help and village defense. 
Furthermore, they were much more accustomed to handling weapons and horses, and 
could easily be led to form xiangbing in defense oftheir locales. 12 
However, in certain parts of Jiangnan sorne xiangbing really were organized. For 
instance, when the Qing army entered into the Jiading area, numerous types of military 
groups and local defense corps were formed in village after village in the countryside as 
the resistance to haircutting spread (see below). In terms of social customs, the 
appearance of xiangbing in Jiangnan area is not strange. In 1626, based on the Regional 
Inspector of Zhili and Investigating Censor's (xun 'an Zhilijiancha yushi ;ig:fft:Œi~~~ 
~ Y:) observations, the Jiangnan people were, by custom, flippant and easily incited. 
They were also easy to gather together. When they told each other ofnew and strange 
things, they often gathered into factions, and, they blindly followed others. 13 
We will see that the role they played in the future battles, in fact, verifies Chen 
Zilong's observations. 
12 Wakeman (1985), voU, 376. 
13 Ye Dehui ~1~*" Xu Xun 'an jietie 1~~t1(f~*t!i, in ZGYSJC 27, 476. 
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The weakness of the military in this area was also related to the fact that the Ming 
local government had paid little attention to military affairs. The decline of military 
power had already, in fact, allowed for extensive attacks from Japanese pirates in the 
sixteenth century. When these raids first began, the Japanese pirates were able to come 
and go without serious military confrontation or resistance and many prosperous market 
towns suffered severe losses. By the mid-sixteenth century, in one incident, a band of 
pirates, reportedly only fi ft y or seventy men, was bold enough to maraud inland on a 
route that encircled the southem capital, which had a garrison boasting, at least on paper, 
120,000 men.14 
In the face of these raids, the Ming Jiangnan government had taken various 
measures to cope with the crisis. In the Prefecture of Songjiang, a total of 3,000 soldiers 
were conscripted to defend the east shore. However, this number decreased gradually, 
and by the end of the Ming, only 270 soldiers remained. These soldiers, divided into 
two camps ofland and sea, generally came from certain big families Chao jia S;:%), and 
had inadequate skills and training. Thus, their existence did not contribute much to the 
maintenance of law and order. 15 
This situation was only worsened by the fact that the area around Lake Tai came 
under the jurisdiction of three, often non-cooperative, authorities belonging to the 
provinces of Zhejiang and the imperial authority in Nanzhili. In addition to the vast lake, 
countless waterways, and marshes which made this area a perfect haven for bandits of 
an sorts there were no local authorities who could bring the area under direct control. 16 
At the same time, no government could ignore the area. This was due not only to its 
economic resources, but also to the fact that it functioned as an important commercial 
concourse of southeast, east, and north China. In his recent study, James Shih takes the 
14 R. Huang (1981), 159. 
15 Riben cang Zhongguo hanjian difangzhi congkan B *~r:pOO!J~ J'lJtf!.1J~.tiJ, Chongzhen Songjiang 
fuzhi ~t~t~ŒJfif$,juan 25, bingfang ~j)Jj, ce A (Beijing: Shumu wenxian, 1990),643. 
16 For example, Shen Shixing's $~fJ "Hufang gongsuji" ~~Jj0~~G (written in around 1638) 
provided detailed information about this aspect. See Chongzhen Wuxianzhi *ffWi~~,*~, juan 12 (2), in 
Tianyige cang Ming dai fangzhi xuankan xubian ~-OO»lajj{~1J~~fUIU,\ii (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Shudian, 1990), 137-38. 
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total number of military personnel stationed in the area as direetly proportional to 
public seeurity. 
Military Personnel in Wujiang County 
Date offieers (N) soldiers (N) total 
1560 3 45 48 
1569 16 219 235 
1628-44 1 400 401 
1645-1726 17 831 848 
1745 20 617 637 
(Figure 3) 
On this basis, he conc1udes that the Lake Tai area was more secure during the Qing 
than the Ming. The number of military personnel only inereased significantly after the 
establishment of the Manchu regime. For instance, in Wujiang County, the total number 
of military personnel doubled. These personnel were distributed evenly among strategie 
locations in the eounty, thus ensuring the seeurity of market residents and business 
activities. 17 Shih also mentions that the original duties of the military guards and 
battalions in the lower Yangzi region were ehanged - instead of being eharged with 
maintaining public order, they beeame responsible for the shipment of grain tribute 
from the lower Yangzi to national granaries. 
Early Manchu rulers, with the help of numerous Chinese literati, c1eady realized 
that they were aliens whose prolonged and successful rule depended on their 
understanding of the situation throughout China. As we mentioned before, in north 
China they achieved great suceess, especially in terms of social control. Every effort 
was made to secure the services of those Chinese who had established themselves 
officially, socially, and academically before the change of dynasty. The successes of 
these efforts ensured that the old social order remained basically intact. Even though 
17 James C. Shih, Chinese Rural Society in Transition, A Case Study of the Lake Tai Area, 1368-1800 
(Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1992),73-74. 
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Jiangnan presented an entirely different situation for the Manchu rulers, they quickly 
demonstrated their abilities in restoring order, bringing peace to the masses, and 
continuing the former system of government unchanged. These success came about 
despite the fact that their plans for conquering this area were made under extremely 
tumultuous conditions, and, furthermore, that they had not heard of the establishment of 
the Hongguang regime. 18 
From a special edict issued by Dorgon, we can understand why the Ming Jiangnan 
officiaIs, both Wen and Wu, surrendered to this "righteous force," and why most of the 
ordinary people did not choose to resist the Qing's arrivaI. This edict begins by blaming 
the southem officiaIs for their bad performance, pointing out that when the Ming 
Chongzhen Emperor found himself in difficulty and the reigning house was destroyed, 
Your southem ministers did not send a single soldier, nor 100 se a single arrow, nor 
look a single bandit in the face. Instead, they hid in their holes like rats. That was 
the first crime. 
Then, when our armies entered to exterminate the roving bandits who tled 
westward, even before you in the south had received definite news from the capital, 
and without a last [imperial] testament [to name an heir], you dared to set the 
Prince of Fu [upon the throne]. That was the second crime. 
The roving bandits are your worst enemies. Yet you did not think to subdue and 
punish them. Rather, aU your generals crowded together, jostling each other [to be 
the first] to ravage the good folk, to rebel capriciously and declare hostilities [upon 
each other]. That was the third crime. 
It is these three crimes that have created universal anger in the empire, and that 
cannot be condoned by the law of the land, l have thus solemnly accepted the 
Mandate of Heaven, and so arrayed the six armies to subdue and punish the guilty. 
AU civil and military officiaIs in each locale who take the lead in surrendering their 
towns and territories will be meritoriously advanced one degree in rank. Those 
18 See Li Ge *f-1l, "Qing chu guanyu duoqu Jiangnan diqu de zhanlue juece jiqi bianhua" nHJJmmm-W!&Œ 
ilitllilillY-J'ilBtt~1fV?(;1't~1t, in Qishi luncong (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1991), vol. 8, 131-42. 
157 
who obstinately [deny] the Mandate and do not submit will be massacred and their 
wives and children taken prisoner. If the Prince of Fu can repent his earlier faults 
and surrender before our arrny, then we should forgive his former crimes and treat 
him like aU the other Ming dynastic princes. AU those ministers in whom the 
Prince of Fu personaUy confided but who soon realized that they must reform and 
tender aUegiance [to the Qing] will also in tum be considered for promotion and 
employment. 19 
For the ordinary people, the Qing decreased their levies and exempted them from aU 
the extra taxes imposed under the Ming.2o 
Because of the success of these endeavors, the Jiangnan area came under the control 
of the Qing army within about halfa year. Most of the open, land-based resistance in 
southem Nanzhili was quashed by early December 1645. According to the report sent 
by Dodo on December 17: 
We captured the Prince of Fu, Zhu Yousong, and in succession defeated enemy 
naval and land forces, cavalry and infantry, in over one hundred and fi ft y 
engagements. Jiangnan and Zhejiang are completely pacified. We accepted the 
surrender of 244 civil and military officiaIs, and 317,000 cavalrymen and 
infantrymen? 1 
Entering 1646, the Qing arrny set up four headquarters in Nanjing, Suzhou, 
Hangzhou, and the Zhejiang coastal area in order to garrison the whole of Jiangnan. The 
Manchu arrny, totaling about 70,000 men, was given the task of defending important 
19 Quoted from Wakeman (1985), voU, 582-83. 
20 QSL, ce 3- Shizhu shilu 1!!:jji.El..~, 154-56. 
21 Quoted from Wakeman (1985), voU, 674. 
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cities such as Nanjing,22 as well as several smaller cities. For instance, 1,000 cavalrymen 
and infantrymen were deployed to Changzhou m'l'I'[ city.23 
Most of the Qing army was comprised of soldiers from the Southem Ming army 
who had surrendered. After Dodo took Nanjing, it is said that a total of23 brigade 
commanders, 47 lieutenant commanders, 86 battalion commanders, and 238,000 troops 
surrendered.24 Regardless of the ethnie difference between Manchu and Chinese (Han), 
all of the Qing army in Jiangnan was required to change from battlefield troops to an 
occupation force. In most cases, this transition appears to have been successful. 
Ordinary peasants and most city residents,despite having to bear sorne of the 
heaviest taxes and levies in the empire, did not rebel. The absence of large scale peasant 
rebellions can be attributed to several factors: for one thing, it was obviously related to 
the development of spinning and weaving as well as other household sideline 
production. Unlike peasants from northem China, they could easily find way to make a 
living. For another, a very high ratio of Jiangnan farmland belonged to officiaIs. This 
meant that there were fewer specifie landlords and other social elite to become the 
targets of rebels, the rebellions were scattered, and the local authorities could suppress 
them separately.25 
For local elite and literati, economic and commercial development reduced the 
attraction of an official career. This opened the way for greater social stratification. As 
Wakeman puts it, "a more dynamic interaction of elites could be expected in which 
gentry and other families competed with one another to improve or maintain their local 
position through land acquisition, marriage, commerce, and the official 
22 Chen Feng Il*~, Qing dai junfei yanjiu m{-\: •• UJf~ (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue, 1992), 92-94. 
23 Gugong buowuyuan ed., Gugong zhenben congkan t&'§'~*1lfU -Jiangsu fuzhouxian zhi Œ~JfHI'I~~ 
;E; (Haikou: Hainan 2001), ce 4, Wujing xianzhi ftt~~~;E;, juan 2, bingfang ~~jj, 66. 
24 Wakeman (1985), voU, 592. 
2S Lin Jinshu, 114 -18. On this aspect, the most important study is Wang Peng's ]]111~ paper entitled "Li 
Zicheng lingdao de Ming mo nongminjun weihe budao Jiangnan"$ 13 ~~Ji~li9a)j*.~.m{QJ::f~UŒ 
~. Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi yanjiuhui ed., Zhongguo nongmin zhanzhengshi yanjiujikan $~. 
~,~~.§t:UJf~~fU (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1982),2: 114-22. 
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examinations.,,26 Furthermore, many ofthese families knew how to cope with alien 
rule, because their forefathers had had similar experiences under the Mongols. In the 
past several decades, academics in China and abroad have emphasized the Ming 
literati's inheritance from Song literati, generally with an emphasis on the areas of 
culture and social organization (kinship).27 However, sorne research also indicates that 
many Jiangnan literati imitated the Mongols' language, dress, hairstyle, and eating 
customs. Sorne even went so far as to change their sumames in order to serve as 
officiaIs under the Mongols. According to Zheng Kecheng, "all inherited customs from 
the Song had vanished." He goes on to note that after the founding of the Ming, it took 
about one century to resume the old Chinese fashions.28 
The summer of 1645 marked the apex of Jiangnan's resistance against the Qing 
army. However, the gentry had actually already begun to get in touch with the Qing in 
order to ensure their later surviva1.29 
In the first stages of their conquest of Jiangnan, the Qing government did what they 
could to pacify the area by reducing local resistance. At this time, Hong Chengchou was 
Dodo's chief lieutenant. He bore the grandiose title of Grand Secretary, Tutor to the 
Heir Apparent, President of the Board ofWar, Right Assistant Supervising Censor of 
the Metropolitan Censorate, and Grand Military Coordinator for the Pacification of the 
Province of Jiangnan and for the Regulation of Military Rations, a title that was given 
him after he had been presumed gloriously dead in battle on the northem frontier. 
Wakeman writes that "one way ofrelieving his shame, while effectively carrying out 
his mission to pacify Jiangnan by 'inviting and soothing' (zhaofu) the province into 
submission, was to widen the policyof admitting former Ming officiaIs into the Qing 
govemment. After he reached Nanjing, Hong repeatedly recommended former Ming 
26 For more information about the life and alternative careers of the Jiangnan elite in late Ming times, see 
Wakeman (1985), vol. 1, 604-39. The preface ofthis dissertation also mentions sorne important aspects. 
27 See Patricia Ebrey and James L. Watson, ed. Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China 1000- 1940 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 
28 Zheng Kecheng, 16. 
29 Huang Zongxi ji'i*l!t. Hongguang shilu chao 5.L:JI:.~~J>, juan 4, in ZGYSJC 32, 697. 
160 
officiaIs for office under the Qing, explaining to the court that, without their help, he 
could not pacify the region. Hong believed that the appointment of former Ming 
officiaIs both to the central government and as magistrates in their native provinces 
would increase the density of administrative control, and prevent military incidents 
from occurring. ,,30 
In order to placate the locals, the Qing also had to overcome the deep impression of 
the Yangzhou massacre on aIl the people. The Qing deemed this tragedy and the 
violence to be a result of resistance. Thus, they claimed that they 
... had no choice but to do it. If [the Ming] officers and civilians, the military staff 
and local residents want to pursue resistance rather than surrender, Yangzhou city 
serves as a mirror. AlI human beings are bom of he aven and earth, for those people 
who disobey the mandate ofheaven, the appropriate way is to commit suicide. 
How can they implicate ordinary people's lives in this trouble?3! 
In many cases the initial motive for the resistance of the Jiangnan literati was not 
ethnie prejudice; instead, it was because local officers (mostly Chine se) sent by the 
Qing put these literati to shame and caused them to lose their dignity.32 
The hair-cutting decree in 1645 was the last straw which triggered a series of 
resistance movements in the Jiangnan area. From the Manchus' perspective, the 
command not only brought about the physical resemblance of rulers and subjects, it also 
provided a perfect test ofloyalty. The command began to be carried out in April of 
1644 after the Qing took over Shan Hai Pass I-UmJlm. Since this decree had already 
been the cause of severe resistance in north China, Dodo had once considered 
suspending the haircutting order in the rest of the area. He suggested shaving the 
30 Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 643. 
31 Wen Bing )(~t Lie Huang xiaoshi- Jiangnan wenjian lu r.!H'Î'!/N~ - ŒmIYJ5MN<, in ZGYSJC 33, 114. 
32 For more information, see Guo Songyi ~f~~, "Jiangnan dizhujieji yu Qing chu zhongyangjiquan de 
maodunjiqi fazhan he bianhua" Œ]$jtt!Et[ll'~*g(:wmfJJCP:*~ma~;fJ§15Z.;It~~ftl~1t, in Qingshi 
luncong(Beijing: Zhonghua 1979), vol.1, 121-37. 
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military but not the civilians. But now, one year later, he ordered that aH Chinese, 
soldiers and civilians alike, shave their foreheads and plait their hair in a tribal queue 
like the Manchus. 
From the perspective of Chine se officers and literati this was a great humiliation. 
The usual Ming style was for men's hair to be left long and tied in a knot worn on top 
of the head; cutting one' s hair was a degradation of one' s dignity. 33 As Wakeman 
indicates, this decree 
.... also enraged common folk, who viewed the loss of their hair as tantamount to 
the loss of their manhood. When the new policy was announced, time and again 
demagogues aroused peasant mobs by telling them that if they eut their hair they 
would lose their wives ... It represented a betrayal of Han masculinity ... 
Consequently, the rulers' effort to make Manchus and Han one unified 'body' 
initially had the effect of unifying upper-and lower-class natives in central and 
south China against the interlopers. The conflict between superior and inferior was 
momentarily overridden; and for once the aristocracy of the mind above, and the 
masses of Jiangnan below, stood together -even against the many eIders, merchants, 
and retired officiaIs in between who wished to accept the Qing offer of peaceful 
collaboration. And just as towns and cities had surrendered so amenably days and 
weeks before, so did their inhabitants now rise against the new government. 34 
The haircutting decree indeed stirred anger among the people. Among the angriest 
were degree-holders, former officiaIs, and incumbent local officiaIs who had been 
displaced by the Qing. Resistance in southern Nanzhili began in late July and early 
August in those districts of Changzhou and Suzhou that first received this decree -
Jiangyin, Jiading, Kunshan, and Songjiang. In these areas, the district yamens were 
vacated, and many magistrates fled their posts. However, previous studies, both in 
33 For instance, The Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing) in its opening chapter contains the lines, "our torso, 
limbs, hair, and skin we receive from our fathers and mothers; we must not destroy or damage them. That is 
the beginning of filial piety." 
34 Wakeman (1985), voU, 650. 
162 
China and abroad, have overemphasized the role of this decree in inciting people to 
rebellion. The resentment and rage was undoubtedly true and needed to be expressed, 
but going to battle to sacrifice one's life does not seem a likely response. Instead, it 
should be argued that military actions against the Manchus were joint actions which 
involved forces from various social strata. Each of these had their own considerations. 
After this decree was issued, the commoners of Jiangnan began to panic. In a place 
named Chen Hu ~*fr!j)j, a peasant rebelleader took this opportunity to induce more 
people to join him. A contemporary description tells us that 
.... the rural inhabitants became more fearful. At the same time, the runners from 
both prefecture and county relied on the power of the Qing army to demand several 
times more food than before. Thus an the farmers intended to be rebels ... The 
uprising spread everywhere. An they did was 100ting.35 
A few remnants of the Ming army, such as Wang Fei.:E~ and his sol di ers had no 
further plans for resistance but simply arrested the people who shaved their heads, and 
plundered every village they passed by. When the Qing army arrive d, they fled. 36 
An article entitled "Luqiao jiwen" J1MflMèM, written at the time of the decree, 
provides detailed analysis of the Jiangnan literati and Ming officers' real motives for 
opposing the haircutting: 
The changing of institutions is not an easy thing even in peaceful times, let alone in 
a period of dynastie transition. The establishment of the Qing dynasty accords with 
the wills of both heaven and human beings. When the de cree of haircutting was 
issued, foolish rebellions occurred in the Southeast. Although aIl of them used the 
name of restoration (of the Ming), in fact most of them are of two minds. Clothes 
and caps may be changed easily. However, if the hair was shaved, those people 
could not be fickle and freakish any more. This is why rebellions occurred in 
3S Gu Yanwu, Sheng'an benji~3(**ê 6, in ZGYSJC 32, 657-58. 
36 Ibid., 661. 
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swarms after the new decree was promulgated. Could everybody really want to 
restore old institutions; could every household care about the death of the Ming 
emperor?37 
To analyze the impact ofthis decree, we have to distinguish the different reactions 
of rural and urban areas. In many of the cities, the localliterati and other elite had 
collaborated with the new government, and quickly took power with the help of Qing 
magistrates. However, these urban leaders found themselves losing control of the 
countryside after obeying the order to shave their heads. As one source indicated: 
After those ofus in the city cut our hair, it was only the country folk who continued 
as before. Those who had hair did not visit the city. Those who had shaved their 
hair did not go into the countryside. If they were seen, they were in either case 
killed. The countryside and the city were blocked offfrom each other.38 
The conditions in the villages became even more chaotic as those inhabitants who 
had complied with their headmens' orders to cut their hair tumed against villagers 
whose hair had been kept long. This kind of turbulence, often coinciding with existing 
conflicts between the various social strata and military forces, gave the Jiangnan literati 
an opportunity to demonstrate their characteristics and abilities. Below, we will 
examine the military forces in rural society, and, on this basis, explore the role played 
by the Jiangnan literati. 
3: 2. The Nature of the Resistance Forces 
Facing the invasion of the Qing's mixed Manchu and Chinese army, none of the 
Jiangnan forces would have been able to organize effective resistance, even if they had 
37 Anon. (falsely attributed to Wu Weiye ~1~~), Luqiao jiwen- Jiading zhi tu Jmt~*cM- g;E:':z'~, juan 
A. (Taipei: Guangwen, 1964). 
38 Quoted from Wakeman (1985), voU, 651. 
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really wanted to do so. Since the normal Ming military forces, both land and naval, had 
collapsed, there was no way to expect them to mobilize armed resistance. Among very 
scattered forces, sorne very disjointed and ad hoc resistance did occur, but generally the 
organized resistance by the Ming armies vanished. As for the civil officiaIs and local 
elites, many chose surrender as the most certain way to guarantee their survival. There 
was virtually no cooperation between civil forces and the former Ming armies; instead, 
their relationship was usually characterized by conflict. Had they managed to achieve 
unit y , a much more effective resistance could have been expected. Despite the general 
failure, there were sorne distinguished literati such as Chen Zilong and Zhang 
Huangyan who not only managed to gain a certain degree of coordination between the 
different forces, as we will mention below, but also managed to gain sorne success in 
their anti-Qing goals. 
Judging from history, the Jiangnan literati and the other local elite did have the 
ability to demonstrate their political power when necessary. In the past, they had been 
successful at integrating other social strata to fight for their own economic benefits. For 
example, during the 1620s, there had been cooperation between lower classes and sorne 
'righteous gentry' who were united against the Ming govemment in the common 
defense of urban privileges such as tax cutting. In 1626, the famous Suzhou riot took 
place. "Members of the gentry consciously sought to perpetuate this unit y as tensions 
between upper and lower classes sharpened during the second quarter of the 1 th 
century.,,39 Furthermore, sorne elite families in Jiangnan were keenly aware of the need 
to maintain the solidarity of primary associations like kinship groups, as well as to draw 
together higher and lower orders by organizing villages and districts through public 
charities, other types of groups that provided welfare for social dependents, and, of 
course, self-defense organizations. 
Since they had demonstrated an ability to use their capacities in the realms of 
economics, politics, and social welfare, it seems reasonable that they could also 
organize their own military or semi-military force. Changes in the social structure of 
Jiangnan would have provided them enough human resources had they been able to do 
39 Wakeman (1985), vol.1, 628-29. 
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SO.40 Up to the late Ming, ri ch Jiangnan families had already used their fortunes and 
civic contributions to raise private or semiprivate forces. In most cases, these forces 
were also supplemented by volunteers. This phenomenon relates to the unique social 
structure of the Jiangnan area. One of the most important features ofthe structure was 
subordination (guifu or guishu &ffil)fj, &ffi.). Many who were impoverished or engaged 
in meniallabor chose to be legaUy or illegaUy subordinated to the rich and privileged. 
These bondservants came from various backgrounds: many had fted their fixed 
hereditary occupations as soldiers and artisans, or they had been bandits, gamblers, or 
debtors. In addition, the breakdown in the sixteenth century of the early Ming 
government's system of village organization (such as the lijia system) also forced 
impoverished peasants into servitude. Under the system of toukao t~~ (surrendering 
one self in order to rely upon the protection of a gentry family), personal subordination 
became even more pronounced. If a peasant could not pay his taxes, he could tum over 
his tax indemnity as weU as his property rights to a member of the newly ascendant 
local gentry who se degree status exempted him from paying taxes. Sorne powerful 
gentry with official status could even remove that land from the government's tax roUs 
According to the estimate of Gu Yanwu, "In many cases there were up to one thousand 
people" who entered into this subordinate position in one family.41 
40 For the comprehensive studies about the social structure in late Ming Jiangnan and social subordination, 
class conflicts and so on, see Wakeman (1985), vol.l, 604-46. The most important concise study about 
the social structure of early Ming rural society in Jiangnan is that by Mi Chu Wiens. She provides a 
description of the function of Liangzhang *I-R, lizhang *-R andjiashou Efl1t. She shows that the 
relatively wealthy locals were incorporated into the government machinery, assuming the responsibility 
oftransferring local produce and resources to the government. Besides these personnel, other government 
appointees in charge of community services also were incorporated into the lijia organizations; for 
example, village eIders (li lao ren **A) and others also assumed the responsibility ofsupervising 
farming. See Mi Chu Wiens, "Changes in the Fiscal and Rural Control Systems in the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Centuries," Ming Studies 3 (1976): 53-69. As for the studies oflocal administrative units such 
as lijia, there is no unanimous conclusion among scholars from China and Japan, because this sort of 
study is not limited to the administrative field (it also relates to the financial system such as tax and 
corvée). See Luan Chengxian ~JJJG~, "Ming dai lijia bianzhi yuanze yu tubao huafen" aJlf\';~P!3*jfljUI* 
~UWIII{*lfj7t, Shixuejikan 4 (1997): 200-25. 
41 See Wu Dange ffifrj(;, "Ming dai shenjin dizhu de fazhan" aJl{-\';*$f!1:f;lli.:tB"J~~, in Mingshi yanjiu 
luncongaJlY:tifFJi:lliil!~ (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin, 1983), vol. 2, 9-26. See also Wakeman (1985), vol.l, 
617-23 and the notes therein. 
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The relationship between these subordinates and their hosts was complicated. 
Generally speaking, the local elite were able to control or live in harmony with the local 
people. However, the general emphasis on "c1ass struggle" in Chine se scholarship over 
the last decades has prompted several case studies of serf revoit and peasant or 
household servant uprisings. Those involved in these conflicts would attack their 
masters' houses, demand the retum oftheir contracts ofindenture, and seize food 
supplies. In the countryside of Taicang, sorne subordinates even had their own 
organization called the Black Dragon Society (Wulong hui J~gi[wf). Apart from 
bondservants, most of the membership was composed of marketplace vendors. 
However, many members were also soldiers from the remnants of the Ming army. As 
looting and violence spread, disorder spread even to the cities. In the end, it was only 
with help from the Qing army that the rich families were able to put down the Black 
Dragon Society by arresting and fining its leaders.42 As far as I know, there is not 
enough data to show that Jiangnan literati or any other local elites mobilized their own 
subordinates to fight against the Qing. Except for the riots mentioned above, most 
social conflicts arose from among the peasants. For example, according to records from 
the early Qing, a man named Barefoot Zhang San (Chijiao Zhang San #Jf!l~iJN=) 
attacked the city of Yixing 1r~ where he looted and bumed the property of rich 
families while treating the poor fairly.43 
One report sent to the Board ofWar by Zhang Guowei on April 1, 1638, showed 
that the Jiangnan peasants' rebellion had reached a new stage in the late Ming. The 
report contained a description of rebellion in Liyang 1W!~ in which we leam that a 
bandit chief named Zhu Guozhu *~.El}], a robber for about twenty years, had organized 
several hundred rebels and appeared in the border area ofNanzhili and Zhejiang where 
they public1y killed the people and bumed the houses. The report also inc1udes a 
notification which was issued on November 25, 1642, by Zhu. It reads: 
42 For more information about Wulong hui, see Xie Guozhen, Ming mo nongmin qiyi shiliao xuanbian ~* 
• .§;';m~se}18H~UIiâ (Fuzhou: Fujian, 1981),234-40. 
43 Xie Guozhen, Qing chu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu mf}] • .§;';m~~*4~~ (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 
1957), 18-19. 
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I have witnessed the poor people working hard in the fields during the summer. 
However, they still can not avoid hunger and cold. When they suffer from frustration, 
they have no way to express themselves. Thus I choose the 24th of the twelfth month 
as the date for organizing a parade. If you are fortunate to join me, riches and honors 
will come, and your resentment and grudges will be redressed immediately. Those 
rich families who assist us with grain should expect to get protection. Those who 
submit will survive, while those who resist shall perish ... currently the best place 
for our people is Xintang Village *jftJ!t"1 where grain and pickled tofu is stored for 
several years' use and the solid building could garrison several tens ofthousands of 
people. This is to arouse all of you: for those who are with us in heart in order to 
obtain wealth and honors, as well as those who want to redress injustice, please 
come on that day to conc1ude a treaty of alliance. Now 1 list five disciplines as 
follows. One who disobeys any one of them will be executed: those who retreat in 
the battlefield; those who bungle matters and leak secrets; those who slay ordinary 
people with no excuse; those who catch our spies; those who surrender to the 
government and resist our troopS.44 
The Ming army led by Zhang Guowei finally pacified Zhu Guozhu and his 
followers. A few years later, neither the peasant rebels nor the Ming army could be 
relied upon to fight against the Qing army. What the Jiangnan literati could be expected 
to use in the resistance movement were, rather, outlaw elements, which inc1uded 
remnants of the large roving-rebel armies, local bandit and pirate groups, and other 
armed, illegal organizations such as underground gangs. Dependence on these sorts of 
forces immediately resulted in a series oftroubles for the literati. For one thing, these 
forces had no way to effectively resist the powerful Qing regular army; for another, as 
mentioned before, the various groups of people had different ambitions in mind. Thus, 
their action became a double-edged sword for the literati. Not surprisingly, the literati 
a1ways had an ambivalent attitude toward these rebels: they hoped to use them as a tool 
44 Zhang Guowei ~~*i, "Qi Liyang dadao su" ~i~~*~itffL. In Fu Wu shucao ~~itffL1j1[, SKJHSCK, 
Shi 39, 550-52. 
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to organize resistance, but also felt anxious that they could damage their existing status 
and benefits. After several months of observation and consideration, most Jiangnan 
literati found that the Qing government provided the best hope for bringing about social 
order and the maintenance of their previous lives. Thus, it was the rich men from Lake 
Tai who arrested Barefoot Zhang San and allowed him to be executed by the Qing.45 
However, apart from their consideration of outlaw elements, Jiangnan literati also 
tried to organize their own armies to pursue resistance. For instance, during the summer 
of 1645, in Jiaxing *~, a member of the gentry named Tu Xiangmei m-~~, told the 
residents of 24 fang who resided inside and outside the city that every family should 
choose one member to join the army. If sorne families refuse to do so, the soldiers 
would loot their property and post a note reading "tao min" (people who fled) on the 
door in order to confiscate the house.' Within several days they mobilized more than 
thirty thousand people. There were no general(s) and also no discipline for controlling 
them. What they held was only cudgels, or bamboo sticks bound with a little bit of iron. 
They wore hemp cloth, basically bare, and their shoes were straw sandals ... This 
disorderly band made an uproar, and looked to be playing games. Their daily needs and 
provisions relied totally on the gentry and big families from their ownfang.46 
It is obviously not an easy thing to organize militias. In 1635, Chen Zilong provided 
a detailed analysis of the reasons for this difficulty: 
The Jiangnan people are not familiar with military affairs. [Because of] the heavy 
burden of taxes and corvée, they are extremely poor. Furthermore, the customs of 
Jiangnan people are scattered and they are not used to socializing. They not only 
have no time to do such things, but also have no intention to satisfy this kind of 
request ... The critics also want to let the recommended gentry and rich families 
45 Miyazaki Ichisada '§ïlfflJ"rtïlE, "Ming dai de shidafu he minzhong" 13J.J{-1:;~fj}é"J±*XfD~%<, in Liu 
Junwen chief ed. ~IU{~)(, Riben xuezhe yanjiu Zhongguo shi lunzhu xuanyi B ***UH~9=J~3!::~lfIl~~ 
~ (Beijing: zhonghua, 1993), vol. 6, 258-60. 
46 Nanyuan xiaoke ~~.~ ed., Pingwu shilue zp.~$IB§, in ZGYSJC 33, 181. 
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train their own militia. 1 thought it was a good idea. However, this method is not 
suitable. For the army, what we need is to use it as a united force, to let them keep 
the drilling and bayonet fighting in order. Moreover, let the soldiers and their 
generals know each other. Now the primary concem of gentry is not official affairs, 
meanwhile the rich people are afraid of handling more business. Only a few people 
have responded to the request. Among those few people, most only train a little 
more than ten soldiers. If one day there is an incident, can you simply organize 
several families' soldiers and use them? As for the regular soldiers of prefectures 
and counties, for the most part half ofthem are old and weak.47 
Nevertheless, many militias were organized in the summer of 1645. Because of the 
arrivaI of the Manchus, much had changed. In the area of Changshu m~~, after the 
news of the city's fall reached the countryside, a local militia was organized. Many 
wrapped their heads with a piece of white cloth to signify their membership in the local 
militia - these were the so-called white-head soldiers (baitou bing B:H~~).48 Their 
weapons consisted only of cudgels and bamboo sticks. They called on everybody to join 
them. If somebody refused to do so, they would threaten to destroy his family.49 
Only a few of these local militia belonged to Jiangnan literati. They had 
successfully mobilized sorne social forces to fight against the Qing army between 1645 
and 1647. It might have been theoretically possible for them to bring all classes together 
in a collective effort to defend their homes, property, and hair, however, with no certain 
funds and other resources to sponsor those local militias, it proved practically 
impossible to organize and even more difficult to maintain a powerful military force. 
The uncertainty of funding is indicated in the price of rice in the mid-1640s in the 
Jiangnan area which fluctuated widely between various regions. In 1647, each dan 15 of 
47 Chen Zilong, An yatang gao 3(ft:i:~, juan 17, in XXSKQS 1388, 182-83. 
48 The term of Baitou bing was used by many sorts of Jiangnan local militias. For detailed sources, see the 
quotation in Pan Xinghui's paper, 361. 
49 Guo Songyi, 126. 
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rice was worth 4 tael of silver in the Songjiang area.so Currently available sources show 
that there is no way to analyze the capabilities of Jiangnan literati in terms of military 
mobilization because of the shortage of data. 
From the Qing side, government documents related to Jiangnan routinely refer to aIl 
sorts of anti-Qing activities as simply "banditry" or "robbery." Of course, the primary 
purpose of the Qing was to debase the resistance, but could the Jiangnan literati, the so-
called loyalists, really be distinguished from the outlaw elements? Wakeman points out 
that, "in fact, it was quite common for a loyalist scholar 'leading' a resistance 
movement suddenly to become aware that the men he had gathered were really no more 
than outlaws, living off of the people, looting because they had no other way of getting 
supplies. When Yang Tingshu t~~{~ was asked by the Lake Tai loyalists to join their 
uprising, he asked them how they would get their supplies. 'From the people,' they 
responded. 'In that case,' Yang said, 'you are bandits. What has that to do with 
righteousness (yi)?"Sl 
Facing dynastic change, and the prospect of an alien govemment, the elite could not 
easily make decisions. In Jiading ~5E, aIl residents of the city were obedient to the new 
magistrate Zhang Weixi ,*m~~ appointed by the Qing in the early summer of 1645. A 
few weeks later, Wu Zhikui ~~Jf, a general from the remnant Ming army led his 
soldiers to the east suburb. He ordered sorne people to go to the city, and told the 
residents, "you should not forget your own former mler. Now the anti-Qing armies have 
already decided to rise up immediately. You also should mobilize xiangyong here in 
order to respond to them." Because of general Wu's propaganda, most of the residents 
lost their minds. Magistrate Zhang fled tirst after Wu's coming. When he retumed to 
50 Chen Feng, 352. 
51 Wakeman (1985), voU, 603. After Yang was arrested, there was an interesting conversation between 
Govemor Tu Guobao ±WlJJl and him. Tu asked: "Do you want to pursue insurgence?" Yang answered: 
"No, 1 do not. As a subject of emperor, if the kingdom perishes, 1 would perish too; if the kingdom 
survives, 1 would live with it. Now the kingdom has already perished, what should 1 do except choose 
death?" He was killed in Wujiang ~rr. See Pingwu shilue, in ZGYSJC 33, 180. 
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the city several weeks later, he called on all the gentry, trying to get their cooperation. 
However, this time nobody responded to himY 
As for local militia (generally called xiangbing in the Jiangnan area), in most cases 
the Jiangnan literati had no idea how to lead or force them to pursue a resistance 
movement. Generally speaking, the primary purpose for sponsoring xiangbing was to 
protect their land, and to cope with the extreme disturbances that were common during 
the dynastie transition. Regardless of c1ass contradictions, numerous peasant and 
ordinary residents of cities also shared this intention. One scholar named Yao Tinglin 
tI;J~~m witnessed the real conditions around the Shanghai area; he provides us firsthand 
records with vivid descriptions of how the commoners faced the coming of the Qing 
army. We do not need to detail the confused events of the second half of 1645 as Yao 
Tinglin recounts them. During this time many places around Shanghai changed hands 
again and again, with all the attending disturbance and massacres. However, here is a 
brief description provided by Pierre-Etienne Will: 
As a result ofthis instability the local inhabitants no longer knew what to do: as 
Yao c1aims to have seen by himself around Zhoupu, whenever the Qing army 
approached every household in the towns and villages would paste pieces of yellow 
paper on their doors with the characters 'da qing shunmin' (obedient subjects of the 
Great Qing) written on, but would tear them down as soon as the loyalist rebellion 
seemed to get the upper hand. Only to paste them again when the Qing troops were 
supposed to come back. In the end the Qing order prevailed, of course, and every 
Chine se man had to pass through the agonizing process of shaving his head to 
demonstrate his loyalty. Yao Tinglin's testimony on this is only one among many 
others, but he adds the interesting notion that people made up their minds to do it. 
Rather than going into hiding, once they realized that they needed to be around in 
order to proteet their properties.53 
52 Luqiao jiwen A- Jiading zhi tu. 
53 Pierre-Etienne Will, "Coming of Age in Shanghai during the Ming-Qing Transition, Yao Tinglin's 
Record of the Successive Years." Gujin lunheng 4.6 (2000), 15-39. See Yao Tinglin tl}ÉM~, Linian ji M 
fJ::~ê in Qing dai riji huichao 1~ft B ~êl1it:':9 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin, 1982), 39-168. 
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The genera1 condition of Jiangnan shows us that this area was not on1y 1ess 
militarized, but a1so less politicized. Impacts from outside, inc1uding ethnic conque st 
such as the arrivaI of Manchus , had little effect on its basic social structure, let alone 
social behavior and customs. In June of 1646, only several months after the Qing 
pacified Jiangnan, Tu Guobao, Govemor of Jiangnan, had discovered the real condition 
of local xiangbing while leading the Qing armies' pacification. His report sent to 
Beijing provides a description: 
1 thought that the reason we organize xiangbing is to protect storehouses and [to do 
surveillance of] prisoners. For those belonging to the prefecture, the prefecture 
controls them; for those belonging to the county, the county controls them. Just like 
arms use fingers, it is very easy to manage them. What is unexpected is that these 
xiangbing cooperated with the runners of Yamen only to take perfunctory actions 
to cope with govemment. For instance, the officiaIs from Qingpu of Shanghai LW 
-wrm could not discover [this secret]. When they performed roll calI, less than half 
of the members appeared. And those who attended were either too old or too weak 
to use. 1 am very surprised [about this phenomenon] because 1 only know that to 
decrease the number of officiaIs means to save administrative fees, it is really 
beyond imagination that the people may take another's place by assuming their 
name. 54 
In most cases, it is c1ear that Jiangnan xiangbing were not interested in following 
the Ming loyalists. In the Jiashan ~~ area, the son of Ming Grand Academician *fI: 
± Qian Shisheng ~±1t organized a troop to fight against the Qing during the 
summer of 1645. However, his army lacked discipline and made trouble for the local 
people. He was supposed to lead his army to the battletield, but when they passed by 
54 Ming Qing shiliao yibian, vol. 1, 16. 
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Shengze ~~, a prosperous commercial town, the local xiangbing blocked their way 
and killed him. 
In Yixing, two juren degree holders, Ge Lin~. and Lu Xiangguan LI~n, 
worked together to mobilize a "righteous army" ~~. This army attacked Qingpu .~m 
in cooperation with other anti-Qing forces. After losing the campaign, the remaining 
soldiers selected Ge Lin as marshal. Ge led them by boat to Lake Tai where they met 
with another "righteous army" led by langzhong .B!~r::p (Director) Wang Qisheng 3]{JB+. 
The joining oftheir forces undoubtedly increased their power, but Wang proved to have 
little aptitude for military affairs, and lacked the ability to control the army. His 
subordinates routinely looted the homes of people living in the area. Because of their 
suffering at the hands of the righteous army, local residents asked the Qing army to 
attack and bum their boats and ships. Wang was forced to flee. 55 
In Jiaxing, militiamen were conscripted from individual households. Since social 
disorder spread rapidly through the villages of the prefecture, urban residents managed 
to kill Ming loyalists inside the city walls and defended their own gates when the anti-
Qing army attacked. 56 
Exploring the relationships between the various xiangbing may help us to 
understand the characteristics of Jiangnan's local militia. The following example, 
describing the situation of a shengyuan named Zhi Yi 5z:~, is taken from Jiading. 
Zhi used to be Shi Kefa's staff officer. After Yangzhou feIl, he retumed to his 
hometown. In early August, 1645, he organized a group of xiangbing in the Shigang ".fi 
llifJ area. By this time many villages had organized their own xiangbing, sorne places in 
Jiading County called themyibing (righteous soldiers). Since sorne were jealous of Zhi 
Yi's reputation as weIl as his wealth, he was incriminated for the illegal possession of 
Shi Kefa's military supplies, worth a total of about 5,000 taels of silver. According to 
He Xiuling's description, "the masses wanted to get this money for military pay and 
55 Xu Zi 1*$, Xiaotianjizhuan IJ\W!!*i31$, juan 46, Liezhuan 39, yishi ~Bffll. Taiwan wenwu congkan 
(Taibei: Bank of Taiwan, 1963), no.138, 469. 
56 Wakeman (1985), voU, 652. 
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provisions for the yibing, so they went to attack him, moving like thunder. Five family 
members from three generations were killed by beheading. ,,57 
Existing data provides information on a few special cases of well-organized and 
effective xiangbing from communities isolated by Lake Tai. For instance, there is a 
description of a place named Moli ~M island, which is 40 li in circumference. 
According to Deng Ruozheng ~::E~, the population is dense and all ofthem are 
engaged in commercial activities. When they are alarmed about a bandit invasion, they 
all come [to fight]. They are able to defend themselves even without help from the 
official army. 58 
However, since these few forces were from the isolated communities of Lake Tai, 
they could not be expected to play a crucial role in the resistance movement of Jiangnan. 
While the above examples indicate a general unwillingness among the xiangbing to 
become involved in the anti-Qing movement, there were sorne who joined the 
resistance under the leadership of various sorts of elite. The following section will 
examine their performance and relationships with the Jiangnan literati. 
3: 3. Jiangnan Literati and Military Action 
During the summer of 1645, there were several instances ofwell-organized resistance 
in the Jiangnan area that are relevant to my topic. The first of the se took place in 
Kunshan ~Ù-I. The resistance here shows how a local officer, Yang Yongyan ~1k ï=i, 
the former Magistrate, and several others joined together to train loyalist militia units, 
and how their resistance gained the support of severallocal elite inc1uding the famous 
scholar Gu Yanwu and the poet Gui Zhuang &il!jff. 
57Quoted from He Xiuling, 21. 
58 Deng Ruozheng ~:E~, "Xi Dongting yizhai suo" ggmW!if~~, in Chongzhen Wuxianzhi ~W~~ 
~~, juan 18, bingfang ~~Jj 2, TYGCMDFZXK XB, 458-60. 
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After the Qing army had crossed the Yangzi and issued the haircutting decree, Yang 
y ongyan, who is said to have been a skilled horseman and archer from Henan, secretly 
conscripted several other warriors to assist him in his plans for resistance. His plan also 
gained sorne support among the social elite in Kunshan. None realized that the Qing 
army would arrive in the city so quickly. In early July, 1645, the Qing army began to 
attack the city. After a short battle with the local xiangbing, the Qing army took the city 
on July 6. AH the local militia scattered. There are no materials to indicating whether 
the ordinary people of Kunshan supported the resistance movement or not. In any case, 
the loyalists' defense only held out for three days. "Tho se who were conscripted before, 
now tled secretly". Gu Yanwu's two younger brothers were killed in the massacre. 59 A 
second example of resistance was in Jiangyin city, where the Qing forces were he Id at 
bay for almost three months. When the city feU more than seventy thousand people 
were killed in a bloody massacre.60 
A third example, the Jiading resistance, provides the best case for an exploration of 
the xiangbing's military performance and relation to the literati. Existing materials 
contain descriptions of the behavior of the xiangbing, inc1uding both positive and 
negative examples; and there is evidence showing that the Jiading literati as a group 
demonstrated their abilities in organizing the defense of the city. Hou Tongzheng {~llI[PJ 
if (1591-1645) was born in Jiading and awarded thejinshi degree in 1625. Hou had 
served at the Boards ofWar and Personnel in Nanjing, and as military intendant in 
northern Zhejiang where, in 1643, he was credited with putting down a mutiny of grain 
transport troops and preparing Zhejiang's defenses against the incursions by Zuo 
Liangyu's rebellious troops. After Nanjing feU into the hands of the Qing, he returned 
to the countryside of Jiading. At the beginning of June, 1645, he promised to j oin the 
59 Wakeman indicated that "Gu Yanwu also escaped" (Wakeman [1985], voU, 654). In fact, Gu went to 
countryside to visit his mother as the attack happened. He had not joined the resistance action. See Zhou 
Kezhen ffll-arJ!.:, Gu Yanwu nianpu JIj~ltt1f~ (Suzhou: Suzhou daxue, 1998),82. 
60 During this campaign we finally have found an example of a Wu Juren ltt.À, Wang Gonglue ::E0~, 
who defended the East gate of Jiangyin city. However, no more information was provided about his 
performance. See Gu Cheng, 234. For Jiangyin's resistance, also see Lan Jiadu J/ii%.êlt, "1645 nian 
Jiangyin renmin de kang-Qing douzheng" 16451f.Œ~À~B'gmmF1~, in Li Guangbi *:7\:;11: ed., Ming 
Qing shi luncong (Wuhan: Hubei renmin,1957), 195-214. 
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defense of Jiading city and became the leader of the local gentry and xiangbing. By 
mid-June, he was joined by his close friend,jinshi Huang Chunyao fi~.!j!~ (1605-1645) 
and Huang's younger brother. 
After the Jiading uprising, the Qing Regional Commander of Wusong ~W~*~:ft. 
(the former Ming Regional Commander of Xuzhou), Li Chengdong *mGf*, led his 
army in an attempt to quash the uprising. Hou and Huang relied on the xiangbing to 
deter the Qing attack. The Qing army suffered large numbers of casualties. For instance, 
in the battle of June 14 in the Dongguan *mm area, 83 soldiers were killed and more 
than 40 warships loaded with looted treasures were bumed. General Li' s younger 
brother was also killed on the battlefield. 
As for the xiangbing, most of the available data provide a positive description of 
their performance. Despite their lack of formaI training, they were surprisingly 
successful in fighting and attacking the Qing army. Though they were ultimately unable 
to defeat the enemy, they never surrendered.61 Different areas close to this city 
organized their own xiangbing: from the southeast side, a village caIled Wang 
Jiazhuang .:E*Rf organized 700 xiangbing; in the south, about 1000 xiangbing came 
from a town named Shigangzhen EWfl~, and about 2000 from the town of 
Nanxiangzhen m~~; adjacent areas such as Luodian m~ and Waigang :9i-m also 
mobilized their own xiangbing.62 Sorne came from up to 50 or 60 li away, leaving 
behind their fields and bringing their own weapons and food. 63 However, many of 
these who came did not fight at aIl. Because they were not paid, most never proceeded 
further than the suburbs of the city, where they stopped or simply disappeared.64 
61 Han Tan ~~, Man Qing yeshi wubian 1i1ffim!I!f~liJj, Ith zhong (f.i), Man Qing ruguan baozheng 
zhiyi ?jljljmÀIm~ïliZï<:.-, in ZGYSJC 33, 91-92. 
62 QDRWZG -A ,vo1.2, 257. 
63 Same as note 61. 
64 Yang Kuan ~Jl, "1645 nian Jiading renmin de kang-Qing douzheng" -::ï\rœ1ïif.5E.À~IY,rfJtmFi 
~,in Li Guangbi $7\:;M ed., Ming Qing shi luncong, 215-25. Also see Zhu Zisu *-f-*, Jiading xian 
yiyoujishi .5E~Z."@î*c.$, in ZGYSJC 33, 183-90. 
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Ifwe look at the earlier history of the defense of Jiading city, the important role of 
xiangbing can be traced back to several decades prior to the arrivaI of the Qing. In aH of 
these cases, pay played a crucial role in determining their participation. During the 
Wanli reign, the local government asked each li to send one minzhuang. A total of 668 
were sent. After the threat from Japanese pirates disappeared, this number decreased by 
half, each person who remained receiving a pay of 0.02 tael of silver each day. 
However, most of the se were not the registered militia from the outlying li. Those 
registered in the militia hired city residents or people living close to the city to act as 
substitutes. These arrangements were usually conducted unofficially. In sorne cases, 
these replacements used excuses, such as the need to prepare weapons or armor, to 
procure wages of up to 30 taeIs" of silver per year. As one source points out, in order to 
receive their pay the hired men went to the countryside to collect it themselves.65 
The same custom continued to exist at the time of the resistance against the Qing. 
When Hou and Huang prepared their plans for the defense of the city, they had to pay 
special attention to this aspect. Their plan, called Aihu chudingfa 1*plliT1!, 
expected that every household would contribute one man. They divided all the 
households into one of three levels. Those at the upper level not only had to contribute 
at least one man, but also were expected to provide him with the necessary food and 
clothing, and contribute extra fees for public service; those at the middle level were to 
provide several men with their own food and clothing; low level families had to 
contribute one man with food and clothing, but were compensated at a rate of 0.6 taels 
of silver per day. Those who fought bravely were promised an extra reward: an initial 
reward oftwo bolts of white cloth, followed by a pay raise of 0.2 taels of silver a day.66 
Jiading's resistance proved to be the most effective of allloyalist endeavors in the 
Jiangnan area, and Huang and Hou really did show their abilities in organizing the 
city's defense. In addition to the logistical arrangements mentioned above, they also 
65 Wanli Jiading xianzhi ïl;MJ(;JË~,*iit., juan 7, tianfu 83Jtï1:. 
66 QDRWZG - A, vo1.2, 252-61. 
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drew up detailed plans for the distribution ofmaterials (stone, bricks, wood, earth, etc.) 
that were used to strengthen the city gates.67 
Unfortunately, their administrative and military abilities had no effect outside the 
city. In the countryside, rural Jiading County was in a virtual state of anarchy. Since 
none of those leading the defense of the city had direct contact with xiangbing in the 
suburbs, there was no way to manage or coordinate the various forces. Sorne of these 
xiangbing may have reached the city, but many simply scattered or fled. Jiading 
tuchengji ~5Em:tJ$G~G provides a detailed description ofhow the xiangbing fought in 
the battlefield. We leam that on July 1, 1645, aU the xiangbing from various directions 
gathered to the east of a bridge caUed Zhuanqiao u,~. It is said there were more than a 
hundred thousand people; most ofthese were merely a nuisance because they crowded 
together and had no idea how to deploy for fighting. The well-trained Qing armies 
always divided their armies into right and left wings, a kind of battle formations that 
was called xie 'aochen Mm~ (the crab c1aw formation) by the xiangbing because they 
had no knowledge about it before. At early stages of a battle, the Qing army would 
usuaUy send the cavalry to scatter or challenge the enemy. The xiangbing could offer no 
effective response to the cavalry charges. In the face of the charge, we are told that aIl 
the local forces coUapsed immediately, "runners did not know what they were doing; 
they were killed by stepping on each other.,,68 Four days later, the city feU to the Qing 
army. 
After the fall of the city, Huang Chunyao hanged himself and Hou Tongzeng 
drowned with his sons and servants. Numerous commoners and local gentry also died in 
the resistance that made Jiading a landmark of 10yalism. For twelve hours the carnage 
continued, until the river was clogged with corpses. About twenty thousand people were 
killed.69 
67 Ibid. 
68 Quoted from Gu Cheng, 238-39. 
69 Ming mo zhongliejishi I3Jl*1i!':,P.!Hlê., juan 16,317-18. See also Jerry Dennerline, "Hsu Tu and the 
Lesson ofNanking: Political Integration and the Local Defense in Chiang-nan, 1634-1645", in Jonathan 
D. Spence and John E. Wills. Jr. ed., From Ming to Ching - Conquest, Region, and Continuity in 
Seventeenth - century China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 115. 
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A lack of training and discipline as weIl as poor equipment is the most obvious 
reasons for the defeat of the xiangbing. However, the literati who led the defense also 
proved incapable of integrating the various groups of xiangbing, although they did 
show their abilities in defending the city itself. Besides these fatal shortcomings, they 
had very po or intelligence about the Qing forces in the area. As Hou Tongzeng said, 
"we still have no way ofknowing the enemy's situation now. It is honestly up to the 
Buddha. It depends mostly on the enemy, and that means riding atiger - you can't get 
offin the middle of the ride.,,70 
The Jiading tragedy indicated that neither literati nor xiangbing could play a crucial 
role in the resistance movement. Yet, apart from these two groups there were very few 
forces available to fight against the Qing occupation. The other important source of 
ready recruits for the resistance was the bandit populations of Jiangnan area, most of 
them active in the Lake Tai and surrounding areas. Before the fall of the Ming, most of 
the marsh bandits had been engaged in kidnapping wealthy members of the gentry for 
ransom. In the process, they acquired a knowledge of local geography and landforms 
that would give them a distinct advantage over the invaders. Furthermore, because most 
ofthem were skillfullake fishermen, their fishing boats could easily be converted for 
military uses. The question was, could the Jiangnan literati integrate and lead these 
forces? The example ofWan Shouqi ~.ffrJt (1603- 1652, Juren of 1630) will help to 
answer this question. 
Although Wan was born in Xuzhou and died in poverty in Huai'an (Jiangbei), most 
ofhis political and anti-Qing military activities took place in the Jiangnan area. Prior to 
the arrivai of the Qing, he had demonstrated his skills in organization: he acted as co-
organizer of a convention in 1630 that attracted numerous attendees from among the 
Jiangnan literati; more than 2,500 papers were presented at this convention (sounds like 
an academic conference today). With the arrivaI of the Qing, his attention shifted to 
military matters. At the end of 1644, he mobilized and recruited several groups of 
xiangbing. Moreover, he also got in touch with the former bandits of Lake Tai. Most 
70 Cited from Wakeman (1985), voU, 667-68. 
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importantly, he made a special effort to establish contacts with the anti-Qing forces that 
were in the Jiangbei area, especially Yan Ermei and his peers in Huai'an city. 7 1 At least 
three leaders, along with their xiangbing or militias, joined his coordinated action in 
Jiangnan. They were: xiangbing from the Lake Chen ~*Yi!iJl area led by Shen Zibing 1,t El 
m, xiangbing from Lake Mao 1!iPYi!iJl led by Chen Zilong and Shen Youlong 1,t1!ij~ 
(jinshi of 1616), and Wu Yi's ~~ (jinshi of 1643) militia from Li Ze ~~. 
In June of 1645, Wan Shouqi and the above literati as weIl as sorne former bandits 
and rebellious peasants from Lake Tai jointly agreed to and planned a resistance effort. 
Yan Ermei also heard the news and made plans to lead his few militias to ambush the 
Qing army in Huai'an city (in the Jiangbei area). However, when the city's rich gentry 
heard ofYan's plans, they feared retaliation by the Qing and leaked Yan's plan to the 
Qing. Yan had no choice but to flee. The joint resistance in Jiangnan lasted about three 
months. Most of the leaders lost their lives on the battlefield. Wan was arrested and 
later escaped. When his parents heard of his arrest, they committed suicide by sinking 
their ship in the middle of Lake Tai. 
In reality, this joint action was joint only in name. There are no records showing 
how the disparate groups were knitted together, what kinds of logistical measures were 
taken, or how they assisted each other or cooperated in attacks against the Qing. It is 
clear that Wan Shouqi could not have been in direct command of any of the above 
forces, especially of those composed of rebellious peasants and bandits.72 
Another potential force for the anti-Qing resistance was the former Ming regular 
army. However, only a very few Jiangnan literati attempted to gain their services in the 
resistance. I will examine the case of one of these, Chen ZiIong, in the following section. 
The former Ming navy did not suffer too many casualties after the Qing army 
crossed the Yangzi. Sorne of them were garrisoned at Chongming Island *EljJ under the 
leadership of the Wusong garrison Commander Wu Zhikui ~~~, who had sailed to 
71 Yan was one ofhis closest friends for they were bom in the same city, Xuzhou, in same year (1603); 
they were also awarded the Juren degree in the same year (1630). See QDRWZG- A, voU, 215. 
72 See QDRWZG- A, voU, 215. 
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Chongming when Nanjing fell. Given the fact that most of the Ming armies had been 
defeated or scattered during the summer of 1645, his navy became of central 
importance for both the Qing and the Jiangnan resistance forces. In fact, Wu had 
already tried to make contact with the court of the Prince of Lu ~.:E and other loyalist 
centers in Zhejiang to express his willingness to help restore the Ming. 73 Furthermore, 
when Jiading's defense was in danger, Hou Tongcheng and Huang Chunyao begged 
assistance from Wu Zhikui, and he sent 700 soldiers to provide help. However, they 
were defeated in their first conflict with the Qing army, and simply withdrew from the 
city.74 
Wu Zhikui's army totaled about ten thousand troops. The joint resistance of the 
Jiangnan literati inspired him to move his sail ors and marines from the sea to Lake Mao. 
At this time, one ofhis former teachers, Xia Yunyi ;;:ft~ (jins~i of 1637), and his son, 
the famous young poet Xia W anchun ;;:5G~.ïJ (1631-1647), came to join him and served 
as liaison officers. They intended to take Suzhou city first to isolate the Qing army at 
Hangzhou, and then to besiege Nanjing in order to recover the whole of Jiangnan.75 In 
the process of preparation, Chen Zilong tried to convince Wu to do his bidding (Chen 
was a teacher of Xia Wanchun). According to Chen, the narrow confines of the 
Jiangnan waterways would be disadvantageous for their big warships. If this army 
simply entered the inland waterways of Jiangnan, the "vessels and armies would be aH 
heading in a single direction and spread over more than twenty li; the head and tail of 
the column will not respond to each other and they will inevitably be defeated .... " 
Unfortunately, his suggestion did not affect general Wu's action. On the Qing side, as 
Chen predicted, the infantry and cavalry troops used light craft as well as fireboats to 
fight against Wu's army. The Qing forces' effective counter-attack coincided with high 
winds that struck Wu's fleet. In the end, his navy suffered an overwhelming defeat.76 
73 Zhu Yihai *j.:)w (1609-1662) assumed the title of Regent in the early faU of 1645. 
74 Xu Bingyi, juan 16,317-18. 
75 QDRWZG - A, vol. 2, 240. 
76 Wakeman (1985), voU, 669 -70. 
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The attack of General Wu's regular Ming army brought Jiangnan resistance to its 
apex during the summer of 1645. According to Wen Ruilin, there were a total of more 
than 100,000 militiamen in Jiangnan at this time; these militias were supported by 
groups as varied as merchants, monks, and Taoists. However, because they had been 
organized within a very short period of time, they were lacking in weapons, and 
tinancial resources. When they attacked Suzhou city, they discovered that the capacity 
of the Qing army's defense was much stronger than they had imagined. The garrisoned 
armies had sufficient logistical supplies, and could rely on the protection of a very solid 
city wall. Furthermore, they forced the city residents who already shaved their heads to 
join the city's defense. FinalIy, Wu's army was defeated in the Panmen Ür~ area of the 
city. 77 
The army led by Wu and his literati staff members was in a state of disunity. After 
this failure, Wu lost control of the army, and he was later captured and killed in Nanjing. 
AlI of the cooperating armies intended to flee. Xia Yunyi cried as he begged them to 
stay with the resistance.78 This was not the tirst time that Xia Yunyi had encountered 
such a hopeless and embarrassing situation. Several years earlier, after hearing that 
rebellious peasants had already occupied most of north China, he wrote letters to fort Y 
gentry households asking them to donate money and organize local militia to suc cor the 
emperor. He received no positive response, and only succeeded in inspiring the 
contempt of the gentry. 79 
Wakeman provides his comments on the failure of the Jiangnan resistance in the 
summer of 1645: "The ethnic alliance of upper and lower classes against the Manchu's 
haircutting order was already sundered, and the gentry of Jiangnan were too socially 
alienated from its own subordinates to hold out for much longer alone."so 
1 want to argue that examining the gentry as a unitied group is insufficient. To 
understand the tragedy that befell the Jiangnan literati and gentry, we must explore the 
77 Nanjiang yishi F-?Ja~§l:, liezhuan JU1*, juan 19, ZGYSJC 35, 386. 
78 Ibid. 
79 QDRWZG- A, vol.2, 239. 
80 Wakeman (1985), voU, 673. 
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relationship between the few "radicals" and the more moderate majority. The more 
examples we examine the clearer it becomes that the few people who insist on the 
pursuit of pure and abstract goals cannot be successful, at least in the early stages, 
because they are always a tiny minority within the ocean of the real world. 
The summer of 1645 was a turning point for both the Qing and the Jiangnan 
resistance movement. Each side knew that they would have to reorganize their forces to 
deal with later conflicts. The period leading up to the spring of 1647 seemed, to sorne 
loyalists, to present another opportunity to achieve their goals. 
The Songjiang Military Commander fl1It:lJ!fi-, Wu Shengzhao ~MJ~Is, had 
decided to tum against the Qing army. His important staff officers came from Jiangnan 
and many had close relationships with Chen Zilong. They worked together to get in 
touch with the Southern Ming's navy garrisoned in the Zhoushan archipelago and led 
by General Huang Binqing ~Jj\U~p. Huang himself subsequently agreed to support a 
naval expedition north to coincide with the uprising. They hoped to join together on 
May 20, 1647, and then to make plans for further attacks. 
Wu Shengzhao carried out his plans according to schedule. He assembled his 
soldiers in front of the city's walls, and swore an oath to join the Southem Ming armada 
to overthrow the Qing dynasty. However, the things that happened later were beyond 
his control. While Wu, like most of his force, was from north China, many of the new 
subordinates and soldiers were local people who had only become his followers in 
recent months. Wu had great difficulty controlling these locals: those who had 
surrendered andjoined his forces wanted to be given superior treatment because they 
were locals; those who had never formally surrendered to Wu did not care about his 
authority at an. The lack of cooperation between Wu's northern soldiers and the local 
militia caused major problems in Wu's army.81 As plans for the uprising were made, 
news about it became common knowledge among the people of Songjiang city. Two 
days before the uprising was scheduled to begin, the Qing army led by Tu Guobao 
already knew of the imminent invasion. The failure to preserve the element of surprise 
became one of the crucial factors in the failure ofWu's mutiny. 
81 Huang Zongxi, Xingchao lu 5 - Zhoushan xingfei 1TijïJj~Z1ï-ffl-r.D:OO-~, in ZGYSJC 32, 246-47. 
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In the end, although he occupied the city for several days and killed sorne Qing 
officers, Wu could not rely on his own army. Furthermore, more than two hundred 
Southem Ming warships that were to have supported him were swept across the mouth 
of the Yangzi by a typhoon; nearly all of the smaller vesse1s and about half of the ships 
were destroyed. Those soldiers who managed to straggle ashore were either killed by 
Qing warriors with swords and crossbows or captured. A few days later, sorne ofhis 
subordinates decided to tum back to the Qing - they captured Wu Shengzhao and sent 
him to the Qing army in an attempt to guarantee their own survival. Wu was later killed 
in Nanjing.82 
There was a man who had joined both of the above military actions of Wu Zhikui 
and Wu Shengzhao against the Qing army - Chen Zilong. A thorough examination of 
his military career may provide us a more complete picture of how the loyal Jiangnan 
literati demonstrated their abilities in military affairs such as strategy, training, 
mobilizing the masses, launching campaigns, integrating forces, and providing logistics. 
More importantly, exploring his military as well as administrative career may help us to 
understand how military, political, and social factors combined to ensure that the Ming 
dynasty would not survive. 
3: 4. Political Factions and Military Action 
In early June of 1647, Chen Zilong was captured by the Qing army. On the 15th of the 
same month, he took the opportunity of the negligence of the Qing guards to drown 
himself. His last several months were spent in attempts to coordinate the various anti-
Qing forces, especially planning the mutiny of Wu Shenzhao. After doing all that he 
could to rescue the Ming dynasty, he finally sacrificed his life. While still young, Chen 
Zilong had already made it c1ear that his intent was not to become a pure scholar.83 
82 enlG, 454-62; Wakeman 1985, vol. 2, 743-48. 
83 For example, in a poem written on his 25th birthday, he expressed this kind of meaning. See Chen 
Zilong, Chen Zilong shiji ~T~ft~ (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1983), juan 13,414. 
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During the 1630s, his activities showed a desire to change the CUITent state of affairs. 
He not only helped to compile the Huang Mingjingshi wenbian ~E)j*~i::f:t:x*I, a 
collection in five hundredjuan of essays and memorials on political and economic 
issues, but also edited Xu Guangqi's Nongzheng quanshu Mij(~if, a major work on 
agricultural administration. In the political realm, Chen and several young men such as 
Xia Yunyi and Xu Fuyuan of the prefecture formed a society, called Jishe ~iif±, that 
served as a forum for scholarly discussion. They followed the model of the Fushe fIiif±, 
a similar society in Suzhou. Their original discussions dealt mainly with literature, 
learning, and morals; later, they became more interested in the topic ofpolitical reform. 
As it became increasingly evident that the Ming central government lacked the power to 
maintain order within the empire and to hold back the Manchus in the north, members 
of the Jishe tumed their attention to questions of military defense. 84 
As we quoted before, Chen Zilong demonstrated a wide military knowledge and 
capacity in sorne ofhis writings. However, his bookish approach was also everywhere 
exposed. Sorne of his goals, practically speaking, were unattainable because what he 
described rarely occuITed in the 1630s and 40s. For instance, an article written in 1636 
discussed how civil officiaIs could control a self-important, fierce, and untrained army: 
Therefore, the elegant and capable civil official must open his heart to get in touch 
with generals in order to use them. In peacetime, establish connections and 
contracts with them, during wartime, we may expect to get news of their entering 
into our administrative area for they will send good runners to tell us the date they 
are coming; in this case we may cope with them easily.85 
84 For a related study ofthe Fushe, see William S.Atwell, "From Education to Politics: the Fushe," in Wm. 
Theodore de Bary and the Conference on Seventeenth- Century Chinese Thought, eds., The Unfolding of 
Neo-Confucianism (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975),333-67. Aiso see John 
Thomas Meskill, Gentlemanly Interests and Wealth on the Yangzi Delta (Association for Asian Studies, 
1994). Dennerline's book also provides detailed information and analysis. Jerry Dennerline, The Chia-ting 
Loyalists: Confucian Leadership and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century China (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1981). 
85 An'yatanggao3(.fiÊ~~,juan 11, inXXSKQS 1388,81-82. 
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However, his strategie perspective on military affairs is evident in a suggestion sent 
to Beijing in the summer of 1641. He thought that by this time the two most important 
regions in the empire were Shandong and Jingxiang JflJ~ (Jingzhou and Xiangyang, 
located in present day Hubei). For geographic and political reasons, controlling these 
two regions usually resulted in the ability to conquer the entire empire. Since Li 
Zicheng's army had already conquered Xiangyang alWî, Chen's view was that they 
could not defend that city but would plan either to attack the Central Plains by crossing 
the Han River or attack Jingzhou due south in order to occupy east China.86 One year 
later, Li Zicheng's action verified his prediction - Li and his followers established their 
government at Dashun *111& in Xi'an and took Beijing several months later. 
Based on the failure of the Ming army in pacifying the peasant armies of Li Zicheng 
and Zhang Xianzhong in north and central China, Chen Zilong realized that neither the 
conventional regular army nor existing local militias would suffice for the defense of 
Jiangnan. In the late 1630s, he began promoting an empire-wide militia movement. 
Along with other members of the Jishe, he sought to persuade the Chongzhen Emperor 
to sanction the formation of new kinds of local militia under the leadership of gentry 
throughout China. With these new militias and bureaucratie leaders, they felt they 
would be better able to coordinate guerrilla warfare in the future. 87 
Because of the particular geographical conditions of the Jiangnan area, Chen made 
the following suggestions: "Fishermen would be recruited for river and lake patrols, 
since much of Jiangnan's banditry originated among the lake people and the fishermen 
were accustomed to fighting. This new police force would be professional, paid by 
commuted conscription levies and fishing taxes. It would be coordinated by military 
officiaIs of the province, and it would serve both as a defense against rebel incursions 
and as a means oflocal control. Moreover, it would function independently ofboth the 
local elite and the yamen functionaries.,,88 However, his proposaI reveals a dilemma 
about how to control local militias. Like many ofhis contemporaries, he called for the 
86 An'ya tang gao 3(ft1it~,juan 17, in XXSKQS 1388, 195. 
87 Dennerline (1979), 125. 
88 Dennerline (1979), 114. 
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establishment of local defense systems such as the baojia. According to him, this kind 
of social unit "does not disturb the people and does not drain their resources. It 
embodies the old system in a new method; its implementation has many merits. Once 
disorder is upon them, the people will understand the hardship they must bear and each 
will try to save himself. Only then can the people themselves organize their rural 
militia. But ifwe hope to organize in advance, we can only do so by letting the 
government administer the organization and not by depending on the people."s9 
In 1640, he was appointed as prefectural judge in Shaoxing *R,Q.m, soon after he 
was appointed to serve as acting county magistrate of Chuji ~~ (*R,Q.mm'§'~.~ 
~~DW,*) in northern Zhejiang. This position allowed him an opportunity to put into 
practice sorne of his ideas. The success of his actions showed him to be one of the very 
few Jiangnan literati of the Ming-Qing transition who were adept in military affairs. 
During his tenure, apart from administrative affairs, he also supervised the building of 
forts and city walls, the manufacture of cannons, and the storing of gunpowder. Within 
a period of only two years, he twice led mixed local militia and regular armies to pacify 
peasant rebellions. By 1642, there were more than one thousand soldiers under his 
banner marching to the mountainous Sui chang ~Ë§ area to join the Ming armies in a 
coordinated military suppression organized by the provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and 
Jiangxi. Despite suffering casualties at approximately the same rate as those rebels in 
the border are as of these two provinces, the armies under his direction and supervision 
finally forced the rebels to surrender by cutting off their supply lines.9o 
Entering into 1644, an incident occurred which unsettled the military preparations 
and endeavors of Chen Zilong and his friends - the Xu Du Incident. As far as we know 
there is no direct detaHed data about Xu Du himself. We know only that he was a 
prefectural student from Dongyang of Jinhua prefecture in northern Zhejiang. His 
reputation was established through his prowess in martial arts and his righteous actions. 
On the basis ofthese characteristics he attracted a group of young men as followers. As 
we mentioned in Chapter Two, after Xu Du took He Gang's advice to train a unit of 
89 Ibid. 
90 QDRWZG- A, volA, 378. 
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fighting men in order to defend Jiangnan, he pieced together an army in his hometown 
and the surrounding districts. It is said that, by the faU of 1643, this army numbered in 
the tens ofthousands. Because various social strata were involved and the organization 
extended throughout the prefecture, local officiaIs and sorne rich families became afraid. 
At the end of 1643, they accused Xu ofplotting a rebellion and began to suppress his 
army. Xu now had no choice but to begin an uprising. 
The current Dongyang magistrate was related to Zuo Guangxian tr:7\::;)'ê by 
marriage. Zuo was the younger brother of Zuo Guangdou tr:7\::;FOI'j, the Donglin martyr, 
and was serving as the provincial inspector of Zhejiang #mI~tti:. Coincidentally, the 
governorship was temporarily vacant, so it was Zuo who was forced to deal with the 
uprising. He dispatched the governor's brigade to Jinhua but was defeated by Xu's weIl 
trained and locally-popular troops. Meanwhile, Chen Zilong and his troops successfully 
forced Xu Du out of the area of Dongyang and into the nearby hills. On December 29, 
Chen's army killed more than 300 rebellious members ofXu's militia, and captured 
more than 50.91 However, since Xu's troops now held an advantageous position in the 
rugged and steep mountains, Chen decided to negotiate an end to the cri sis. He rode 
into the hills alone to discuss the matter with Xu and promised him amnesty if he 
surrendered. Xu ordered the rebels to disband, and led sixt Y ofhis followers to 
surrender to the official army. Chen accompanied the captured rebels to Hangzhou, but 
was unable to save Xu's life. Chen did not seem to realize that, as a Ming official, he 
had no right to promise amnesty. Soon after their arrivaI, Zuo Guangxian ordered the 
execution of all of these rebels without trial. 92 
In fact, Chen and Xu had known each other quite weIl before the uprising. He met 
Xu through Xu Fuyuan's recommendation when he was serving as prefecture judge in 
Shaoxing, and he was impressed by Xu's abilities in military affairs. He even praised 
Xu as the "backbone" (~:I:filG) of the country and recommended him several times.93 
Thus, Chen Zilong was involved in the affair on two different levels - both personaUy 
91 See Pan Xinghui, 355. 
92 Xu Bingyi ,juan 16,352-53. 
93 QDRWZG -A, vol.4, 379. 
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and officially. Because ofhis inability to save Xu from execution, his reputation on a 
personaiievei suffered great damage. After Xu Du was executed, Xu Fuyuan directed 
the blame at Chen Zilong. According to him, since Chen wronged Xu Du, nobody 
would be willing to befriend him later on (:::R--r~fl:Ef)(:3(TfJ~~). 
Since late Ming times, the concept of yi (righteousness) played a crucial role in the 
daily lives of Chine se literati. For fear of a loss of reputation among their peers, these 
men would devote much effort to its pursuit. This is apparent not only through the 
descriptions in novels like Sanguo yanyi -=.~M~ (Romance of the Three Kingdoms) 
and Shuihu zhuan 7..k~m:1$ (Water Margin), but aiso in the lives ofhistorical characters 
such as Yan Ermei and Gu Yanwu. Without this common concem and identification, 
how could they have survived for so many years in north China following the Ming 
demi se? Zhao Lisheng's study helps us to understand that their travel fees and supplies 
were provided from aIl of the scholars' households they passed by. If any ofthese 
scholars refused to do so, he would be looked down upon.94 
As a lower Ievel Ming official, Chen Zilong really did not have enough authority to 
give this kind ofamnesty. As Dennerline states, "by 1644, he had already become 
enmeshed in a variety of privately organized military and logistic operations which 
increased his effectiveness as a leader but compromised his position as an agent of 
bureaucratie control.,,95 
In the militarization of local society, the attitudes of various levels of officiaIs 
played essential roles. If possible, they relied on private organization and popular action. 
But, could these forces be strictly controlled? Dennerline uses the case ofXu Du to 
analyze these ambivalences. He shows that there was a shi ft in the "focus of historical 
discussion from loyalism and the personalities of famous men to the problems of local 
leadership and political integration." He also indicates that the Jiangnan literati, 
represented by the Donglin faction, were "a large elite nexus of bureaucrats with a 
94 Zhao Lisheng m{l~, "Qing chu Ming yimin benzou huodong shiji kaolue" ~f}]A}j:iW~~~mtJJ$ 
li!Jt~~, in Zhao Lisheng shixue lunzhu zixuanji M!{II~~"'lliif § jJ!~ (Jinan: Shandong daxue, 1996), 
301. 
95 Dennerline (1979), 114-15. 
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special interest in securing order throughout the several prefectures which divided their 
native land." He shows that the Xu Du affair called into question the integration of 
bureaucratie politics and local power, and that "political fragmentation was related to a 
hiatus in the structure of local power. ,,96 
However, his analysis does not pay enough attention to Xu Du's troops. His article 
focuses instead on what the literati and high ranking officiaIs said and what they 
intended to do. He supplies no data to verify whether their military plans were carried 
out or not, nor does he examine the results of this action. Paper work was the strong suit 
ofChinese officiaIs and literati, but action was often another story. For the Xu Du case, 
it is not enough to only know that this was a local, private force organized by one of the 
local elite. More important is to examine why Xu Du proved unable to control his own 
troops. 
After Xu's initial organization of the troops, sorne ofhis subordinates, led by Yin 
Dou JJ!r'J, discussed how to get more equipment: 
If we want to do great things, a cudgel will not be enough; we need powerful 
weapons. Most stored weapons are in the arsenal ofXuanping County '§zp.~*,. 
Since this is a small county without preparations, [if] we go suddenly to take those 
weapons, we would be successful. 
Yin, leading more than 100 soldiers, crept into the county at night. But, they met an 
unexpectedly vigorous defense. Xuanping residents fought them with firearms such as 
muskets (niaotong J~~) and killed Yin Dou.97 
No data is available to show that Xu Du was involved in killing the wealthy and 
aiding the poor. In fact, he seems to have been very careful to maintain social order. 
One evidence of this is the considerable amount of time he spent building his "Palace of 
Loyalty and Righteousness" (Zhongyifu J~\f!iJff). He expected that the government 
96 Dennerline (1979), 124-25. 
97 Kangxi Dongyang xianzhi ~W~.!iI~:ll!bJfJTiit, juan 4, Zhifangzhi lM:1Jiit, zhiluan mîiJL. 
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authorities would allow him to demonstrate his abilities in defending the state and 
society since the regular Ming army could not be relied upon anymore. If he really 
wanted to pursue an uprising, it would have been very easy for him because he was 
capable of mobilizing a peasant rebellion in Jinhua and surrounding areas - this was an 
indication of the resentment of local commoners over heavy taxes and corrupt officiaIs. 
In the first two weeks of this uprising, his troops had already reached into tens of 
thousands people. However, aIl his actions showed his ambivalent position between the 
Ming govemment and society. As a typical member of the local elite, he really wanted 
to find new ways to render services to his hometown as weIl as the Ming state. In other 
words, his intentions coincided with Chen Zilong and other literati, such as the 
members of Jishe. AIthough Xu Du had only a shengyuan degree, he was proud ofhis 
special abilities in military affairs and the control of local society. Chen Zilong and 
other members of the Jishe who witnessed the decline of the Ming Empire and the 
collapse of the Jiangnan military and administrative systems began to shift their focus 
to newly available forces such as those raised by Xu. 
This is why Xu Du and the Jishe members knew each other before the incident, and 
why Chen decided to mediate the conflict. Their cooperation can be seen as evidence of 
local forces combining with upper social strata to voice, through military action, the 
discontent oflocal society. Chen Zilong's pacification and guarantee left Xu Do with no 
choice but to surrender. It seems that Chen succeeded in the first step of his endeavor. 
However, it is apparent that Chen was not representative of other Ming officiaIs. 
After the Xu Du revoit, Chen's troops were suddenly faced with challenges from 
other local forces such as militia and local gentry. Furthermore, his actions conflicted 
with the local authorities. As mentioned above, Zuo Guangxian was the highest ranking 
official involved in the matter. AIthough he was an important figure in the Donglin 
Party and he and Chen Zilong had known each other quite weIl, he still ordered the 
execution ofXu and his subordinates.98 Of course we may assume that Zuo made his 
decision based on his marri age relation with the Magistrate, as mentioned above, but 
the real reason is more complicated. 
98 Pan Xinghui tI~)\$!, "Mingji Dongyang minbian kaolun" aJ.l**~.tR;~~~ifli, in Zhu Chengru *~~D 
and Wang Tianyou .:E7(~ ed., Ming Qing luncong, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zijincheng, 1999),355. 
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In fact, most Zhejiang provincial authorities in the Xu Du affair advocated harsh 
punishments for the rebels when Chen Zilong proposed his amnesty. For example, Hou 
Tongzeng supported Zuo Guangxian's action in the case. Qi Biaojia as weIl as his 
teacher Liu Zongzhou also did so. From their perspective, "had Xu Do gone unpunished, 
they believed, Ming control of Jiangnan would have been lost. No matter how 
sympathetic other restorationists may have been to Chen Zilong's plan, they knew that 
private military action and restoration were an explosive mix.99 Among them, Qi 
Biaojia (1602- 1645,jinshi of 1622) was proud ofboth his administrative and military 
experience. As Govemor of Susong, he not only asked Zuo to repress Xu Du, but also 
tried to enforce the baojia system in order to strengthen local defense measures. During 
the summer of 1645, he captured and executed several rebels immediately after he 
pacified the revoIt of servants. After the Qing army took Hangzhou, he refused to 
cooperate and drowned himself. 1oo 
Nevertheless, Chen Zilong was promoted to the position of Palace Steward (Jishi 
zhong *fl:fp=p) of the Minister ofWar as reward for the pacification ofXu Du. To 
express his regret for Xu and to protest against Zuo's rejection of amnesty, he refused 
active duty.lOI 
After the faIl of Beijing, Chen went to Nanjing to try to help to save the Southem 
Ming. Because of the lessons he gained from the Xu Du incident, he shifted attention to 
the upper levels of society. During his service in the Ministry of War at Nanjing, he 
took partial responsibility for the defense of Nanjing. This job provided him a chance to 
make a number of suggestions directly to the Hongguang emperor conceming how to 
defend the Yangzi River. He emphasized the importance of waterbome forces (shuishi 
7j(gffi) and strongly recommended the building of ocean-going boats for use in the near 
future. On his recommendation, as we mentioned in Chapter Two, He Gang was 
employed to train a special force named Zhong Guanying. Chen also suggested 
deploying troops in the Lianghuai area in order to consolidate the defense. "These 
99 Dennerline (1979), 122. 
100 Xiaodianjizhuan, juan 15, liezhuan 8, 177-78; also see Xu Bingyi, 373-75. 
lOI Xiaodianjizhuan,juan 41, liezhuan 34, 412. 
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included the recruitment of more armies by first selecting generals who would 
themselves enroll stouthearted villagers from the areas under their command." \02 
Unfortunately, Chen Zilong was once again witness to the corruption of the 
Southern Ming court. The factional politics even involved the Xu Du incident because 
sorne ofXu's followers had continued to militate for action after the faH of Beijing. The 
manipulation of the Hongguang court by Ma and Ruan forced Chen to give up his post 
in the Ministry ofWar and return home to Songjiang three months later. \03 
In developing their plans to fight against the Qing army, Chen Zilong and other 
members of the Jishe began to get in touch with the gentry and former Ming officiaIs in 
his hometown. On August 1, he rallied his townsmen to attack and kill the local Qing 
official and take over the city. One source provides a vivid description of the 
preparations for the revoIt. Most importantly, it hints that this revoit only involved a 
few local gentry. According to this source, when Chen Zilong, Xia Yunyi, and other 
scholar-bureaucrats (Shidafu ±*~) returned to Songjiang, 
... some young people of Songjiang who resented the pacification of the Qing came 
to tell [them] everyday about the commoners who could not tolerate [the Qing's 
rule] ... Zilong was moved by the news. He went to discuss strategy with Yunyi. 
Yunyi said: 'The things [ofresistance] cannot suc cee d, but the pursuit of 
righteousness cannot be terminated.' Only then did Chen Zilong take his suggestion. 
[Xu] Fuyuan and his followers were very happy when they heard this news, so they 
started to deploy the youngsters who were not peaceful, the revoit would have its 
day.\04 
After Songjiang fell on September 22, Chen Zilong and the others fled the city. At 
the beginning of the following year, he was appointed by the Prince of Lu in Shaoxing 
as Minister ofthe Board ofWar, and by the Prince of Tang in Fuzhou as Left Vice-
\02 Wakeman (1985), vol. 1,373-74; see also Nandu lu [$j?1i~, juan 2, in NMSL BZ, 198. 
\03 Struve (1984), 41. 
104 Song Yuanwen *~:x, "Yunjian bingshi" ~ra'#$, in Dongcunjishi *;j".t~c.$, quoted from Guo 
Songyi. See also Wakeman (1985), voU, 666. 
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Minister of the Board of War as weIl as Left Censor-in-Chief (Bingbu zuosilang zuodu 
yushi ~ff~tr:1~~~tr:m~~). In the early summer of 1646, he saw the Prince of Lu in 
eastem Zhejiang. Since he was very familiar with the military and political situation of 
the regions of the northem Qiantang River, he finally decided to retum to Songjiang. By 
this time, most of the Jiangnan area had fallen to the Qing, so he had to take a circuitous 
route. 
Chen Zilong was now very careful injoining or cooperating with local forces. For 
example, although he accepted the post of Censorial Military Commissioner (Jianjun 
yushi ~.~ 31::.) under Shen Y oulong, a commander of several thousand partisans, he, 
in fact, did not place much faith in the fighting ability of the se hastily recruited troops, 
because he found that the troops were composed of "city folk" without adequate 
military supplies and training. 105 
In his military planning, Chen began to emphasize two factors. The first was the 
role of the local gentry. He felt the key to victory lay in the use ofhis network of gentry 
contacts throughout Jiangnan to coordinate a regional uprising. "He and Xia Yunyi first 
mobilized the nucleus of friends around them who constituted the original Jishe circle, 
such as Xu Fuyuan. Then, through these friends, other fellow literati were contacted; 
more and more people might be involved later on.,,106 The second factor was the 
potential assistance from the loyalist navies at Chongming Island. He believed that 
these regular armies were one of the most promising resources for the resistance 
movement in Jiangnan. This explains why, after the failure of Wu Zhikui, he 
immediately joined Wu Shengzhao's conspiracy in April of 1647. 
The Qing's greatest worry was a resistance movement composed of Jiangnan literati, 
the Southem Ming regime, and former Ming military and officiaIs. After Wu 
Shengzhao's mutiny, Qing military and police authorities began to search for the key 
figures behind the revoIt, and soon settled upon the name of Chen Zilong as a leading 
conspirator, even though he was only "an intermediary between Wu Shengzhao and the 
105 Quoted from Wakeman (1985), voU, 667. 
106 Ibid. 
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Lu court," and on the periphery ofthe Songjiang mutiny.I07 Altogether, nearly one 
thousand scholars were captured and killed by the Qing. By the end of the summer of 
1647, most of the resistance forces in Jiangnan had been pacified, and the Qing began 
to consolidate its mIe in the Jiangnan area. 
Xu Bingyi used the comment Wangmen touzhi ~F~:t~lI:. to de scribe Chen Zilong's 
actions in support of the resistance movement. The phrase means "try to use any sorts of 
forces or means to reach certain goals."lo8 Chen Zilong indeed had done his best to 
devote himself to the restoration of the Ming Empire, but his main focus had been on the 
upper social strata and the existing armed forces, regardless of whether they were from 
the Ming government, local society, or even the Qing side. The following case of Wu Yi 
provides us with another example of a Jiangnan literatus who began by mobilizing and 
leading local forces to pacify bandits and peasant rebellions, and then shifted to fight 
against the Qing invasion. 
3: 5. When a Civil Official Decornes a General 
In the fall and early winter of 1645, Chen Zilong lived in Jiashan and the area 
surrounding Lake Tai. At this time, another resistance army led by Wu Yi ~~ became 
the most powerful anti-Qing force in Jiangnan. This army soon got in touch with gentry 
loyalists who had survived the Songjiang uprising, especially the eminent leader Chen 
Zilong. 
The Prince of Lu ordered Chen to join and supervise Wu Yi's "righteous army". 
Accompanied by a few disciples, Chen came to join Wu's mufu and become one ofhis 
staff officers. However, as Wakeman indicated, he soon became disenchanted with both 
their quarters and the prospects of Wu Yi leading a successful war against the Qing. 
One ofhis disciples gives sorne hint of the reasons why they soon left this army: 
107 Wakeman (1985), vol.2, 751-52. See also Zhu Dongrun **fIJ, Chen Zilongjiqi shidai 1l*-T1i~.&~~ 
f-t (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1984),300. 
108 Xu Bingyi, vo1.l2, 197-98. 
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Changxing [Wu Yi] is one of the heroes of our age, but in my view his strategy 
tends to underestimate the enemy. Besides, aIl his secretaries 51} [or staff officers] 
are frivolous and his generals only pursue robbing and plundering. [Although] his 
army assembled plenty of members, since they have not been put in order, how 
could they be deemed a righteous army? 109 
Chen Zilong did have sorne suggestions and plans for the organization of xiangbing, 
but he did not have any experience in commanding or even getting in touch with this 
sort oflocal force. In Wu Yi's troops, he saw much that was far from his ideal ofwhat 
local forces should be. Unfortunately, Chen Zilong did not realize that Wu Yi's anti-
Qing resistance forces had been among the most effective in Jiangnan. 110 
Wu Yi was born in Wujiang County; he was awarded thejinshi degree in 1643. He 
was famous in his hometown not only for his writing and poetry, but also for his 
abilities in military affairs, his physical agility, and his spiritual boldness. He was also 
known as a devotee of the martial arts and noted for his strength and skill at swimming. 
He edited a book entitled Fuqiang yaolan ~5gt~. in 1643 after receiving his jinshi 
degree; another four articles were collected as Huifu Zhongxing moyi '1~1ii:f:'"*ii 
and sent to Shi Kefa who was responsible for Yangzhou's defense. AIl ofthese works 
were focused on current military, political, and economic affairs. It is said that Shi Kefa 
was deeply touched by Wu's papers, and he immediately appointed Wu as secretary in 
the Bureau of Operations of the Board ofWar (bingbu zhifangsi zhushi ;:tg~~::1Jp]± 
109 Chen Zilong, Zhong Zhongyu quanji ~J!t,m~~, Nianpu 1f~ (B), 4, printed in 1803. Unfortunately, 
Wakeman's translation made a crucial mistake, and he relied on this misunderstanding to make another 
wrong conclusion later on - those yishi look down upon literati. ".~f§'~~~z±" cannot be translated 
"(he) had recruited retainers who look down upon leamed scholars" as he did. Moreover, "~X~~~ 
3f" also cannot be translated "they remain a dissolute bunch altogether". Changdang:R~ is a place 
name where Wu launched his yishi. Wakeman (1985), vol.2, 726. 
110 There are numerous of specialists who were involved in Wu Yi's Mufu. Apart from Chen Zilong and 
his disciples, Chen Qubing ~*"*W3 listed more than thirty staff officers as weIl as secretaries and 
provided more detailed information. Quoted from Xie Zhengguang and Fan Jinmin, 193. 
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$). III He was later sent back to the Jiangnan area by Shi Kefa to raise funds for 
military rations. It was thanks to this mission that he was not killed with Shi and his 
foHowers in the faH of Yangzhou. 
Wu Yi's practical military action began with skirmishes with pirates and rebels of 
the Lake Tai area. He used his family's own properties to hire and equip two thousand 
militiamen to defend his native village at the eastem end of Lake Tai. However, as soon 
as Wujiang city feH to the Qing, he summoned several do zen people to capture and kill 
the officers who had surrendered to the Qing. By then it had become very clear that the 
Qing armies were preparing to take over all of Jiangnan. He began to contact friends 
among the local gentry. The most famous ofthese was Sun Zhaokui (mentioned above). 
Since Sun was skilled in military training and strategy, Wu soon established a close 
relationship with him, and even named his troops the Sun Wu Army :i%~lL Within 
one day three hundred men had joined them, and by the third day a thousand people had 
been assembled. They set up a military camp by the si de of Lake Tai at Changbai Pond 
~S~. 
Wu's army was commonly known as the "White Headed Army" (baitoujun sËjlL) 
because of the white cloths that his soldiers wrapped around their heads. Sun Zhaokui 
helped him to add large numbers of bandits and other sorts of local militia such as 
xiangbing to these original troops. His army soon became a mixed group led by literati. 
The incorporation of these other forces was one of the important characteristics of Wu 
Yi' s military action. 
These local armed forces included bandits, such as the subordinates of Barefoot 
Zhang San. However, the most important were the forces led by Shen Pan tÈrl and Li 
Jiucheng *tL~. Their arrivaI helped to tum Wu's forces into the most powerful 
literati-Ied resistance forces in Jiangnan. 
Shen Pan was the leader ofSongjiang's bandits. He and his 1,400 followers had 
done much looting in this area. Because the local gentry were afraid of his threat, they 
wrote a letter to Wu asking for his help. While Wu Yi did not have enough force to 
111 Xie and Fan, 186. 
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ensure victory, he finally captured Shen with a "stratagem" Gi gt) and incorporated his 
troops, inc1uding 70 warships.112 
It is not c1ear what kind of stratagem he used to pacify Shen Pan's bandit force, but 
the case of Li Jiucheng provides more details of what may have been a similar process. 
Li was a bandit leader from Zhejiang. Under the pretense of uprising, he led his rebels 
with about 1,000 boats and ships in widescale plundering. Wu Yin hoped to incorporate 
Li' s subordinates into his own troops; to achieve this goal, he would have been willing 
to kill Li. Sorne worried that this kind of fighting would damage the harmony among 
the Jiangnan forces in the face of the coming Qing invasion. However, Sun Zhaokui 
supported Wu: 
What we are engaging in is just like slicing a whale with a little knife and fighting a 
tiger with bare hands. Only with this kind of righteousness could we expect to 
summon the people. If we tolerate their looting and buming, then aU the people will 
be our foes. That means we would have been defeated by ourse Ives before the 
coming of enemy.l13 
Li's troops were eventually ambushed by Wu Yi through a strategy involving Wu's 
pretended cooperation. 
The local gentry aiso joined Wu's efforts. One ofthese, Shen Zhizheng 1xz1iE, was 
a famous scholar in Songjiang. Shortly before his death, he prepared 1,000 ships for use 
in the struggie against the Qing. When Wu organized his troops, Shen's two younger 
brothers not only provided an these vessels to Wu, but aiso brought another 500 boats 
calledjiansou miJiJ!ll to the harbor at Lanxi :tI~. 
Since the Qing army's greatest strength lay in its cavalry, they were severely 
hampered in certain areas of Jiangnan. The Qing forces were frequently attacked by 
water; in these cases, their lack of competent sail ors left them ill-equipped to restrain 
the resistance movement. In contrast, Wu Yi' s troops were primarily composed of 
112 Ji Liuqi (B), juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 598. 
113 Xie and Fan, 188. 
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fishermen, pirates, sorne peasants from the lakeshore, and a smaU remnant from the 
former Ming navy. Their effective resistance often caused the Qing army severe 
casualties. 
The foUowing is an example of the strategies that were used to defeat the Qing on 
the water. 
Wu Yi scattered those of his soldiers who were good at swimming among the local 
peasants. When the Qing armies looked for sail ors to sail their ships, aU these 
scattered people came together. When they sailed these ships into the middle of the 
water, they let the ships sink and drowned countless G~~JEM-~) enemies. 114 
As the foUowing story indicates, the long banks were also used to the advantage of 
the local resistance forces. One day a Beile ~ 1f.j] led a group of Qing soldiers past a 
place named Bace J\mrr. Wu let Sun Zhaokui and others use muskets to attack them. 
Because the bank was long and high, the Qing's cavalry did not have the agility to tum 
their heads; furthermore, they did not use firearms. FinaUy, this smaU group was 
defeated because the arrows they shot were absorbed by either boards or straw men. lls 
Wu Yi not only had direct control over numerous troops of his own, he was also 
able to cooperate with other local forces such as rebels and xiangbing. For instance, 
there were several thousand xiangbing in the border areas of Wujiang, Qingpu wmt 
and Jiashan g~. Among the groups who submitted to Wu's command was one led by 
Zhou Rui JWJfIfij, a man skilled in the use of firearms such as muskets and cannon. On 
March 23, 1646, Tu Guobao, the Qing Govemor of Suzhou, ordered General Wang 
Maogong 1.I.~J}j to pacify this rebellious local militia. Three days later, it is said that 
114 Xu Zi, juan 46, liezhuan 39, Yishi ~gi!i 1,463. 
liS Xie and Fan, 187. See also Wang Youdian 1.I:ff~, Qian Ming zhongyi biezhuan ïWaJHitt,~3U~,juan 
23, SKWSSJK 1,ji- 19,242-47. 
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about 2,000 Qing soldiers were killed by Zhou's army in the Fenhu ~J}Yi!Vj area. This 
victory forced the Qing to enforce martiallaw in Suzhou city. 1 16 
Wu Yi gradually came to control the entire east shore of Lake Tai and he organized 
his armies into formaI banners, cut seals, and even appointed his own regular officiaIs. 
His growing eminence was recognized by the Lu regime, and he was enfeoffed as Earl 
of Changxing ~~18. 
Wu Yi's successful military actions coincided with the resistance movements of 
other Jiangnan elite; in fact they usually joined together to launch attacks. Their 
activities meant that one of the Qing's most important transportation lines - from 
Nanjing to Hangzhou - was cut off. Govemor Tu Guobao soon realized the very real 
threat from Wu Yi and his army, a threat not only to the security of aIl Jiangnan, but 
also to other areas such as Zhejiang where they had contacts with Southem Ming armies. 
In early 1646, Tu decided to build his own marine force, stating that "the thing of 
greatest importance is to train 2,000 sailors." The pay ofthese sailors was set at 6 dou 
of rice per month and 0.02 tael of silver for non-staple food. 117 
The well-trained Qing armies and their guaranteed pay were in sharp contrast with 
many of the resistance forces. The failure oftheir joint attack on Suzhou was a 
watershed in the Jiangnan resistance movement. Following this, the anti-Qing forces 
were once again scattered. Wu Yi led his remaining follow~rs and fled into the 
marshland of Lake Tai to regroup. Later on, he had allied his own forces with another 
small army, and, together, they established at Changbai Pond the nucleus of a new 
loyalist confederation. On March 2, 1646, they emerged from the confines of the lake 
and took over Wujiang again, killed the magistrate and pillaged the district. 1 18 
Wu still wanted to do more. He planned to attack the city of Jiashan in order to 
break through the Qing cordon encircling Lake Tai. The city at this time was said to be 
116 This number is from Xie and Fan, 190. Undoubtedly it is exaggerated. One primary source indicated 
that the total casualties of the Qing army during this campaign were 215. See Ming Qing shiliao yibian, 
vol. 1, 15. This report to the Qing Emperor sent by Tu Guobao also verified that the Qing's casualties 
were mainly caused by firearms. See also Zhouzhuang zhenzhi JWJif.HJiit, in XXSKQS 717, Shibu dili lei 
~ ~BtlliJ.l!l&i, 121. 
117 Ming Qing shiliao yibian, voU, 15. 
118 Wakeman (1985), vol. 2, 726-27. 
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poorly defended. In the end, the magistrate of Jiashan ambushed Wu by luring him with 
the faise promise of a coordinated uprising. The Qing soldiers seized Wu easiIy and 
sent him to Hangzhou. On July 15, 1646, Wu was executed. 
After the death of Wu Yi, Xia Wanchun appraised him only as a secretary or 
government clerk - he was not qualified to be a general or marshal. 119 Xia seems to 
have expected too much of Wu Yi. Wu did have clear abilities in military affairs, and 
showed an organizational aptitude in drawing up concrete plans for systems of social 
control such as the baojia. In terms of the latter, he thought that the implementation of 
the system would help to realize the following goals: training xiangyong, prohibiting 
thieves, defending the city, ensuring taxes and corvée, and reducing the number of 
lawsuits. In this way, he believed that disorder could be interdicted and turbulence 
pacified. 120 
However, he never had a chance to carry out even the most preliminary plans before 
the arrivaI of the Manchus; and, during his time as Shi Kefa's staff officer, he never 
appeared on the battlefield. In Jiangnan, he focused on the integration of the various 
local rebel forces and militias, as weIl as the units that had been brought in from 
different areas. But he had no way to ensure the strict control of these mixed troops. In 
other word, he emphasized the numerical expansion of his forces while ignoring 
questions of quality and training. Within the city of Wu County, many people joined his 
uprising as "righteous soldiers" in the early stages, and the gentry households treated 
these people with wine and feasting. But none proved capable of effectively resisting 
the Qing army's attack later on. Most ofthem simply scattered in the face oftheir 
superior opponent. 121 
With help from Sun Zhaokui and others, his troops occasionally fought with success 
against the Qing army, but, in many cases, the opposite was true. A source from the 
gazetteer Zhouzhuang zhenzhi mJjff.~ indicates that since the Qing army faced 
challenges from the Southem Ming in eastem Zhejiang, many Jiangnan people could 
119 QDRWZG- A, vol. 2, 240. 
120 Li Yuqiu '* :gÎ't*, Luzhi chunqiu ~;<::~fj(, juan 12, ZGYSJCXB 25, 503. 
121 Zhouzhuang zhenzhi, in XXSKQS 717,121. 
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not decide what to do next. Wu Yi often sent his troops to attack the Qing army as they 
passed by. However, "all his armies are mobs; they can not be expected to be used". 
Standing on the top of a pagoda, Govemor Tu Guobao one day witnessed the se armies, 
and, laughing, commented how easy it would be to overcome these forces with his 
cavalry. On August 21, Tu sent his troops to attack and destroy the central camp of Wu 
Yi; more than 1,000 of Wu' s soldiers were killed and drowned. 122 
Wu fled, and, along with him, one of the most powerful local resistance troops. 
Generally, their activities were mainly along the northem shore of Tai Lake. Due south 
across this lake is the area of Zhejiang, an area which provides us with a chance to 
examine certain unprecedented phenomena. For instance, we can consider whether, 
how, and to what extent the remnant Ming forces from the sea and inland social forces 
affected each other. Moreover, the military action of Zhejiang literati also involved 
sorne very important factors like the role of lineage in military history as well as the 
relationship between Wen and Wu. These conditions make it possible to write a general 
survey about these two crucial issues in both social history and military history. 
3: 6. Summary 
Although the Jiangnan area basically was less militarized and politicized, military actions 
against the Qing still involved various social strata and local forces. In certain aspects 
Jiangnan officialliterati went even further than their peers in Jiangbei: they successfully 
shifted to a fight against the Qing invasion with local forces which they had originally 
mobilized for pacifying bandits and peasant rebellions. However, although they had been 
successful at integrating other social strata to fight for their economic and commercial 
benefits in times of relative peace, their organization of anti-Qing military action was not 
so effective. A few of them did show sorne ability in organizing the defense of cities, but 
the vast rural area was another story. Moreover, while a few ofthem had direct control of 
troops, and could even cooperate with local forces from other areas, most Jiangnan 
122 Ibid. 
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literati focused on the upper social strata and the existing armed forces, regardless of 
whether they were from the Ming government, local society, or even the Qing side. We 
noted that Jiangnan literati joined together with the former Ming armies to launch attacks, 
but the result of this cooperation was weakened by the actual influence of the literati 
themselves. Neither they nor the local forces could play a crucial role. Previous studies 
have called into question the integration of bureaucratie politics and local power, but, 
since they only paid attention to local elite and officiaIs, they left unanswered the 
question of how both controlled local military forces. Although sorne local forces wanted 
to combine with those of the upper social strata to give substance to their intention to 
save the Ming, they had no way to escape from dual predicaments: the conflicts with 
local authorities, and the shortage of capacities to control those rebellious peasants. The 
localliterati occupied an ambivalent position between the Ming state and society,-
there was no hope to reach the goal of integrating bureaucratie politics and local power. 
In one word, the burden of knitting together disparate groups was too heavy to bear for 
the Jiangnan literati. Furthermore, they had no way to take appropriate military measures, 
such as developing an effective system of logistics and supplies to maintain their force, 
let alone retain strict control of them. 
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Chapter 4 
Land and Sea: the Final Fate of the Literati's Military Action 
4: 1. Individual Uprisings and United Military Action 
The resistance in the Zhejiang area, lasting from 1645 to 1664, was the longe st in aIl of 
China. In the summer of 1645, this area suffered from extreme drought. With the faIl of 
the water level of the Qiantang River, Manchu troops were able to cross on horseback. 
Within four days, Prince Bolo led the Qing cavalry across the river, reaching Hangzhou 
in mid-July. Several Qing armies converged in the area on July 17, but the main target of 
their attack shifted to the border of Zhejiang and Jiangxi, from whence they intended to 
penetrate into Fujian. One year later, they successfully suppressed the loyalist movement 
in that province. 
During this time, uprisings against Qing armies spread quickly in the southeast of 
China.1 Two Southern Ming courts were established separately but aimost simultaneously 
in eastern Zhejiang and Fujian. The Prince of Lu, Zhu Yihai *P)1~ (1618-1654), had 
been assigned to reside in the Taizhou area of Zhejiang but was soon moved to Shaoxing, 
mainly by some Zhejiang officiaIs, where he assumed the titie of Regent (Jianguo !Mi:~). 
Meanwhile, the Prince of Tang 18.:E, Zhu Yujian *$. (1602-1645), announced his 
intention to become the next regent in Fujian on July 10, 1645. As will become clear, 
these two courts did not have authority to Iead or even join with the resistance.2 
The few Ming armies in Zhejiang could not be expected to pursue resistance. Since 
the 1620s, they had often been underpaid. According to a report sent to the Board ofWar 
1 In the Zhejiang area, the series ofwars along the Qiantang River were called "Hua Jiang zhiyi .YI~f~" 
in Chinese records. 
2 For detailed information about these two courts and the other political factors, see Struve (1984), 76-77; 
Gucheng, 266-67. 
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by Govemor Lu Wanxue ~~~~ in 1635, the military allocation for Zhejiang was short 
more than 424,000 taels ofsilver from 1621 till1630.3 Beginning in the early spring of 
1645, remnant Ming armies fled to Zhejiang from Southem Zhili and other places. They 
used any possible means-including plundering, apportioning (from the Southem Ming), 
or even cheating-to supply themselves. Their actions were a catastrophe for the people 
of Zhejiang.4 
One of the Southem Ming armies on the banks of the Qiantang was commanded by 
Fang Guo'an nm3ï:, a former Regional Commander from eastem Zhejiang. In the early 
summer of 1646, his force fell back in chaos to Shaoxing where it soon collapsed 
completely. Fang and aIl his subordinates surrendered to the Qing. Wang Zhiren .=E~ 1.-, 
from Baoding f*5E in Bei Zhili, was a Regional Commander garrisoned at Dinghai 5EmJ. 
In comparison to Fang's, Wang's army was quite weIl disciplined. However, they had 
never supported each other, and their defense ultimately failed. Wang and his family 
members drowned themselves. 5 Within a very short period, aIl the Ming regulars along 
the river were scattered and Shaoxing succumbed with little resistance. Regent Lu fled by 
sea to Zhoushan Island tti-Ù!. 
After the Qing army entered the Zhejiang area, one of the province's famous scholars, 
Liu Zongzhou IU*mJ (1578-1645, ajinshi of 1601 from Shanyin Ù!~), serving at the 
time as Left Censor-in-Chief(Zuo duyushi tï:1M5~Y:), wanted his students, such as Qi 
Biaojia, to organize a resistance movement to defend Hangzhou. According to Liu, the 
Zhejiang area could rely on certain geographic advantages for its defense. He felt that as 
long as the people's hearts were calm, the loyalists could train an army and mobilize 
soldiers to defend the city; after this army was prepared, the entire empire would benefit. 6 
3 Bi Ziyan $EiB, Duozhi zouyi tl:st*j!, Zhejiangsi #JT1I~,juan 1, in XXSKQS 488, Sibu- zhaoling 
zouyilei ~:g~~?H'J*gi!lm, 190-9l. 
4 Li Qing (B), juan 6, in NMSL BZ, 361. 
5 Shao Tingcai B~~*, Dongnan jishi ]i/:[m*e.JJ, juan 6, 222, in ZGYSJC 32. 
6 QDRWZG -A ,juan 2, 225. 
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Shortly after leaming that Hangzhou had fallen into the hands of the Qing, and that the 
main local officiaIs of Shaoxing had surrendered to the Qing, going so far as to welcome 
the Qing army's coming with gifts, he decided to go on a hunger strike. His last few 
words not only explain this decision, but also express his hope for the younger 
generations: 
Of course 1 have realized that to make plans would be better than to sacrifice my life. 
However, 1 think 1 am too old to bear the burden.7 
Liu's example did inspire Zhejiang literati to resist. Soon after, Zhang Guowei of 
Dongyang *~, another higher ranking Ming official, dedicated himselfto the anti-Qing 
movement. Zhang had eamed hisjinshi in 1622, after which he served in various places 
inc1uding Guangdong and Beijing. As a high ranking official (Govemor of Yingtian JJ!;:J(, 
Vice-Minister of the Board ofWorks I:g~:tl{~~~), he was not only proud ofhis 
administrative capacities and irrigation work (he edited a book entitled Sanwu Shuili 
quanshu .=.~7j(fU~~ in thirty volumes), but was also confident in his abilities to 
undertake the pacification of peasant rebellions. He had successfully supressed Li 
Qingshan's rebellion in the Shandong area. In 1642, he was promoted to Minister of the 
Board ofWar but was soon impeached and imprisoned because he had failed to stop the 
Manchu invasion. In the spring of 1644, he was released. Keeping his original title, he 
went to Jiangnan and Zhejiang to conscript troops for future use. However, due to the 
conflicts of political factions, he was not able to cooperate with Ma Shiying during the 
reign of Prince Fu in Nanjing and retumed to Dongyang later in the year. After the Qing 
army's entrance into the province, Regent Lu immediately appointed him Minister of the 
Board ofWar and Chief Grand Secretary (Bingbu shangshu dongge daxueshi ~:g~#Ù~ 
*OO*~±).8 At the earliest stage of the resistance in Zhejiang, he raised up an army in 
his hometown and deployed these soldiers at Changhetou :B~jEJgJ[ to defend the Qiantang. 
7 Quoted from Gu Cheng, 231-33. 
8 Xu Bingyi, juan 14,246-47. See also Li Yuqiu '$ $>1(, Luzhi chunqiu ~zwf.k, juan 3, 435, in 
ZGYSJC XB 25. 
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While we have a few brief mentions of this deployment, including descriptions of their 
building of fortifications along the river, there is no information on the number of 
soldiers that were mobilized, let alone their performance on the battlefield. When the 
Qing army occupied Yiwu ~,~, Zhang realized there was no hope to do more. 
Prostrating to the South, he said he had already done what he could, and drowned 
himself.9 
Chen Qianfu ~-*mx from Renhe 1-*0 county, another famousjuren (1636), also 
chose to commit suicide along with his family after losing aIl hope in the possibility of 
successful resistance. Chen's career was similar to Zhang Guowei's in many respects. 
While serving in Hunan, he had gained experience working with local military forces in 
the pacification of peasant rebellions. After hearing of the establishment of a new Ming 
regime in Nanjing, he insisted to the Hongguang Emperor that the Southern Ming forces 
should not abandon a single inch of territory in Shandong and Henan. Enumerating the 
hundreds of zhai in Henan, he assured the emperor that the haojia ~~ (magnates) could 
link their camps together and guide imperial troops through their region against the 
enemy to the north. He traveUed to Henan where he strove to knit together the many zhai 
of the Henanese magnates into a loyalist defense line. The zhai headmen and magnates 
acclaimed his endeavors. Unfortunately, as Wakeman points out, "his plan was smashed 
by the political faction of the Southern Ming, and he was even thrown injail ... The 
loyalty of the magnates was subsequently altogether 10St."1O After Prince Lu established 
his authority in eastern Zhejiang, Chen was appointed as Vice-Minister of the Court of 
the Imperial Stud (taipushi shaoqing :t:~~yg~P). Later on, aIlloyalist armies in 
western Zhejiang were under his surveillance. He conscripted 300 soldiers to serve as his 
own force and provided them with weapons and other supplies from his own funds. This 
smaU force joined more then twenty campaigns during the resistance. ll 
9 Xu Bingyi, juan 14, 246-47. 
10 Wakeman (1985), voU, 371; 525-26. 
Il Wang Youdian Œ1r$, Qian Ming zhongyi biezhuanWJajL~,titJjUf-t,juan 22, in SKWSSJK 1 ji- 19, 
241-42; also see Xu Bingyi, juan 14,248. 
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In addition to the stories of Zhang and Chen, the individual and group activities of 
four jinshi, Sun Jiaji i*iUt, Xiong Rulin ~~&~, Zhu Dadian **~, Qian Suyue i~ 
JI~, from the Zhejiang area provide us with a relatively complete picture of the 
resistance movement along the Qiantang River. However, primary records and secondary 
studies only mention their individual actions separately, and do not attempt any kind of 
synthesis. In the following section, 1 will begin with a brief review of their individual 
backgrounds before knitting together and analyzing their cooperative military actions. 
Sun Jiaji, from Yuyao county #;~É, was the first to become actively involved in the 
resistance movement. After being awarded the jinshi degree in 1637, he worked in both 
Beijing and Nanjing. While in Beijing, he had gained relevant experience as an official at 
the Board ofWar. In June, 1646, faced with the arrivaI of the Qing army, the Magistrate 
ofYuyao fled. The Instructor of the Confucian School (jiayu fj(~®) of the county offered 
the land and population registration lists to the Qing, and because of this, he was 
appointed as the new magistrate. Cooperating with the Qing, this new magistrate 
conscripted 300 people to build roads to facilitate the movement of the Qing army's 
logistical supplies. Sun agitated among these men, convincing them to join him in an 
uprising. He led this new army against the county city and killed the magistrate. His 
sudden attack helped to trigger a wide range of resistance in the Zhejiang area. 
Eventually, several thousand people joined his army.12 
Sun Jiaji was not alone in Yuyao County. Xiong Rulin, ajinshi of 1631, also played 
an important role in Zhejiang's resistance movement. When the Qing army entered the 
province, he had several hundred of soldiers in hand. He was not satisfied to merely 
pursue a policy of defense. Without seeking any assistance, he led this army across the 
river to garrison the Qiaosi 1ii§j area, from where he attempted to attack Haining $$ 
city. It is said that ten thousand people we1comed his army into this city, but no other 
righteous armies or famous literati answered his calls for local assistance. At this time, 
many gentry from Hangzhou had fled to this area, but none were willing to take on the 
responsibility of defending the city. They were touched by Xiong's plea for resistance, 
12 Xu Bingyi,juan 14,245-46; Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 196-99. 
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but were not ready to make any immediate decisions. FinaUy, ajinshi named Yu 
Yuanliang lfrIJG.Bt from Haining city promised to offer his services. Xiong Rulin used 
this city as the base for his planned resistance. He placed Yu in charge of logistics, while 
Jiang Guozhu .mtt:, a former Commander (zhihui Hîf.ij[), was made responsible for 
military affairs. Xiong also successfuUy increased his troops by annexing another local 
force led by Chen Wanliang ~-*f.it.B!. Chen owned a zhai in eastem Zhejiang, but he 
received Xiong's command without hesitation. 13 While Xiong's army, caUed xiongbing 
f4~~ during the early period of the Zhejiang resistance movement, was certainly small 
(the exact number of soldiers is unknown), the army was always deployed as the 
vanguard on the battlefield; and when it was defeated, it quickly reorganized, refusing to 
be frustrated. 14 
In Jinhua ~~, Zhu Dadian (jinshi of 1616) mobilized about 3,000 soldiers in the 
spring of 1644 after hearing of the faU of Beijing. His main motive appears to have been 
the redemption ofhis reputation for "extreme corruption and cruel action". 15 He served 
for many years in Shandong and Jiangbei as Govemor and Vice-Minister of the Board of 
War. He accumulated considerable military experience through his involvement in the 
pacification of Kong Youde's mutiny and various peasant rebellions. After Li Zicheng 
took Beijing, he met Liu Zongzhou and Xiong Rulin in Hangzhou to discuss how to 
"succor the King 1fJ.:f.." Zhu led his newly conscripted army to Nanjing, but, his 
Zhejiang background made him a victim of political factions. The officiaIs of the Board 
of Personnel refused to accept him, and his troops were not officiaUy listed. Finally, with 
the help of Ma Shiying, his army was listed as part of the Capital Troop (jingying J3=(if), 
and Zhu was given the position of Minister of the Board ofWar. He later retumed to his 
hometown where he organized an army, composed primarily of veterans, to defend 
13 Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92. 
14 Xu Zi, Xiaodianjizhuan INJYI!*èf,f, juan 40, liezhuan 33, 386; Aiso see kanben IJJ/.$:, liezhuan JUf,f, 
juan 22, in ZGYSJC 35, 405; Xu Bingyi, juan 14,252-54. 
15 Shao Tingcai,juan 5, 203-07. 
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Jinhua city. Among the various troops of the time, only his army was deemed as "useful" 
because of its training and experience in warfare. Most of the others were litt1e better than 
mobs. This army's first enemy was not the Qing, but Fang Guo'an's soldiers, currently 
garrisoned in the Yanzhou area D1H. Instead of focusing on preparations for the Qing 
invasion, Fang's troops became jea10us of Zhu's wea1th and his well trained forces. 
While fleeing to the sea from Hangzhou, Fang 1ed his troops in an attack on Jinhua. After 
plundering the suburbs, he asked the city to pay fort Y thousand taels of sil ver. Zhu 
refused Fang's demand, and led his troops in a successful attack, defeating Fang's forces. 
Despite his success, this event made Zhu Dadian rethink his plans; he began to pay 
exclusive attention to the defense ofthe city. Several months later, Fang surrendered to 
the Qing and joined them in once again besieging the city. Zhu killed their special envoy 
and refused surrender. During the three months of the siege, no subordinates betrayed 
him. On the last day oftheir defense, Zhu Dadian, along with the Regional Commander 
and Vice-Regional Commander decided to bum the three-hundred barrels of gunpowder 
still remaining in the city in order to prevent it from being used by the enemy. These 
three men lost their lives in the huge explosion, and no remains were found after the 
battle. 
Among allloyalists who sacrificed themselves for the Ming, their story is the most 
solemn and stirring. 16 
In Yin County I~W!*, Qian Suyue (jinshi of 1637 and former Vice-Director of the 
Board of Justice- xingbu yuanwailang 7fU:g~~j}~~) became a leader of aH the resistance 
forces (mengzhu M.:t). On June 10, Sun Jiaji sent one ofhis disciples named Lin Shidui 
.f.*j:f,fW to Yin County to mobilize the uprising. In the early stages, Lin and others 
recommended Xie Sanbin ~.:=.~, former Chief Minister of the Court of the Imperial 
Stud (taipusi qing :t:f~~g~P), as their leader in the resistance because of his previous 
experience as Army Supervisor (jianjun ~~). Xie firmly refused their request, asking, 
"Are you not afraid of death?" 
16 Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 203-07; Xu Bingyi, juan 14,249-50; Li Yuqiu,juan 3, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 440-41. 
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With no hope of gaining Xie's cooperation, they tumed to Qian two days later. Qian's 
affirmative answer put the city in the hands of a strong Ming loyalist. General Wang 
Zhiren, leader of an army garrisoned at Dinghai 5E~4ij, had already surrendered to the 
Qing, and kept his original position as Regional Commander. At nearly the same time, he 
received two opposite requests from Yin County: one from Xie Sanbin who asked 
Wang's army to suppress the uprising led by Qian, and another from Qian Suyue asking 
him to join the resistance movement. General Wang promised to cooperate with both of 
them. On June 15, Wang led his troops to the city. His decision was soon c1ear: he 
captured Xie and tumed to the side of the resistance. To ensure his survival, Xie 
promised to donate ten thousand taels ofsilver. Aside from general Wang's regular army, 
two battalions of soldiers from the Sea Defense Army ~4ij~jJili= ~ also joined the 
resistance camp. Together they created an alliance to defend the city of Ningpo (capital 
of Yin County). Three days later, they sent Zhang Huangyan 5:IH~ 1=1 (1620-1664,juren 
of 1642) as representative to Taizhou to welcome Regent Lu. 
The coming of general Wang's regular army did not bring comfort to aU the people of 
the Ningpo area. For one thing, the ordinary people ofthis area were accustomed to a 
peacefullife. They had not witnessed warfare since the pacification of pirates in the 
middle of the sixteenth century. For another, most of the so called righteous armies were 
either vagrants of the cities or ordinary peasants, both of them short of proper training 
and equipment. Qian Suyue and his righteous troops were unable to harmonize 
themselves with the regular army. Further complicating the situation, Qian was involved 
in complicated political struggles related to the authority of Regent Lu. Because of his 
sharp criticism of the eunuchs' surveillance, he could not hope to get the understanding 
or help of the Lu authorities. Within fort Y days, his troops were without supplies; he had 
to flee and later died of worry. 17 
Generally speaking, the abovejinshi began their uprisings separately, but in most 
cases they engaged in allied military action. The first alliance was between Sun Jiaji and 
17 Shao Tingcai, juan 6,222; Gu Cheng, 258-59; Wen Ruilin, liezhuan,juan 16, in ZGYSJC 35, 350-51; Xu 
Zi, juan 40, liezhuan 33, 389-90. 
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Xiong Rulin. After Sun Jiaji took the city ofYuyao and killed the new magistrate, more 
and more people from surrounding are as came to join his camp. He refused to act as the 
head of the alliance, instead, he recommended Xiong Rulin: 
A great affair needs a suitable general. Xiong Rulin has shown unremitting effort in 
pursuing great goals and he is familiar with military affairs, we should ask him to be 
our leader. 18 
Coincidentally, Xiong led his troops from Ningpo and the coalition quickly took 
shape. This united army was called the "Sun-Xiong Army i%~~#." According to the 
report of Xiong himself, the total number of soldiers was no more than one thousand. 19 
Its activities usually centered on Qiaosi ~I§] and its vicinity. In order to effective1y 
control the army, they divided the troops into two battalions, Right (Xiong) and Left 
(Sun). During aIl oftheir campaigns, Xiong pIayed the role ofvanguard while Sun 
followed him; however, Sun also took care of logistics, even using up his family wealth 
for the cause.20 
GraduaIly, the number oftheir troops increased, and the so-called "Six Families 
Army Î\~tij!" was formed. Among them, Xiong's army was the strongest, while Zhu 
Dadian's troops were proud oftheir firearms. In order to ensure the effective organization 
and use of these latter troops, a special battalion was organized called Huogongying 1<Jj( 
:g.?l These righteous troops as weIl as the Ming regulars led by Fang Guo'an and Wang 
Zhiren aIl had experience in battles with the Qing army. Because of the scattered nature 
18 However, in Xu Bingyi's description, Sun Jiaji was not familiar with military affairs; he let his army be 
controlled by both Wang Zhiren and Fang Guo'an. See Xu Bingyi, juan 14,245-46. Considering of the 
real condition of Wang and Fan, Xu's conclusion needs to be questioned, see Gu Cheng, 296. 
19 Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92. 
20 Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 196- 99. 
21 Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183- 92; see also juan 6, 225. 
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of the resources, current scholarship includes only very brief descriptions of the 
processes.22 
However, a careful examination of the limited sources allows us to trace the basic 
course ofthese resistance movements from the summer of 1646 until the next year, 
especially their united military actions. By looking at the campaigns which involved the 
above literati, we will be able to explore the characteristics of their military action. 
The scattered anti-Qing battles launched by various Zhejiang forces after the Qing 
army took Hangzhou ended in rapid defeat. In the middle of August, 1646, aIl the 
righteous troops were reassembled around the Haining ~i$ area. The Manchu cavalry 
now faced a united resistance because the righteous troops were deployed as a Hne: 
Xiong Rulin's army in the middle; Sun Jiaji on the east wing; and Qian Suyue leading his 
force on the west wing. During the course of their campaign, the explosion of several 
cannons in Sun Jiaji's camp caused massive confusion and the final failure of the 
righteous troops. Numerous soldiers were drowned or killed while others scrambled onto 
boats to escape. Arrows like rain hit the area surrounding Xiong Rulin; he tried to do his 
best to stop the soldiers fleeing, but he had no chance at aIl. As a scholar and civil official, 
what he demonstrated was not only courage, but also military capacity. One month later, 
his troops' performance in the suburbs of Hangzhou won the respect ofWang's regular 
army. Without any help from other righteous armies, Xiong led his army to Hangzhou to 
cooperate with Wang. In the early stages, the Qing army's cannons brought great 
casualties to the allied army. On September 12, it was Wang's army that was the first to 
flee, having run out of supplies. One week later, Xiong led his troops in a retreat across 
the Qiantang River. As they were crossing, about six hundred Qing cavalry troops 
suddenly launched an attack. Standing on a boat, Xiong personally shot arrows. More 
than ten Shengyuan among his troops lost their lives during this battle but the Qing army 
lost as many as one hundred cavalry troops. Considering that most members ofXiong's 
army were newly conscripted soldiers and ordinary peasants, the respect they received 
from the Ming regular armies cornes as no surprise.23 
22 For the general conditions of the resistance movement in the Zhejiang area, see Xu Hanzhi ~~Z, 
Zhedongjilue #Jf51~JèJII~·, in ZGYSJC 33, 320-30; Gu Cheng, 270-71; see also Struve (1984), 75-94. 
23 Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92. 
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After this campaign, the Qing army had to return to Hangzhou. Xiong asked Regent 
Lu to coordinate the righteous forces while urging GeneraIs Wang and Fang to take this 
opportunity to Iaunch an attack on the isolated Qing army. According to him, it wouid be 
better to send several thousand soldiers to attack Jiaxing to eut off the Qing grain 
transportation line rather than passively defending the Qiantang River. Xiong, Sun Jiaji, 
Huang Zongxi, and Qian Suyue all shared this opinion. 
On the Qing side, it seems that the united threat from these forces had little effect on 
their overall strategy for controlling Zhejiang. The Hangzhou garrisoned army sent sorne 
soldiers to pacify a rebellion led by several students (shusheng .~) in the Pinghu zp.#iIj 
area. Qian Suyue asked Regent Lu to send emergency assistance from the sea in order to 
enable cooperation between eastern and western Zhejiang. Unfortunately, his report was 
never sent to Regent Lu. We will see, like Prince Fu of Nanjing, Regent Lu was unable to 
take certain rneasures because of factors such as politicai factionalization, conflicts, and 
contradictions among the military forces?4 
For the literati of Zhejiang as well as those from other areas, raising an anti-Qing flag 
proved to be rnuch easier than enlarging or even rnaintaining the so-called righteous 
armies. Apart from donations, plundering, and the selling off of family wealth, no 
concrete records explain how problems of rnilitary supply were resolved. One source 
indicates that Zhang Guowei had a plan to redeem the contributions made by rich 
households (fujia ~*). He encouraged the wealthy families of Dongyang to provide 
financial support as well as clothes, weapons, and grain. To recompense their endeavors, 
he used Dongyang's natural resources and local production as deposits. His purpose was 
"to use local families to support the soldiers who did not flee, the wealthy get goods 
while the army that is raised gets its food suppIy." However, we do not know whether 
this measure was carried out or not, and there is no way to examine its effect.2S 
24 See Gu Cheng, 262-65 etc. See also Li Yuqiu ,juan 5, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 449; Xu Zi, juan 7, ji 7-
Jianguo Luwang l'ffi:~~.:E, 85-87. 
25 Shao Tingcai, juan 5,169-73. 
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Because of the shortage of supplies, Xiong Rulin had to give up his original plan to 
meet Wu Yi's troops coming from the Taihu area; instead he led his troops back to 
Yuyao. 
Contradictions between two courts became entangled with a deteriorating resistance. 
Faced with the Qing's attack, Zhu Dadian and Qian Suyue suggested cooperation with 
Luwu ~:rtt, emperor of Fujian, while Xiong Rulin as well as Zhang Guowei opposed this 
idea.26 
In May of 1646, both Sun Jiaji and Xiong Rulin realized that there was no hope to do 
more in the eastem Zhejiang area. They allowed their soldiers to be subordinated to 
Huang Zongxi and General Wang Zhengzhong IlE $ and then withdrew to Zhoushan 
Island.27 
Sun later died (because of grief and illness) at a Taoist temple while Xiong Rulin 
fled to Fujian along with Regent Lu. However, a warlord named Zheng Cai ~%, who 
was currently in control of the province, deemed Xiong Rulin to be an obstacle to his 
dictatorship and cruelly drowned Xiong as well as his youngest son in the sea.28 
4: 2. How Literati Maintained their Forces of Resistance 
The withdrawal of Xiong Rulin and others did not mean the end of resistance movements 
in the Zhejiang area. As a whole, eastem Zhejiang's resistance lasted until the summer of 
1651 when Wang Yi I~ (1616-1651), leader ofthe righteous army, was captured and 
executed on Siming Mountain [g13)jLlJ. 
Following the pacification of the pirates in the mid-sixteenth century, eastem 
Zhejiang had enjoyed several decades ofpeace. Most of the garrisons had shifted their 
function from defending to grain transportation. In the early Ming, Shaoxing Prefecture 
26 For concrete reasons, see Xu Zi, juan 40, liezhuan 33, 387-90; Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183-92. 
27XuZi,juan 7,ji 7,85-87. 
28 Shao Tingcai, juan 5, 183- 92; Xu Bingyi, juan 14,252-54. 
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had three Wei and five SUD, totaling 22,400 soldiers. However, their numbers decreased 
gradually.29 
With the sudden eruption of peasant rebellions in northem China, the Chongzhen 
Emperor ordered the organization of local military forces such as tuanlian and xiangbing 
across the empire in 1636. Zhejiang province generally complied with the edict. Because 
of the province's rich resources and developed economy, local govemments usually 
provided better treatment for the local forces than was common in northem China. For 
instance, in Jiaxing County, each xiangbing received a salary of 3,000 wen a year, and the 
govemment provided clothes and weapons. They practiced every month.30 
Another important characteristic of Zhejiang's resistance movement is the broad 
range of social forces that participated. In eastem Zhejiang, several Magistrates 9(D~* 
took part in the resistance almost simultaneously: 
Wang Yuzao ~3S:~ in Cixi County ~~; Zhu Maohua *~~ in Dinghai County; 
Gu Zhijun !Ii;L,13t in Fenghua County ~1t; Yuan Zhouzuo R1\1\11~ in Yin County; Jiang 
Xin JI:f:JT in Xiangshan County ~Ù-J. On behalf of the local govemment, these officiaIs 
not only provided help on matters of provision, but also conscripted soldiers.31 
One ofthem, Wang Yuzao (jinshi of 1643), went even further. He set an example in 
administrative affairs for aU Zhejiang local officiaIs before the Qing's invasion. After the 
Qing army took Hangzhou, he organized a righteous army and led it on the battlefield. 
According to him, 
What the Ming relies on to defend itself is only the Qiantang River, we had better 
attack the Northem army before they cross the river rather than defend against them 
after, although l am short of capacity, l still want to be the vanguard. 
29 Qianlong Shaoxingfuzhi~~*'B:ftJ&~ l,juan 21, Wubei zhi :l1t'Ûi~- Bingzhi ~~U, in ZGDFZJC (Z) 
39,527-30. 
30 Jiaxing xianzhi .~W'*~, juan 15, Bingfang ~~jj, in Zhejiangfu zhouxian zhi #JfŒJ&1'1'1~*~, 
GGZBCK (Z) ce 4, 300. 
31 Gu Cheng, 260. 
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He gave up the position of Magistrate, and began to lead the army as part of his duties 
as ChiefSupervising Secretary of the Board ofWar (bingke dujishi ~f411fl3*§-$). 
However, his actions provoked the jealousy of other righteous armies; furthermore, his 
criticism of the "timid" and "arrogant" performance of the regular army also made those 
military officiaIs hate him. When he realized that he would not have any chance to 
demonstrate his ability in military affairs, he asked to be relieved ofhis duties. Finally, he 
died at his hometown, Yangzhou. 32 
The famous scholar Huang Zongxi provides a more substantial opportunity to explore 
the literati's military behavior in Zhejiang province. Huang was from Yuyao County. As 
a well known scholar, his publications are too long to list here, but basically, unlike 
Wang Yangming who emphasized the idea that "knowledge and conduct are identical" 5çD 
f:rir-, he paid attention to the existing material world, substance (wu ~). The essence 
of his philosophy was an emphasis on practice and experimentation. Based on this, he 
argued that a man must try to do something useful for the state by active participation 
rather than avoid dut y by withdrawing from society or wasting time in contemplation. His 
military works such as Liushu W~, Weisuo l$Ï?JT, and Daifanglu Bingzhi 1~~JJ~ ~ftu 
also covered a wide range of fields. He was particularly critical of one aspect of the Ming 
military system: namely, the fact that professional military officiaIs and civil officiaIs 
blamed and looked down on each other. However, his main point was not to elevate the 
position of professional military officiaIs; rather, he wanted civil officiaIs to have greater 
power, because it was they who possessed virtue, and they who would be able to really 
carry out the emperor's policies.33 
Huang began to take part in military action with the faU of Hangzhou. He used 
kinship relationships in his hometown, Huangzhupu ~t'J1m, to mobilize several hundred 
soldiers caUed Shizhongying tlt,~~. His original intention was to participate in anti-
Qing military affairs as an ordinary military planner or advisor to provide sorne 
32 Xie and Fan, 74-77. 
33 Huang Zongxi, Ming yi daifang lu aA5'&t~IDJ~, Bingzhi ~mù 2, 3; in Huang Zongxi quanji Ji*tit~~ 
, ce 1 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, 1985). 
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suggestions. However, this request was refused because his reputation made it apparent 
that he deserved more. Finally, he had to accept the position of Director of the 
Department of Operation of the Board ofWarAg~IlitÎJ'±'$.34 In this position, he 
successfully resolved a conflict between civil and military officiaIs. 
In the spring of 1646, a Ming Regional Commander named Chen WU ~JIH1~ tled with 
his scattered soldiers to Yuhang ~ifJt from Zhapu 1=rm. Since they plundered 
everywhere they passed, Chen was killed by the Magistrate of Y uhang, Wang 
Zhengzhong .:EIEr:p (jinshi of 1640)?5 This case became more complicated and 
sensitive because Wang was the second son of Wang Zhiren. Probably for this reason, 
Huang carefully established close relations with him. Huang's endeavors were soon 
rewarded: among the righteous armies in the Zhejiang area, only Huang's could expect to 
receive military pay from the court of Lu, controlled by the regulars under General Wang. 
After Chen was killed, the military leaders under Regent Lu asked to punish Wang in 
order to pacify the rest of Chen's soldiers. It was Huang who strongly disagreed with 
them, saying: 
General Chen is a thief because he took the chance of disorder to do selfish things 
and deserves to be hated by the people. Zhengzhong defended the territory, protected 
people for the country, what sort of guilt has he? 
Finally, Wang was deemed not guilty by the court.36 
Joined by Sun Jiaji and the other literati, Huang strongly suggested to General Wang 
Zhiren that he send the army to western Zhejiang. Apart from this shared opinion, he also 
suggested that Chongming Island be used for the future counterattack. But none of these 
34 Xie and Fan, 883. 
35 He died in poverty as hermit later. See Xie and Fan, 70-73. 
36 Xie and Fan, 880- 08; It seems that the latest research by Chinese scholars purposely ignores the close 
relation between Huang and Wang in order to emphasize Huang's role. See Cao Guoqing ff~llI, 
Kuangshi da ru- Huang Zongxi l!~H!t*{~~*. (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin, 2000), 28. 
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suggestions was accepted. Later, both Sun Jiaji and Wang Zhengzhong's troops were 
merged with his own Shizhongying, for a total of 3,000 soldiers. AU ofthem took part in 
the campaigns along the Qiantang River during the summer of 1646. 
As mentioned before, Xiong Rulin's withdrawal in 1646 was a fiasco for the anti-
Qing alliance. Since autumn ofthat year, Huang Zongxi and the others had decided to 
enter into the deep hills around Siming Mountàin. 
This area is on the border of the counties of Yin, Yuyao, Shangyu I-Ji:, and Fenghua. 
!ts perimeter is about 800 li and the center is called Dalan shan ::kI'ifLU. Depending upon 
its narrow passes and various geographic advantages, Huang Zongxi intended to establish 
forts here. About 500 soldiers followed him to the mountains and finally garrisoned at the 
Zhangxi Temple *3tfJJ~. Huang decided to go out secretly to get in touch with Regent 
Lu. Before leaving, he warned his two subordinates to be familiar with and establish 
close relationships with the local people. However, things soon got out of control: these 
soldiers had no supplies but what they got from plundering. Several thousand mountain 
people LU~ united to launch an attack against these righteous soldiers. In the middle of 
the night, the temple they had garrisoned as well as camps and forts were destroyed by 
fire. 3? 
Huang's troops were not the only ones occupying this mountainous region. Another 
force led by Li Changxiang *~~ (jinshi of 1643 from Dazhou ~1H of Sichuan 
Province) also established a base here. Li had worked as the Investigating Censor during 
the Hongguang reign. Regent Lu later ordered him to supervise an army. After Regent Lu 
fled to Zhoushan, he led his remaining troops to establish forts at Dongshan *LU in 
Shangyu County (Zhang Huangyan's activities were in the Pinggang ZfS.1UfJ area). 
At that time forts were everywhere in eastern Zhejiang, they also collected funds 
everywhere, thus causing the local residents to suffer. Only the three battalions of 
Changxiang, Zhang Huangyan, and Wang Yi who garrisoned here cultivated the 
farmland, and did not bother the locals.38 
37 Huang Zongxi, Siming shanzhai ji I2B~JlJ**è, Xing chao lu- 71Tlj!)j~Z -1::;, in ZGYSJC 32, 250. 
38 Xu Zi, juan 47, liezhuan 40 9Uftl2B+, yishi 2 ~gijj=, 485. 
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Under Li's control, sorne farmland was tilled by his soldiers. As for the land tilled by 
local peasants, they only levied a small tax. Rich households were ensured fair treatment, 
having only to provide suitable labor and levies. Altogether they managed about 280 hills, 
over several months, it was said that these righteous troops let the mountain people enjoy 
their peacefullives, and none of the former petty officiaIs and runners ~Jë dared to go to 
the countryside to engage in corruption. Later on, the righteous forces in Siming 
Mountain even had their own currency called Daming tongbao qian *B)jill[W~.39 
Apart from Li Changxiang, another important figure at Siming Mountain was Wang 
Yi .±.~. In fact, most of the achievements mentioned above were created by both Li and 
Wang's troops. In 1649, Regent Lu's court gradually realized the importance of building 
an alliance between the various zhai of eastem Zhejiang. Comparing Wang with the other 
leaders of local zhai, Huang Zongxi acclaimed his power, abilities, and loyalty to the 
Ming, and suggested that he be given a higher rank ofnobility (lif~;t:t:J}).40 
Wang Yi also had close relations with the famous resistance leader and Fu She 
activist Feng Jingdi i,*:m. In the spring of 1648, Feng led his troops to merge with 
Wang's force. Although the Qing's attack had set them back for a short period, they 
worked together with the other righteous forces to rebuild their movement and reasserted 
control in virtually aIl of rural Siming and adjacent areas. However, as Struve has 
indicated, there was no further operational relation "worked out between the Lu court and 
the various stockade defenders in the hills, moreover, the capacities of the latter were 
limited by the leadership style of Feng Jingdi, who was personally concemed about 
statecraft (as were many in 'righteous' circles) and tried to treat his soldiers according to 
forms and systems appropriate to peaceful times, he behaved in a superior manner, and it 
39 Xie Guozhen 1957a, 115-16; also see Wen Ruilin-liezhuan JU{l!J, juan 21, in ZGYSJC 35, 399; Xu 
Bingyi ,juan 16,341-42; Huang Zongxi, Lujinian ~*,è1f (A), in ZGYSJC 32, 243. 
40 Wang finally did not get the position he deserved at Regent Lu's court because ofZhang Mingzhen who 
actually controlled Zhoushan Island. For their relations, see Xie and Fan, 880-88; also see Siming shanzhai 
Ji. 
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was not easy for his men to become close with him. This was a frequent cause of 
failure.,,41 
What 1 want to argue here is that in the case of Wang Yi, the main "cause offailure" 
was neither isolation nor leadership style as Struve suggests. Rather, the failure was due 
to local military forces, tuanlian, which belonged to the mountain people. We will see, 
these kind of local forces were advocated and sometimes directly conscripted by the Qing 
authorities. 
At least as early as the spring of 1648, He Zhaolong {pJ~~§~ raised a rebellion in the 
mountainous area of Y ongjia County 7.k~~'*' to challenge the current social arder. The 
rebels wrapped their heads in white cloth as symbols of their right to plunder villages and 
find food supplies at every household they passed by. Their total numbers reached 
100,000 and they spread everywhere among the hills and valleys. The Qing army 
conquered the county but did not have enough force to suppress them completely. 
However, the rebels' attacks were often stopped by xiangbing of the local communities 
since their zhai always cooperated and supported each other. One year later, this 
rebellious force established relations with Regent Lu's court and guided a large numbers 
ofwarships from the sea to the interior of the county. The northem part of the county (on 
the north side of the Qiantang River) was looted everywhere. This time, however, the 
local xiangbing's defenses coincided with the Qing army's attackjust across the river. 
This united counterattack forced the "sea pirates" #iJ(S. to flee. 42 
At the first stage of the pacification ofWang's righteous army, it was the tuanlian 
which had attacked as a vanguard for the Qing army. The Govemor of Zhejiang 
obviously realized the importance of this sort of force. He "ordered the village people to 
organize the tuanlian in order ta defend themselves". Wang Yi had to withdraw to the 
Tiantai area. There is no record indicating that the xiangbing forces of Siming were 
aware of concepts such as "righteous army," "national identity," or ethnie conflict. They 
41 Struve (1984), 114. 
42 Guangxu Yongjiafuzhi :7\:;~7J<KJff~, juan 8, Wubei ltt'Ûlft- Bingshi ~$, in XXSKQS 708, Shibu dili 
lei ~~~tllirJ[~, 198. 
222 
seem to have been purely interested in self-defense. After this failure, Wang Yi decided 
to concentrate on the challenges from these forces. 
According to his observation, "although the Northem soldiers are powerful, without 
the tuanlian's role as guides, it is not easy for them to expect to attack us beeause of the 
ruggedness of the mountains." Gradually, he reorganized his remaining troops (about 400 
soldiers), and defeated the villages' tuanlian. Within a month, he enlarged his army to 
more than ten thousand soldiers by absorbing the peoples who were thus subjugated. But 
most ofthese new recruits were raseals and people with no fixed profession.43 
As Wang indicated, without the tuanlian's cooperation, the Qing army was forced to 
withdraw from the mountains. In the spring of 1649, Wang Yi's force reaehed its apex. 
He took charge ofmilitary affairs by dividing aIl the troops into five battalions (wuying 
li !fit); meanwhile, administrative affairs were managed by five departments (wusi li 
p).44 
His successful measures meant that the Qing army could not launch an attack 
immediately against Regent Lu's court on Zhoushan Island. According to Lu zhi chunqiu, 
entering 1650, the Qing army "considered only Wang Yi's troop as the real threat." After 
Wang refused to surrender, the Qing armies launched a concerted attack on the Siming 
Mountain as weIl as other places along the Qiantang River in the fall. Led by General 
Tian Xiong EEI$l, the Qing armies finally encircled Wang's troops in the Dalan area *~. 
They continued to use tuanlian as guides, and aIl the peoples from the various zhai either 
surrendered or fled. After consecutive days offighting, Wang could no longer maintain 
his defenses.45 
After the defeat, Wang fled to the sea with only a few guardsmen. In July 1651, the 
Ming loyalists lost their final base in eastem China, Zhoushan Island. Wang Yi attempted 
to reenter the Siming Mountains, but aIl his subordinates had already either died or fled. 
43 AlI the above references are from Xu Bingyi, juan 16, 341-42. 
44 Li Yuqiu,juan 18, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 535. 
45 Li Yuqiu,juan 18, in ZGYSJCXB 25,535-36. 
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It was the tuanlian who finally captured him at Beixi ~t~. He was executed one month 
later.46 
The case of Wang Yi and the performance of local tuanlian showed that the eastem 
Zhejiang literati represented by Huang Zongxi had failed to realize their hope of 
mobilizing the various social forces to pursue the resistance. Since all these forces were 
either defeated or unavailable, and the former Ming regular army led by Fang Guo'an and 
others would not accept their command, the only type of forces available was the 
righteous armies. 
Huang provides the most detailed and vivid firsthand description ofthese forces. 47 
Based on his writings, the righteous troops have been described as thieves (zei ~m). He 
writes: 
All the local military forces ofthat time were composed of ruffians' sons and 
brothers of the local people. When they heard the righteous flag (~Dft) had been 
raised, they called on each other and congregated together in order to get wealth and 
dignity. Under the pretense of getting military pay, they go to every rich household 
of the countryside as weIl as the city to drink and eat without scruples. 
He goes on to de scribe the actions of the righteous armies in the Siming Mountains: 
... all are thieves who stole donkeys and cows; [they] only brought harm to the 
people. Fathers killed people for revenge while sons pursued plundering. 
46 Xu Zi, juan 47, liezhuan 40, yishi 2 ~gffi=, 489. 
47 Chinese scholars' recent studies indicate that Huang's own opinions are full ofpolitical and private 
prejudices, even rumors. See Xu Dingbao ~JË., Huang Zongxi pingzhuan jf*awp{.l;IJ (Nanjing: 
Nanjing daxue, 2002),82. Aiso see Gu Cheng, 164-68. However, it seems that there was no need for 
Huang to do the same regarding local military forces- political and private prejudices were only used to 
express his frustration (toward the other political factions). 
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ln addition to the righteous anny on the land, called lukou ~.mJfI, there were also sea-
based forces called shuikou 71<JfI. Like the former, these were also undisciplined and 
impossible to control effectively. As Huang puts it, 
ln the daytime they kill people in the market place, and hang the intestines over 
the gate of the government offices.48 
After Huang Zongxi lost aIl his soldiers, he also left for Zhoushan Island. Here he 
could do nothing but give lectures on ships to his very few followers or study European 
calendars mE~!J~r*.49 
Can we expect Zhejiang's loyalist literati to do more? 
4: 3. The Role of Lineages in Military Action 
From at least the mid-Ming, sorne Zhejiang people, especially those from Yiwu and 
Dongyang counties, were considered fierce and warlike. This impression can be traced 
back to mountain people's warlike behavior in the ISSOs. Apart from this, the role of the 
lineage in military action has also drawn special attention. As we mentioned above, 
Huang Zongxi began his practical military career by organizing his Shizhongying, 
comprised primarily of people connected to him by kinship and from his hometown, 
Huangzhupu. What 1 want to argue in this chapter is that the military behaviour ofthese 
people from Zhejiang, as weIl as the concrete role of the lineage, was common to the 
whole Yangzi delta. However, their importance cannot be overstated. 
These characteristics arose in a context in which the official annies 'ê. in Zhejiang 
were in a state of decline or even collapse. As Minister of the Board ofWar, Tan Lun ~ 
~ (1520-1577) realized that these armies were not only unable to kill thieves, but could 
48 Huang Zongxi quanji, quoted from Zhao Yuan iM~, Ming Qing zhiji shidafu yanjiu l3J.jmZ~±*7çiiJf 
~ (Beijing: Beijing daxue), 1999,60-64. 
49 Xie and Fan, 880-88. 
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hardI y even defend themselves. He thought that the reason for this was the shortage of 
soldiers. However, the composers of Shaaxingfuzhi argued against his opinion by 
pointing to the rampant corruption of the existing forces: 
... for instance, within the Wei and Suo of the coastai cities ofNingbo, Shaoxing, 
Wenzhou and Taizhou, there are no civil residents [aU are soldiers]. Houses are 
closely built like scaIes; do they not belong to Wei and Sua? For those who are 
from the rich families they usuaUy become officiaIs or runners by paying money. 
The second choice is going out to be a merchant by bribing officiaIs; the other 
choice is to engage in handicrafts.50 
Facing the threat of attack from Japanese pirates, the Zhejiang government had no 
effective army at hand. Therefore, the highest officiaIs such as Govemors had to ask for 
help from other provinces. According to these officiaIs, the fiercest men were the Tubing 
±~ or Langbing 5~~ from remote or border areas like Guangdong and Guangxi, and 
especially the Qiangbing n~ from the Songpan tl~1 area, on the border of Sichuan and 
Tibet. 
In June of 1555, the Regional Inspector of Zhili made another request for those 
soldiers mentioned above to come to Zhejiang. He finally received permission but with 
sorne conditions. The Jiajing Emperor ~m (1507-1566, reigned 1521-1566) realized that 
the local officiaIs of Jiangnan used these sorts of excuses to avoid disturbing their 
peacefullives. 
The Emperor said: 'Now many sorts of soldiers like Tubing and Langbing are sent to 
Jiangnan. (But) Commissioners-in-chief as weU as Govemors take the attitude of 
hesitation. Those enemies can not be put down means these soldiers are actuaUy 
raised as disaster [become the burden of the local communities]. This is why new 
thieves follow. Combined they become even more powerful. [You] require the 
50 QianlongShaoxingjuzhii.'ftJfff.fPdJ!!Jffit. l,juan 21, Wubeizhi- Bingzhi tttfFmit, J't~U, in ZGDFZJC 
(Z) 39, 527-30. 
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sending of more armies again; the real reason is to postpone [suppression]; do you 
really have a loyal mind to pacify the thieves? For the moment 1 agree with what you 
plan to do; however, ifyou still waste time and have no merit ... there will be no 
pardon for your guilt.51 
The Emperor was not the only one to be aware ofthese problems; in fact, it was 
common knowledge among other high ranking officiaIs in the empire that the soldiers of 
Zhejiang and Jiangnan were virtually useless. By May of 1556, Shen Liangcai 1X.Ft:t, 
the Right Vice- Minister of the Board of the War and Right Censor-in-Chief of the 
Censorate (bingbu yousilangjian duchayuan youqian du yushi ~g~:tî1~É!~~1'm~~JDb 
~1'm~9:), was ordered to go to Zhejiang to pacify Japanese pirates. Before leaving for 
. the province, he asked to transfer 9,000 soldiers from north China: 
Three thousand from Henan, including one thousand militia; three thousand from 
Shaanxi ~gg; three thousand militia from Xuzhou as weIl as Pizhou 1~1H, ifthis is 
not enough, the rest of them should be conscripted from the Shandong area. 52 
Sorne records from Yongjia xianzhi also certify that the official army was useless. 
What this county relied on for defense was a combination of conscripted militias from the 
county and other people from Yiwu ~J~ and Wuyi ff;\;~ counties. As for pay, they 
levied a special tax to meet the needs. However, the commanders had only limited 
knowledge about military affairs. This condition had remained basically unchanged from 
the mid-sixteenth century until the arrivaI of the Manchus. Most importantly, according 
to the editor ofthis gazetteer, this was a common phenomenon in the entire south-east 
coastal area. 53 On June 28 of 1644, Xiong Rulin witnessed the Zhejiang armies' extreme 
51 MSLLZ - ZJSHJ, 1117. 
52 ibid., 780. 
53 Yongjia xianzhi 7:kJU~iit, quoted from Gu Yanwu, Tianxiajunguo libingshu ::RrW~flJwglf, ce 22, 
Zhejiang (B), in XXSKQS 597, Shibu dililei ~{f~:f:llif!~, 99. 
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disorder and bad discipline on his way from Danyang ft~ to Nanjing. At this time the 
Qing army had already taken aH the Jiangbei area and was preparing to launch an attack 
across the Yangzi River. AlI the Zhejiang armies were fleeing back to the province. He 
writes: 
1 saw their real condition of extreme nervousness, so 1 may imagine the degree of 
the Zhejiang armies' fright and 1 am sure that they have no strong suit at aU.54 
In addition to the very scattered official Ming armies in Zhejiang, the performance of 
the local military forces also needs to be reexamined. For this purpose, Yiwu County is a 
typical case from which to begin the discussion. Almost all previous records consider that 
the so-called warlike characteristics of the people of Yiwu (induding other areas in the 
vicinity such as Dongyang and Yongkang) came from "nature" (tianxing ]1('1:1). Based 
on this characterization, they go on to de scribe the great bravery of the soldiers. 55 
However, "nature" is a very abstract basis on which to found any description. It is 
necessary to undertake an examination of the more concrete factors that contributed to 
this description. One reasonable explanation can be found in the military capabilities that 
the forces of various locallineages demonstrated in their conflicts with each other. In 
conflicts between these lineages, people from the mountainous area of Yiwu did often 
reveal their courage and bravery on the battlefield. 
At the end of the 1550s, sorne merchants from Yongkang County had begun 
exploiting a mine in the area of Yiwu. This triggered broad scale fighting with the local 
people, represented particularly by the two major sumames of Chen ~* and Song *. It is 
said that a total of several thousand people were involved, and that all of them were brave 
fighters. 56 But, the real scope ofthis conflict needs to be reconsidered; most importantly, 
54 Xiong Rulin, Bushujianwen su :riim13i1.Mi61t. in ZGYSJC 30, 279-80. 
55 It is too long to list the relevant quotations about this appellation. One of the earlier versions is from Yiwu 
xianzhi - Minbingshu ~,~~*~'~~:fl See Gu Yanwu, Tianxiajunguo libingshu, ce 22, Zhejiang (8), 
in XXSKQS 597, 85-88. 
56 For a detailed description about this conflict, see Yiwu xianzhi - Kuangfang shu il~~,*~-lfi~jjil, in 
XXSKQS 597, Shibu dili lei, 84-85. 
228 
it is necessary to discover what role these lineages actually played. It is difficult to come 
to any authoritative conclusion because various gazetteer materials differ in their 
descriptions of the forces that were involved in this conflict. For example, Shaoxingfuzhi 
indicates that it was xiangbing (not the lineage organization of Chen and Song) of Yiwu 
County who defeated the "mine thieves" (kuangzei lilM). Furthermore, this source also 
mentions the results of the conflict: only severalleaders of the thieves were killed. The 
xiangbing ofYiwu were proud oftheir skills with the spear (changqiang-If<:ïfffJ). As for 
technology, they had only sorne private teaching, and a cursory knowledge ofmilitary 
tactics. 57 Yiwu xianzhi, quoted by Gu Yanwu, not only indicates that the county began to 
gain fame for its "pacification of the mine thieves" (~U~~lilM), but also provides a 
description of the social background of the county. According to this work, the people 
had long enjoyed a peacefullife, 
Most of them indulged themselves in entertainment. Hearing war drums, they were 
afraid; seeing war flags and banners, they were scared ... [Since] they lived in an 
isolated mountainous are a, they were obedient to the teaching of the rites and were 
not familiar with military affairs.58 
Without Qi Jiguang, this county would not have had the fame it had since the 1560s. 
Despite the peaceful atmosphere, sorne mountain people of Yiwu continued to 
demonstrate their warlike spirit. Looking to bolster defenses against the Japanese pirates, 
Qi Jiguang's attention was drawn to these warriors. However, it should be mentioned that 
most ordinary Yiwu people and local officiaIs were not proud oftheir hometown's 
militaristic reputation. Because the different levels of officers from the Ming central 
government as weIl as other provinces came here for conscription, there were no more 
strong men to perform agricultural work: "among ten houses, ni ne are empty" (+~fL 
~). Furthermore, local social customs were changed because ofthese conditions: 
57 QianlongShaoxingfuzhi 1 ~~ ~Jlî.JfJ;G,juan 21, Wubeizhi - Bingzhi lftfrm;G, ~fM, in ZGDFZJC (Z) 
39,527-30. 
58 Yiwu xianzhi ~}~~*;G, in Gu Yanwu, ce 22, Zhejiang (B), XXSKQS 597, 85-88. 
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Bad young people were not accustomed to cultivating anymore; instead, they became 
soldiers. [What they are doing is] eating delicious food and wearing good quality 
clothes in order to be recruited. The Yiwu people suffer greatly from them.59 
In October, 1559, Qi Jiguang personally conscripted three thousand soldiers in the 
county. Between 1561 and 1567, he led this troop against the Japanese pirates on the 
southeast coast. Qi's achievement was based on his successful creation of a model which 
incorporated many aspects of military affairs. Applying this model, he was able to expel 
the Japanese pirates. However, this model was clearly adapted to a special historical 
environment. For example, he gained the strong support of each level of government 
officiaIs, from central government and provincial government officiaIs such as Tan Lun 
as weIl as the Magistrate (~O~'*) Zhao Dahe m*1"BJ. The good pay, quick promotion, and 
extremely rigorous training were important in creating his troops' unique qualities.60 
AH these factors differ sharply from what Xu Du did, as was mentioned in Chapter 
Three. Based on his thorough examination ofQi's career in Yiwu, Thomas G. Nimick 
suggests that "the way in which that army was recruited and the impact of that 
recruitment on the local area exemplify the extent to which developments in local society 
could shape regional and national events, and the extent to which the actions of centrally 
appointed officiaIs could affect local society in the Ming period.,,61 
If we focus only on what Qi Jiguang did in this county while ignoring the general 
condition of the whole Jiangnan area and the rest of the empire, Nimick's conclusion 
59 Qianlong Shaoxingfuzhi 1, vol. 21, Wubeizhi- Bingzhi, in ZGDFZJC (Z) 39, 527-30. 
60 Relevant studies about Qi Jiguang and his army are too numerous to list here. The concise description 
and analysis is from R. Huang. See R. Huang (1981b), 156-88. However, probably because Huang realized 
the complexity of the social society of Zhejiang, he provided little information about where Qi's 
conscripted army came from. The other relevant studies that should be mentioned here are as follows: 
Yan Chongnian ~*if: ed., Qi Jiguang yanjiu lunji ~*Iii*1îtF~~ifIi~ (Beijing: Zhishi, 1990); James 
Millinger, "Ch'i Chi-kuang - A Ming Military Official as Viewed by his Contemporary Civil Officiais," 
Oriens Extremus, 20 (1973), 103-17; Thomas G. Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-kuang and I-wu County," Ming Studies 
34 (1995),17-29. 
61 Thomas G. Nimick, "Ch'i Chi-kuang and I-wu County," Ming Studies 34 (1995), 17-29. 
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makes sense. However, he undoubtedly exaggerates the universality ofthis special case. 
Among his peers, Qi was "a lonely general"; most of the effective methods he created 
were not suitable for other generals. The subsequent Chine se military history will show 
us that Qi often existed as model. An increasing number of people tried to follow him in 
sorne way, especially in the area ofmilitary training; but the results suggest a lack of 
effectiveness. The only thing we know is that China's military declined throughout 
modem history. 62 
Other factors emphasized in his paper also indicate that Nimick's conclusions can not 
be applied universally. For instance, he suggests that a common dialect probably made 
the troops more aware of their common origin and contributed to their cohesion as a 
fighting force. In addition, the fact that both the veterans and new recruits were from 
Yiwu meant that the integration of recruits was facilitated by previous personal or clan 
contacts with the veterans.63 
Dialect and social customs indeed played a certain role in Chinese military history, 
and we have other cases that can exemplify this tendency in modem Chinese history. 
Nevertheless, overstating this factor would lead us to ignore other more important aspects 
such as social relationships and cultural identity. At the end of December, 1643, Jiang 
Ruolai ~:t=*, the Brigade Commander of Hangzhou (Hangzheng youji mjft!Z~.) and 
former Regional Commander of Anqing (Anqing zongbing ~!f*~~), was ordered to 
lead his army to pacify Xu Du's uprising. Considering that most ofhis subordinates were 
also from Dongyang, he asked: 
You and those thieves are fellow-villagers; today you will find that they are either 
your relatives or neighbors, can you fight with them? They answered: 'We can! ' 
[Based on this situation] they marched on. When those thieves found there were 
62 Sorne Chine se rnilitary historians have already indicated that Qi's rnethod does not deserve to be 
followed "Jf::r )E~)J~1t". See Wei Rulin ~&~ and Liu Zhongping iU{rflZfS, Zhongguo junshi sixiang 
shi r:p~.$J5'J&t~ (Taibei: Lirning, 1979),434. 
63 Nirnick, 1995. 
231 
many familiar faces among the official army, they hesitated [to fight]. The official 
army took the chance to go forward immediately and expelled them.64 
This source also raises another important factor related to the Jiangnan literati's 
resistance movement: the role of lineages during the process of military actions. Huang 
Zongxi did lead sorne ofhis lineage members injoining the resistance, as did Huang 
Chunyao and his sons in Jiangyin, and Xia Yunyi and Xia Wanchun in Songjiang. Was 
this a common phenomenon among Chinese literati? To what extent did kinship affect 
military action during this period? Since Chine se locallineages were an important force 
in stabilizing rural society, the subject of variation within lineage organizations has 
inspired endless discussion and argument in both anthropological and historicalliterature. 
Because Freedman's model could not explain why lineage organization was strongest in 
regions where centralized political control was weakest and vice versa, more and more 
specific studies have been undertaken.65 
It is now generally recognized that there was no uniform process of lineage formation 
in Chinese society. Based on his study of Changzhou literati in late imperial China, 
Elman indicates that in the first two centuries of the Ming dynasty "the complex 
triangular relationships among the imperial state, local gentry, and village peasants had 
been transformed." By the late Ming, "therefore, those gentry who organized into 
powerfullocallineages were able to fill the power vacuum in local affairs and to 
maintain political and economic control over rural society." As for imperial power, 
although it could blunt literati organizations and academies that threatened its absolute 
hold on central power, the power of local gentry was not challenged.66 
64 "Dongyang fukoujishi" *~#!!Ur~g2$, quoted from Pan Xinghui, 355. 
65 See Maurice Freedman, Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. (London: London School of 
Economics. Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 18, 1958); see also his Chinese Lineage and Society 
(London: Athlone Press, 1966). 
66 Elman, 1990, 16-26. See also Patricia Ebrey, and James L. Watson, ed. Kinship Organization in Late 
Imperial China 1000- 1940 (Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1986), "Introduction". 
232 
Generally speaking, what Elman draws is an idealized picture of Jiangnan at peace. 
Since there were no major battles within this area historically, it is difficult, from the 
perspective ofmilitary history, to examine how the different social forces tried to position 
themselves. However, a limited exploration ofthis sort ofmilitary behavior can still help 
us to argue against Elman's exaggeration of the function of the lineage. Because lineage 
organizations were never uniformly well-developed or evenly distributed geographically 
throughout the empire, the area 1 examine is limited to the several provinces discussed in 
this dissertation. Unlike Guangdong and Fujian, provinces with the most developed and 
well-organized lineage organizations, there were no such powerfullocal forces in the 
northern plain area or Shandong province. Because of long term warfare and frequent 
natural disasters, it was not easy to accumulate wealth. Furthermore, the relative 
similarity of dialects and social customs facilitated frequent immigration and emigration. 
Thus, there was no intense relationship among people who shared the same SUrname 
(tongxing [qJt&). 
The Jiangnan area is another story. It is a truism among Chinese people that "no 
wealthy family lasts three generations" ifu buguo sandai M::f~-1~); this has also been 
confirmed by several recent studies.67 On the other hand, while these were certainly 
exceptional cases, sorne "big surnames" (daxing *'11) did continue over considerably 
longer stretches than several generations or even several centuries.68 
In northern Zhejiang, the existence oflineages was a common phenomenon; however, 
this does not mean that there were developed lineage organizations. T 0 exaggerate their 
capacity for social management as weIl as social integration is not appropriate. The 
southern part ofthe province basically corresponds to Fujian province, but is not touched 
upon here.69 
67 Such as Feng Xianliang, 506; also see Fang Zhuyou ::1JfftEl.~, Qing chu Zhedong xuepai luncong ?W:fJJ#Jf 
*~r*ü~~ (Taibei: Wanjuanlou, 1996),67. 
68 Liu Xianting ~U~~, Guangyang zaji .~~~Ô, juan 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985),43; For comments 
on recent scholarship in this area by Western scholars, such as Hilary Beattie, Jerry Dennerline and 
William Rowe, see Timothy Brook, "Family Continuity and Cultural Hegemony: The Gentry ofNingbo, 
1368-1911," in Esherick and Rankin, 32-33. 
69 See Yu Xinzhong ~JilfffiS'" "Qing qianqi Zhexibei jiceng shehui jingying de jinshen tujing yu shehui 
liudong" ?WiWM#Jfg§~t~Jiffctin~~8j1f ~~1~WïF±Wrt'itlJJ, Nankai xuebao 4 (2000), 14-21. 
233 
Self-defense was a natural choice for these lineage organizations. Fitzpatrick 
provides a case study of the siege of Tongxiang in northern Zhejiang province that 
may illustrate the value of influential local lineages in campaigns against Japanese 
pirates. The main theatre of war in the campaign was the silk districts around the 
Grand Canal. Sorne prominent members of the local bureaucratie elite belonged to 
important lineages in their respective districts. One ofthem, named Pu Wenqi f~3tg, 
is described as a local scholar who had undertaken an in-depth study of military 
strategy. Pu was a resident of the unwalled market town where his li ne age had lived 
for generations. With cooperation from others, this town successfully eradicated the 
pirates within a few months.70 
Of course, the defense of a lineage's own benefits or the interests of a local 
community does not simply correspond to the defense of the country. For centuries, 
kinship values, such as loyalty and filial piety, were thought to redound to the state, and 
the central government always encouraged their pursuit, because these moral influences 
were thought to be beneficial to the state. But, practically speaking, it is very difficult to 
find an instance that demonstrates how loyalty could be magnified gradually and simply 
transferred from family to lineage, to local community, and finally to the country. It is 
especially evident that when people realized the inevitability of the current dynasty's 
downfall, they prepared to welcome the new rulers. They may have fought against 
Japanese pirates or sorne small group ofrebels, but their response to the Qing's mixed 
Manchu and Chine se powerful army was another story. 
In light of the distribution of the lineage organizations in east China, there is no need 
to examine the lineage's role in the resistance movement in Shandong.7) In the southwest 
part ofNanzhili, represented by Huizhou, there was extensive lineage organization, but 
almost no records that trace any lineage's anti-Qing military activities. Actually, the 
failure of lineages to participate in the resistance was the most important reason for the 
70 Merrilyn Fitzpatrick, "Local Interests and the Anti-Pirate Administration in China's South-east 1555-
1565," Ch'ing-shih wen-('i 4.2 (1979), 1-50. 
71 It does not mean that no such thing happened within the province. For a very few cases, see An 
Zuozhang, 73-74. 
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ultimate failure of Jing Shen and his brothers, the case study we explored in Chapter 
Two.72 
In the Jiangnan area, sorne lineage members were involved in the resistance 
movement. However, the relevant data about their activities usually provides only 
abstract and obscure descriptions. For instance, Sheng'an ben}i only offers one sentence 
to describe the role oflineages in the process of Kunshan's defense: "there are lots of 
huge Iineages :EMe in Kunshan. AIl of them devote money and they would Iike to defend 
it until death.',73 
It is easy to explain the absence of detailed records from Jiangnan literati-they 
wanted to remind people that the fact of resistance did exist, but they did not want to 
provide vivid and detailed materials that might have brought trouble from the Qing side. 
One prerequisite in exploring the role of lineage in the resistance movement of literati in 
eastem China is to treat the literati at two levels-as family members and as lineage 
members. After a thorough examination of their military performance, it appears that the 
lineage's military action was usually restricted to family members, and rarely extended to 
the scope of lineage. If somebody pursued resistance, he was deemed a threat to the 
whole lineage and would have suffered the death penalty. In a report sent by the Assistant 
Surveillance of the Circuit of Hangzhou and Yanzhou (Hangyan dao qianshi mDm:ft$) 
on January 6, 1655, we learn that a man was killed by other lineage members for his 
connection with the anti-Qing forces from the sea.74 
The case of Lu Xiangguan .~Ifà (jinshi of 1643) from Yixing of Jiangnan will 
pro vide us with a concrete study of the subtle roles of both literati and the lineages they 
belonged to. For one thing, it confirms that lineage resistance did exist in a few cases; but 
most importantly, it shows that it was also because of the lineage that the Jiangnan literati 
were finally unable to pursue military action. 
72 See Zhou Zhiyuan mJ~jê, "Rujia lunli yu Ming dai Huizhoujijinshi" ffm~{1R(I]'!.WE)j{-t~1'1'I*iit±, 
Anhui daxue xuebao, 4 (1999), 80-85. 
73 Li Qing, 6, in ZGYSJC 32, 659. 
74 Ming Qing shiliao dingbian, vol. 2, 110 (A-B). 
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Lu Xiangguan's oIder brother, Lu Xiangsheng 1!:~7T (1600-1639), was once the 
General Govemor of Shanxi and Xuanda (Shanxi Xuanda zongdu ~lJiZ.§1§'*M~fi); he 
died in the fighting against the Manchu invasion in Zhending ~JË in 1638. During the 
summer of 1645, Lu Xiangguan began to revoIt in Mao Mountain ~U-! at the southem 
border of Nanzhili. At the first stage ofhis uprising, his troops fell into a trap set by the 
Qing army when they attacked Nanjing according to schedule. He had to retum to his 
hometown to reorganize the remnant of followers that had survived. After the city was 
occupied by the Qing army, one retired Ming general, Chen Tangong ~*fS0, was 
recommended to be put in charge of the loyalists' military affairs. Together with Chen, 
Lu organized several tens of thousands of people into a mob and planned to attack Yixing 
city. He personally led the vanguard while Chen Tangong, leading the main army, 
followed him. However, Lu was misguided by the reconnaissance. He thought the city 
had no defense so he led only about thirty cavalry through the gate. This small army was 
soon besieged and he was hit by two arrows. 
Tangong was greatly surprised [by Lu's action] and said: "The schoolboy is not 
familiar with military affairs. As the highest commander, how can he be so 
imprudent?" So he carefully selected three hundred cavalry to provide support. 75 
This campaign thus became the tuming point. Moreover, Lu's actions brought his 
lineage into a dangerous situation. Since the Qing army wanted to destroy Lu's home, 
sorne members from his lineage intended to capture him in order to ensure the lineage' s 
survival. This news forced Lu, with about three hundred followers, to flee to Lake Tai. At 
the end of August, 1645, Lu realized that his actions as a Ming loyalist would not succeed 
and he drowned himself. 
75 Ji Liuqi B, juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 594-95. 
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Lu's younger brother, Lu Xiangjin Ia:~1f, became a monk after the founding of the 
Qing dynasty. Altogether, several dozens ofhis nephews as well as other relatives 
dedicated their lives to the Ming.76 
In terms of the lineage's role in military actions, the case of the Lu lineage echoes 
with the examples of Yin County in eastem Zhejiang. Thanks to Quan Zuwang, this 
county's relevant sources have been fairly well preserved. Quan appears to have been 
proud ofhis hometown's performance in the resistance movement for he named it 
Zhongyi zhibang J~~z1~ (the home ofrighteousness and loyalty). In total, more than 
60 people died for the resistance. 77 
However, Quan's praise does not challenge the model we established-the literati's 
lineage as a whole did not exhibit an intention to be involved in the resistance movement 
and they were prepared to shi ft national identity at any time. 78 Quan's description 
provides reliable and detailed information about their resistance, and also brings to light 
an important characteristic of their military action: usually the literati who came from the 
same lineage did not appear together on the same battlefield; instead, they chose different 
ways to devote their lives to the cause. In addition to the case of Zhang Huangyan and his 
relatives, which we will explore later in this chapter, the most important instance is that 
of Qian Suyue and his brothers, the so-called Qian shi sizhong ~a[9J~\ (the four 
loyalists of the Qian family). Qian Suyue died in Fujian while his fifth younger brother 
was also killed in that province. In 1650, his ninth younger brother devoted his life to his 
76 Sorne sources said about one hundred, see Xu Mingjishi benmo .ajJ*-è$**, juan 15, in ZGYSJCXB 
25, 103; Ji Liuqi (B) indicated about 40-50 people; see Ji Liuqi, juan 9, in ZGYSJC 36, 594-95. For 
detailed information about his anti- Qing activities, see also Wen Ruilin, lie zhu an juan 21, in ZGYSJC 35, 
396. 
77 Quan Zuwang, "Ji jiashen sanzhong ji " ~Ej3 $ ~J&,~è, in Jieji tingji ~êitiÜ.~, juan 22, XXSKQS 
1429, 668. 
78 To protect themselves from pirates and rebels is another story because they realized these threats were 
temporary. For example, when Li Zicheng's peasant rebellion swept across the North China Plain, one 
Shengyuan of Yin County named Tu Mujun tf:!H~ discussed the matter of defending the local 
community. Those Yin County's literati as weIl as the other local elite ordered their lineage members to 
practice the military tactics to ensure self protection, especially patrolling at night. See Quan Zuwang, juan 
8, XXSKQS 1429,30. 
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hometown. One year later, his seventh younger brother became a madman and died in 
Kunshan because of the failure of the resistance.79 
The characteristics of the literati in military affairs, in Yin County, as well as Lu 
lineage in Jiangnan mentioned above, have also been confirmed by Timothy Brook's 
study. Focusing on family continuity and cultural hegemony, his study of Yin County 
shows that the gentry had no interest in military affairs; this included even those whose 
ancestors were from military families, such as the Wan family ~~.80 Nevertheless, the 
question ofwhether continuity was the only concern for these literati and their lineages 
demands further discussion. 
As a whole, the lineages in Jiangnan and Zhejiang showed relatively little effect from 
the wars and economic dislocation brought on by the fall of the South in the 1640s. In 
order to survive and reestablish their local preeminence, the lineage leaders had to make 
the important decision to accede to the new central power. 81 
4: 4. Literati and Triple Pressures: the Southern Ming, Qing and Local Society 
Although the Qing army was able to sweep through all of eastern China with virtually no 
powerful resistance, it had no navy. AlI ofits previous victories relied too heavily upon 
its land forces-its cavalry strikes on the field and its use of cannon in attacking cities. 
Because the literati's resistance movement was defeated in Jiangnan and eastern Zhejiang, 
the southern navies as well as coastal ports and islands off of Zhejiang and Fujian 
gradually drew the attention of various forces. Beginning in the fall of 1646, loyalists 
gathered into these areas, especially the Zhoushan archipelago and Chongming Island, in 
order to recover their military fortunes and try to cultivate a possible alliance with the 
scattered forces under the court of Lu. 
79 For detailed information ofthis family's anti- Qing activities, see Quan Zuwang, juan 5, in XXSKQS 
1429,493-97. 
80 The family had first risen to prominence through military achievements during the founding of the Ming 
dynasty in the 1360s. See Timothy Brook (1990), 28-29. 
81 Elman (1990), 49-50. 
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Off the coast of Zhejiang there is a long sea bank (haitang mfJi!f) which stretches from 
Wenzhou and Taizhou to Ningbo and Shaoxing, this barrier is accompanied by a long 
beach. Since there are no ports available within this broad area, the Japanese pirates as 
well as other sea rovers posed less of a threat to eastem Zhejiang. Instead, their main 
targets were the are as from Zhapu "Fiffl, Qingcun wif1, Nanhui ~11i , Shanghai, Jiading, 
and Taicang to Changshu m,~, and Jiangyin as well as Jingjiang ~1I in Nanzhili where 
countless rivers connect directly to the sea.82 
After these threats were ended in the 1560s, the Jiangnan people of the coastal area 
retumed to their peacefullives, and military affairs were gradually ignored. In July of 
1634, Qi Biaojia made his plans for the defense of the Jiangnan area. His report 
mentioned that all the relevant equipment as well as constructions had become useless, 
they were "extremely weak" î'fl~~8;fj. As for the coastal residents, many were cunning 
and brave, with a tendency to revoit. He suggested the organization of so-called yubing 
~~ (fisher sol di ers) which depended on the method of baojia to let fishing vessels work 
together as separate units. Under the command of shaoguan n~'§', they were expected to 
cooperate with the official army if needed. 83 
Although there are no records of whether his plan was carried out, it shows that the 
Jiangnan literati had already realized that the fishermen should not be ignored. In the 
Shaoxing area, these fishermen spent their whole lives half on land and half at sea. 
Unlike the ordinary people of Zhejiang, these fishermen were proud oftheir brave spirit 
as well as their facility with weapons, such as the sharp broadsword they used in fighting. 
These characteristics drew the local govemment's attention to their dual functions: to use 
82 Jiaqing Zhili Taicang zhouzhi ~~œGJ';~ft*=1î1'r'[~, juan 24, in XXSKQS 697, 399-400; in those areas, 
sea defense was always the main concem for the local govemment since the Japanese pirate attacks. Many 
local gazetteers list "haifang" 1tlj:~jj as special category, such as Jiaqing Songjiangfuzhi .!tt~ŒHt;:5;, 
juan 33, Wubeizhi- Haifang ~'Ûi;:5;, in XXSKQS 688, 134. 
83 Qi Biaojia, Yifen quangao ïrrjti:~, juan lO, in XXSKQS 492, 549-50. Unfortunately, we have no way 
to get more information about this Yubing; probably it never existed. 
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them to fight against the enemy while also levying taxes on them to provide for military 
pay.84 
The Qing army's rapid conquest meant that nobody was able to demonstrate a 
capacity to organize and use these forces. However, the series ofwars that happened later 
showed that these fishermen never expressed absolute politicalloyalties. Instead, they 
were more concemed with pursuing their own bene fit, by trying to find a balance among 
the various sorts of forces-the loyalist troops, the Qing army, as weIl as the remnant 
army of the Southem Ming. 
Huang Zongxi made sorne comments about the strategy of the Southem Ming after 
the resistance movement was totally defeated. According to him, if the Southem Ming 
had garrison armies in both Chongming and Zhoushan, then these forces could have 
responded and supported each other to break down the transportation lines of the Qing 
army.85 
What Huang imagined was not a pipe-dream. The anti-Qing forces in both 
Chongming and Zhoushan Island did have certain available resources. Control of 
Chongming Island see-sawed after the late 1640s between the Qing army and various 
anti-Qing forces. For residents of the island, the anti-Qing forces from far away usually 
brought them benefits such as grains and other goods (because of their desperate poverty 
they had no need to worry about plundering from the outside), meanwhile the Qing 
authorities always forced them to participate in the defense. In late 1653, the city of 
Chongming had been besieged for eight months by loyalist navies led by Zhang 
Mingzhen. 
Entering the spring of the next year, the loyalist armies began to till the farmland 
surrounding the city. According to archives, starvation meant that most of the local 
residents (more than eighty percent) had no choice but to accept the rulership of the 
loyalists. Although the Qing army still controlled a few places, many people had already 
been starting to get in touch with the loyalists. The few defenders loyal to the Qing 
finally lost any hope of outside assistance because aIl the waterways were blocked. As a 
84 Qianlong Shaoxingfuzhi 1 ~1li*B~Jff~ 1, juan 22, Wubeizhi - Bingzhi ft.tfjjfi~, ~fM, in ZGDFZJC 
(Z), 39, 539. 
85 Huang Zongxi , Zhoushan xingfei fîtr.lJ~m, ZGYSJC 32, 247. 
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head of the tuanlian reported, aIl the people suffered greatly from starvation and could 
not be gathered to be used.86 
In comparison with the siege of Chongming, the Zhoushan archipelago played an 
even more important role in the whole resistance movement.87 
Before the court of Lu moved to Zhoushan, this archipelago area had been controlled 
by a general named Huang Binqing ~t.lftg~p for eight years. Huang was originally from 
Zhangzhou ~1H in Fujian, and he was related to Zhang Mingzhen by marriage. 
Gradually, his force was enlarged by absorbing various other troops, including Zhang's 
navy.88 
Since Huang occupied Zhoushan in 1641, he conscripted aIl the male residents above 
the age of fifteen to be either xiangbing or regular soldiers. Since most of the farmland in 
the island belonged to the rich families who resided in the coastal area of Zhejiang, 
Huang simply confiscated all the land and deemed it official land (guantian '§' EH). 
However, as more and more remnant Ming soldiers came to the island, the limited 
resources proved insufficient. In the mid-1640s, a Shengyuan from Chongming named 
Shen Tingyang 1,tffm came to Zhoushan.89 Shen was weIl known for his abilities in 
logistics. Huang took his suggestion and started to levy tax as weIl as supplies for other 
military needs based on the amount offarmland. These measures enabled Huang's troops 
to maintain good discipline, and so they did not bother the local residents too much.9o 
In November of 1649, the Lu court moved to the island. Their coming also marked 
the end of the restoration in the coastal and inland areas of Zhejiang and Jiangnan. 
86 Ming Qing shiliao dingbian, vol. 1, 94-96. 
87 Zhang Mingzhen finally withdrew his navy several months later; see Gu Cheng, 814-20. 
88 Zhang Mingzhen was a native of Nanjing who received his military Jinshl in 1638. At the time of the faH 
of the Nanjing regime, he held the post of major at a garrisonjust south ofNingbo. He transferred his 
10yalty to the Prince of Lu, who made him a general, and later an earl. See Zhoushan xingfei -xingchaolu 5 
(fJ')j~L.li) ZGYSJC32, 246. Also see Struve (1984), 113-14; Wakeman (1985), vol. 2, 741- 43. 
89 He was executed in 1647 at Nanjing. See Xu Bingyi, 356-57. 
90 Huang committed suicide in October of 1649. For detailed information about Huang, see Lu zhi chunqiu, 
juan 10, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 490- 91; see also Zhoushan xingfei, in ZGYSJC32, 247. 
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However, from the perspective of the island's defense, they at least enlarged the loyalist 
force in numbers. The available literature provides scarce and very confused information 
about this court's practical measures in dealing with resistance movements in the coastal 
areas after its move to the island. Based on second hand materials, Struve claims that "no 
operational relation was worked out between the Lu court and the various stockade 
defenders" in the eastern Zhejiang areas such as Siming Mountain.9 \ 
After thorough examination of the Qing archives, and especially the confessions 
from prisoners ofthe Qing army, l have found sorne sources that provide concrete and 
vivid cases showing that the Zhoushan regime not only did connect with and try to affect 
the coastal area in various ways, but also that the Lu court's activity reached to the lowest 
level of society in eastern Zhejiang. Unlike the Jiangnan literati represented by Chen 
Zilong who only paid attention to the counterespionage work of the revolting military 
officers of the Qing army, they even aimed their efforts at ordinary Qing soldiers. 
Wang Wanxun .:EjeiiJ was a local rebelleader whose forces occupied the hills of 
Yuyao County. A man caUed Tang Shipin ~1~~ was kidnapped to be Wang's soldier in 
early September, 1650. Tang fled from the camp and became a Qing soldier as soon as 
the Qing army began to conscript. In the Qing camp, he and six other soldiers become 
close friends (xiang hou if§~). By the end of that year he had aiso established a close 
relationship with two Shengyuan named Shen Zhitai 1./t2.* and Zou Zishi ~~r., both 
from his hometown. Shen and Zou were officiaIs under the rebeIIeader Wang Wanxun 
and they had close contact with Zhoushan. Through Tang Shi pin, aU the above Qing 
soldiers received the seai and certification issued by these two shengyuan. Tang himself 
was appointed as Vice General (fujiang MUM~). His father Tang Rixin ~ B ~JT, afraid of 
what he had done, later burned his certificate. However, his uncle Tang Sheng ~~ had 
became involved in the revoIt. Tang Sheng was sent by Tang Shipin to see Wang 
Wanxun in the mountains and ask to get money as reward and pay. Wang responded: 
91 Struve (1984), 114. 
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I need plenty ofmoney to give the soldiers as gratuities for the arrivaI of the New 
Year. 1 would like to go to Zhoushan to see the Prince of Lu. After getting the 
money, l will give it to him [Tang Shiping]. 
This case shocked the Qing army greatly; they began to realize that the local Zhejiang 
sol di ers could not be used any more.92 
Another case from Yuhang County 7.Rm also shows contact between Zhoushan and 
certain social forces of the eastem Zhejiang area. A group ofrebels began their revoIt 
between 1647 and 1648 in the are as of Qiantang, Yuhang, and Lin'an G!iTh3( counties. The 
leader of the troops, Sheng Yulin ~±.u (also named Sheng Gui ~.), demonstrated 
his capacity in military affairs. He divided his eight hundred soldiers into six battalions 
and allowed them to supply themselves while only giving the extra "goods" (wujian fo/lftf::) 
to him. Since most of the income came from plundering and there was no guaranteed 
supply, Shen implemented a levy ofthree sheng ofrice for each mou in those areas he 
controlled. In 1652, Sheng changed his name to Jiang Si ~IZY. Through a monk who 
called himselfjianjun ~. (Army-inspecting Censor), this army made a connection with 
Zhoushan. The rebels asked this monk to let them know how to call on the emperor. With 
seal and blank certificate in hand, the monk collected more than four hundred taels of 
silver from Sheng's force.93 
However, neither Zhoushan nor Chongming finally played a crucial role in the 
resistance movement. As Zhang Dai indicates, since Zhoushan is much closer to the 
mainland, it was not suitable for use as the base for reviving the Ming; instead, it was 
only suitable for taking a breath.94 
After the Qing army swept the coastal area, they launched an attack to conquer the 
island. In October of 1651, the main defenses were broken without severe fighting. Thus, 
92 Ming Qing shiliao jibian, vol. 2, 106-108. 
93 Ming Qingshiliao dingbian, vol. 2, 110 (A-B) . 
94 Zhang Dai, juan 50, in XXSKQS 320, 706. 
243 
the loyalists ofboth Jiangnan and Zhejiang lost their final base and had to go southward 
aiong the coast. Regent Lu was taken to Zheng Chenggong's headquarters in Xiamen and 
died Iater because of serious asthma. This defeat aiso meant that the Southem Ming's 
hopes for a maritime offensive were dashed. 
Countless reasons caused the tragedy. However, 1 will deal only with one factor from 
a military perspective. PreviousIy, the Iimited studies that exist have usually paid 
attention to the falling out between certain top figures such as Zhang Mingzhen and 
Huang Bingqing. However, a statistical study based on an examination of the Qing 
archives reveais an interesting phenomenon: the Zhoushan defense troops were aimost all 
controlled by military officiaIs from northem China. According to the report sent by Qin 
Shizhen *i!!:ffrfJ, the Govemor of Zhejiang, among a total of twenty-three higher and 
middie ranking military officiaIs who surrendered to the Qing army, only two did not 
belong to this category (these were both from the Prefecture of Jinhua 3Z~J&).95 
Likewise, among the ordinary soldiers, it was the northemers who comprised the most 
powerful defending unit. Finally, it was also they who guided the Qing's attack after they 
surrendered.96 
In confrontation with the powerful Qing army, also from the north, it is easy to 
understand why the court of Lu (its most important officiaIs, both Wen and Wu, were 
composed of southem men) could not count on these armies. Untii now, as a whole, the 
Iiterati's resistance movement was defeated in Jiangnan and eastem Zhejiang as well as 
the Zhoushan archipelago. However, Zhang Huangyan still insisted on his anti-Qing 
military behaviour. 
4: 5. The Ming Loyalists' Last Stand 
Like Qian Suyue, Zhang Huangyan also began his resistance action in Yi County, 
Zhejiang. Zhang was the last of more than fort Y people in this county who sacrificed 
95 Ming Qing shiliao dingbian, vol. 2, 135 (AB) . 
96 Zhang Dai, vol. 52, in XXSKQS 320, 713. 
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themselves for the Ming dynasty. In his childhood, Zhang not only received a traditional 
Confucian- style education, but also, unlike many others, was introduced to martial arts 
and qigong ~J;fJ practice. In the mid-1630s, the Ming Dynasty began to pay attention to 
military affairs because of the threats from both peasant rebellions and the Manchu 
invasion. When Zhang Huangyan took his shengyuan examination in 1636, the 
authorities of Yi County asked aIl candidates to take an extra examination in horse riding 
and arrow shooting. Among aIl the candidates only Zhang foIlowed the order; aIl three 
arrows he shot hit the target C=.~ $). He received hisjuren degree in 1642. When 
Qian Suyue started to revoIt in this county, Zhang was the only local elite to respond to 
his calI. As ajuren degree holder, Zhang's appearance moved Qian to tears. Zhang was 
immediately appointed as an envoy to welcome the Prince of Lu to Tiantai ~S. Among 
the officiaIs in Qian's army, only Zhang Huangyan could handle both military and civil 
affairs.97 
In 1647, he supervised Zhang Mingzheng's navy in response to the mutiny of Wu 
Shengzhao in Jiangnan. Although their fleet's failure was mainly caused by a typhoon, 
Zhang Huangyan realized that the Southem Ming's navy needed to be trained weIl, 
especiaIly in the skills of sailing. After several months, he was even able to direct the 
drills personally as a steersman on the deep ocean. From 1652, this navy entered into the 
Yangzi River three times, but never received military cooperation from either the Central 
Plain or Jiangnan areas. After Zhang Mingzhen died at Zhoushan in January, 1656, this 
navy came totaIly under his control. 
Entering 1659, the Qing army launched its campaign to conquer Yunnan and 
Guizhou. Allied with another weIl-known loyalist, Zheng Cheng gong, Zhang Huangyan 
decided to take this chance to start another northem expedition (beifa ~C{j(;). During this 
process, Zhang took the lead in Zheng's attack. This alliance enabled the Ming loyalists 
to achieve a degree of organization that their army had never had before. Not only were 
they thoroughly trained, they also numbered an impressive 100,000 military personnel as 
weIl as more than 3,000 warships and service ships, plus equipment such as cannon and 
97 Li Yuqiu,juan 16, in ZGYSJCXB25, 528. 
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armor. However, the following campaigns, especially the siege of Nanjing, showed that 
this army was unable to translate its formidable power into success on the battlefield. 
Their battle effectiveness was seriously limited by the accompaniment of family 
members, and their final defeat was ensured by the fact that they did not have horses. 
Both Zhang and Zheng wanted to undertake a massive campaign in order to win an 
impressive victory, thereby arousing the Chinese (Han) people out oftheir lethargy, but, 
unfortunately, they overplayed their hand. Previous studies ofZheng's failure in Nanjing 
usually emphasize the factor of the Qing army's retum from Guizhou and Huguang in the 
summer of 1659. In fact, the Qing si de had already begun its preparations long before the 
attack. The archives show that the Qing armies had been reassembled in 1658. We learn, 
for example, that a large number of troops from Henan, Jiangxi, Shanxi, and Shandong 
were redeployed in order to defend against attacks from the Southem Ming navies;98 and 
in Zhejiang province, the Coast Defense Army ~ij~jjJt was increased to 10,000.99 
Moreover, Zhang Mingzheng's threats over the previous years had made the Qing 
leadership aware ofhow to go about defending the mouth of the Yangzi River, a point of 
access to the Jiangnan area. Not only had garrison forces been strengthened, but a number 
of additional special measures had been taken. For instance, a long iron cable was 
stretched across the river. 100 
Zhang Huangyan led his vanguard troops up the Yangzi river after taking Guazhou m. 
1'1'1. Shortly after Zhang's advance, Zheng led his main forces to occupy another 
important city, Zhenjiang. After their short meeting on the Yangzi River at Nanjing, this 
powerful northem expedition troop was again divided. Zhang took a light naval unit, 
several thousand soldiers and no more than one hundred warships upstream toward Wuhu 
98 Ming Qing shiliao jiabian, vol. 5,423. 
99 Chen Feng, 92-94. 
100 Beginning in early May, the Southem Ming army's so-called northem expedition lasted more than three 
months. In addition to the factors mentioned above, many reasons such as poor intelligence gathering 
caused their failure. For more information, see a special report sent in September by Lang Tingzuo ~~~1ti:­
the General Govemor of Jiangnan, in Ming Qing shiliao jiabian, vol. 5,456-57; also see Gu Cheng, 939-
940; 955-61; Struve (1984), 185-93; Zhang Yu ~.:li, "Zheng Chenggong beizheng Nanjing gaishu" ~g\(; 
J}]~tfiEm"*;fI~lll!!;, Lishi dangan 2 (1988), 90-96. 
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in order to prevent the Qing's attack from Jiangxi and Huguang. lOI On July 7, Zhang 
reached Wuhu and then sent a small number oftroops to take the surrounding cities such 
as Liyang, Chizhou 1fgv'['[, Heyang fD~, and Ningguo. 102 
In comparison with the Qing propaganda directed at the Jiangnan area that promised a 
peacefullife for ordinary people and the maintenance of status for local elites, such as the 
edict issued by Dorgon, as mentioned in Chapter Three, Zhang Huangyan, usually under 
the name of Zheng Chenggong, the Prince of Y anping ~zp: .:E~~fflGJj] could only 
emphasize some abstract doctrines such as Huayi zhi bian, in order to claim his 
legitimacy. However, by the end of more than a decade of Qing control, it was clear that 
many of their promises had not been kept-the constant wars as well as various smaller 
conflicts left the Jiangnan people waiting for a brighter future. Zhang's coming brought 
some ofthese local people a new hope. Within about two months, four Prefectures 1&, 
three Zhou v'N, and twenty four counties ~'* were restored to the Ming. It is recorded that 
the sight of their clothing, in the style of the former Ming, moved many of the gentry to 
tears. Zhang's troops were welcomed everywhere, their influence even reached to parts of 
the Huguang area. Zhang Huangyan considered his successes to be the result of his 
effective control and the army's thorough training. He pointed out at one point, if"by 
chance there are some disbanded soldiers who plundered, they were arrested and 
puni shed immediately.,,103 
By the end of July, Zheng Chenggong had been defeated in Nanjing by the Qing 
army. Without notifying Zhang, he began to flee along the Yangzi River. Since he had 
previously refused Zhang's suggestion to occupy Chongming Island as a base, his fleet 
had no place to rest and had to return to the south. In late autumn of 1659, they finally 
arrived back at Xiamen. 
101 Zhang Huangyan, B. 
102 Xu Bingyi, 384-86. 
103 Zhang Huangyan, B. 
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For Zhang Huangyan, the loss of Nanjing and Zheng's failure meant that his smaIl 
navy had no way to retreat. In this case, he sent a message to Zheng imploring him to stay 
at Zhenjiang: 
Winning or losing is very normal for military men. What we depend on now is the 
hearts of the people. Moreover, we still occupy the upstream area. Ifyou could add 
about one hundred warships to assist us, it would be possible to reach our goal. 104 
Zhang did not receive any reply from Zheng because he was still fleeing. The Jiangxi 
and Jiangchu areas yI~ (present Hubei province) did not know of the latest 
developments in the Jiangnan area. Many Ming loyalists continued to come to join 
Zhang's army. He decided to go upstream further, intending to reach Poyang Lake Mj)~ 
~. On August 7, they met a Qing navy at Tongling ilJ~~. After losing four warships, the 
Qing fleet intended to escape from the battle at night. However, their use of cannons and 
hurried movements made Zhang's soldiers think that the Qing army was attempting to 
raid their camp. Zhang's fleet coIlapsed within several hours. He led several hundred 
people to Huoshan Mountain tiW. Since aIl the local zhai and residents had already 
surrendered to the Qing, no one welcomed his coming. AlI his subordinates scattered 
except one servant and one soldier. After a trek of more than 1,000 kilometers along the 
border of Nanzhili, these three people finaIly escaped overland to the southeastem 
Zhejiang coast half a year later. 105 
Later on, he continued his support of the resistance, and organized a smaIl band of 
amphibious fighters. He asked Zheng Chenggong not to abandon the mainland to take 
Taiwan, insisting that if Zheng "would campaign in the North again, 'a million bravoes 
would join and a thousand locales could be taken in.' When this persuasion failed, Zhang 
pleaded eamestly several times with Regent Lu to actively take up the banner that Zheng 
had let faH, giving the Chinese masses one more chance to rise up in response to a Ming 
104 QDRWZG -A, vol. 2, 275-8l. 
105 Quan Zuwang, juan 9, in XXSKQS 1429,34-35. 
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rallying cry.,,106 However, the former regent died soon after because of asthma (at the 
end of 1662), and the Ming dynasty had finally come to an end. 
The campaign of 1659 marked the Ming loyalists' last hope to revive the empire. 
Their tenacious resistance reached an apex in 1647 with the alliance of Jiangnan literati 
and Wu Shenzhao. Since the failure ofthat end~avor, the Southem Ming loyalists 
realized that the resistance movement on land could not succeed. What they had always 
expected was a strategy in which the Southem Ming navies would launch an attack by 
sea to which they could provide assistance. Zheng Chenggong and Zhang Huangyan's 
retreat seemed like an epilogue. With the consolidation of Qing mIe, they had to find 
another way to survive. 
Zhang Huangyan was captured and killed in 1664. His participation in the resistance 
movement for nineteen years was likely something of a record. In the course of his 
participation, he entered into Fujian three times, four times launched attacks along the 
Yangzi River, and his fleet capsized twice. In his last few years, he refused to surrender 
several times. Witnessing more and more people acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
Qing mIe, it became obvious to him that to continue the resistance meant only a 
meaningless 10ss of lives. After disbanding his small group of soldiers in June 1664, he 
hoped to spend the rest ofhis life on an isolated island. I07 
When he was captured inmid-July, he delivered the following words to Zhang Jie ~ 
~, the Provincial Military Commander of Zhejiang (Zhejiang tidu #JT1Itll!:tT): 
When my father died, 1 could not bury him; when the Ming dynasty feH, 1 could not 
save it; 1 cannot expiate all my crimes even in death. What 1 expect today is to die 
soon.
I08 
106 Struve (1984), 193. 
107 In a letter written to the Govemor of Zhejiang, he expressed why he had disbanded the troop: to avoid 
people's suffering caused by war. See Fang Furen ntMe, "Shilun Zhang Cangshui" ~~ifâ~1i*, in 
Guangming ribao, Shixue Jl:!.~, January 29, 1964. See also Chen Yongming 1l*7]<8Jj, "Lun jindai xuezhe 
dui Zhang Huangyan de yanjiu" ~ifâ~1~~~!<f~1:l j§ 8"Jutf~, Journal ofChinese Studies, 25.1 (1992), 
56- 67. 
108 Xu Bingyi, juan 18, 384-86. 
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Before he was executed in the market on September 7, he composed this poem, it 
reads: 
Both the state and my family have perished, what 1 can do? 
~UBZ~LU\1SJZ 
There are models at this West Lake 1 need to follow: 
The sun and moon were suspended above Yu Qian's grave, 
This disintegrated country makes me always think about Yue Fei's tomb. 
~:f:$*m-ffi~J:lI09 
Among aIl the Chine se literati during the Ming-Qing transition, Zhang set the best 
example ofhow to balance both political and personal pursuits. He was a loyalist first, 
dedicated to the sovereign and country, but he al ways kept his own moral integrity. By 
the disbanding ofhis troops and his brave death, he successfully realized his ideal of 
maintaining honor and noble character without bringing about the loss of ordinary 
people's lives. Moreover, as a wenren, Zhang Huangyan played his role in the various 
fields of military affairs: not only had he already demonstrated his unique ability as a 
young person, he continued in the same way over the nineteen years of his resistance 
career. Apart from organizing both overland and navy campaigns, he also showed ability 
in strategic decision making as well as the coordination of the various anti-Qing forces. 
For instance, he tried to intercede in the conflicts between the court of Lu and the Reign 
of Longwu at Fujian, albeit without effect. He intended to integrate aIl forces available 
109 Zhang Huangyan, Zhang zhongliegongji 5:RJ~,r.!~:L}~,juan 5, XXSKQS 1388, p. 376. Yu Qian T~ 
(1398-1547) was a statesman and military man bom in Hangzhou. He was awarded thejinshi degree in 
1421. As Minister ofWar, he successfully defended Beijing against the Oirat. See L. Carrington Goodrich 
and Chaoying Fang, eds. Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1976), 1608- 12; Yue Fei lUIt (1103-1142) was a hero from Henan who led the troops to fight 
against the invasion of the Jin; he was killed by his opponents among the Song court by the end of January, 
1142. 
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regardless oftheir background, including those of Liu Kongzhao ~HLBB, one of the 
warlords of the Southem Ming who used to have severe conflicts with the Donglin literati 
when they were at the Hongguang court in Nanjing. 110 
When Zhang Huangyan and his comrades were attempting to institute a revival on the 
southeast coast, the Qing govemment gradually consolidated its mIe over the rest of 
China. lll 
From Yao Tinglin's memoirs, as mentioned in Chapter Three, we can understand 
how, and to what extent, the Qing authority was able to mobilize various forces against 
Zheng and Zhang's northem expedition in Songjiang and adjacent areas in Jiangnan. As a 
clerk of the local yamen, Yao had worked for the Qing for several years before this 
northem expedition. During this period, he worked as a contractor, with aU the 
opportunities for profit but also with aU the risks involved. In 1659, he was moved to the 
military bureau (bingfang ~m). Faced with Zheng and Zhang's broad ranging raids on 
the Yangzi and other areas, the response on the Qing side was the frantic mobilization of 
troops and resources; the state of emergency was to last a long time after Zheng 
Chenggong was finally defeated and had fled across the ocean. Yao's Linianji recounts 
in detail how he had to requisition boats, horses, fodder, and other supplies, and deliver 
them on time if he wished to avoidjail or a beating. In fact he was once even threatened 
with beheading by a certain Ma, who was provincial commander-in-chiefwho had 
happened to stop at the Wusong garrison. Regardless of what happened, it was al ways the 
po or who suffered the most because it was their property that was being requisitioned. 112 
110 Quan Zuwang ,juan 9, in XXSKQS 1429,32-33. 
III During wartime, the Qing govemment of course had to face the challenges of military affairs. For 
example, its military provision needed about 20,000,000 -24,000,000 taels of silver every year after 1656, 
but its total available income was 19,600,000. See Weng Tongjue ~l8lfi, "Liechao bingxiangjilue" jUïiIJ3 
~~*è~, in Huangchao bingzhi kaolue ll!ïiIJ3~f!W~~, juan 3, XXSKQS 858, 655. 
For the case of Zhejiang, when Zheng Chenggong and Zhang Huangyan launched their northem 
expedition in 1659, this province had a huge budget deftcit in the military logistic affairs, especially for the 
grain supply. See Ming Qing shiliao jibian, vol. 5, 477. 
On the battlefield, the Qing army was always proud of its powerful cavalry, but those horses from the 
north were not accustomed with the climate and fodder after they entered into Southeastem China. In 1658, 
within halfyear 552 "official horses '§~" died due to the reasons mentioned above. See Ming Qing shiliao 
jibian, vol. 5, 464. 
112 Pierre-Etienne Will, "Coming of Age in Shanghai during the Ming-Qing Transition, Yao Tinglin's 
Record of the Successive Years," Gujin lunheng 4 (2000), 15-39. 
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Indeed, the Ming loyalists' last northern expedition achieved great success in the first 
stage, as marked by the siege of Nanjing, but we have to pay attention to the concrete 
reasons. The latest studies by Wei Qingyuan show that this navy had special advantages 
in terms of conscription and financial supply. Apart from fishermen and peasants from 
the southeast coast area, many of the soldiers were from the "Green Battalion" (lüying Ml< 
~) ofthe Qing army, and sorne ofthem were clerks from the Qing Yamen. It seems that 
the only reason they were involved in Zheng's army was because of the higher salaries 
being offered. For instance, in 1654, Zheng provided four dou of white rice plus 0.5 tael 
of silver every month for each newly conscripted soldier, far more than the ordinary Qing 
soldier's salary from the Green Battalion. When the yellow recruiting flag was raised, 
many people came to be conscripted, "like a continuous stream," the former Qing army 
soldiers even brought their weapons. Zheng's income came mainly from overseas trade, 
tax collection, and plundering of coastal areas from Fujian to the mouth of the Yangzi 
River. 113 
These conditions remind us that we should not overstate the role played by a sense of 
ethnicity during conflicts between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. This navy's 
coming did arouse a certain ethnic sentiments among sorne literati, but not aU. As Wen 
Ruilin indicates, because of their fear of the calamity caused by warfare, many of the 
gentry of eastern Zhejiang as weIl as other coastal areas had secret communications with 
the official (Qing) army during these three months. As guides, they led the official army's 
attack; as residents, they responded to the Qing army's military action. Ming loyalists 
were subject to arrest or execution. 114 
By early August, most of Zhang' s subordinates had been scattered. Considering the 
long anti-Qing tradition of the Ying and Huo mountainous areas ~.0-n~, sorne people 
suggested to Zhang that he enter into the hills. On August 17, they reached Yangshan 
113 Wei Qingyuan :&tJ!f~, "Youguan Qing chujinhai he qianjie de ruogan wenti" ~lUJmfJJ~mJfDm:w-8"J 
;STrl=l~m, in Ming Qing luncong (Beijing: Zijincheng, 2002), 3, 189-203. 
114 Wen Ruilin, liezhuan JU~,juan 19. 
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Zhai ~Lli~, on Huo Mountain. This zhai was built on the top of the mountain; it was 
broad enough to allow room for about ten thousand people to reside. Furthermore, it was 
dotted with springs so there was no worry about water supplies. The local military force 
led by Chu Liangfu m.Rffi had already been pacified and surrendered to the Qing army. 
Originally, he was hesitant, but when he got the news about Zheng's failure in Nanjing, 
he firmly refused Zhang's entrance. 115 For most ordinary people, the Ming was only an 
increasingly distant memory. Sorne ofthem did offer help or a welcoming attitude when 
Zhang Huangyan's fleet arrived in July, and Zhang himselfwas deeply touched by the 
assistance they provided. However, when he lost his fleet and intended to flee overland, 
he suddenly found nothing in hand and no followers except one soldier and a servant. 1 16 
Among the various reasons leading to the failure of Zhang Huangyan, one overlapped 
with what we have previously studied -the relationship between Wen and Wu. 
4: 6. Summary 
The resistance movement of the Zhejiang literati was not only expressed in separate 
uprisings, but also allied military action. However, the effect oftheir resistance was 
reduced because it became tightly entangled with political conflicts as well as 
contradictions among the two Ming courts and regular Ming armies. The so-called 
righteous troops cooperated and supported each other in self-defense. This force, together 
with the local mountain people and fishermen, never expressed absolute certain political 
loyalties because they were more concemed with pursuing actual benefit, and intended to 
find a balance among the various sorts of forces. Military action by lineages was usually 
restricted to members of an individual family and rarely extended to the sc ope of the 
whole lineage. The defense of a lineage does not correspond to the defense of local 
society, let alone the whole empire, because this sort of loyalty cannot be magnified 
115 Gu Cheng, 961-67. 
116 Zhang Huangyan, B, in ZGYSJC 35, 386; see also Gu Cheng, 961- 67. 
253 
gradually and simp1y to the 1evel of the state, despite what Confucian ideo1ogy 
traditionally claimed. As a whole, the lineages showed relatively little effect from the 
wars and economic dislocation, and they intended to accede to the new central powe, in 
order to survive and reestablish their local preeminence. The Ming loyalists' last northem 
expedition reminds us that we should not overstate the role played by a sense of ethnicity 
during conflicts between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. Finally, Zhang Huangyan's 
experience of engaging in military action off ers us an example of how a Chine se literatus 
cou1d best engage in military affairs: he must balance both political and persona1 pursuits; 
be dedicated to the sovereign and home land while maintaining moral integrity; and 
preserving his honor and noble character without bringing about the 10ss of ordinary 
people's lives. 
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Chapter 5 
Between Wen and Wu 
5: 1 The Role Change: A Reexamination of the Relationship between Wen Wu 
The relationship between Wen and Wu is generally considered to be one between polar 
opposites: the Wen are associated with culture and refinement in the practice of 
government and Iiterature, while the Wu are connected with warfare and violence. 
Edward L. Dreyer provides a typical explanation as follows: 
The civil officiaIs have a common upbringing and a strong sense of being the 
guardians of the moral tradition that is the basis ofall civilized society, and this gives 
them a strong feeling of corporate unit y , despite the Confucian preference for moral 
qualities over technical expertise, the civil officiaIs provided imperial China's 
nearest equivalent to a professional body, and, despite their frequent tinancial 
corruption, their loyalty to Confucianism and to the reigning dynasty was always 
dependable. Military officers, on the other hand, did not have a selection process that 
endowed them with a common outlook and common values, and their loyalties in 
consequence tended to be particularistic, directed to the official or commander who 
had furthered their careers, rather than to the state as a who le. 1 
Quite frankly, the above conclusion is basically based on imagination. In practice, 
Chinese emperors usually considered civil officiaIs to be easier to control because, in 
comparison to military officiaIs, they were not even strong enough to hold a chicken 
(shou wufuji zhili ~~~~tt;Z.:1J). Needless to say, Chinese history, as well as military 
literature has been written by the educated people, so-called wenren, thus the contents of 
historical records have been largely shaped by the needs and interests of civil officiaIs or 
ordinary literati, and the role they played is always overstated or exaggerated. On the 
other hand, descriptions of the military commanders are usually limited to their 
1 Dreyer, 9-10. 
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"imposing physical presence and courage, horsemanship and personal acquaintance with 
weapons, good judgment in an actual battlefield situation, and, most important of aH, firm 
maintenance of military discipline.,,2 
Thus, the professional role of the military officer was confined to the actual 
leadership of his troops on the battlefield. Their lack of literacy is further demonstrated 
by the fact that there were often civil officiaIs attached to them at different levels to 
handle their administrative work. They and army supervisors, in a number of dynasties 
personal servants of the emperor, such as eunuchs, also, of course, served to check the 
ambitions of the generals by making frequently reports back to the central administrative 
authorities. lndeed, the generallevel of education of military officers was much lower 
than that of their civil counterparts. In fact, most of the military officers were illiterate. 
For this reason, policy-making and the administrative work required for maintaining the 
military establishment were taken over by civil officiaIs. These aspects ensured that the 
military officers had much lower prestige than civil officiaIs in corresponding ranks. 
These phenomena undoubtedly not only affected the common concerns of literati, for 
they had no intention to be familiar with military affairs, but also impressed the ordinary 
people who created a proverb that said: "Just as good iron is not beaten into nails, so a 
good man is not turned into a soldier.,,3 
2 Dreyer, 8. 
3 For the general survey of the relationship between Wen and Wu in the ancient and imperial China, to the 
best ofmy knowledge, the following studies should be paid attention to and cited: 
Edward L. Dreyer, "Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China", in William W. Whitson ed, 
The Military and Po/itieal Power in China in the 1970s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972),1-10; 
Needham and Yates have done another important general survey. The relevant chapter (chapter 30, part 
B), covers almost aIl aspects of the classical Chinese military text, military affairs as weIl as this 
relationship. See Volume 5, part 6, "Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges" (Chine se version, Beijing 
and Shanghai: Kexue and Shanghai guji, 2002); 
Michael 1. Handel, Masters ofWar, Classieal Strategie Thought (London: Portland, OR. Frank Cass, 
1996), "introduction"; 
Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1974); 
Winston W. Lo, "The Self-image of the Chine se Military in Historical Perspective," Journal of Asian 
History 31.1 (1997), 1-21; 
Hong Luxun ~~tgwll, Junshi zhengzhixue- wen wu guanxi /ilun .$il&1Él~ -3t:lit1UJ1*J1U#li (Taibei, 
Wunan tushu, 2002). This book focuses on introduction ofdevelopment of the West studies as weIl as the 
contemporary civil and military relations. It seldom mentions the relevant contents of the late imperial 
China, let alone ancient knowledge; 
Wang Houqing 3:.JJg~p ed., Zhongguojunshi sixiang lungang r:p~.$J'1S'\~MBjiJ (Beijing: Guofang 
daxue, 2000); 
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AIl of the se dominant opinions have been reexamined and challenged in the past 
decades. In the case of the Ming, based on the above common knowledge as well as sorne 
remarks from Ming literati such as Huang Zongxi, Struve states that "stellar careers were 
not made from martial achievements, and the man who could lead either a campaign or a 
court conference with equal facility was a very rare anomaly. Although lip service was 
paid to the principle of integrating wen and wu in men of elite status, in actuality officiaIs 
c1ung to their civil identities. In Ming China there were no Dwight Eisenhowers or 
Alexander Haigs, or lieutenant colonels who later became govemors or mayors, proud to 
tell constituents of their record in military service. Such role changes were unthinkable 
forthe Ming scholar-official.,,4 
Kenneth Swope's recent series ofstudies remind us that Ming military history was 
actually very complicated. For instance, he notes that, as a civil official, a former censor-
in-chief was not only responsible for successful policies, but also appeared in the 
advancing Ming columns in 1600 as a military official. In one paper, he finds that, 
contrary to what has long been assumed, the creative combination of civil and military 
officiaIs in charge of the campaign (the Bozhou Campaign) may have led to their 
success.5 
Wei Ruolin and Liu Zhongping, see mentioned above; 
Huang Kuanzhong JiJ[][, "Zhongguo lishishang wuren diwei de zhuanbian" t:f:t~~.§I:J:ft.tA:f:tg{:V: 
B-9"~, in Nan- Songjunzheng yu wenxian tan m*îliï6<:W3tC:f* (Taibei, Xinwenfeng, 1990),367- 99; 
The Song Dynasty plays a crucial role in changing position ofmilitary officiais. Usually, this dynasty 
has been characterized as militarily weak, but Peter Lorge suggests that such a characterization is largely 
the result of distortions wrought by literati historians of the Song and subsequently. See Joanna Waley-
Cohen, "Civil- Military Relations in Imperial China: Introduction", in War and Society 18.2 (2000), 6. 
For the Ming period, a concise analysis is by Ray Huang. Using Qi Jiguang as a case study, he not only 
provides a general survey about this relationship, but also indicated that Qi is a special case in the mid-
sixteenth century. "Although his rise to prominence had been the result of the peculiar situation in the 
middle of the century, he nevertheless owed a great deal ofhis success to the unreserved support and 
patronage ofa civil official." Ray Huang (l98Ib), 174. 
Another paper by James Millinger also provides careful examination about this relationship. See "Ch 'i 
Chi-kuang - A Ming Military Official as Viewed by His Contemporary Civil Officiais," Oriens Extremus, 
20 (1973), 103-117. 
4 Struve (1984), 6. 
5 Kenneth Swope, "Civil-Military Coordination in the Bozhou Campaign of the Wanli Era," in War and 
Society 18.2 (2000), 49-70. 
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My own research suggests differences from the views of both Struve and Swope. 
Role changes between Wen and Wu (that civil officiaIs could become military officiaIs or 
vice versa) were claimed "unthinkable" by Struve. However, primary materials show us 
that these phenomena did exist. February, 1638, witnessed a wide-spread peasant 
rebellion met by an extremely ineffectual Ming army. Zhang Renxue 71Hf:~, the 
Regional Inspector of Henan (Henan xun 'an yushi 1EiJj$j~ft(~ 31:), asked to change his 
civil official position to that of a military official. The Chongzhen emperor was touched 
by this request, and he ordered the Board of War and Personnel as well as the Censorate 
m~~ to personally make his new appointment. Since he was not satisfied with Zhang's 
first position as Army Inspecting Censor also in charge of the affairs of the Regional 
Commander (jianjun yushi jian zongbing shi ~]l[~ .9:~*~A$), he let Zhang be 
appointed as the Acting Assistant Commissioner-in-chief as well as the General 
Regional Commander of Henan (shu dudu qianshi wei Henan zongbingguan ~mtf:ft$ 
~7IiJm*,~A '8').6 
Beginning in July of 1645, the shifting of roles between civil and military officiaIs 
became even more widespread. There was a special section entitled Wen wu huyong 3t~ 
lfJtJ (the replacement of civil and military officiaIs) in a book written by Fu Ge mf! of 
the Qing dynasty. The author lists more than ten people who changed their roles in this 
section. Among them, there are four who changed from civil to military officiaIs. Sorne 
ofthem even changed their position twice: civil to military, and back to civil again. 7 
Swope's writings focus on the late period ofWanli reign's (1573-1620). His study is 
admirable in asserting that "it would be more accurate to say that Wen and Wu have stood 
and still stand in a dialectical relationship to one another, and that interchange between 
the two fields of activity has been much more fluid than had previously been supposed."s 
Moreover, his works challenge the previous model in which this reign was given a 
6 Long Wenbing ft3tW, Ming huiyao a)lWr~, juan 42, Zhiguan 14 ~'B(Beijing: zhonghua, 1956), 759. 
7 Fu Ge :m;f~, Tingyu congtan ~~ii~, juan 1, in Qing dai shiliao biji congkan m{-t'§!::*4~~ë'.ilfU 
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1984),20-21. 
8 Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Civil- Military Relations in Imperial China: Introduction," in War and Society 
18.2 (2000), 7. 
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negative portrayal in military affairs. However, the significance ofhis case studies is 
limited by the period he has selected and other matters. For one thing, we do not know 
whether or how the literati (civil officiaIs) handled either ethnic conflicts on the frontier 
or the campaigns offighting with rebels inland. We also do not know, for example, their 
attitudes and the measures they took when faced by these two threats simultaneously. For 
another, the example he mentioned above (censor-in-chief) is of a former civil official; 
what was the role of CUITent officiaIs, such as those mentioned in the above several 
chapters? Furthermore, while role changes certainly took place, these cannot be ascribed 
univers al significance-this sort of case was so rare that nobody in the court of 
Chongzhen knew how to appoint Zhang Renxue to a suitable position, as we mentioned 
above. This reminds us that we also cannot overstate the frequency of the role changing 
between Wen and Wu. 
Relying upon the latest scholarly research from both abroad and China, including 
Taiwan, I would like to argue that indicating this kind of "dialectical relationship" is not 
enough. In one word, the way that civil and military officiaIs affected each other in fact 
expresses the characteristic of the real relationship between the central govemment and 
its own military forces or certain local forces in the whole empire. As the representative 
of the empire, the emperor usually occupied a neutral position between Wen and Wu. The 
military officiaIs always acted out their role as important players in a machine that was 
dedicated to defense and suppression; however, the role of the civil officiaIs (composed 
ofliterati who passed the civil examination) was not designed for commanding or 
supervising the military officiaIs. There was no abstract relationship between them. In 
order to examine the essence of this relationship, one important prerequisite must be set: 
we have to explore it on the basis of concrete historical periods or certain backgrounds as 
weIl as situations. Especially, we have to distinguish between wartime and peace. 
Previous research, generally based on records from times ofpeace, has always 
emphasized the importance of civil officiaIs; a few examinations, such as Swope's, pay 
equal attention to both war and peace time and thus shed light offer a balanced view. But 
it is important that wartime be understood as a completely different situation. Since the 
empire's destiny is determined during times ofwar, my examination ofrelationships in 
wartime allows me to propose a conclusion contrary to aIl previous studies: it is military, 
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not civil officiaIs, who played the crucial role. The civil officiaIs, of course, fulfilled their 
duties in times of peace; but does this phenomenon make sense in times of military 
conflict? Let us use the Ming dynasty, especially the period from 1640s to 1650s, to 
briefly explore the characteristic of this relationship. 
Undoubtedly, the rise and fall of the empire usually took place during times ofwar. 
As long as the state was at war, the power and importance of the military officiaIs, 
especially the leading generals, maintained the prestige of the officer class. When a new 
regime was bom, the dynastic founders usually intended to disband or at least decrease 
the number of their armies. What they hoped was that the conditions of peace they had 
achieved could be maintained permanently by good administration and moral example, 
rather than by force. The civil officiaIs thus began to become involved more and more in 
military affairs. 
As the founder of Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang's background, as weU as his close 
friends from Huaixi rtïZ§ had few of the merits usually associated with civil officiaIs. In 
fact, he belittled and hated Wenren, especially those from Jiangnan because they used to 
support his opponent Zhang Shicheng 5;&±~. Despite aU this, he still wanted to upgrade 
the position of civil officiaIs after the establishment of the Ming. Due to the strong 
opposition from his old generals (xunchen l1Jê ), his first endeavor in 1384 proved 
unsuccessful. The military officiaIs' superior position was not questioned by those civil 
officiaIs until the 1390s.9 
Beginning at this time, the Ming Empire graduaUy entered into a peaceful period 
which lasted more than two centuries. The sporadic attacks from steppe and sea did not 
hurt it fundamentaUy. During these two centuries, the relationship between Wen and Wu 
basically corresponded to what has been revealed in previous studies (such as those of 
Huang 1981b, and Struve 1984): the civil officiaIs controlled the whole empire 
politically, economically, culturally, as well as militarily in times ofpeace. In November, 
1567, one source issued in the Ming Shilu indicates the condition of that relationship: 
9 Zheng Kecheng, 62-64; also see Wang Xintong XiG'mI, "Ming chu de wenwu zhizheng" a)jfJ]B"J3tJtt~ 
~, Nankai xuebao 3 (1993), 75-80. 
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Some civil officiaIs humiliated generals ... Yet, probably because those generals 
realized that they were short of professional capacities, they candidly acknowledged 
their inferiority in order to get the protection [from those civil officials].lo 
When the security problems on the northem frontier began worsening, a lot of people, 
mostly civil officiaIs, realized that the Ming army's deterioration was partly caused by 
civil officiaIs' unprofessional interference in military affairs. Also in the mid 1560s, Xu 
Jie 1*r~ (1503-1583), a grand secretary (neige daxueshi j7gM**±), asked the emperor 
to make a "decisive decision" (~Z-~) to resolve this problem. The answer he 
received was: "1 am afraid it is difficult to let those generals have authority.,,11 
Hu Zongxian, as we mentioned before, was himself ajinshi. When he was sent to 
Zhejiang as the Regional Inspector to pacify the Japanese pirates in the late ISSOs, he 
discovered the main reason causing the Ming army's failure in fighting against the pirates: 
because the civil officiaIs did not go to sea, there was no hope to expect the generals to 
fight on the ocean. 12 
5: 2 Peacetime and Wartime: A Tendency ofWarlordism 
As a result of economic changes, political abuses, and other factors, the civil 
officiaIs', and specifically the literati's control over military affairs, began to be called 
into question. They, of course, still occupied the highest positions, whether in the central 
govemment or at the locallevel, but it is important to consider whether statesmanship 
and military leadership could appear in the same men, and whether civil and military 
officiaIs could be in accord. 
10 Ming Muzong shilu ~f~*.Wff<, juan 14; Longqing yuannian- November Jli:~:7êif. (1567) +-}=j. 
11 Liu Zhonghua jU1~., "Shixi fenquan zhiheng he yiwen zhiwu sixiang dui Ming dai jiubian fangwu tizhi 
de yingxiang" ~fJT?tmfljU~;fIJ~J)(fljUfttJjSI\~f.fajJ{~fLjfl3JjmmfljUé"J~., Ningxia shehui kexue 6 
(1999),92-96. 
12 Chongzhen Songjiangfuzhi *W~tlŒJff~, juan 25, ce A (Beijing: Shumu wenxian, 1990), 665. 
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Indeed, the civil official was above the military commander in peace time; even in 
war, they were the highest officiaIs on the battlefield, at least in name. However, Chinese 
military history, on the other hand, exactly like the whole of Chinese history, always 
reveals its complexity. Despite the nominal superiority of civil officiaIs, both literature 
and tradition explicitly recognized the desirability of leaving control of the actual 
operations to the general at the front. This kind of situation is expressed by a proverb 
which states:jiang zai waijunming yousuo bushou M~tE:9};g1'fiJ:f:fpJT::f~ (the general at 
the front may reject sorne orders from the court). 
In contrast, as Yan Ermei indicated, civil officiaIs never joined the battle physically, 
and could often not even recognize the different types of weapons. "Witnessing death or 
life, can you expect them to be imperturbable? AlI they can do is to close the city gate, 
simply giving up the suburbs and the rest of the area."J3 
As grand secretary and the Minister of the Board ofWar, Yang Sichang enjoyed the 
emperor's confidence for a long time; he finally committed suicide in Huguang in 1641 
after his failure to suppress the rebellion of Zhang Xianzhong. He undoubtedly showed 
his loyalty, but his military action was a dismal failure. Faced with increasing threats 
from peasant rebellions in the plains area, he showed a great capacity in the field for 
"mathematics and logic." He usually listed more than several tens of relevant items (or 
reasons) when he met with the emperor, and continued his reports without interruption. 
This unusual behavior was satirized by his peers, who joked that he appeared to be trying 
to fight the enemy with his mouth CÀ5~JttJDftM1}). When the Manchu army broke 
through the Great Wall and entered into the plains, he continued to make his "daily 
suggestion." The Chongzhen emperor finally lost his patience and rebuked him with the 
following words: 
You are in charge of the Board ofWar. [What you should do is] to strictly supervise 
the matters of fighting and defending, as well as to glorify the meritorious and 
impeach the guilty. It is enough for you only to mention the important things. Is it 
not an encumbrance to make a daily report? 
\3 Yan Ermei, in XXSKQS 1394,517. 
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Yang walked out of the court in shame. 14 
Huang Daozhou's activities in the south-west part ofNanzhili, mentioned earlier, can 
be taken as another example of civil officiaIs' typically bookish behavior. These officiaIs 
tended to be focused on the realization of an ideal goal, but, meanwhile, did not know 
how to adapt themselves to changing conditions. For instance, Feng Jingdi always 
insisted on using the law of the Ming for controlling and managing his mob on Siming 
Mountain. 15 
Ironically, a successful model ofusing wenren was provided by the peasant rebel 
leader Zhang Xianzhong. He simply treated them in two ways: killing them or letting 
them provide suggestions. He was very proud of the success he gained in this way: 
Previously when 1 was in Luzhou, using one wenren we could take one city, how can 
you say they are useless?16 
Entering the 1640s, the Chongzhen emperor had to gradually shi ft emphasis to the 
military officiaIs, because he c1early realized that civil officiaIs were lacking the capacity 
to protect the court from the attacks launched by both peasant rebels and the Manchus. 
On the other hand, these military officiaIs took this chance of extreme turmoil to escape 
from the strict control of the civil officiaIs. In most cases, the civil officiaIs were no 
longer able to supervise their military counterparts . 
. In 1641, Li Jingu *~tî took charge of the pacification of a peasant rebellion in 
Shandong, serving as the Regional Inspector and Army Inspecting Censor. He 
14 Sanyuan biji - dianjiao shuoming -=tlHff~c. f!î&~m~, in Yuan ming shiliao biji congkan 5f}I)l~*4.~c. 
ilfU (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1982),5. 
15 Quoted from Zhao Yuan, 60-64. 
16 Ji Liuqi, A,juan 16, in ZGYSJC 36, 174-75. 
263 
complained that he had no army in hand. AlI he could do was "use his tongue" to inspire 
the troops that belonged to the various prefectures. 17 
Compared to other high ranking civil officiaIs, Li was quite lucky. During the reign 
of Chongzhen, there were a total of seven general govemors *~t}, eleven govemors ~~ 
as weIl as numerous other civil officiaIs killed by the emperor for various reasons. 18 In 
contrast, no high ranking military officiaIs (i.e., those with at Ieast one army in hand, such 
as zongbing) were punished. 
This fact shows us that the Chongzhen emperor had practically lost his ability to 
control and command the military officiaIs. His new measures- to let military officiaIs 
get full authorization, especially those who had their own personai troops, caused a very 
serious and unexpected consequence-a tendency towards warlordism. Specifically, the 
role change of the Regional Commander (zongbing) may be taken as an example of this 
tendency. 
At the end of the Ming, many zongbing began to conscript their own troops. In order 
to control and manage their troops, these military commanders had to handle everything 
from logistics to discipline. These soldiers were connected only to the commanders who 
provided their food and pay; the court did not command their loyalty. Previously, the 
most important concem of the Ming military system was the separation of commanders 
from troops with whom they were familiar. With the policy no longer in effect in the 
1640s, what it had been designed to prevent began to take place. The Ming emperor, in 
fact, could not control his own army anymore. 19 
There are several examples ofthe Emperor' s loss of control as early as the 1630s, and 
this situation became more common in the 1640s. In 1634, on the battlefield of Liaodong 
17 Ming Qing shiliao jiabian, vol. 1,29. 
18 Zhang Shizun ~±#, "Ming dai zongbing shehui diwei de lishi bianqian" 13J11-t~~ffr±1t:f:lli1ftB"JM~~ 
~, Shenyang shifan xueyuan xuebao 4 (1998), 23-27. 
19 Fan Zhongyi fBtf:tfi, "Lun Ming chao junzhi de yanbian" ~iÎûl3J1~)j.tUB"JM'~, Zhongguo shi yanjiu 2 
(1998), 129-39; Li Du $rJl, "Ming dai mubingzhijianlun" 13J11-tJJ~tUM~iÎû, Wenshizhe 2 (1986), 62-68. 
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~*, General Zu Dashou Wg*_ refused Chongzhen's orders three times.20 In 1640, 
General Zuo Liangyu ignored Yang Sicong's command to fight the rebellious army led 
by Zhang Xianzhong.21 In February of 1644, the Ming court ordered aIl armies to go to 
Beijing to protect the capital (qinwang ib.l:.). But most of the zongbing did not respond 
to this calI. From their perspective, since there was no hope to rescue the court, it was 
better to survive themselves. Therefore, they fled to the South, and later surrendered to 
the Qing.22 
To cope with these dual dilemmas from both civil and military officiaIs, Chongzhen 
eventually preferred to let his armies come under the surveillance of eunuchs. He treated 
them as representatives ofthe court (usually under the name ofjianjun ~J:l[ or zhenshou 
jjv), but their actions show that these eunuchs frequently exceeded the boundaries of 
their authority. At theearly stages, eunuchs were criticized by both civil officiaIs, 
represented by Liu Zongzhou, and military commanders. Liu's criticism emphasizes 
sorne abstract aspects such as interference in military affairs, while the military 
commanders' dissatisfaction was caused by two concrete factors: a fear of sharing 
authority and the shame ofbeing subordinate to a eunuch. However, after July of 1636, 
there were no further objections from the generals. This became understandable later on 
(except to the emperor himself). 
Most of the generals began to realize the special relationship of these people and the 
emperor; the wisest choice was to treat them weIl rather than asking that they be expelled. 
In fact, by doing this they no longer had to worry about achieving victory on the 
battlefield. With the privileges and protection of the eunuchs, victories could be 
exaggerated while failures could be covered up. The Chongzhen emperor was cheated 
until his death; this result was exactly opposite to what he expected.23 
20 Qing Taizong wen huangdi shilu m:::t:*?X:~ ~'Sf~, juan 20. 
21 Ming tongjian aJHm~ ,juan 87. 
22 QDRWZG- A, vol. 2, 186-87. 
23 See Chao Zhongchen ~'*~, Chongzhen zhuan *ff~f.f (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu, 1999), 158-59. 
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5: 3 The Southern Ming: Wu's Superior Position 
In general, this examination of the relationship between Wen and Wu has shown that 
the latter were already in a superior position during the last decade of the Ming dynasty; 
the civil officiaIs in fact had already lost their ability to maintain control. 
In the following section, I will turn to the Southern Ming to examine the 
characteristics of this relationship in the Hongguang regime as weIl as at the court of Lu 
in eastern Zhejiang and Zhoushan Island. As mentioned before, because military history 
has often been ignored, previous studies in this field have naturally emphasized political 
reasons such as the factional conflicts between Ma, Ruan, and the remnant figures of the 
Donglin party. What I want to discuss here is a less obvious factor which affected the 
court of the Southern Ming. The Southern Ming should have and could have adopted a 
wartime policy of emphasizing the role of military officiaIs. However, opponents of the 
Ma-Ruan clique always tried to bring the Ming back to the old mid-Ming patterns, when 
military figures were under the control of civil officiaIs. Considering the fact that most of 
the military officiaIs surrendered to the Qing army in Northern China in 1644, one report 
sent to Hongguang suggested that he "let the civil officiaIs hold authority first then use 
the generals." Hongguang agreed with the advice.24 The problem was, could he 
implement the measures necessary to carry it out? 
As we mentioned briefly in Chapter Two, this very sensitive topic was touched on by 
Liu Zongzhou when he was in Nanjing. He sharply criticized the military officiaIs 
represented by Liu Zeqing for their involvement in civil governance. Backed by support 
from the others, Liu Zeqing Iaunched a counterattack and referred to the Iiterati as 
"white-faced schoolboys" (Bfii~1:). 
Standing in the middle ofthis relationship of "fire and water," the emperor could do 
nothing except offer weak admonishment.25 As for the court of Lu, it is estimated that it 
had a complicated and scarcely coordinated army, totalling more than 200,000 troops at 
the beginning. This regime, in Struve's words, 
24 Li Qing (B),juan 2, in NMSL BZ, 214. 
25 For the problems conceming the political background of the conflicts within the court of Lu, see Struve 
(1984),93-94. 
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was not highly structured and, consonant with the general Ming tendency toward 
decentralization in finance and military supply, no central Ministry of Revenue ever 
was established.26 
Given this condition, the question ofhow to feed the army became a frequently 
debated topic. Through the competition for resources, the real relationship between Wen 
and Wu was no longer ambiguous-military officiaIs clearly began to play the decisive 
role. 
Shortly after Sun Jiaji and Xiong Rulin began to revoit in Zhejiang, Fang Guo'an and 
Wang Zhiren's troops took control of eastem Zhejiang. Wang's authority spread to a 
particularly large area because all the garrison leaders were his former subordinates. He 
was conferred the title of Marquis ofWuning ftt'm{* (Fang's title was Marquis of 
Zhendong _*{*) by the court of Lu. Facing the arrivaI ofthe Qing army, all the 
resistance forces were divided into two types: zhengbing lE~ (regulars) andyibing ~~ 
(auxiliaries and volunteers). Since the court ofLu's total income from govemmental 
taxes (about 600,000 taels of silver) obviously could not support both types oftroops, the 
regulars soon suggested a new policy whereby they would be allowed to draw on the 
govemmental tax proceeds of the prefectures in which they were based (specifically, the 
tax income from Ningbo, Taizhou, and Shaoxing), whereas the righteous forces would be 
supported by contributions from the districts in which they originated. 
According to Dong Shouyu 1i~~IDI (juren of 1624), a secretary of the Board of 
Revenue in the court, the so-calledyixiang ~~fiiJ (contributions) could not be expected: 
They only exist in name. Feeding the righteous troops with this source is not 
sustainable. Suppose it were enough, who would manage it? Now 1 beg that the 
Board of Revenue be allowed to collect all the tax proceeds; giving pay based on the 
number of soldiers and feeding them according to the places where they are. With 
26 Struve (1984), 93-94. 
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this method it is hopeful that the soldiers may get enough supplies, and the money 
may also be expected to be received on time.27 
His plan was rejected by both Fang and Wang. They even refused to accept another 
compromise suggestion by which the whole of eastem Zhejiang would be divided into 
several areas, with each army as well as the Board of Revenue receiving tax proceeds 
from the area under its jurisdiction. The areas were allotted as follows: Shaoxing - the 
Board of Revenue; Ningbo - Wang Zhiren; Jinhua - Zhu Dadian; the other are as - Fang 
Guo'an.28 
The regulars, made up of professional military men, were dissatisfied with every 
arrangement made by civil officiaIs because they wanted to have aIl sustenance, monies 
and materiels for their own needs. In addition to tax proceeds, they were eager to get 
contributions and other sorts of forced requisitions. In this competition for funds and 
supplies, the righteous armies led by literati would, of course, be in the inferior position. 
For civil officiaIs who served in the court of Lu this was a constant threat. The regular 
army's officiaIs who were responsible for logistics might go to the imperial palace 
directly to scrabble for the yixiang.29 
When Wang Zhiren's demands for "the tax of the fishing boats" (yuchuanshui ~jljt} 
m) and other tax sources were refused by civil officiaIs, his soldiers went so far as to 
bring their weapons to the Board of Revenue, and Dong Shouyu almost lost his life.3o 
Among aH the righteous armies in eastem Zhejiang, Qian Suyue's suffered the 
greatest harm. Its original source of supply was the contributions from both Yin and 
Fenghua*ft counties. Since Fang Guo'an forced these two counties to cut off the 
supply, Qian's two thousand soldiers had nothing to sustain them for more than fort Y 
27 Li Yuqiu,juan 3, in ZGYSJCXB 25, 434. 
28 Huang Zongxi, lujinian ~*è1f:, juan A, ZGYSJC 32, 243. 
29 Weng Zhou laomin ~tfH~~, Haidong yishi 1~*~§I::, juan 6, 244, in ZGYSJC 33; Xiaotianjizhuan, 
410. 
30 Xu Zi, juan 41, liezhuan 34, 411. 
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days. Qian "made his indictments several times, but the Prince of Lu could not handle 
it.,,3l 
The literati of eastern Zhejiang had to bear heavier burdens than those in north China 
or even those in the Jiangnan area during their resistance movements. They not only 
could not effectively control the righteous troops they organized, such as those on Siming 
Mountain, but also had no way to deal effectively with the Ming military officiaIs and 
their regulars with whom they were supposed to cooperate. In reality, the eastern 
Zhejiang resistance movement sel dom witnessed cooperative action between the various 
righteous troops and regulars. In contrast, "if a civil official had a different opinion, even 
a little, it would bring him disaster.,,32 
As the case studies have showed, both Xiong Rulin and Qian Suyue lost their lives in 
conflicts with military officiaIs. In his article entitled Haiwai tongku ji ~B.j1i-JIJ~~è 
(Record of Lament Abroad), Huang Zongxi reveals deep feelings of grief and indignation, 
helplessness as well as desperation. He really intended to dedicate himself to the revival 
of the Ming; but faced with military officiaIs, aH he could do was discuss sorne purely 
academic affairs or European mathematics in the headquarters of the resistance 
movement on Zhoushan Island.33 
This fact brings me to a conclusion about the character of the relationship between 
Wen and Wu: it was military rather than civil officiaIs who played the decisive role in the 
turbulence ofwartime; the civil officiaIs' superior position could only be realized in 
times of peace. This change of roles usually signified the uncertain destiny of a dynasty. 
Yet, we do have a few figures called "scholarly (or Confucian) generals" (rujiang {~M~), 
men who were able to combine both civil (cultural) and military talents. Their political 
and military abilities during wartime were often prominent in periods of transition 
31 Xu Zi, juan 7, ji 7,85- 87; Xu Bingyi, juan 14,255-57; see also Xiaotianjizhuan, juan 40, lie zhuan 33, 
39l. 
32 Huang Zongxi, Haiwai tongkuji mJjf.'IJ!}g~è, ZGYSJC 32, 275-85. 
33 Zhao Yuan, 60-64. 
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between old and new regimes. In eastem China during the 1650s, Zhang Huangyan may 
be deemed as the representative ofthose rujiang. Nevertheless, his role in military action 
did not challenge the basic picture we described above. 
5: 4 Summary 
Since the military officers had much lower prestige than civil officiaIs in corresponding 
ranks for a long time in Chinese history, the role ofliterati played in military action 
usually has been overstated or exaggerated. This chapter not only explores the role 
change of Wen and Wu, but also indicates that the frequency ofthis change is limited. 
Practically, there was no abstract relationship between them: civil officiaIs' superior 
position could only be realized in times of peace. They had in fact already lost their 
ability to maintain control during the last decade of the Ming dynasty; meanwhile, 
through the competition for resources, the military officiaIs were already in a superior 
position. The ways that civil and military officiaIs affectedeach other in fact reveals the 
characteristics of the relationship of the central govemment and its own military forces or 
certain local forces. Although the emperor usually occupied a neutrai position between 
them, the full authorization of the military officiaIs to manage their armies without civil 
officiaIs or eunuchs reporting to the central authorities led to the loss of his ability to 
control his own armies. 
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Conclusion 
The death of Zhang Huangyan was the final elegy for Ming loyalists in east China. His 
military actions, as weIl as those of the more than twenty other literati explored in this 
dissertation, created a tune which voiced the inevitability of the collapse of the Ming 
dynasty and the tragedy of Chine se literati in late imperial and even modem times. 
From the northem plain to the rivers and marshes of Jiangnan, from the 
mountainous in land areas to the eastem coastal area and sea, numerous places- both 
rural and urban- witnessed the extreme turmoil of the Ming-Qing transition. Beginning 
with a brief examination and comparison of the economic, political, as weIl as social 
structural changes within these regions in each chapter, this dissertation has undertaken 
a preliminary and general exploration of the various military conflicts that arose among 
govemments, ethnic groups, local social forces, soldiers, inc1uding those of both 
regular army units and volunteer auxiliaries, peasants, as weIl as others from the lower 
social strata such as serfs, tenants, and common residents of the cities. In addition, the 
dissertation has also briefly shown that topographical features and other social and 
economic characteristics were intertwined and mutually influential. This background 
was the stage on which Chinese literati demonstrated their military abilities. 
Whether as individuals or as members of a group, such as Chen Zilong and Jishe, 
many Chinese literati employed aIl possible measures to save the Ming from decline. 
Their military actions took place not only on land, but also at sea; not only in rural 
society, but also in defense of cities. In addition to their organization and mobilization 
of local forces, as mentioned in Chapter Three, they also tried to make use of the 
remnants of the Ming army, or to go even further and engage in counterespionage 
aimed at inspiring the Qing army to revoIt. From the perspective of weaponry, they 
used not only cudgels and bamboo sticks, but also the latest firearms such as muskets 
and cannon. In terms of the role literati played in these military actions, they could join 
an army as advisor, staff officer, coordinator, or liaison between the various forces, and, 
of course, as military commanders. 
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For the sake of convenience, 1 wou Id like to classify the "non-official literati" 
mentioned in the "introduction" into two further categories: "Scholar Literati" (or Pure 
Literati) and "Gentry Literati." These two categories, together with Official Literati, 
comprise the three groups examined in this dissertation. 
Scholar Literati 
This group can be represented by Huang Daozhou. It provides us a wonderful 
example of how typical, pedantic literati went about demonstrating their military 
knowledge and capacity on the battlefield. Their common tendencies show that they 
wanted no deviations from the pattern established in the Ming (and other previous 
Chinese dynasties) which emphasized Confucian legitimacy, that civil officiais be 
above professional military officiaIs, and so on. Nearly aH their endeavors consisted of 
little more than idle theorizing; they almost never had the chance to command an army 
on the battlefield. However, when presented with the opportunity for actual military 
command, they either overrated their own abilities or miscalculated popular sentiments 
toward the rebellion and the Qing dynasty; they often assumed that aH people shared 
characteristics identical to their own. FinaHy, they tended to be focused on the 
realization of an ide al goal, but were unwilling or ill-equipped to adapt themselves to 
changing conditions. 
Official Literati 
In the militarization of local society, the attitudes of various levels of officiaIs played 
an essential role. These officiaIs might have been expected to demonstrate strong 
loyalties to the Ming government, but in fact they cou Id not. During united military 
actions against the Manchu invasion (including sorne campaigns fought along with the 
rebels), their authority over the Ming armies was, in many cases, only nominal. With 
the increasing militarization of the period, they neither knew how to effectively control 
the Ming military officiaIs and regular soldiers with whom the y were supposed to 
cooperate, nor how to deal with local military forces. Shi Kefa suffered from the 
warlords' interference in Yangzhou, while the literati of eastern Zhejiang were forced to 
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handle both the regular Ming armies and local military forces such as tuanlian 
simultaneously. In conflicts with military officiaIs, sorne people such as Xiong Rutin 
even lost their lives. Generally speaking, when involved in conflicts with military 
officiais in the camp of resistance, aIl the literati lost their campaigns: Shi Kefa in 
Yangzhou, Chen Zilong and Xia Yunyi in Jiangnan, as weIl as Huang Zongxi and others 
in east Zhejiang. EssentiaIly, the ways in which civil and military officiais atfected each 
other is an expression of a larger relationship within the whole empire-namely, the 
central govemment's relationship with its own military forces or certain local forces. 
This is why the contradictions between Wen and Wu became obvious at the end of the 
dynasty. There was no abstract relationship between them. Without paying enough 
attention to military and war history, previous research has emphasized the importance 
of civil officiais, but we should bear in mind that their superior position could only be 
realized in times of peace. 
Further complicating the situation of official literati was their involvement in 
complex political struggles. Through the exploration of Chen Zilong's military and 
administrative careers, we can understand how military, political, and social factors 
combined and affected each other. During wartime, the literati were basically helpless. 
Between the state and local society, Xu Du has shown us that sorne lower level literati 
wanted to find new ways to render services to the throne, and consequently were in an 
ambivalent position. Their pursuits coincided with the goals of literati such as Chen 
Zilong: since he and others witnessed the decline of the Ming Empire, they now shifted 
their focus to newly available forces, such as those raised by Xu. Their cooperation can 
be seen as evidence of local forces combining with upper social strata. However, 
Chen's main focus was, in the end, only on the upper social strata and the existing 
armed forces, regardless of whether they were from the Ming govemment, local society, 
or even the Qing side. Finally, none of them could reach their goal. 
Gentry Literati 
In most cases this group showed no hesitation in fighting for the rebels. Their 
motives for joining the resistance stemmed not only from the abstract concems of 
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politicallegitimacy, traditional ideals, or the conflict between Chinese and 
non-Chine se, but also from the fact that their interests coincided with defending their 
property. Only after realizing that the Qing wou Id bring them peacefullives, social 
order, and the maintenance oftheir previous lives were most ofthese literati willing 
to withdraw from the resistance, or, in sorne cases, to cooperate with the Qing. 
The local gentry in wartime lost many of the privileges that they had enjoyed 
during times ofpeace. Zheng Yuanxun's overestimation ofhis capacities for 
mediating conflicts between armies and local people shows that the gentry literati 
were often unable to ensure their own survival, let alone affect others; there was 
little hope that they might compose a so-called civil society. Only a few of the se 
literati were passionate idealists. For these few, their individual consciences were set 
above social consensus, and their sense of obligation to repay the throne was a 
primary concern. However, most put local or family interests and the maintenance of 
their position and prestige far ahead of any abstract notions of loyalty or Huayi zhi 
bian. 
Both gentry literati and officiaIs shared the same tendency to consider only how to 
control or administer society in peace time. During this period of war, many helped to 
mobilize forces for the purpose of pacifying . the rebels and leading the resistance. In 
this case, raising a flag of protecting their localities and fighting against the Qing's 
invasion proved to be much easier than enlarging or even maintaining their armies. 
They, in fact, could not control rural society, and, most especially, the existing local 
military forces. Without paying equal attention to both foreign invasion and inner 
rebellions, previous studies have usually focused on the triangular power relationship 
involving the government, the elite (including literati), and dispersed communities of 
commoners. They have either emphasized the "united control" (lianhe tongzhi ~~~-@JMê 
1"Éî) of the Manchu- Han officiaIs and landlords in studies from Mainland China since 
the 1950s or the role of local gentry in the Western world. Essentially, as 1 mentioned in 
Chapter One, aH these studies tend to overstate the cooperation between Ming officiaIs, 
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local elite, and other early Qing leaders.! Because of this, it is unclear how the local 
elite handled the simultaneous pressure of both Han Chinese (including the government 
and the common people) and foreigners. 
The real conditions were more complicated than has been previously imagined. 
Considering that aIl military actions are grounded firmly in time, space, environment, 
and certain cultural traditions, 1 have used the Qing's attack and the response from the 
literati as a clue from which to begin my exploration. 1 think that it is possible to 
de scribe the basic trajectory of how literati faced the challenges from both peasant 
rebellions and the "barbarian" invasion: at first, they deemed the peasants as the most 
important threat, while treating the Qing army as an outside force with which to 
cooperate in fighting against the rebels. When they began to realize the real threat 
posed by the Qing, it was too late, and they had no choice but to capitulate to the Qing 
or sacrifice their lives for the Ming. Ling Jiong in the northern plain are a, Lu Zhenfei 
and Shi Kefa in Jiangbei, and Zhang Guowei and Qi Biaojia in Jiangnan and Zhejiang 
aIl demonstrated a willingness and ability to pay attention to the complexities of local 
society and the local administrative system when they were engaging in the pacification 
of peasant rebellions. In their minds, the rebels, rather than the Qing invaders, were 
clearly the most dangerous threat. With their personal qualities, they were able to 
combine both cultural and military talents. Moreover, their military experience in the 
pacification of peasant rebellions did give them sorne understanding of how to mobilize 
the local community. But fighting against the Manchu invasion was another matter. 
Due to their emphasis on class conflict, many historians from post-1949 China have 
blamed the failure of the resistance on their inability to "mobilize the masses." What 1 
have argued in this dissertation is that the resistance movements represented by the 
literati were involved in processes of mobilization. They did make an effort to include a 
broad scope of the Chinese population in the resistance movement. Whether or not 
these movements actually took place and their scale when they did, were entirely 
dependent on the effectiveness in management and control of the various levels of 
1 Struve provided a general survey about these research developments; see Struve (1998), 105-17. 
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govemment, as weIl as the attitude and actions ofthe common people. To put it another 
way, the scope of the resistance in certain places was inversely proportional to the 
existing social order. The more powerful the rebels of a certain area, the more peaceful 
the attitude of the local community toward the arrivaI of the Qing. In other words, 
whether or not the resistance occurred did not directly relate to the degree of ethnie 
consciousness, but rather on the local desire for self-defense. Not realizing this, people 
may be misled by the numerous Chinese records, as weIl as current researches, 
especially those from southem Anhui and eastem Zhejiang which usually were c1aimed 
as regions characterized by a strong ethnie consciousness by those authors from these 
areas. The motives for these authors were simple: for one thing, they wanted to glorify 
their homelands,2 for another, regardless of whether they acknowledged it or not, their 
motives stemmed from their ignorance of the above phenomena, which means, unlike 
north China, these places had not suffered from long time warfare before the arrivaI of 
the Qing. 
As Beattie indicated, the Chinese social fabric had already been strongly woven by 
the Ming-Qing transition period. The existing social order was, in fact, resilient in the 
face of many kinds of disturbance. Impacts from the outside, even including ethnie· 
conque st, had little effect on basic social structure, let alone social behavior and 
customs.3 The case studies of local forces from Liyang in the Jiangnan area, and also 
Shandong, show us that how different social strata affected each other: the local elite 
wanted to use the ordinary people to launch anti-Qing action; however, the latter finally 
united with the Qing army to fight against them. This phenomenon should lead us to 
reexamine the role of local military forces and their relation to the anti-Qing literati. 
Generally, local military forces had no relation with the govemment. Facing the 
2 Since only a very few people who are real loyalists in fact, the so ca\led "unyielding integrity" (buqu 
de qijie /f J/f!~~1rn is one of the highest honors among Chinese. For the cases of southern Anhui and 
eastern Zhejiang, the typical studies are as follows: Dong Yukui ji1f~~, "Zhang Huangyan yu 
Zhejiang renwen chuantong" ~~§:W#JfŒA:Xf.*-1ê, Zhejiang xuekan 107.6 (1997), 104-08; Fang 
Zuyou :1JffŒl.~, Qing chu Zhedong xuepai luncong fflf}]#Jf:*~iJœ~lfBit (Taibei: Wanjuanlou, 1996); 
Zhou Zhiyuan J1lfJiJt:7ë, "Rujia lunli yu Ming dai Huizhouji jinshi" f1AH"K{jfl{f:!l!:WJ:Y=j{--t~1'i'1~IH~±, 
Anhui daxue xuebao 4 (1999),80-85. 
3 Hilary J. Beattie (1979a), 269-70. 
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invasion of the Qing, it may have been theoretically possible for Chinese literati and 
other local elite to bring all the strata together in a collective effort to defend their 
home land and property. They did indeed have an ability to use their power in the realms 
of economics, politics, and social welfare, but they showed much less aptitude in 
organizing their own military or semi-military forces. Nonetheless, different sorts of 
forces were mobilized in certain places, as we explored in the chapters above, including 
existing local forces as well as the newly recruited righteous armies. Cou Id literati 
integrate and lead these kinds of forces? 
Both Yan Ermei and Chen Zilong realized that the most important action they could 
take was to mobilize the masses, those numerous peasants at the bottom level of the 
society, but they had no concrete measures to carry this out. In practice, the resistance 
movement relied primarily on local bandit and pirate groups, and other ilIegal 
organizations. This meant that the literati were sometimes able to organize local forces, 
but an even larger challenge arose from the fact that they had no idea about how to 
maintain or lead these forces in pursuit of an effective resistance. Apart from donations, 
plundering, and the selling off of family wealth, there are no specific records explaining 
how problems of military supply were resolved or what kinds of logistical measures 
were taken. AIso, there are no records showing how the disparate groups were knitted 
together, and how they assisted each other or cooperated in attacks against the Qing. 
Only a few were successfully "mobilized," but mobilization was often only the piecing 
together of sorne local forces to fight against the Qing army. Lack of training and 
discipline, as weIl as poor equipment were the most obvious reasons for their defeat. 
For those a few literati who actually led the defense, they also proved incapable of 
integrating the various groups on which they had to rely. 
Wu Yi was relatively successful in mobilizing and leading local forces to pacify 
bandits and peasant rebellions, and then shifted to fight against the Qing invasion. He 
focused on the various local rebel forces and militias, as well as the units that had been 
brought in from different areas. But he had no way to ensure the strict control of these 
mixed troops. Zhej iang literati like Zhang Guowei provide us with little more than 
plans for how to resolve the problem of maintaining and integrating the resistance 
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armies. Unfortunately, we have no way to examine the results of the se plans. At the 
base of the anti-Qing movement, Siming Mountain, preliminary efforts were totally 
destroyed by the united attack of both Qing forces and local mingtuan. In terms of 
existing social and lineage organizations in Jiangnan and Zhejiang, it is very difficult to 
find instances that demonstrate how loyalty could be magnified gradually and simply 
from single man to family, to lineage, to local community. They may have fought 
against Japanese pirates or sorne small group of rebels, but their response to the Qing's 
powerful army was notably unenthusiastic. It appears that military action regarding to 
consanguinity was usually restricted to members of an individual family, and rarely 
extended to the entire lineage. 
Local military forces might unite and co-operate with any force, including local 
bandits, or they might oppose and resist any other forces from the outside. Since basic 
living conditions were always their primary concem, they cared little about who held 
authority, or who controlled it most of the time. They had their own standard for 
choosing to support or oppose outside intrusions: it depended entirely on whether or not 
someone or sorne forces could provide the means that they needed to survive. Sorne 
inde pendent local military forces belonged to the peasants or to other ordinary people 
such as fishermen or city-dwellers. At other times, the se were usually deemed "illegal 
forces." ln most cases there was no clear definition conceming their social background 
among these forces because the numerous strata of the bottom of the social scale also 
shared the intention to defend the local area. These sorts of local military forces were 
usually mixed together with various social strata and so it was difficult to clearly 
distinguish which belonged to the literati or any other local elite and which were 
controlled by the common people. Their political attitudes were also blurred. 
Furthermore, these kinds of social forces belonged to the local people but were 
sometimes advocated, encouraged and ev en conscripted by the local govemment, 
including both Ming and Qing authorities. As we have seen, without their cooperation, 
the Qing army was forced to withdraw from the mountains of eastem Zhej iang. 
Meanwhile, the literati of this area, represented by Huang Zongxi, failed to realize their 
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hope of mobilizing the various social forces to pursue the resistance. 
Essentially, what the literati and the other elite wanted from the local military forces 
was the pacification of peasant rebellions, and, later on, resistance against the Manchu 
invasion. But the local military forces were primarily concemed with ensuring their 
own benefits. They did not care where or from whom these benefits came. Formally, 
there were regional variations of violence, but practically this kind of "independent 
force" always played a crucial role. The attitudes and actions of the ordinary peasants 
and their own local forces really were the most important factors. It was they who 
decided the real fate of rural society. In addition, it was they who were always there, 
and they always fought against war, turmoil, and famine itself. It was these sufferings 
that resulted in their rebellions. At the same time, they did not pay special attention to 
who was the nominal leader of rural society. For them, there was no certain "moral 
model" to follow. When the literati's anti-Qing military action took place, they feared 
this type of behavior wou Id cause retaliation from the Qing army, so they simply chose 
to refuse to cooperate with the loyalist armies. However, their final destiny still hung in 
the balance; the choice of whether to surrender and join the rebels or to continue under 
the govemment's control was totally dependent on changing circumstances. 
In conclusion, the fate of the Ming loyalist literati indicates that Chinese 
intellectuals had to find another way to demonstrate their abilities to affect military 
and political affairs. Through their tears, blood, and lives we can know that the crux 
of China's destiny depended on the existence of a force able to integrate and lead 
other forces, especially the far more numerous· peasants (as weil as their armed. 
groups) into its military plans in order to reach a political goal. That is, there was a 
need for zealous Chinese Iiterati knowledgeable enough about political and martial 
arts to integrate and lead the various social forces. Such leaders could not remain 
limited to the "ivory tower", but had to venture to the margins of outlawry 
themselves in order to integrate and lead the others. From this perspective, we can 
see that there were historical precedents for why and how the Chinese Communist 
Party took over the Mainland by the end ofthe 1940s. 
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